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This thesis examines New Zealand’s counterinsurgent communication – that is, its press releases 
that focus on the ‘war on terror’ – from 9/11 for a period of ten years. The aim is to understand 
the effectiveness of a counterinsurgent’s press releases in an era where the number of key 
audiences in a counterinsurgency has grown and targeting any of them is near-impossible, with a 
particular focus on how the different requirements of each key audience compromises the utility 
of communication for others. 
 
The thesis identifies two narratives present in New Zealand’s counterinsurgent communication: 
the ‘deliberative’ and ‘reactive’. The former is understood to be honed by technocrats over time 
in a measured fashion – it is deliberated upon – while the latter is quickly crafted by politicians 
during the emotive shockwave that follows an attack – it is a reaction. It also proposes that these 
two narratives have differing functions, the deliberative serves to justify the counterinsurgent’s 
cause and legitimise them as an actor to both their own support population and the insurgent 
support population while the reactive helps control and direct the negative emotions generated 
by a terrorist attack within the counterinsurgent’s support audience, mobilises domestic support 
for action and also reinforces ingroup bonds with international allies.  
 
Using population-centric counterinsurgency theory combined with insights on insurgent’s 
strategies and the characteristics of counterinsurgents, it outlines five key opposing qualities that 
define these narratives. The thesis creates an analytical framework that fuses framing theory with 
these five opposing qualities and extracts the necessary data from a decade’s worth New Zealand 
government press releases given by the Prime Minster, Foreign Affairs Minister and Minister of 
Defence using content analysis. Each deliberative and reactive framing task is examined using a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative assessments to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the utility of these two narratives with regard to three key audiences: the 
insurgent support population, the domestic audience and the allied audience. 
 
The findings suggest that these two different narratives to some degree, compromised the overall 
utility of New Zealand’s communication, specifically the justness of New Zealand’s cause and, 
consequently, their legitimacy as a counterinsurgent. Furthermore, the thesis argues that the 
reactive was of limited utility for the insurgent support audience, mixed utility for the domestic 
audience and utility for the allied audience, while the deliberative narrative was of utility for the 
insurgent support audience, mixed utility for the domestic audience and limited utility for allied 
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audience. It also concludes that the reactive was used more frequently following attacks, to a 
wider international rather than domestic audience and its use declined over time while the 
deliberative was used more for the domestic audience and was used more consistently over the 
period than the reactive. Finally, it warns that while democracies may be suited to fighting 
conventional conflicts, they are not so well placed with regard to communicating in 
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At 8.46am on September 11, 2001, American Airlines Flight 11, one of four planes hijacked that 
day, flew into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City. This impact was 
the first in a series of attacks that would have long-lasting and far-reaching repercussions. As the 
United States (US) President, George W. Bush, communicated his version of the events to the 
American people and wider world – in many ways, setting the tone for the following era of 
international relations that rose from the ashes of Ground Zero – it fell upon New Zealand’s 
(NZ) Acting Prime Minister, Jim Anderton, to respond to the attacks as the Prime Minister was 
in transit to Europe. This would be NZ’s first communication as a counterinsurgent in its 
‘international campaign against terrorism’ (ICAT).1  
 
Anderton’s initial response catalysed this thesis; in particular, two statements made within just 66 
words of each other in his first short press release on September 12, 2001.2 The first was that 
“there is no evidence of any threat to New Zealand” and the second was that “[w]e must see this 
attack not only as an attack on the US, but as an attack on all civilised nations.”3 There is a 
degree of incongruity between these two statements. The first seeks to limit the threat, it fits into 
NZ’s entrenched security narrative: that as one of the most geographically distant states, which 
has promoted itself as a pragmatic and principled player in the international system, it faces little 
direct threat. The second, however, expands the threat, and, while it is not totally incompatible 
with aspects of NZ’s security narrative, it does not have the same fidelity as the first statement, 
as it not only portrays the threat in a way uncommon in NZ security policy but also uses 
language rare in domestic political discourse.  
 
A review of NZ’s key security documents from before 9/11 reinforces this position. In these 
documents the threat from terrorism is portrayed in a relatively limited manner. The 1997 Shape 
of New Zealand’s Defence refers to terrorism as a ‘low-level’ threat and New Zealand’s Foreign Policy 
and Security Challenges from 2000 states that “[t]errorism represents a limited but continuing risk” 
and “[t]errorist activities by non-state organisations (often based on religious or ethnic causes) 
can present a threat. New Zealand is less likely to be the target of terrorist acts by ‘rogue 
                                                 
1 Here the term ‘counterinsurgent’ is used to refer to a state/government operating against an insurgency.  
2 New Zealand is on Pacific Standard Time(18 hours ahead of New York) and while the attacks occurred on 
September 11, 2001, US time, in New Zealand they occurred on September 12.  
3 Jim Anderton, “New Zealand Response to US Attacks,” beehive.govt.nz , September 12, 2001, accessed on 
12/03/2012, available from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-zealand-response-us-attacks 
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states’.”4 The restrained nature of the terrorist threat assessment is clear in the Strategic Assessment 
2000: “Some communal conflicts give rise to cross-border terrorism. Counter-terrorism 
measures, often entailing cooperation between states, have had many successes. But terrorism 
continues to be a threat.”5 New Zealand Defence Force Capability Reviews is even more measured, 
explaining in 2000 that “New Zealand remains physically distant from many areas where 
terrorism occurs”.6 In the Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000, however, it is understood that “New 
Zealand’s interests would be affected by significant internal unrest in certain parts of Asia or 
insurgency that could spill over borders and/or pose a risk to New Zealanders”.7 Likewise, the 
Terrorism (Bombing and Funding) Bill states that “[t]errorism and crime are now global phenomena” 
and “[t]errorist acts are increasing”.8 While not as limited, these descriptions are not at the same 
existential level as Anderton’s second statement. Also, these less limited descriptions are 
countered by the general outlines of NZ’s threat level; Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000 concludes 
that “there is no discernible threat to New Zealand’s physical security”.9 Similarly the New 
Zealand Defence Force Capability Reviews states that “no situation could be visualised in the 
foreseeable future which threatened New Zealand’s survival”.10 Finally, New Zealand’s Foreign 
Policy and Security Challenges states that “there is no direct threat to New Zealand or immediate 
interests”.11 Thus, even at the more extreme end, the majority of threat descriptions regarding 
terrorism or the threat in general are measured, matching Anderton’s first statement.  
 
In contrast, the phrase ‘civilised nation/s’ is not used once in any of these documents, nor is the 
word ‘civilised’ on its own, though the term ‘civilisation’ is referred to once in the footnotes of 
the Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000 when quoting National minister Doug Kidd, who stated, with 
regard to Bosnia: “But we were all aware of the ethnic cleansing, the mass rape of women and 
                                                 
4 Ministry of Defence, The Shape of New Zealand’s Defence: A White Paper (Wellington: Ministry of Defence, 1997); Phil 
Goff, “New Zealand’s Foreign Policy and Security Challenges,” beehive.govt.nz, May 10 2000, accessed on 
13/04/2014, available from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/feature/new-zealand039s-foreign-and-security-policy-
challenges 
5 External Affairs Bureau, “Strategic Assessment 2000,” External Affairs Bureau, June 19 2000, accessed on 
10/04/2014, available from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/feature/external-assessments-bureau-strategic-assessment 
6 New Zealand Defence Force Capability Reviews, Phase One – Land Forces and Sealift (Wellington: Ministry of Defence, 
2000), accessed on 13/04/2014, available from http://www.defence.govt.nz/reports-publications/nzdf-cap-
rev/introduction.html 
7 Derek Quigley, Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000 (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 1999), 25, accessed on 
12/04/2014, available from http://www.defence.govt.nz/pdfs/archive-publications/inquiry-defence-beyond-
2000.pdf 
8 Phil Goff, “Terrorism (Bombing and Funding) Bill,” beehive.govt.nz, May 3, 2001, accessed on 15/05/2014, available 
from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/terrorism-bombings-and-financing-bill-first-reading 
9 Quigley, Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000, 18. 
10 New Zealand Defence Force Capability Reviews, Phase One – Land Forces and Sealift, 
http://www.defence.govt.nz/reports-publications/nzdf-cap-rev/key-findings.html 
11 “New Zealand’s Foreign Policy and Security Challenges”. 
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the ‘in-your-face’ affront to everything which we believe represents civilisation.”12 A search of 
the official NZ Government website, beehive.govt.nz, for “civilised nation/s” returns only two 
uses of the phrase before the attacks on September 11, from an archive of exactly 12,531 press 
releases issued between 1993 and September 12, 2001, one by a Finance Minister and one by a 
Corrections Minister.13 Anderton’s second statement, then, is anomalous to both NZ’s security 
narrative and general domestic political discourse. What makes this even more interesting is that 
later on that same day, in her first reaction to the attacks, Prime Minster Helen Clark also stated 
that the “attacks against the United States were attacks against all civilised nations.”14 It appears 
that something occurred to NZ’s security narrative on September 11 (9/11). This, it is proposed, 
was the introduction of a ‘reactive’ counterinsurgent narrative into NZ’s usually more 
‘deliberative’ counterinsurgent narrative, from now simply referred to as the ‘reactive narrative’ 
and the ‘deliberative narrative’.15  
 
The contrast between Anderton’s two statements – one that outlines the threat situation in 
relatively clipped, direct and dispassionate phrasing and the other that uses more expansive, 
florid and moving language – launched this investigation into deliberative and reactive narratives. 
A narrative, as the US counterinsurgency field manual (hereafter FM 3-24) explains:  
 
“is an organizational scheme expressed in story form. Narratives are central to 
representing identity, particularly the collective identity of religious sects, ethnic groupings, 
and tribal elements. Stories about a community’s history provide models of how actions 
and consequences are linked. Stories are often the basis for strategies and actions, as well 
as for interpreting others’ intentions.”16  
 
Likewise, Stryker explains that: 
 
“Narratives are sequential accounts. They organize material into chronological order to tell 
stories about what happened. These stories are conceptual wholes, built through selection 
and chronological linkage of otherwise discrete parts, each of which takes on meaning in 
light of the whole. Adopting a narrative form requires the narrator to focus on individual, 
                                                 
12 Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000, 28.  
13 See http://www.beehive.govt.nz/advanced_search for the total press release numbers. 
14 Helen Clark, “PM Condemns Terrorist Attacks in United States,” beehive.govt.nz, September 12, 2001, accessed on 
12/03/2012, available from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/node/11775 
15 While these narratives will now be referred to as the ‘reactive narrative’ and the ‘deliberative narrative’, to be clear 
the ‘counterinsurgent’ component is essential as it is believed that these are versions of more comprehensive 
narratives that can be deployed for an array of different contexts.  
16 Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the 
Army, 2006), 1-14 hereafter cited as FM 3-24. 
16 
 
institutional or collective actors; the actions they take; and when, where, why, how, and 
with what consequences they take them.”17 
 
A counterinsurgent narrative, then, is an organised account, one that not only seeks to provide a 
comprehensive account of reality but also aims to use this account as a means of achieving 
outcomes. Thus, as Tatham explains:  
 
“Narratives are the foundation of all strategy. They are the organising framework for 
policy and the definitive reference for how events are to be argued and described. Their 
purpose is to bind together all of the actions of the government (possibly ‘governments’) 
when working in coalitions, and their representatives, under a common understanding.”18  
 
Narratives are a means of describing problems and proscribing solutions. Freedman believes 
narratives are “strategic because they do not arise spontaneously, but are deliberately constructed 
or reinforced out of the ideas and thoughts that are already current” and while this is largely 
correct, as will be argued, the term ‘spontaneously’ is somewhat misleading, particularly for the 
reactive as this is understood to be spontaneously built from these existing tropes.19 The two 
counterinsurgent narratives are strategic tools; they have a utility, although, because narratives are 
not objective accounts of reality but rather interpreted and negotiated by the audience, their 
utility varies depending on the audience.20  
 
As strategic tools, the deliberative and reactive narratives are understood as different accounts of 
reality with different utilities for different audiences. Five key opposing qualities distinguish these 
narratives; where the reactive is exclusive, emotive, hyperbolic, absolute and figurative, the 
deliberative is inclusive, restrained, constricted, nuanced and literal. The deliberative is believed 
to be a narrative largely produced by the technocratic components of the government and state – 
the analysts, experts and practitioners who advise on, study and conduct foreign policy and 
security affairs – in an ongoing and considered manner. In contrast, the reactive is a more 
quickly constructed narrative, mainly originating in the political element of the state using extant 
rhetoric to respond to dramatic events that can be considered ‘outré’ – extreme events beyond 
the everyday operational parameters of the governing body. Thus, the former is honed over time 
                                                 
17 Robin Stryker, “Beyond History Versus Theory: Strategic Narrative and Sociological Explanation,” Sociological 
Methods Research 24 (1996): 305. 
18 Stephen Tatham, Strategic Communication: A Primer (Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Advanced Research 
and Assessment Group, Special Series 08/28, 2008), 9.  
19 Lawrence Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies 
Adelphi Paper 379, 2006), 74 
20 Tatham, Strategic Communication; M. Mitchell and M. Egudo, A Review of Narrative Methodology (Edinburgh, SA: 
Australian Defence Force, Land Operations Division, 2003), 3. 
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in a measured fashion – it is deliberated upon – while the latter is more hastily crafted during the 
emotive shockwave that follows an attack – it is a reaction to this shockwave. Anderton’s first 
statement, then, is an example of the deliberative and the second of the reactive.  
 
Thus, one of the reasons Anderton used both narratives was probably that the September 11 
attacks were so shocking that the generally deliberative nature of NZ’s security-oriented 
communications were ‘interrupted’ by the reaction to the attacks. However, to be clear, the 
reactive is not considered a personal reaction of shock, though this is a component, but rather more 
importantly is a necessary political reaction to events outside the norm. Specifically, it helps reduce 
some of the more politically dangerous emotional impacts of a terrorist attack for the 
counterinsurgent domestically whilst simultaneously enhancing relationships with other allied 
states, particularly when the victim state is a close ally, though its more expansive, florid and 
moving language could also alienate those who support the insurgent.  
 
The fundamental aim of this thesis is to explore the utility of these two narratives with regard to 
the three key audiences: the insurgent, domestic and allied. To do this, Chapter Two will examine 
the deliberative and reactive narratives using a range of population-centric counterinsurgency 
(COIN) literature as well as specialised terrorist studies. This chapter will serve as the literature 
review, grounding the thesis in the wider scholarship, justifying the identification of this situation 
as an insurgency and the NZ Government’s response as a counterinsurgency. It will first provide 
an overview of what is referred to as ‘classical’ and neoclassical COIN, illustrating the underlying 
theories and understandings that inform the deliberative narrative, from which the most 
important qualities of the deliberative will be extracted and examined. Following this, it will 
explain what is referred to as the counterinsurgent communication paradox, which addresses the 
strategic logic of terrorism, the centrality of a number of emotions, the expanded audience of the 
contemporary world and the nature of the counterinsurgent as a pre-existing political actor. 
From this, it will explain the drivers and nature of the reactive narrative and it will then outline 
the core reactive qualities. Finally, it will conclude with an overview and the outlining of the key 
hypotheses of the thesis.  
 
Chapter Three will focus on methodology. Here the various analytic aspects will be explained 
and outlined. The first key focus will be on introducing the main theoretical tool used in the 
thesis, which is framing theory. This introduction will provide an explanation of this theory and 
justify its use, detailing that the focus will be on what are termed ‘reactive counterinsurgent 
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frames’ (RCFs) and ‘deliberative counterinsurgent frames’ (DCFs) and explaining that each will 
be examined in their own separate research chapters. It will then go on to adapt framing theory 
for the thesis. As will be outlined, framing theory is highly flexible and has a number of varying 
components that enable it to be adapted for specific uses and this section will seek to develop 
the analytic framework of the thesis. This framework provides both the overarching structure of 
the two research chapters and the analytical tools within that structure. Following this, the three 
audiences will be described and some key generalisations about these audiences will be made. 
The point here is to provide an outline that will be filled in throughout the thesis, one that will 
inform not just the research but also help explain the following section, which is the data set 
used. The final section of this chapter will detail the method of analysis, which is a form of 
content analysis. That is, it will explain how the data was examined so that the analytical 
framework already outlined can be utilised. Here the focus will be on providing a practical 
explanation of how the actionable data was extracted from the wider data set and while this will 
be contextualised by a summary of content analysis as a diverse set of methodologies, the main 
thrust here is on the actual techniques used in the thesis. Finally, in the data set section, the 
selection and source of the data used in the thesis will be explained. This section will justify the 
use of ten years’ worth of NZ press releases from key government actors and the ways in which 
these have been selected, divided and categorised. It will also provide useful metrics for the 
following analysis, including a chronology of events, word counts and other useful parameters.  
 
Next, Chapter Four will examine the use of reactive counterinsurgent frames. First it will provide 
a summary of all the events examined for the thesis, which, in turn, provides the information 
necessary to justify the selection of the case studies that will be presented. Once the rationale 
behind the selection of the case studies has been provided and the events selected outlined, it 
will then offer a detailed analysis of the four case studies, specifically 9/11, the Afghan Invasion, 
Bali 2002 and the Iraq Invasion. Then, after a brief overview of the uses of the reactive narrative 
in the events not selected for case studies, there will be a section at the end of the chapter that 
focuses on providing the total frequency of usages of each RCF over the entire period as well as 
an overview of the entire RCF as a whole.  
 
Chapter Five will then focus on examining the uses of deliberative counterinsurgent frames. This 
chapter is not divided into specific events, both because of the consistent and constant nature of 
deliberative frames and because of the practicalities of examining this far more common 
narrative in such a fashion. There will be a focus on chronology within the analysis, but the 
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overarching structure of the chapter will not be chronological. The frequencies of each DCF will 
be provided as each is examined. At the end of this chapter there will be a brief overview of the 
entire DCF before the conclusion proper. 
 
Finally, Chapter Six will offer the overarching conclusion. Here the interactions and interferences 
between the two narratives will be examined and the general trends and usages of each explored 
in contrast to each other. This chapter will not only seek to review how these were used in 
particular reference to NZ and the ICAT but will also seek to understand the wider implications 
of these narratives, both in regard to counterinsurgency and to political rhetoric in general. It will 
also outline insights into the application of theory, research limitations, future study areas and a 
final concluding statement.  
 





DELIBERATIVE AND REACTIVE NARRATIVES 
This chapter outlines the key qualities of the deliberative and reactive narratives and, in the 
process, justifies the central analytical division of this thesis. The former is hypothesised as a 
narrative that is of utility with regard to the insurgent support population while the latter is 
hypothesised as a narrative used by the counterinsurgent after a terrorist attack that is politically 
expedient for the domestic support population and international allies. While the deliberative 
helps the counterinsurgent defeat the insurgent, the reactive helps mobilise domestic and 
international audiences. Thus, these populations have very different communication 
requirements during a counterinsurgency, especially one where the insurgent’s main strategy is 
terrorism. What is of utility for the insurgent support population is often counterproductive for 
the domestic and international audiences and vice versa.  
 
Critically, it is their different target audiences that provide the theoretical understanding of these 
two narratives. As noted, the deliberative is understood to target the insurgent support 
population while the reactive is seen as focusing on the domestic and international audiences. To 
outline the qualities of the deliberative, this chapter will first examine so called ‘population-
centric’ COIN – often referred to as either ‘classical’ or ‘neo-classical’ depending on iteration – 
as this body of understanding is seen as providing the theoretical underpinning of the 
deliberative narrative.1 This assertion is based largely on the commonalities between the key 
principles of population-centric COIN and the deliberative counterinsurgent narrative – 
particularly that both focus on the insurgent support population – as well as the abundance of 
population-centric COIN theory in NZ’s key military doctrinal and operational publications.2 
The population-centric approach’s influence goes beyond NZ; the classical version reached its 
peak of popularity in the 1950s and 1960s after Malaya and Algeria, with a neo-classical crest 
after 9/11, when it became so influential that it was the chief inspiration of the US 
                                                 
1 The delineations between these three terms is not consistent in the literature or even for a single theorist. David 
Kilcullen refers to population-centric as the classical approach in his book, Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in 
the Midst of a Big One (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), xv, while in a blog post, “Two Schools of Classical 
Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars Journal, January 27, 2007 accessed on 13/09/15, available from 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/two-schools-of-classical-counterinsurgency, he refers to both population-centric 
and enemy-centric as classical. Likewise, neo-classical is not used by every scholar, nor is it used consistently by 
those that use it.  
2 See New Zealand Defence Force, Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine NZDDP-D (Wellington: New Zealand 
Defence Force, 2004) and New Zealand Army, Future Land Operating Concept: Precision Manoeuvre 2020 (FLOC) 
(Wellington: New Zealand Army, 2007) as documents with numerous classical COIN principles.  
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counterinsurgency field manual, FM 3-24, amongst many other states’ COIN doctrines.3 While 
the post-9/11 neo-classical COIN was somewhat updated, the similarities with the first wave are 
greater than the differences; Nagl, an FM 3-24 author, believes “the differences between 
previous and current insurgencies are overstated.”4 Kilcullen refers to a “Neo-Classical Revival”.5 
FM 3-24’s continuity has been criticised, Betz wrote: “it is pervaded by concepts drawn from 
Maoist-style People’s Revolutionary Warfare, which is not the sort of insurgency now being 
faced.”6 Gentile states: “idea of populations as the prize in war, that they are the focus, is drawn 
directly from the pages of FM 3-24”.7 Jones and Smith believe the classical “assumption, largely 
reflected in the Field Manual, suggests that an insurgency is something that originates abroad, 
and stays there.”8 Kilcullen believes the population-centric approach is the “dominant paradigm 
through which practitioners approach today’s conflict”.9  
 
This section will first provide an overview of insurgency and it will then explain the pertinent 
principles of population-centric COIN, with an emphasis on the key qualities that 
counterinsurgent must appreciate for their communication to be of utility with regard to the 
insurgent support population. The aim here is not to develop a comprehensive general outline of 
insurgency and counterinsurgency, but rather to hone in on those components relevant to 
counterinsurgent communication in general and an understanding of the two narratives 
specifically. The neo-classical population-centric COIN model will be used primarily for the 
counterinsurgent principles, with reference to any changes or debates, as this is the best way of 
gaining a clear understanding of deliberative communication that targets the insurgent support 
population as the fulcrum of success. It will not attempt a comprehensive delineation of the 
debates surrounding population-centric versus enemy-centric COIN, though it should be 
acknowledged that some are critical of the population-centric approach.10 This is intended to set 
up the following section, where the population-centric outlook is contextualised by an 
                                                 
3 Dan G. Cox and Thomas Bruscino, “Introduction,” in Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: A False Idol? ed. Dan G. 
Cox and Thomas Bruscino (eds.) (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010) ; Gian P. 
Gentile “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army,” Parameters (2009) 
4 John A. Nagl, “Constructing the Legacy of Field Manual 3-24,” Joint Forces Quarterly 58 (2010): 118. 
5 David Kilcullen, “The State of a Controversial Art,” in The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, ed. 
Rich, Paul B., and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (London: Routledge, 2014), 137 – emphasis added.  
6 Betz quoted in Frank G. Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Insurgency?” Parameters 37, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 73.  
7 Gentile “A Strategy of Tactics,” 5.  
8 David Martin Jones and M. L. R Smith, “Counter-Insurgency Politics: Going Global,” The World Today 65, no. 10 
(2009): 28. 
9 David Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” Survival 48 , no. 4 (Winter 2006–2007): 111. 
10 Ralph Peters, “Progress and Peril: New Counterinsurgency Manual Cheats on the History Exam,” Armed Forces 
Journal International 144, no. 2 (February 2007); Gentile “A Strategy of Tactics.”; Cox and Bruscino, “Introduction.”; 
Kilcullen, “The State of a Controversial Art.”; Paul Dixon, “The Future of Counterinsurgency?: The Crisis of 
Classical Theories,” in A History of Counterinsurgency, ed. Gregory Fremont-Barnes (Santa Barbara, California : 
Praeger, 2015).  
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examination of the strategic logic of terrorism and the counterinsurgent as political actor, as 
these provide the qualities of the reactive narrative.  
 
2.1 INSURGENCY 
The key to combating any opposition is understanding the enemy, their methods and the context 
of the conflict.11 The US Department of Defense (DoD) defines an insurgency as “the organized 
use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.”12 An 
insurgency, then, is when a non-governmental group uses violence to challenge the authority of a 
state in an organised manner.13  While 9/11 and the subsequent response have been categorised 
as ‘terrorism’ and a ‘war on terrorism’, respectively, according to British Army Field Manual on 
COIN, (hereafter Countering Insurgency), al Qaeda can best be “defined as a religiously inspired, 
global insurgent movement that uses terrorist tactics”.14 Numerous leading scholars support this 
categorisation, as al Qaeda’s driving ambition is to become the legitimate authority in a number 
of states, creating a Caliphate.15 Terrorism will be examined below, suffice to say here that this 
study is focused on an insurgency that uses terrorism as a method of conflict. The rest of this 
section will focus on the key qualities of an insurgency with respect to communication.  
 
2.1.1 POLITICAL 
Insurgencies are inherently political, an insight that guides the population-centric model.16 
Hoffman believes that some jihadis are apolitical, though leading theorists dispute this position. 
17 While some insurgents may not be interested in wider issues, motivated only by martyrdom, 
this does not define the movement as a whole. As such, perception is generally more important 
than reality – victory lies in the relative perception of both the insurgent and the 
counterinsurgent, which leads into the psychological nature of insurgency.18  
 
2.1.2 PSYCHOLOGICAL 
                                                 
11 Land Warfare Centre, Countering Insurgency, Army Field Manual Volume 1, Part 10 (British Army, 2010), 2-1, hereafter 
cited as Countering Insurgency; Michael F. Morris, “al Qaeda as Insurgency,” Joint Forces Quarterly 39 (2005): 41. 
12 FM 3-24, 1-1 – 1-2. 
13 FM 3-24. 
14 Countering Insurgency, 2-1 
15  
16 FM 3-24,1-1, 1-2. 
17 Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Insurgency?”; Payne, “Winning the Battle of Ideas.”; Kilcullen, “Countering Global 
Insurgency.”; Brinjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaida Policy Study 
Preceding the Madrid Bombings,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27 (2004): 356. 
18 Mark Grdovic, “Understanding Counterinsurgency,” Special Warfare 17, no. 2 (2004): 5. 
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While all conflict is psychological, insurgency is even more of a ‘mind game’ than regular war 
because it is primarily political and the levers of action and determinants of success are largely 
intangible.19 Counterinsurgents may be physically dominant, but will struggle to win if they are 
unable to impact the politics of the situation. Payne writes that “the goal of the insurgent is as 
much an apathetic as a sympathetic population. So, some insurgent messages aim at exacerbating 
fear and uncertainty and thereby inducing apathy – terrorism is itself, of course, just such a type 
of message”.20 Perception is key as this is the lever of action upon which success is predicated 
and perception is influenced by emotions and ideas.  
 
2.1.3 EMOTIVE 
Emotions are important in insurgency as they guide cognition and perception, impacting 
decision-making.21 An insurgency is as much a battle of perceptions as a military operation.22 
Ingram defines perception and what he refers to as ‘polarisation’ as “the ability of an actor to 
effectively shape how a population interprets and understands events and issues (perception) in 
order to drive the allegiance of the population towards themselves and away from the other actor 
(polarization)”, explaining that “perception and polarization” are “major pillars of an insurgent 
movement” and that an insurgency “is a battle to shape the perceptions of a population in 
crisis”.23 Emotion is one of the most important means of affecting perception, especially, as will 
be shown, because of the insurgent’s use of terrorism as a strategy. 
 
2.1.4 IDEAS 
Insurgency are driven by ideas. Insurgency is a ‘war of ideas’, as a conflict between narratives that 
express these ideas.24 As such, the counterinsurgent will know that they have won when their 
cause has become widely unpopular. 25 That is, when the idea has been defeated, or has been 
perceived to be defeated. FM 3-24 states:  
 
                                                 
19 Countering Insurgency,1-7; J. Michael. Waller, Fighting the War of Ideas Like a Real War: Messages to Defeat the Terrorists 
(Washington, DC: Institute of World Politics Press, 2007). 
20 Ibid., 26. 
21 Tobias Broscha, Klaus R. Scherer, Didier Grandjeana and David Sander, “The Impact of Emotion on Perception, 
Attention, Memory, and Decision-Making,” Swiss Medical Weekly, May 14, 2013, accessed on 03/07/15, available 
from http://www.smw.ch/content/smw-2013-13786/; R. J. Dolan, “Emotion, Cognition, and Behavior,” Science 
298, no. 5596 (2002); David Betz, “The Virtual Dimension of Contemporary Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” 
Small Wars & Insurgencies 19, no. 4 (2008): 515; Payne, “Some Principles For Influence in Counterinsurgency,” 24. 
22 Countering Insurgency,1-3.  
23 Hararo Ingram, “A Four Dimensional Model of Insurgency and the Centrality of ‘Perception and Polarization’ to 
Strategic Success,” Small Wars Journal (2013): 1,4.  




“Ideas are a motivating factor in insurgent activities…The central mechanism through 
which ideologies are expressed and absorbed is the narrative. A narrative is an 
organizational scheme expressed in story form. Narratives are central to representing 
identity, particularly the collective identity of religious sects, ethnic groupings, and tribal 
elements. Stories about a community’s history provide models of how actions and 
consequences are linked. Stories are often the basis for strategies and actions, as well as for 
interpreting others’ intentions.”26  
 
Ideas are seen as important in an insurgency, along with emotions they are the key mechanisms 
of impact on perception.  
 
2.2 COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Insurgencies have political goals, insurgents work to impact change on the psychological level 
and use emotions and ideas to affect perception. These factors helped guide the selection of the 
following counterinsurgent principles, drawn from the population-centric literature, which are 
most pertinent for ensuring the counterinsurgent’s communications are of utility with regard to 
the insurgent support population.  
 
2.2.1 POPULATION IS KEY 
The insurgent support population is the ‘key’ to victory in the population-centric model.27 In the 
classic model, the insurgent support population was a segment of the counterinsurgent’s own 
population as these were intra-state conflicts.28 While the neo-classical model encompasses trans-
national and global insurgencies, many experts feel it still has an undue focus on the classical 
intrastate struggle.29 The 2007 US Counterinsurgency Field Manual definition certainly reinforces this, 
stating insurgencies “normally seek to achieve one of two goals: to overthrow the existing social 
order and reallocate power within a single state, or to break away from state control and form an 
autonomous entity or ungoverned space that they can control.”30 Thus, the population focused 
on by the population-centric model is, generally, that of a single state. The key developers of the 
US COIN doctrine, Nagl, Crane, Petraeus and Caldwell, are well-known population-centric 
proponents.31 Nagl writes: “counterinsurgent and insurgent are both competing to win the 
                                                 
26 FM 3-24, 1-7,1-14. 
27 FM 3-24; Countering Insurgency.  
28 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 190. 
29 Betz in Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Insurgency?”; Peters, “Progress and Peril.” 
30 US Army and Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago 
Press 2007), 3 – hereafter Field Manual. 
31 Cox and Bruscino, “Introduction,” in Population-Centric Counterinsurgency.  
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support of the population”.32 For population-centric counterinsurgency, the main fulcrum of 
success is the insurgent support population.  
 
2.2.2 ISOLATE INSURGENTS FROM THEIR SUPPORT 
The aim of the counterinsurgent is to isolate the insurgent from their support population and 
this key classical COIN principle remains central in the neo-classical model, though its scope has 
expanded from largely physical isolation to include a greater focus on ideological and 
psychological isolation.33 FM 3-24 explains: the “contest for the support of the population 
provides counterinsurgency with its principal distinguishing characteristic; it is concerned 
primarily with moulding the population’s perceptions”, the “decisive effort is to isolate the 
insurgents by denying the local population as a base of support”.34 Isolating insurgents from their 
cause and support is a core population-centric COIN principle; the key is to discredit the 
insurgents in the eyes of the support population so that they are unable to maintain ongoing 
operational and ideological viability.35  
 
2.2.3 LEGITIMACY 
Legitimacy remains the defining measure of success in population-centric COIN; it is, as Cohen 
et al. explain, “the main objective”.36 The US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual categorically states that the “primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster 
development of effective governance by a legitimate government.”37 A complex political 
concept, legitimacy can be summed up as recognition of the right to govern.38 In population-
centric COIN, both the insurgent and counterinsurgent seek legitimacy from the support 
population and only one can have ‘sufficient’ legitimacy to rule the state.39 Legitimacy is based on 
the “perception [of the insurgent audience] of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of 
actions.”40 Victory is comes from recognition of one actor’s legitimacy relative to their opponent 
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and is decided in the minds of the population.41 In fact, both perceived legitimacy and the just 
effect of actions are able to increase power and the perception of illegitimacy just as unjust effect 
can constrain the exercise of power.42 Payne argues that success in contemporary conflict does 
not require the unconditional support of the population but rather their apathy or 
submissiveness.43 While the counterinsurgent wants to legitimise their own cause, they also need 
to try to delegitimise the insurgent’s cause.44  
 
2.2.4 UNDERSTAND THE POPULATION 
Legitimacy’s centrality means counterinsurgents need to understand the insurgent support 
population.45 This principle is, largely, a new addition to population-centric COIN as previously 
the counterinsurgent and insurgent were made up of the same population so there was less 
chance of a cultural or religious chasm.46 Countering Insurgency stresses the need to understand the 
human terrain.47 Hunt et al. explain that a COIN campaign “requires a deep and nuanced 
understanding of culture, politics, economics, ideology, social networks, and the media.”48 A 
nested factor within this overarching principle is the need to understand the enemy, both 
internally and with respect to the wider insurgent support population.49 The point is that 
population-centric COIN that isolates the insurgent from their support by being perceived as 
relatively legitimate requires a broad and deep understanding of the support population and the 
enemy actor.  
 
2.2.5 INVOLVE THE POPULATION 
The counterinsurgent must also involve the population in the solution. This understanding dates 
back to Lawrence of Arabia and remains key in neo-classical COIN.50 As Kolenda and 
McChrystal explain: “When people own outcomes they will develop ways to ensure the solutions 
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are durable… If you sweat for it, you protect it.”51 The only way to get loyalty is to empower 
local actors by crafting shared objectives.52 One of the key methods for winning the ‘battle of the 
wills’ for the counterinsurgent is inclusive strategies and solutions. 53 Thus, counterinsurgent 
must ensure that their actions and their narrative includes the insurgent support population.54  
 
2.2.6 CONTROL EMOTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS 
The counterinsurgent also needs to control the emotions and expectations of the insurgent 
support population.55 This principle remains unchanged from the classical to neo-classical model. 
Chiarenza explains that “[e]motions like fear, anxiety, and alienation generate exploitable 
opportunities for the insurgent”.56 For this reason, the counterinsurgent must ensure that they 
control the emotions of the insurgent support population, Gompert details how 
counterproductive demonising the enemy is because of the anger and alienation it generates.57 
Payne believes that conflict has always been a contest of wills where victory occurs by changing 
your enemy’s underlying attitudes through, amongst other factors, emotions.58 Expectation’s 
connection to legitimacy is apparent in Countering Insurgency, which states:  
 
“realistic local expectations are important and an enduring outcome is more likely if a long 
term view is adopted. Taking such an approach is important because it takes account of 
the population’s view. Populations are unlikely to actively support their government until 
they are convinced that the government has the means, ability and stamina to provide 
security and further their interests over the long term.”59  
 
The counterinsurgent must manage the emotions and expectations of the insurgent support 
population because perception lies at the heart of legitimacy.  
 
2.2.7 SIMPLICITY IS BEST 
Insurgents seek complexity as it confounds their opponent, meaning that the counterinsurgent 
needs to aim for their solutions to be relatively simple; that is not to say that the thought behind 
                                                 
51 Christopher D. Kolenda and Stanley A. McChrystal, The Counterinsurgency Challenge: A Parable of Leadership and 
Decision Making in Modern Conflict (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2012), 76-77. 
52 Peter Charles Choharis And James A. Gavrilis, “Counterinsurgency 3.0,” Parameters (2010): 41. 
53 Jones and Smith, “Counter-Insurgency Politics,” 28.  
54 Ibid., 28.  
55 FM 3-24.  
56 David C. Chiarenza, “Moral Warfare in Counterinsurgency Operations,” (Monograph, School of Advanced 
Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2006-2007), 
13. 
57 Gompert, 31.  
58 Payne, “Some Principles For Influence in Counterinsurgency,” 23-24.  
59 Countering Insurgency, 1-8. 
28 
 
them should be limited but rather that the output should not be complicated.60 As Berlow shows, 
while counterinsurgency may be functionally complex, the best solutions come from reducing it 
to its most basic responsive components.61 For counterinsurgents, simplicity is the best way to 
win over the insurgent population.62 At the psychological level, Kilcullen recommends using a 
“‘single narrative’: a simple, unifying, easily expressed story or explanation that organizes 
people’s experience and provides an understanding of events”.63 Likewise, Payne explains: 
  
“Among the more common advice given to those seeking to persuade is to keep it simple. 
[Simplicity] can be used to the counterinsurgent’s advantage. Research shows that simple 
messages are more likely to be believed as true, and that repeating messages will reinforce 
that believability… Moreover, messages that are delivered in direct linguistic styles, using 
easily comprehensible vocabulary, and not hedged about with caveats, sub-clauses and 
close argument, are more convincing.”64 
 
Simplicity of approach for the counterinsurgent not only helps combat the insurgent’s 




The counterinsurgent must have a narrative that accommodates all of the above; a neo-classical 
addition to the population-centric model. As a contest for the support of the insurgent 
population the primary concern for a counterinsurgent is moulding the population’s perceptions, 
making a carefully crafted narrative that reinforces the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent 
central.65 As Freedman explains, counterinsurgencies are “understood in terms of the stories they 
tell as much as their direct impact on the enemy’s physical capacity”; at its most basic a narrative 
is the story of the counterinsurgent.66 Going deeper, Vlahos outlines that a “narrative is much 
more than just a story. Narrative may sound like a fancy literary word, but it is actually the 
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foundation of all strategy, upon which all else—policy, rhetoric, and action-is built.”67 Drawing 
on the above principles, the narrative must be focused on the insurgent population with the aim 
of enhancing the counterinsurgent’s legitimacy whilst delegitimising the insurgents, it has to be 
crafted with an understanding of the insurgent support population and it must include them, it 
must control their emotion and it must be relatively simple.68 
 
2.3 DELIBERATIVE NARRATIVE 
For counterinsurgent communication to be of utility for the insurgent support population, a 
number of recommendations can be drawn from the above. The nature of the insurgency and 
the principles that ensure utility suggest that the content of the counterinsurgent’s 
communication is essential to the overall success of the counterinsurgency. It is a political 
conflict, waged on the psychological plane, where emotions and ideas are the key weapons in 
affecting perception. To successfully counter it, the counterinsurgent must focus on the 
insurgent support population, isolating them from the insurgent and seeking to convince them 
that they are the legitimate actor by creating a simple narrative that is based on an understanding 
of the insurgent support population, that controls emotions and expectations and includes the 
insurgent support population. These factors provide a huge range of possible guides for the 
counterinsurgent’s narrative. However, rather than provide a comprehensive run down, five 
aspects will be given here, not just because they are important in general but also because they 
contrast with the qualities of the reactive narrative. A deliberative narrative should be: inclusive, 
restrained, constricted, nuanced, and literal. These are not mutually exclusive, but rather additive. 
They all connect and have significant overlap, though crucially each has a distinctive quality that 
demands its analysis independently.  
  
2.3.1 INCLUSIVE 
Firstly, counterinsurgent communication must be inclusive. This is the most important of the 
five and informs the other recommendations. An inclusive narrative isolates insurgents from 
their support by focusing on and including their support population, with the aim of the 
counterinsurgent being perceived as more legitimate than the insurgent. For a counterinsurgent, 
the emphasis on inclusion is fundamental.69 The counterinsurgent narrative must be focused on 
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ensuring the insurgent support population feels included in the outcome.70 The narrative should 
encourage the insurgent support population to see the counterinsurgent as a legitimate actor 
whose proposed solutions are just and do not just involve the support population but are 
beneficial to them. That is, communication must be phrased in a manner that does not alienate 
or exclude them and that does not delineate a self-serving outcome. The counterinsurgent is 
often already at a disadvantage, as they are either a state that is suffering a crisis of legitimacy, or 
they are an outside actor whose influence over the insurgent support population will be lower 
than the insurgent’s.71   
 
2.3.2 RESTRAINED 
To ensure inclusiveness, counterinsurgent communication also needs to be emotively restrained. 
Specifically, it should not invoke negative emotions within the insurgent support population. The 
counterinsurgent needs to convince the insurgent support population that they are a legitimate 
actor.72 As Betz writes, in the ‘war of ideas’ “[a]rguments which appeal to reason are deemed 
more trustworthy than those which appeal to emotion”.73 The US Army Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual suggests that “[c]alculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts.”74 Emotion can be a 
powerful means of persuasion but if misused it can generate significant blowback by excluding 
the insurgent support population; the narrative needs to embody ‘emotional intelligence’.75 The 
counterinsurgent is already at a disadvantage when it comes to emotion, the insurgent has an 
advantage in emotional manipulation, able to tap the key emotional concerns of the population, 
and the counterinsurgent should try to neutralise this rather than retaliating with their own 
emotive narrative.76  
 
2.3.3 CONSTRICTED 
The narrative also needs to be constricted in its scope. That is, while the parameters of its 
descriptions and identifications need to be strict and precise, it should be pared-down to the 
creditable minimum. This serves to control emotions and expectations and can help reduce the 
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apparent legitimacy of the insurgent. Constricted descriptions of the threat posed by insurgents 
help to reduce the capacity of the insurgent, thus limiting their ability to impact the support 
population emotionally. A narrative that portrays a constricted scope of the threat the insurgent 
poses helps neutralise the insurgent’s ability to impact the insurgent support population’s 
emotions. At the same time, this negatively impacts their apparent legitimacy, as the insurgent 
needs to appear competent to be perceived as a replacement government. Constricted outcome 
identifications also ensure that the counterinsurgent does not unrealistically raise expectations 
that they cannot hope to meet with regard to their own proposed solutions, otherwise they risk 
creating what Gurr called the ‘revolutionary gap’ wherein expectations rise faster than reality and 
the counterinsurgent may experience a drop in apparent legitimacy.77  
 
2.3.4 NUANCED 
For the narrative to be inclusive, it has to be descriptively nuanced. Nuanced here means that the 
communication must be balanced in its identifications rather than extreme. It needs to be based 
on an understanding of the insurgent support population rather than a caricature of them.78 
Nuanced language ensures that the communication is able to incorporate a refined 
understanding of the support population, meaning that it will be more inclusive. The 
“contextualisation of the conflict’s origins and the insurgents are essential if the… [narrative is] 
to be effective and nuanced”.79 Also, while it may seem counterintuitive, to reduce complexity of 
insurgency into a simple counterinsurgent message, a counterinsurgent narrative must be able to 
provide fine distinctions between issues. To communicate about a complex issue in a simple 
manner requires gradation and tone, not stark contrasts or simplifications.80  
 
2.3.5 LITERAL 
It is also important that the narrative is literal. That means that the intended meaning must be 
the primary definition of the word or words, the narrative should not be built from figurative or 
metaphorical components. The reason for this is that for the narrative to be able to help isolate 
the insurgents from their support and convince the support population of the counterinsurgent’s 
legitimacy, for it to be restrained, nuanced and constricted, it is best delivered in clear and direct 
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language as it has the least chance of being misperceived or distorted.81 This is particularly true 
when the insurgent support audience is from a different culture to the counterinsurgent. Use of 
literal phrasing will deliver ‘strategic clarity’ to the narrative.82 A ‘good’ narrative ensures the 
insurgent support population understand the reasons for counterinsurgent’s motives and actions, 
which is best served by being literal.83 
 
2.4 THE COUNTERINSURGENT COMMUNICATION PARADOX 
While this all works in theory, it is argued here that it is rare for the counterinsurgent’s 
communication output to ever completely meet these guides. That is, while the population-
centric literature recommends that counterinsurgents use a narrative that is inclusive, restrained, 
constricted, nuanced and literal if they want to ensure their communication is of strategic utility 
for the insurgent support population, this does not always happen. Rather than solely using the 
deliberative narrative, the counterinsurgent also uses a reactive narrative. There are two major 
interconnected issues in practice that mean that counterinsurgent communication is unlikely to 
be as deliberative as the population-centric approach would demand: the strategic logic of 
terrorism as a tool of insurgency and the counterinsurgent as a pre-existing political actor with 
domestic and allied interests. These two issues will be explored, contextualising the above focus 
on population-centric COIN.  
 
2.5 TERRORISM  
Terrorism is famously difficult to define and much ink and many pixels have been expended 
attempting to place this phenomenon in a neat conceptual box. In his review of definitions, 
Meisels notes that there are literally hundreds and Smith and Thomas explain “the difficulties in 
trying to define the phenomena even within the Executive Branch of the United States 
government are legendary.”84 Nevertheless, some clarification is required, though the aim here is 
not a complete definition but rather an orientating statement that enables exploration of the 
most relevant aspects.  
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Schmid, writing of the definitional issues, lists the many attributes of terrorism commonly 
outlined:  
 
“its often symbolic character, its often indiscriminate nature, its typical focus on civilian 
and non-combatant targets of violence, its sometimes provocative and sometimes 
retributive aims, the disruption of public order and the putting in danger of public security, 
the creation of a climate of fear to influence audiences wider than the direct victims, its 
disregard for the rules of war and the rules of punishment, and its asymmetrical 
character… Some key elements of many definitions also refer to the fact that terrorism is 
usually an instrument for the attempted realization of a political or religious project that 
perpetrators lacking mass support are seeking, that it generally involves a series of 
punctuated acts of demonstrative public violence, followed by threats of more in order to 
impress, intimidate and/or coerce target audiences.”85  
 
Merari is more succinct, he believes the three main elements of terrorism are the use (or threat) 
of violence, political objectives and the intention of sowing fear in a target population as a means 
of achieving these political objectives.86 Friedman’s focused definition of terrorism is “violence 
aimed at producing terror or extreme fear in a population and undertaken for political or 
ideological ends”.87 For the purpose of the thesis, these are seen as useful guides and while issues 
could be raised with many inclusions and absences in these outlines, there is only one particular 
commonality in all four that will be focused on here: fear as the functional emotion generated by 
terrorism.  
 
2.5.1 FEAR AS THE PREEMINENT EMOTION 
Much is made of fear as the preeminent emotion generated by terrorism.88 As well as the above, 
the DoD defines terrorism as “unlawful violence to inculcate fear”.89 Crenshaw explains that 
terrorism aims to create “fear and hostility in an audience identified as the ‘enemy’.”90 Terrorism 
“is violence used in order to create fear; but it is aimed at creating fear in order that the fear, in 
turn, will lead somebody else to embark on some quite different program of action that will 
accomplish whatever it is that the terrorist really desires”, according to Dibb.91 Similarly, 
Braithwaite believes that terrorists “desire and require the cultivation and proliferation of public 
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fear”, explaining that “success is predicated upon being able to convert the fear that their attacks 
cause within the public into demands for policy change that would help bring about changes in 
line with the terrorists’ demands”.92 Finally, Meisels, concluding his review of definitions, writes: 
 
“fear is a key element as it is tied at the most basic philological level to the term itself, as 
well as describing a seemingly basic feature of the phenomenon – its frightening intention 
and result. Consequently, most authors include this feature – literal terrorization – within 
their definition or description. This element appears to cut across political lines and is 
included in the widest variety of discussions on terrorism.”93  
 
In short, fear is often portrayed as the emotion without peer when it comes to terrorism’s ability 
to effect change, the argument being that fear is able to impact perception and this changed 
perception will lead to different outcomes.  
 
What makes this dominant focus on fear highly problematic is that it is also widely 
acknowledged that the counterinsurgent often utilises the fear generated by a terrorist attack for 
its own purposes.94 As Nacos et al. write, “hyping threat and fear is central to terrorist and 
counterterrorist rhetoric”.95 Likewise, Altheide refers to this as the “politics of fear”, examining 
“decision makers’ promotion and use of audience beliefs and assumptions about danger, risk, 
and fear, to achieve certain goals” in the wake of a terrorist attack.96 Thus, while many terrorism 
theorists refer to fear as the vital emotion of a terrorist attack, many also acknowledge that the 
victim state will often use fear to their own advantage. Braithwaite claims that terrorism works by 
converting the fear into policy changes that meet the terrorist’s objectives, yet a common 
response of the counterinsurgent is to use the fear to their own advantage, effectively using it to 
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make policy changes that suit themselves rather than the terrorist. There is a major problem with 
this line of reasoning if, rather than enabling the terrorist to achieve their aims, fear can help the 
counterinsurgent achieve their own aims. There is also another issue with the apparent utility of 
fear, though this time as a means for the counterinsurgent to achieve their objectives. A number 
of studies looking at the interplay of emotions and risk perceptions have found that fear “evokes 
appraisals of uncertainty and situational control” while anger “is associated with appraisals of 
certainty and individual control”.97 The findings also show that with regard to a terrorist attack, 
for those in whom fear predominates, there is less certainty about the cause of an attack or the 
response, while for those in whom anger is the dominate emotion, the cause is more clearer, as is 
the need for a forceful military solution.98 Anger appears to be more politically expedient than 
fear, while fear does not seem that problematic for the counterinsurgent. Crucially, this suggests 
that the focus on fear as the preeminent emotion of terrorism is questionable.  
 
Terrorist attacks undoubtedly generate fear, but they also evoke other emotional responses, 
including confusion, concern and, critically, anger.99 The confusion, concern and anger that 
occur as a response to terrorist attacks happen because the attacks are generally unexpected and 
they target random civilians, utilising violence and the media reaction to intentionally generate an 
emotional shockwave. To be specific, people are confused about why the attacks occurred and 
who was responsible, they are concerned that there are no measures in place to prevent future 
attacks, and they are angry that the attacks occurred.100 The emotions are critical for 
understanding not just the insurgent’s actions but the counterinsurgent’s response as well. As 
Small et al. write “[c]itizens’ attributions for the terrorist attacks merit systematic study not only 
for what they may reveal about basic cognitive-emotional processes but also for what they may 
reveal about policy preferences. Causal attributions can implicitly inform views on how one 
should respond toward terrorists and how one should prevent future attacks… Causal 
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attributions after an aggressive and tragic event may be shaped by emotion… anger drives and is 
driven by thoughts of blame and punishment”101 
 
2.5.2 STRATEGIC LOGIC OF TERRORISM 
To understand the emotive power of terrorism, the means by which it translates into outcomes 
needs to be explained. Kydd and Walter’s influential article – which itself builds on the work 
done by Pape in his seminal article – outlines five principal strategic logics at work in a terrorist 
campaign: attrition, intimidation, outbidding, provocation and spoiling.102 Briefly, attrition seeks 
to impose unacceptable costs on the enemy government; intimidation aims to convince the 
insurgent support population the terrorists are strong and the enemy government is weak; 
outbidding is intended to show the insurgent support population that the terrorists have a greater 
resolve than the enemy government; provocation is focused on forcing the enemy government 
to overreact militarily with the aim of increasing support from insurgent support population; and 
finally spoiling seeks to portray the moderates on their own side as weak to the enemy 
government.103  
 
According to this model, the emotive power of terrorist attacks functions by either attempting to 
influence the insurgent support audience, the enemy government or both, through the 
generation of emotions and the impacts these have on the perception of the situation. But 
importantly this can be direct, through the actual attacks themselves, or indirect, through the 
response of the enemy government. As Kydd and Walter explain, while also overemphasising the 
role of fear: “Terrorism works not simply because it instills fear in target populations, but 
because it causes governments and individuals to respond in ways that aid the terrorists’ 
cause.”104 Thus, while terrorism can be used to directly target an audience with the aim of 
generating an emotive impact that changes perceptions, insurgents also strategically plan attacks 
taking into account how they expect the state to respond, aiming to provoke the 
counterinsurgent into reacting in a manner that generates emotions in their support audience.105 
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As Mueller explains, “the costs of terrorism come much more from hasty, ill-considered, and 
over-wrought reactions, or overreactions, to it than from anything the terrorists have done.”106 
 
Kydd and Walter devised these five strategies by examining the types of uncertainty that can be 
generated by an attack – uncertainty of power, resolve and trustworthiness – and by splitting the 
audiences the terrorists are trying to influence into the insurgent support population and the 
enemy government.107 Attrition and spoiling seek to influence the enemy government while 
intimidation, outbidding and provocation target the insurgent support population. While these 
are a useful starting point, to explain how terrorism as a mechanism of insurgency impacts the 
strategic utility of the counterinsurgent’s narrative requires some adaption. 
 
2.6 THE EXPANDED AUDIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY 
COUNTERINSURGENCY  
One of the main issues with Kydd and Walter’s theory is that the delineation of the target 
audiences is limited. They state terrorists “play to two key audiences: governments whose 
policies they wish to influence and individuals on the terrorists’ own side whose support or 
obedience they seek to gain”, which reduces their model’s applicability to classical ‘single state’ 
insurgencies where the ‘enemy’ government rules the support population.108 However, 
contemporary insurgencies are rarely ‘single state’, either because the insurgents are targeting a 
foreign state, because they are acting in an area without clear governance or because the 
counterinsurgent is an alliance.109 As Kilcullen explains, the population-centric model “posits  an 
insurgent challenge to a functioning (albeit often weak) state…. [and] tends to assume a bilateral 
struggle between the insurgent and counterinsurgent” where the contemporary situation has 
gone ‘beyond single state COIN’ and ‘beyond binary COIN’, to the point where in the current 
environment most counterinsurgents will not be the government of the insurgent support audience.110 Thus, 
aside from governments themselves, there are generally at least two distinct key support 
audiences: the insurgent support population and the enemy government support population 
(from now the ‘domestic support audience’).  
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This expansion of actual support audiences has been amplified by the rapid globalisation of 
media and communications. Not only is the world more connected, but media and 
communications spheres have been ‘democratised’ meaning states can no longer control 
information flows.111 Metz writes:  
 
“[In] the 20th century, insurgents struggled to reach external audiences… Now the global 
media, satellite communications, cell phones, the Internet, and other information 
technology gives insurgents instant access to national and world audiences”, explaining 
that it has given insurgents a greater ability to effect psychological impact, “[t]he terrorism 
of contemporary insurgents is thus designed to influence both a proximate audience and a 
distant one”.112  
 
This audience can actually be expanded beyond just the enemy government’s own citizens to 
include the allied states and other actors, just as the insurgent support population can no longer 
be restricted to a single state but now includes all other self-identifying members, be they 
diasporic nationals or members of the same religion.113  
 
The existence of two key support audiences, combined with the impossibility for states to 
control the spread of information, means the emotive force of a terrorist attack takes a more 
convoluted course than Kydd and Walter’s model suggests. In particular, there is an almost 
unavoidable ‘spill-over’ from one key audience to another between these different strategic 
logics. Specifically, even if an insurgent aims to use an intimidation, outbidding or provocation 
strategy, their attack will almost inevitably intimidate the domestic support audience. The reason 
for this is that even though these three strategies seek to influence the insurgent support 
audience, they do so indirectly by acting on the enemy government, which will, inevitably, 
intimidate the domestic support audience. The domestic support audience are not aware of any 
specific ‘strategic logic’ behind an attack on their state, they will just be impacted emotionally. 
Thus, if the situation involves two distinct support populations, no matter what strategy the 
insurgent is using, the domestic support audience will be intimidated, which means that the 
counterinsurgent government is faced with managing two key audiences whose communication 
requirements are very different. And this is where the role of the counterinsurgent as a pre-
existing political actor becomes important.  
 
2.7 COUNTERINSURGENT ARE PRE-EXISTING POLITICAL ACTORS 
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The counterinsurgent state is not  counterinsurgent. It is a pre-existing political actor that is both 
a government and a state and as such it has an array of pre-existing interests and obligations at 
both the domestic and international level. The counterinsurgent’s response to a terrorist attack 
will always be moderated by these interests and obligations, from the government’s desire to stay 
in power through to the state’s alliance arrangements, from political and economic interests to 
political and military obligations. The counterinsurgent’s response will also be shaped by the 
relative stakes of the insurgency for the counterinsurgent, including whether they are directly or 
indirectly threatened by the insurgency and whether the threat is serious or not. These two 
overarching sets of influencers – the counterinsurgent’s pre-existing interests and obligations as 
well as their relative stakes in the insurgency – have somewhat of an inverse relationship, the 
higher the relative stakes for the counterinsurgent the less likely they are to act in a way that takes 
their domestic and international interests and obligations into consideration. A 
counterinsurgency is not conducted in a vacuum, to understand the counterinsurgent’s response 
the political context must be understood and, in particular, their own support audience. As Metz 
notes, in the 20th Century: 
 
“Nations facing serious insurgencies such as South Vietnam or, later, El Salvador, certainly 
had other security problems, but they paled in comparison to the insurgent threat. 
Insurgencies were organizationally simple. They involved the insurgents, the regime, and, 
sometimes, outside supporters of one side or the other… Rather than being discrete 
conflicts between insurgents and an established regime, [modern insurgencies] are nested 
in complex, multidimensional clashes having political, social, cultural, and economic 
components.”114 
 
It is likely that when a modern counterinsurgent responds to a terrorist attack their 
communication will not only be shaped by the attack itself and the demands of the 
counterinsurgency but also the wider multidimensionality Metz refers to, particularly what is 
politically expedient with regard to their own support population. When Kydd and Walter 
explain that “the challenge for policymakers in targeted countries is to calibrate their responses in 
ways that do not further any of the terrorists’ goals”, they ignore the counterinsurgent’s position 
as a pre-existing political actor, one whose responses are calibrated by many factors beyond the 
conflict itself.115  
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Where a ‘classical’ insurgency-counterinsurgency was primarily focused on legitimacy, for a pre-
existing political actor with wider interests and obligations conducting a complex global 
insurgency with a number of key audiences, there are a number of interrelated goals for 
communication. These will be outlined in full in the following chapter. Briefly, however, they are 
mobilisation, justification and legitimisation. While these are all intent on enhancing the 
counterinsurgent’s cause, they are different and not all are important for all the audiences. 
Mobilisation is focused on marshalling support for action and is only important for the state’s 
own support population, justification is interested in ensuring the action is seen as right and 
proper and is important for all three audiences, while legitimisation is about how the rightness 
and properness of the action reflects on perceptions of the government as right and proper and 
is vital for both insurgent and domestic support audiences.  
 
This political context is seen as influencing all of the counterinsurgent’s communication because 
they are a pre-existing political actor. It is hypothesised that the deliberative narrative will display 
political influence, that rather than being purely technical and objective there will be ideological 
and politically pragmatic aspects to it and that it may even be used by the counterinsurgent to 
sanitise their actions so as to increase their communication’s utility with regard to their own 
support population during the course of the conflict. While the deliberative narrative is not seen 
as providing the necessary response immediately after an attack because it does not deal with the 
confusion, concern and anger generated, this does not mean that it is not of utility for a domestic 
support audience during the conflict. Rather, its utility with respect to the domestic support 
audience depends on political context, which can change over time.  
 
Nevertheless, it is further hypothesised that in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack the 
counterinsurgent will not use a deliberative narrative because of the need to address the vacuum 
of comprehension, the need for reassurance and the anger that such an event generates – which 
are all exacerbated by fear. Take 9/11 as an example, the event that marks the beginning of this 
thesis’s period of interest. Fear, as a emotive propellant, was present. Sullivan speaks of the 
“psychic terror of 9/11”, explaining that “[i]n our panic, fear kept 40ilieu40ing upward… If our 
minds had not been flooded with dread, many of us would never have believed that 9/11 was 
just a dummy run for a much bigger strike with weapons of mass destruction”, concluding that 
“fear dominated my being”.116 On the vacuum of comprehension, Holland writes of the 
“profound silence… This was the void: devoid of (harmonised) meaning… The empty space of 
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Ground Zero was mirrored in the vacuity of thought and words”.117 Jackson also refers to the 
“void of meaning” as 9/11 unfolded, that while the ‘facts’ were known, the meaning of the 
events was fluid and unsure.118 The need for reassurance dovetails with this vacuum. Ackerman 
states: “[w]hen terrorists strike on the scale of 9/11 nobody has the slightest idea of what may happen 
next. The citizenry confronts the shock of the unknown, and the resulting anxiety is qualitatively 
different from many other uncertainties in life”, going on to explains that terrorist attacks are a 
“public affront to national sovereignty” that require both symbolic and functional reassurance.119 
Finally, Ross writes that “it seems only natural that a large-scale terrorist attack would spark 
anger” while Pemberton confirms that “anger was the dominant reaction of the American public 
to 9/11”.120 In the wake of this emotive shockwave, where the victim state’s citizenry are 
confused, concerned and angry, it is hypothesised that the counterinsurgent will use a narrative 
that best deals with these issues. The exigencies of the situation mean that rather than using the 
deliberative narrative they will choose one that is completely focused on addressing the needs of 
their own population by using what is referred to as a reactive narrative.  
 
2.8 REACTIVE NARRATIVE 
Thus there are several factors that shape a counterinsurgent narrative beyond the COIN 
principles. First, if the insurgent support population and domestic support audience are two 
separate entities, then no matter what strategic logic the insurgent is using, one of the results of 
an attack will be intimidation of the domestic support audience. Critically, however, the emotive 
impact on the domestic support audience will not just be fear, but also confusion, concern and 
anger. This is where the influence on communication becomes interesting; as a pre-existing 
political actor one of the counterinsurgent’s primary aims is their own political viability, they 
need to reassure their own support population that they are capable, not just as a 
counterinsurgent but as a government. Also, in cases where the insurgent support population 
and domestic support audience are different, the counterinsurgent’s most important audience 
immediately after an attack is their own support audience. As de Castella and McGarty write:  
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“The rhetoric used by the leaders of Western democracies about terrorism has attracted 
considerable attention… The implicit (sometimes explicit) understanding of political 
rhetoric is that it is designed to advance a leader’s political agenda. That is, by framing 
arguments in particular ways political leaders are seeking to convince audiences to support 
their political program”.121  
 
In other words, even though they are a counterinsurgent, in the wake of an attack their main 
focus is their own domestic support audience and their own political agenda. Their main aims, 
then, will be to address the negative emotions generated by the terrorist attack, while ensuring 
that they mobilise support for future counterinsurgent actions. These two aims are mutually 
reinforcing. Addressing the confusion, reassuring concerns and directing anger all work together 
to help mobilise support, a process that is empowered by the inchoate fear that follows a 
terrorist attack.  
 
As well as the domestic considerations, another dynamic that may influence the 
counterinsurgent’s response is their international interests and obligations, though this particular 
factor would vary largely depending on context. All states operate in an existing set of 
international relationships, from enmity through to amity, and if rather than being the direct 
victim of terrorism the counterinsurgent has a close relationship with the victim, then their 
response will be moderated by this pre-existing relationship. There are two perceived interrelated 
levels to this particular dynamic. The first is that many states, especially those with a strong 
connection, have a ‘shared vocabulary’. That is, much of their political language will be similar 
because of factors like common origins, similar culture and mutual influence. In the wake of an 
attack the counterinsurgent may emphasise this shared vocabulary because it is of political utility 
with regard to the victim state. The second level is, and this is where context is critical, 
depending on the specific relationship between the two, the counterinsurgent may ‘mimic’ the 
victim’s response. This goes beyond just using a ‘shared vocabulary’ and refers to the wholesale 
repetition of key aspects of the victim’s narrative. Mimicking, it is thought, would occur because 
it is of even greater utility as it completely reinforces the victim’s own delineation of the 
situation. Either way, because of the confusion, concern and anger, it is more than likely that the 
victim state is using a reactive narrative. 
 
These factors all mean that rather than reacting to a terrorist attack with a deliberative narrative, 
the counterinsurgent will react in a way that aims to neuter the emotive impact of the attack, one 
                                                 




that seeks to resolve the domestic support population’s confusion, alleviate their concerns and 
direct anger at the insurgent. However, because fear is not an emotion that actually threatens the 
counterinsurgent government’s own viability and can help with mobilisation, they may not 
actually try to ameliorate this emotion in the wake of an attack, despite this being the very 
emotion that most terrorism theorists stress as being the most important. That means that in the 
wake of an attack a counterinsurgent narrative will often be more focused on reducing 
confusion, eliminating concerns (about whether the government is capable) and, most critically, 
directing anger. This is not to say that in the wake of an attack every counterinsurgent will use 
the fear generated to further their political agenda but rather that it does not pose the same 
problems for the counterinsurgent as the other aspects of the emotional shockwave of a terrorist 
attack and that this means these aspects are likely to be dealt with by the counterinsurgent rather 
than fear per se.  
 
For these reasons, the reactive narrative of the counterinsurgent will not be shaped by the 
counterinsurgent principles – that is with a narrative that is inclusive, restrained, constricted, 
nuanced and literal – but rather will be almost exactly the opposite: exclusive, emotive, 
hyperbolic, absolute and figurative. As will be shown, these qualities, while lacking strategic 
utility with regard to the insurgent support population, are of political expediency for the 
counterinsurgent as a political actor in the immediate wake of an attack.  
 
2.8.1 EXCLUSIVE 
First, it is argued that the counterinsurgent’s narrative will be exclusive after an attack. Exclusive 
here means that narrative will not involve or include the insurgent support population but rather 
will alienate them. It is common during conflict for a state to communicate in an exclusive 
manner that delineates an ‘Other’ outgroup, directing anger and mobilising support.122 As 
Demmers explains, “identities are constructed representations of the ‘self’ in relation to ‘the 
other’… [and] a key aspect of the mobilization of support for armed conflict is identity with the 
group, community or state whose representatives decide on the use of force against the 
‘other’.”123 The counterinsurgent will use a narrative that is exclusive after an attack because their 
own support audience is intimidated and the counterinsurgent is more interested in negating or 
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redirecting the negative emotions in their own support population, as well as serving the 
underlying mobilisation needs, not because they specifically want to exclude the insurgent 
support population. That means they will seek to direct anger at the insurgent and not 
themselves because it is politically expedient. The exclusive nature of the reactive narrative is 
largely shaped by its other listed qualities – that it is emotive, absolute, hyperbolic and figurative. 
This is inverse to the way in which the deliberative narrative functions. The importance of 
inclusivity is the key aim of the deliberative narrative, and this inclusivity informs the other 
critical qualities. Thus, a greater understanding of how the reactive narrative can be exclusive will 
best be gained by examining these other aspects. 
 
2.8.2 EMOTIVE 
It is also argued that the reactive narrative will be highly emotive. A terrorist attack is designed to 
provoke emotions, these emotions are a key component of terrorism’s power. And just as 
traditional provocation aims to make the counterinsurgent overreact militarily, it is believed that 
terrorism also provokes an emotional overreaction.124 As Crenshaw explains, “[t]here are few 
neutral terms in politics, because political language affects the perceptions of protagonists and 
audiences, and such effect acquires a greater urgency in the drama of terrorism.”125 At the 
personal level, the communicators will also be feeling emotional just as the rest of the domestic 
support audience will; at the pragmatic level, rational actor theory aside, emotion is critical to 
politics and political communication is saturated in emotional appeals.126 In the wake of an 
attack, it would be politically problematic for a counterinsurgent to respond in a measured and 
dispassionate manner. Politicians need to convey the right level and type of emotion, crying for 
no reason is as problematic as would not emoting be after a terrorist attack – there is a strict 
relationship between the event, the emotive response and the political utility of the 
communication.127 The counterinsurgent’s focus on their own support audience means that it is 
politically expedient to communicate in an emotive manner after an attack. Research has also 
shown that public displays of emotion after a natural or manmade disaster are cathartic, that 
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shared grief is ‘good grief’.128 Thus, not only do they need to emote but must do so in a manner 
that their support population finds appropriate– though for obvious reasons while they will 
emote anger, they will not emote fear, concern and confusion. A number of scholars explore 
emotion’s role in politics, specifically anger. Ost believes that political parties “stoke and 
mobilize anger in order to gain and maintain support, that anger is the emotion politicians 
“capture and channel… by offering up an ‘enemy’ they identify as the source of the problem”.129 
Likewise, Valentino et al. found that anger was a powerful mobiliser for participation in 
elections.130 Finally, Ross explains that not only is anger a predictable emotional response to 
terrorism but that it also generates a desire for revenge.131 Emotion, then, is critical to 
mobilisation of support. In turn, the emotive nature of the narrative makes it exclusive as the 
counterinsurgent will be attempting to direct the anger toward the insurgent and in so doing is 
likely to emote in a manner that excludes the support population.  
  
2.8.3 HYPERBOLIC 
After an attack, the reactive narrative is also likely to be hyperbolic.132 It will use language that 
exaggerates “narrative, descriptive and argumentative features and make assertions that are 
overstated, literally impossible, inconceivable or counterfactual in many different types of 
discourse context.”133 Exaggeration, or in some cases minimisation, enables the counterinsurgent 
to tailor the narrative to best serve their purposes, enabling them to reduce confusion, alleviate 
concerns and direct anger by amplifying and restricting aspects of the narrative to ensure these 
outcomes. While hyperbole is present in a range of areas, it is most likely to be seen in threat 
diagnosis. As Johnson has argued, threat exaggeration actually helps reduce confusion as it 
provides a degree of predictability and that this generation of order from chaos in turn gives the 
impression the communicator has control, reducing concern, all through the utilisation of fear 
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and anxiety.134 Furthermore, Johnson explains that threat exaggeration achieves consensus, 
mobilising support for a response.135 Crenshaw believes that terrorism’s apparent randomness 
and the shock of an attack mean it is highly susceptible to exaggeration.136 Wolfendale outlines 
the rationale for the hyperbolic narrative surrounding terrorism:  
 
“exaggerating the threat of terrorism—scaring the public—is a means of achieving public 
acquiescence for significant and far-reaching changes to legislation and well as for the 
massive financial and military commitments ‘‘required’’ to fight terrorism at home and 
overseas”.137  
 
A hyperbolic narrative will also be exclusive, it does not have the capacity to outline the situation 
in a manner that is based on an understanding of the insurgent support population.  
 
2.8.4 ABSOLUTE 
It is also hypothesised that the reactive narrative will also be absolute in its language and 
identifications.138 In general, this means statements will be unambiguous, lacking nuance in 
interpretation.139 One of the most common forms of absolute language is binary pairing.140 
Binary pairing is not balanced but rather exist as a violent hierarchy where one term dominates 
the other.141 This opposition generally involves a positive and negative term that are intrinsically 
connected, so that use of one automatically invokes its binary pair.142 Binaries are a frequent 
feature of political rhetoric, especially in the wake of an attack.143 Binary language is easily 
understood, especially those terms that are already well embedded in their support population, 
meaning that their use enables the counterinsurgent to reduce the confusion following an attack 
by portraying the situation in simplistic form, this in turn makes the communicator appear more 
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capable as it makes them appear informed, and this helps them focus anger by portraying blame 
in a singular fashion as one of the pair is inherently negative. Binaries also help mobilise support 
as they portray events as dilemmas that can only be resolved in in one of two ways.144 By 
collapsing the situation into a polarizing binary, the possible responses are limited. However, a 
binary narrative directed at the government support population will not just lack the nuance 
necessary to understand the insurgent support population but will polarize the situation by 
portraying the insurgent support population in a negative manner, meaning it will be exclusive.145 
Binaries are unifying for the ‘in’ group but this also creates an alienated ‘out’ group.146 
 
2.8.5 FIGURATIVE 
Finally, it is argued that the  reactive narrative will be figurative, even metaphoric. Like binaries, 
metaphors are pervasive in political rhetoric.147 As Lakoff and Johnson explain, metaphors are 
cognitive phenomena, the “essence of a metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of 
thing in terms of another” and the “fundamental role of metaphor is to project inference 
patterns from source domain to target domain”.148 A metaphor is, by its very nature, non-literal, 
meaning that their use will generally obscure the target because of the influence of the source. 
Metaphors interact with other figures of speech – such as metonymies and binaries – to 
communicate subliminal meanings by drawing on the unconscious emotional association of 
words.149 In effect, they are a shortcut to comprehension. The counterinsurgent is likely to use 
metaphors for the same reason as binaries, they are able to provide comprehension, reducing 
confusion in their support audience and thus making the communicator appear more capable. 
They are also able to direct anger and help mobilise support, they have a persuasive effect.150 
 
2.9 REACTIVE AND DELIBERATIVE NARRATIVES 
The argument, then, is that not all of a counterinsurgent’s communication output will be focused 
on a narrative that is of strategic utility with regard to the insurgent support population. Rather, 
there will be two distinct narratives in the counterinsurgent’s communication that have different 
utilities for different audiences. After an attack, the counterinsurgent’s main priority will be 
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communicating with their own support population, addressing their confusion and concern and 
directing their anger. Then, over time, this reactive narrative will fade as the emotive impact of 
the attack declines, being replaced by a more deliberative narrative that is focused on 
communicating in a manner that is of strategic utility for the counterinsurgency, with this balance 
depending on the government and state’s interests and obligations as well as the 
counterinsurgent’s stake in the conflict. 
 
Alexander and Klein talk of a three phase model for how a community reacts to terrorism – 
reaction, recoil and reorganization. In the first phase, most people are stunned and numb; by the 
second phase, they seek to make sense of what happened, looking for order and control; in the 
third phase, there is a mixture of adjustment and relapse, though with increasing resilience and 
positive outcomes.151 This sequence provides insight into how the counterinsurgent responds 
using these two narratives. The first phase is silence as they prepare their communications, the 
second phase is marked by a reactive narrative and the third phase is a mixture of adjustment 
back to a deliberative narrative with relapses of the reactive framing gradually diminishing.  
 
The reason the third phase is referred to as an ‘adjustment back’ is that the deliberative narrative 
is the pragmatic communication that is largely produced by the technocratic components of the 
government and state, the analysts and scholars who advise on, study and fight 
counterinsurgency. As such, it would be produced in a relatively consistent and ongoing manner, 
with some spikes in frequency depending on context. This is why it has been termed 
‘deliberative’, as it is the product of considered thought and preparation. In contrast, the reactive 
narrative is viewed as situation-specific, crafted by the political element of the government and 
occurring in the immediate wake of an attack. This is why it has been termed ‘reactive’, because it 
is seen as an expedient response to an anomalous situation. The division between reactive and 
deliberative is highly significant, not just in content and in usage patterns but also in terms of 
strategic utility. The mixture of reactive and deliberative narratives means that a 
counterinsurgent’s communication will be of varying utility for different audiences. The reactive 
narrative is hypothesised to lack in utility with regard to the insurgent support population as it is 
exclusive, while the deliberative narrative would have a mixed utility for the domestic support 
population – while its restrained, constricted, nuanced and literal nature would actually help 
ameliorate the fear from the attack, it would not deliver the same mobilisation that the 
counterinsurgent needs because of those very qualities. In other words, the argument is that 
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while the deliberative narrative addresses fear in the domestic support population, it would not 
help with the confusion, concern and anger.  
 
Betz believes counterinsurgents “do not focus enough effort on winning and maintaining the 
hearts and minds of the most critical and accessible population: [their] own.”152 This has been 
true of the population-centric approach to counterinsurgency. Also though, this approach has 
ignored the counterinsurgent’s nature as a pre-existing political actor. Gompert explains:  
 
“There is an undeniable need to maintain domestic support for global COIN… However, 
domestic words, before uttered, must be weighed for their potential effects on the 
perpetuation of jihad. Demonizing Islamic fundamentalism, however tempting and 
gratifying, is not needed to gain domestic support for COIN, which should be based on 
concern for security, not on hatred. It risks being interpreted as a condemnation of 
Islam.”153  
 
Here he is starting to untangle the major issues, that there are different audiences with different 
requirements, though the reality is even more complex. Any analysis of counterinsurgent 
communication must take a number of aspects into account: the counterinsurgent as a pre-
existing political actor, the mixture of audiences and the varying utility between these audiences 
that mean that there are two highly contrasting narratives deployed during counterinsurgent 
communication. These factors create an interesting set of dynamics and it is the aim of this thesis 
to explore these dynamics using the NZ Government’s counterinsurgent communication during 
a ten year period during what will be called the International Campaign Against Terrorism 
(ICAT), from September 11, 2001, until September 2011.  
 
2.10 AIMS OF THE THESIS 
The main aim of this thesis is to examine NZ’s counterinsurgent communication to assess the 
existence of deliberative and reactive narratives and consider their utility on a number of key 
audiences, specifically the insurgent support population, the domestic audience and the allied 
audience. There are a number of consequent hypotheses that will be explored: 
 
 The counterinsurgent’s communication will be a mixture of deliberative and reactive 
narratives and these will compromise the justness of their cause and, consequently, their 
legitimacy as a counterinsurgent. 
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 The frequency of the reactive narrative will be higher during events, it will be higher for 
more deadly and shocking attacks, it will be higher for attacks on NZ’s allies and over the 
entire course of the period the reactive frequency will drop from 2001, while the 
deliberative narrative will be used with a consistent frequency over the period. 
 The reactive narrative will be used more frequently when there is a wider international 
audience than a domestic audience while the deliberative narrative will be used more 
frequently when there is a domestic audience rather than wider audience.  
 The reactive narrative components will be of limited utility for the insurgent audience, 
mixed utility for the domestic audience and utility for the allied audience, and the 
deliberative narrative will be of utility for the insurgent support audience, mixed utility 
for the domestic audience and of limited utility for allied audience.  
 The reactive narrative will predominantly focus on problem/enemy framing tasks while 
the deliberative narrative will predominantly focus on actor and solution framing tasks. 
 
The focus will now turn to methods, specifically framing theory and content analysis, an outline 





The thesis will use framing theory as the main analytical framework as it focuses on both the 
construction and perception of communication, making it ideal as the key tool of examination. 
Framing’s other significant advantage is that it is incredibly flexible, providing numerous 
components that can be selected to tailor the analytical framework with precision. This chapter will 
also provide information on several other key methodological aspects as well, namely: audience 
selection, research method and the data set. The audience selection section will examine the target 
populations that will be the focus of the thesis. The research method section will then explain how 
content analysis will be used to examine the data, how the data set was selected, the source of the 




Framing is a cluster of theories and analytical techniques focused on understanding and examining 
how individuals and groups set agendas, built on an understanding of the creation and perception of 
communication. Frames are “basic cognitive structures which guide the perception and 
representation of reality”, they work like physical frames, focusing attention in some areas while 
simultaneously occluding others.1 Framing has been chosen as it is the “conscious strategic efforts by 
groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and 
motivate collective action.”2 Framing, therefore, has obvious utility, as counterinsurgent 
communication is the strategic effort to mobilise support and justify action. However, the 
‘consciousness’ of the communication should not be overplayed, as while the counterinsurgent does 
generally chose what they say very carefully this does not mean all of their communication is so 
carefully curated; still, counterinsurgent communication has a strategic focus, which encapsulates 
this aspect better – it is objective-focused. As Desrosiers writes: “One of framing’s strengths over 
terms such as ‘discourse’ or ‘narrative’ is its ability to capture the strategic side of communication.”3 
Framing is also a theory of communication, one that provides a nuanced and thorough examination 
of how communication is created and perceived.4 Framing allows analysis of how the “influence 
over a human consciousness is exerted by the transfer (or communication) of information from one 
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location – such as a speech, utterance, news report, or novel – to that consciousness.”5  
 
Framing is comprised of many connected theories and techniques and an outline of these will help 
provide its full scope. Benford and Snow, quoting framing’s original theorist, Goffman, define 
frames as a “‘schemata of interpretation’ that enable individuals ‘to locate, perceive, identify, and 
label’ occurrences within their life space and the world at large.”6 They focus on the individual’s use 
of frames to comprehend situations and events, but frames are also a powerful tool in shaping 
interpretation. Gitlin believes frames are “principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation 
composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters.”7 Entman 
further emphasises framing’s focus on creation and control: “To frame is to select some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote 
a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation.”8 The use of the word ‘select’ by both Gitlin and Entman is important in outlining 
framing’s full spectrum: with regard to communication reception, frames are a subconscious, 
internalised method of individual interpretation, while for communication creation they are viewed 
as a generally overt and deliberate method of controlling interpretation, though there are also 
subconscious aspects in creation as well. In some sense, these two positions can be explained 
through differences in individual role and functionality. For an individual interpreting events, a 
frame is essentially subconscious, for those attempting to diagnose a problem, attribute blame and 
propose a solution, framing is a selective, conscious process. Thus, for an active event framer, rather 
than an event decoder, framing can be used to shape other interpretations. In this way, framing is 
both a methodology for analysis and a tool for influencing interpretation: awareness of the process 
of framing as an internalised process enables both analysis and influence. 
 
It is also important to note that frames are found throughout the process of communication, they 
are in the text or words, they are also in the minds of those who are communicating and those who 
are being communicated too and they are also found in a culture.9 Frames are not, in Benford’s 
words, “‘things’ rather… [they are] dynamic processes associated with their social construction, 
negotiation, contestation, and transformation.”10 Carragee and Roefs’ outline of the various foci of 
media framing studies neatly encapsulates the full spectrum which frames inhabit: “framing research 
examines how frames are sponsored by political actors, how journalists employ frames in the 
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construction of news stories, how these stories articulate frames and how audience members 
interpret these frames.”11 Frames are a hybrid concept, they exist within people’s minds and they 
appear in texts and speeches, they can be intentionally built and can also exist subconsciously.12 The 
success or failure of a frame will often come down to how well the frame within the discourse 
matches the audiences’ internal frame, a concept called resonance.  
 
Framing is not without fault. As one of the leading framing scholars writes, “we have failed to 
demonstrate that one of our central theoretical constructs – collective action frames – affects 
mobilization.”13 Another area in which framing is lacking is the role of emotion.14 Benford states 
that framing has “neglected a vital social movement resource—emotions [and consequently] ignored 
the possibility of examining the ways in which movement actors produce, orchestrate, and 
strategically deploy emotions in pursuit of their collective goals.”15 Likewise, Buechler writes that 
this “lack of attention to emotions prevents framing from convincingly explaining how people 
actually become motivated to act collectively.”16 Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta explain that 
“[e]motions are a part of all social action, yet they have been given little or no place in most social-
scientific theories.”17 The absence of emotion is problematic, “[s]ocial movement scholars 
increasingly argue for the centrality of emotions in movement theories”, and this will be one area of 
adaptation for the thesis.18 As will be shown below, another key concept in framing, resonance, has 
been criticized as a tautological concept. However, despite these problems, framing provides a useful 
toolkit for the analysis of NZ’s counterinsurgent communication during the ICAT. As Reese writes, 
“[f]raming’s value, however, does not hinge on its potential as a unified research domain but… as a 
provocative model that bridges parts of the field that need to be in touch with each other: 
quantitative and qualitative, empirical and interpretive, psychological and sociological, and academic 
and professional” concluding that “framing is more of a research program than a unified paradigm 
and that theoretical diversity has been beneficial in developing a comprehensive understanding of 
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the process.”19 Thus, framing’s adaptation to suit the current project’s needs is justified as it 
usefulness is balanced out by its flexibility.  
 
As stated, framing is used across a variety of academic disciplines for a variety of different 
purposes.20 The two that are most relevant for the study of insurgents and counterinsurgents are 
collective action frames (CAF) and substantive news frames (SNF). CAFs come from the study of 
social movements and focus on how these movements mobilise support, while SNFs originate in 
media studies and are concerned with how influence makers, such as politicians and the media shape 
perceptions. While CAFs main purpose is to urge action, SNFs generally make a moral judgement. 
Pisoiu opted to use CAFs rather than SNFs in her analysis of counter-terrorist communication 
because “frame conceptualisation in media studies is somewhat limited, as it only refers to a process 
of ‘selection’, rather than formulation anew” whereas “[t]he conceptualisation of social movements 
frames is more precise in terms of identifying framing functions: diagnostic, prognostic and 
motivational” and that “frame analysis in social movements has a clear focus on the act of 
‘persuasion’ rather than ‘agenda-setting’.”21 In sum, while SNFs are focused on selection as a means 
of agenda setting, CAFs are formulated with the aim of persuading and mobilising their target 
audiences, which is of greater congruence with the methods and aims of the counterinsurgent. 
Therefore, while SNF literature has been used during the above general discussion of framing, CAF 
literature will be used exclusively during the following examination, both because it has a greater 
utility for the thesis and also to ensure theoretical and methodological clarity. The rest of this section 
will focus on outlining how framing can be used as an analytical framework, with a focus on the 
aspects of framing that will be used in this thesis, rather than on every component of framing 
theory, as there are a number of aspects that are either not relevant or too complex for the project. 22  
 
3.1.1 FRAMING AS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
There are a number of framing aspects that need to be discussed to outline how framing can 
function as a useful analytical framework. First, the section will examine the levels of analysis of 
framing, explaining what framing tasks, frames and masterframes are, as this forms the project’s 
overarching analytical division. Then the concept of resonance will be examined, as this is the means 
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of gauging the efficacy of a frame. Benford and Snow outline six key mechanisms through which 
this functions, as grouped into the two categories of salience and credibility.23 Thus, while the levels 
of analysis provide the analytical structure, resonance is the tool of analysis used within this 
analytical structure.  
 
3.1.2 LEVELS OF ANALYSIS  
One of the most important aspects of framing that needs to be discussed is the various levels at 
which frames can be found. Framing is a dynamic concept, one found throughout the 
communication process, and frames themselves function at different levels, from specific to 
general.24 A frame can be a means of identifying a particular problem or solution, it can be a specific 
composite of these diagnostic, prognostic and mobilising components and it can be a deeply 
embedded composite that has a wider applicability.25 
 
At the micro-level, frames have a number of different functions. This can be seen in Benford and 
Snow’s explanation: “Collective action frames are constructed in part as movement adherents 
negotiate a shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need 
of change, make attributions regarding who or what is to blame, articulate an alternative set of 
arrangements, and urge others to act in concert to affect change.”26 According to Snow and 
Benford, CAFs have four key tasks: identifying a problem, apportioning blame, proposing a solution 
and mobilising support.27 It should be noted that Gamson identified three framing tasks, identity, 
injustice and agency, wherein identity refers to who the collective action group is, injustice refers to 
what the problem is and agency refers to what the group are going to do about the problem; these 
are similar to Snow and Benford’s, with the obvious addition of actor framing.28 These ‘framing 
tasks’ provide a method of deconstructing the discourse into manageable analytic ‘chunks’. 
 
While they are often called ‘framing tasks’, they are really frames in their own right. This can be seen 
in a number of quotes from leading theorists: Zuo and Benford: “framed their grievances in 
[counter]revolutionary terms”; Cress and Snow: “Diagnostic framing is important”; “diagnostic and 
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prognostic frames”; and finally, Noakes: “the FBI framed the threat”.29 This apparent duality is not due to 
incoherence within framing but rather because framing is not bound to a single level. Frames are 
made up out of frames. There is a hierarchy to framing and this segment will make this stratification 
explicit so that the interactions between these levels can be recognised during analysis. Framing tasks 
are lower hierarchy frames that have a single function, such as diagnosing the problem, ascribing 
blame, identifying the enemy, describing the actors or proscribing the solution. Both the reactive and 
deliberative chapters will focus on examining individual framing tasks separately, the rest of this 
section will explain the exact division. Thus, at a practical level, while generally speaking ‘framing 
tasks’ will be used, sometimes they will be referred to as ‘frames’.  
 
Many projects use either Benford and Snow’s four or Gamson’s three framing tasks, as outlined 
above, to divide the discourse up for analysis. This thesis will combine both, with an emphasis on 
the former. The reason for this is while Benford and Snow’s is seen as having greater congruency 
with counterinsurgency, the counterinsurgent is both a pre-existing political actor and a 
counterinsurgent, meaning actors are important.30 Including the framing of the actors enables the 
thesis to examine how the counterinsurgent frames themselves, their allies, their enemies and the 
victims, and it enables important relationships such as those between the enemy and the allies and 
between the enemy and the victims to be explored. The way the actors are framed is just as 
important as the way the problem, blame and solution are framed, so these three divisions will be 
included, though the enemy framing will be conducted as a part of the problem framing as these are 
often difficult to separate.  
 
The division of the analysis at the framing tasks level is: 
 Problem/Enemy: identifies and describes the threat and the enemy that poses the threat 
 Blame/Ideology: identifies and ascribes blame, both direct and indirect, including ideological 
components. 
 Actors/Victim: identifies and describes the counterinsurgent and its allies as well as victims. 
 Strategy/Solution: identifies and describes the strategies and solutions used to overcome the 
threat; that is, in military parlance, ways and ends.  
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While the majority of the actual analysis will be conducted at the framing task level, this is not the 
only level of examination and it is important to tease these out as they will become important when 
the paper seeks to come to conclusions.  
 
3.1.3 COMPOSITE FRAMES AND MASTERFRAMES 
CAFs are composite frames, they are frames constructed from framing tasks. Snow and Benford 
explain: “Collective action frames are constructed” with framing tasks, they are frames designed for 
a specific purpose, mobilising collective action.31 These composite frames bring the various framing 
tasks into a functional whole, using the description of the problem, attribution of blame, 
identification of actors and delineation of solution as a means of achieving an outcome. Benford 
explains that “most collective action frames are context specific”, listing examples like the “drunk 
driver frame, cold war frame, exploited worker frame, [and] environmental justice frame”.32 They are 
a mutually supporting set of frames that together fulfil the required tasks needed to achieve a chosen 
objective, be it mobilising support, in the case of CAF, or shaping opinion, in the case of SNF. 
While framing tasks have a single duty, such as outlining a problem, CAFs and SNFs are a grouping 
of these framing tasks that taken together facilitate an overall outcome. 
  
Then there are masterframes, these are composite frames that “are so pervasive that they can be 
used in almost any situation, and…. posses a superior credibility, in that [they have] moved beyond 
empirical scrutiny.”33 With respect to CAFs, it is said that masterframes “are simply collective action 
frames writ large that are adopted by multiple social movements”.34 Swart thinks this definition is 
tautological; for him, masterframes are “symbolic frames that are culturally resonant to their 
historical 57ilieu”, they are “defined by [their] resonance with the cultural, political or historical 
57ilieu in which it emerges rather than its adoption by other social movements”, such that the civil 
rights masterframe is one because of its cultural resonance with the postwar optimism rather than 
because it was used by many movements.35 While Swart’s definition helps explain why masterframes 
dominate, because they strike a chord with a deeply embedded value, worldview, belief or trait 
within a society, there is middle ground between the two definitions. A masterframe is based on 
these symbolic frames that underpin a society or culture, adapted for use by the framer. The 
masterframe is constructed using these underlying symbolic frames, repurposed for a specific 
objective. A masterframe is a successful frame, a generic frame that is widely resonant and is able to 
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encapsulate and explain a diverse array of scenarios within a certain field or area.36 Generally, a 
masterframe is a set of ideas, beliefs or values that is widespread, culturally embedded and is also 
flexible and inclusive enough to serve in a vast number of roles.37  
 
While framing tasks perform a single duty, masterframes are the generalist, they connect to values, 
beliefs and ideas that are dominant within a society or culture, situated between these two extremes 
are objective-focused frames, such as CAFs, which bring together various framing tasks and will 
often use and adapt masterframes to achieve a desired outcome. This connection can be seen in 
Johnston and Noakes: “An innovative masterframe, for example, can spark derivative collective 
action frames and tactical innovations at the initiation of a cycle.”38 The composite frames examined 
in this thesis are the reactive and deliberative. While they are built using masterframes, they are 
objective-focused, tailoring the masterframes to their specific context. These composite 
‘counterinsurgent frames’ will be examined through their framing tasks before being assessed as 
wholes afterwards. There are two counterinsurgent frames considered here: reactive 
counterinsurgent frames (RCFs) and deliberative counterinsurgent frames (DCFs). Because these are 
two distinct frames (built using two distinct narratives) they require independent analysis in their 
own separate chapters. Thus, the two research chapters will examine RCFs and DCFs individually.  
 
3.1.4 RESONANCE  
Resonance is another key aspect of framing. While the framing tasks will form the main analytical 
division, the various aspects of resonance will be used to examine each framing task. Resonance is a 
central framing concept, it refers to the efficacy of a frame, its ability to strike a chord and become 
an interpretive shortcut.39 As Williams writes: “Some frames ‘work’ better than others because they 
resonate with audiences who are prepared to hear the claim, or have experiences commensurate with 
the claims being made. In this sense resonance is the ‘fit’ between frames and audiences’ previous 
beliefs, worldviews and life experiences.”40 There are two sets of interrelated factors that account for 
a collective action frame’s resonance: the credibility of the frame and its salience.41 Credibility comes 
from three factors: frame consistency, empirical credibility and the credibility of the frame 
articulators. Salience also has three dimensions: centrality, experiential commensurability and 
narrative fidelity.  
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Benford notes resonance remains a somewhat tautological concept, a frame is said to work if it has 
resonance, and it has resonance if it worked, explaining “most scholars who have employed the 
concept have failed to operationalize frame resonance independent of its efforts.”42 Thus, the term 
‘resonance’ will not be used in the research chapters, but rather, the six components will be utilised 
as the key analytical tools. As it stands, resonance is difficult to measure; however, this is not a major 
problem as while the counterinsurgent cannot ever fully quantify resonance (something which is 
obviously impossible), this does not mean it is a useless concept as they can still ‘estimated’ 
resonance. That is, they can make a calculated guess on whether or not their frames will have 
resonance with a particular audience based on an understanding of that audience’s cultural narrative, 
values, beliefs, day-to-day experiences and the many other factors that feed into this realm. In short, 
while some have decried the failure to operationalise resonance, ‘estimated’ resonance provides a set 
of measures by which to examine communication. Thus, while some argue that resonance is 
“extremely vague” as an academic theory, as a tool of analysis it delivers a degree of utility largely 
because it provides six factors with which to examine discourse.43 This thesis will use resonance in 
the same way, as a six-pronged tool for examining the resonance of each framing task through a 
wide array of metrics, which will be explained below. 
 
Below are the six key qualities of resonance – the italicised term in each description will serve as the 
signifying tag throughout the thesis to indicate which aspect of resonance is being considered, 
though in some cases the division will be more arbitrary than in other examples as there is a 
considerable crossover between these various qualities.  
 
3.1.4.1 CREDIBILITY 
3.1.4.1.1 EMPIRICAL CREDIBILITY 
Empirical credibility refers to the accuracy between a frame and real world events; the frame doesn 
not have to be ‘true’ but it must be able to be an accurate portrayal.44 This requires the framer to be 
perceived as telling the ‘truth’. The key focus here will be on whether the frames can be discredited. 
For the purpose of this thesis, this is taken as the most elementary of the credibility measures and 
will be measured by assessing whether the framing task can be proven to be untrue or, at a 
minimum, whether there are some major issues with its apparent veracity.  
 
3.1.4.1.2 CONSISTENCY 
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Consistency can be broken into two components: consistency across frames and between frames 
and actions.45 For a frame to resonate with its target audiences, it must match reality, or rather the 
audience’s perception of reality, and it also must match the previous framing, and any contradictions 
negatively impact the resonance of the frame. The key focus when examining individual framing 
tasks will be accuracy with events, while the final conclusions will bring in the consistency across frames. 
Here, accuracy will be assessed not just by whether the framing can be discredited, as this adds 
nothing extra to the analysis; rather, it will also assess how precisely the frame explains the situation, 
meaning it will not just gauge how consistent the frame is with reality but how much it says. 
Accuracy comes from not just what is said but how much is said about it; the more information 
given about a topic the more accurate the portrayal, all other things equal. 
 
3.1.4.1.3 ARTICULATOR CREDIBILITY 
The final element of credibility involves the perceived credibility of the frame articulators, with 
variables such as status and knowledge considered important.46 As Benford and Snow explain: 
“Hypothetically, the greater the status and/or perceived expertise of the frame articulator and/or the 
organization they represent from the vantage point of potential adherents and constituents, the 
more plausible and resonant the framings or claims.”47 Here, the articulator possesses credibility 
because they are an elected politician, so the key focus will be on how informative the frame is with 
regard to insurgency and counterinsurgency. That is, whether the information provided is congruent 
with theories and principles on insurgency as well as counterinsurgent best practice, as this is a 
means of communicating expertise. This is not to say that the key audiences necessarily have an in-
depth understanding of these theories and principles, but rather that that by using these in their 
communication the counterinsurgent will appear to have a greater articulator credibility as they 
display technical knowledge and, in turn, the use of this technical knowledge will ensure a 
consistency across time and with events. These principles have essentially been honed over years, in 




Centrality refers to how essential the beliefs, values and ideas associated with the frames are to the 
target audiences.48 The closer the espoused beliefs, values and ideas are to the audience, the greater 
the hypothesised resonance of the frame. The focus then will be on the appeal of the frame to the 
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audience based on the ‘beliefs, values and ideas’ of the audience.49 The thesis will assess this by 
attempting to gauge whether a framing task aligns with the beliefs, values and ideas of the various 
target audiences.  
 
3.1.4.2.2 EXPERIENTIAL COMMENSURABILITY 
Experiential commensurability focuses on whether the frames are congruent with the experiences of 
the targets of mobilisation.50 This factor requires that frames are not too abstract or divergent from 
the audiences’ lives. The focus here, then, will be on whether the frame matches the audience’s 
experiences. To examine this, the thesis will assess whether the framing task is congruent with either 
the direct daily experiences of an audience or of their indirect historical experiences, though the later 
blends into narrative fidelity.  
 
3.1.4.2.3 NARRATIVE FIDELITY 
Narrative fidelity is concerned with the cultural resonance of the frames, how well they resonate 
with the target audiences’ cultural narrations, their myths and stories about themselves. The focus 
here is on how well the frame fits with the audience’s perception of themselves. However, the thesis 
will not just consider the deeply embedded cultural narratives, but will also include specific 
narratives about the ICAT, broadening the scope of this component. In particular, it will focus on 
the dominant narratives of the two key protagonists: al Qaeda and the US.  
 
3.1.5 APPLICATION OF THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
This section will outline how this analytical framework will be applied to each framing task in 
practice. The aim is to provide a clear, consistent referent for analysis, a structure that will be used 
throughout the thesis to ensure that every framing task is examined in the same manner using the 
same criteria. There will be two main sections for each examination of framing tasks throughout the 
thesis: content and audiences. Each has a slightly different focus and this will be explained below. It 
is important to note that each framing task will be examined using the content and audience 
division, not every single aspect mentioned below will be examined for each framing task as not all 
always relevant.  
 
3.1.5.1 CONTENT 
The content section is intent on examining the credibility of the framing task. To reduce repetition, 
rather than examine these separately for each audience these aspects have been placed together, as in 
almost every case there is little meaningful difference across audiences. While this may sometimes 
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result in broader generalisations, in the interests of space and avoiding repetition it is necessary. 
Even though these are examined separately from the audiences, they will be referenced in the 
audience sections where relevant and this will help remediate any generalisation.  
 
This section will focus on gauging whether the framing task can be discredited, whether it is accurate 
and whether it is informative. Credibility has a close proximity with three of the five qualities of 
reactive and deliberative narratives, specifically literal/figurative, nuanced/absolute and 
constricted/hyperbolic, as these are all qualities that help determine whether a framing task is 
perceived as true, comes across as precise and is based on technical knowledge. Thus, it will use 
these three narrative qualities as means of assessing the three components of credibility. To examine 
these, the thesis will use a variety of means, including using situation-based evidence, well-regarded 
COIN literature, the internal logic of the framing task itself and the appearance of any ‘say-do’ gap 
between rhetoric and reality. The framing tasks vary from single words to larger sentence fragments 
and each has a differing scope, requiring a flexible approach.  
 
3.1.5.2 AUDIENCE 
The audience section will examine the salience of the framing task with regard to each specific 
audience as well as the emotional impact and the mobilising, justifying and legitimising outcomes. 
The remaining two reactive and deliberative narrative qualities – restrained/emotive and 
inclusive/exclusive – will be used in this section as they have a congruency, specifically 
restrained/emotive with emotional impact and inclusive/exclusive with mobilisation, justification 
and legitimisation. Unlike the content section, it will focus on each audience individually and, where 
applicable, will also use the analysis from the content section. While salience is derived from framing 
resonance, the other aspects are sourced from elsewhere and need some extra explanation.  
 
Salience combines the framing elements of centrality, experiential commensurability and narrative 
fidelity. The reason these have all been placed into a single category is they are felt to have a high 
degree of similarity and, as there is no direct way for the thesis to measure any one of them, they are 
more useful as a single analytical category than as three separate but similar ones. Decisions on 
salience will be made using studies on national/religious narratives and characters, opinion polls and 
survey information, as well as informed supposition based on audience generalisations, which will be 
outlined in a section below. It is recognised that this will often involve simplification, though 
perceived salience is still a useful metric. Depending on the specific framing task, one, two or all 
three of the aspects of framing salience will be examined and, in some cases, the salience will be 




The need to control emotion comes largely from COIN theory, though, as noted, some framing 
theorists have indicated that it is a lacuna in the approach. As has already been examined, emotion is 
central to insurgency and counterinsurgency and the emotive impact of the framing task will be 
gauged for each audience (except for the allied audience, where emotion is of limited importance, 
something examined in the following section). For the insurgent audience the sole emotion 
considered will be whether the framing task could provoke anger, as this is the key means of 
alienating them from the counterinsurgent’s cause. For the domestic audience, the four emotions 
examined will be fear, confusion, concern and anger because, as explained in the previous chapter, 
these are considered the key emotions caused by terrorist attacks. To gauge these emotional impacts, 
the previous analyses regarding the content of the framing task and its salience will be used, as well 
as any useful polls or opinion that will help inform these assessments.  
 
There are several key desired outcomes of counterinsurgent framing and the final analysis for each 
audience will be assessing whether the framing task would mobilise the domestic audience, and 
whether it would justify the counterinsurgent policies and actions for all audiences and whether they 
would legitimise the counterinsurgent as an actor for the insurgent and domestic audiences, which 
will be explained in below. Before this, however, a working understanding of what is meant by these 
three terms is needed.51 First, mobilisation, which comes from framing. Generally speaking, the 
social or political mobilisation referred to in the CAF literature is focused on marshalling active 
support for the cause in question.52 As Benford and Snow explain, ultimately CAFs are intended to 
“urge others to act in concert to affect change” by bringing together ‘consensus mobilisation’ and 
‘action mobilisation’, which foster agreement and participation, respectively.53 The counterinsurgent 
is primarily interested in consensus mobilisation, so for the thesis ‘mobilising’ refers to the 
counterinsurgent marshalling support for political and military action.  
 
Justification and legitimisation are closely connected. As noted, legitimacy is the primary goal in a 
‘classical’ insurgency. For a state, legitimacy is the right and authority to govern; however, in 
situations where the counterinsurgent is not the state the insurgent is trying to take over or secede 
from, greater nuance is needed as, in this case, legitimacy is not as for the insurgent support 
audience and is only directly relevant for the domestic support audience. This is why justification is 
being considered as a metric as well. An outline of the two will help differentiate how they are 
relevant for the contemporary counterinsurgent. Nachbar explains that COIN doctrine generally 
focuses on pragmatic measurements rather than technical definitions, before explaining that 
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counterinsurgent legitimacy hinges on the legality and authority of a political actor, actualised in the 
compliance and consent of the governed.54 Barnes also refers to legality and authority in his 
definition of legitimacy for COIN, but goes on to explain that legitimacy reflects “cultural values 
and define[s] public perceptions of what is right and proper for a government and its military 
forces” before stating that this “creates a double standard of legitimacy for US COIN operations: 
they must have public support in both the US and in the area of operations.”55 On the other hand, 
Simmons explains that “[j]ustifying an act [or] a strategy typically involves showing it to be 
prudentially rational, morally acceptable, or both”.56 More specifically, Utting states that using 
“military force to counter insurgency requires justification and thus the use of this force has to be 
seen to be both proportionate and legitimate.”57 The key difference, then, is that while legitimacy is 
focused on how ‘right and proper’ the actor appears, justification regards the perception of how 
‘right and proper’ the actions or policies of an actor appear. There is a high degree of shared ground 
here, with each influencing the other. The legitimacy of an actor can make their actions or policies 
appear more justified and the apparent justification of an actor’s actions or policies can have an 
impact on their legitimacy. That said, as it rests in the actor, legitimacy is a more holistic, and in 
many cases justification is a component of legitimacy. In practice, this means that generally 
justification is taken as a component of legitimacy for the counterinsurgent and while the former is 
more likely to be impacted by the counterinsurgent communication the latter is more impervious. 
How these two terms will be assessed will be outlined for each audience below.  
 
The three concepts are similar and, in fact, Barnes uses ‘support’ above in reference to legitimacy, a 
number of social mobilisation theorists explain that CAFs ‘inspire and legitimate’, while Tarrow 
notes that CAFs “justify, dignify and animate collective action”, so some differentiation between 
them is required.58 Essentially, in COIN all three are focused on ensuring allegiance for the 
counterinsurgent cause, but while legitimisation emphasises the need for the actor to appear ‘right 
and proper’ and justification is focused on the actions and policies appearing ‘right and proper’, 
mobilisation is not always as bound regarding ‘rightness and properness’ and, therefore, the thesis 
will focus on the ‘inspire’ aspect of mobilisation noted above to help distinguish it from 
legitimisation and justification. This difference also suggests another useful distinction, mobilisation 
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is a more active if intermittent form of support while legitimisation is a more passive yet ongoing 
type of allegiance, with justification between the two, less constant than legitimisation yet requiring a 
greater consistency than mobilisation.  
 
The reason the domestic audience is the only one considered for mobilisation is that it is critical for 
the counterinsurgent to secure support from their population, they are the counterinsurgent’s 
support audience after all. Justification is important for all three audiences, though for the allied 
actor this is as much about the justification of their own actions and policies to the domestic 
audience. Legitimacy is important for both the insurgent and domestic support audiences. For the 
insurgent audience, it is important as the counterinsurgent needs to appear to be the right and 
proper actor to be conducting an insurgency, while for the domestic audience it connects to the 
government’s general appearance of legitimacy as well as their rightness as a counterinsurgent. To 
gauge the mobilisation and legitimisation potential of a framing task, the previous aspects of both 
content and audience examination will be considered. Judging the mobilising, justifying and 
legitimising potential of a statement will be made by assessing the relative impact of these various 
factors, though often the impact on mobilisation, justification and legitimacy will be determined by a 
single standout aspect that trumps the other factors. A brief outline of how these work for each 
audience will help flesh out how this will function in the thesis.  
 
For the insurgent support audience, both justification and legitimisation are important, though as 
they are connected they will not always both be considered. Generally, the analysis will consider 
whichever is most relevant to the particular framing task. Justifying the counterinsurgent’s actions 
and policies and legitimising their status as a counterinsurgent actor is critical with regard to the 
insurgent support population, but the delegitimisation of the insurgent’s cause is equally important. 
As explored in the previous chapter, in some cases apathy towards their own cause is generally the 
best the counterinsurgent can hope for with regard to many in the insurgent support population. 
Legitimacy is relative and if the counterinsurgent’s cause is shown to be lacking this will increase the 
insurgent’s legitimacy. Whatever legitimises one cause helps delegitimise the other. Thus, while in 
some cases the impact on the justification and legitimacy of the counterinsurgent’s actions, policies 
and status will be considered through direct influences, in other cases they will be indirect. Also, 
because the insurgent wants to be perceived as a legitimate political authority, anything that infers 
they have the tangible or intangible capacity for this objective will be taken as legitimising.  
 
Mobilisation, justification and legitimacy are all essential for the domestic audience, they are, after all, 
the key support audience. They need the support for their political and military action, they want it 
to be perceived as right and proper and they want to be seen as the right and proper actor. As with 
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the insurgent support audience, the cross over between justification and legitimisation means that 
often only the most relevant will be examined for a particular framing task. Generally speaking, this 
means that justification will be the primary focus of the two, with legitimacy generally considered 
when the justness of the counterinsurgent’s cause may impact their legitimacy. One important aspect 
must be mentioned: these three forms of support have a degree of conflict, in that often a framing 
task that is considered to deliver mobilisation may have some negative impacts on justification and 
legitimacy, and vice versa. This, also, will be examined during the main body of the thesis, but it 
plays an important role in the usage of reactive and deliberative counterinsurgent frames.  
 
For the allied audience, the analysis will consider how the communication justified US actions and 
policies and whether the framing mobilised the NZ audience, as this has utility for the US cause, 
assessing whether the framing task had a positive or negative impact on the alliance between the US 
and NZ For NZ, one of the key counterinsurgent communication tasks is balancing ‘alliance 
maintenance’ with actor differentiation. That is, between justifying US actions and policies and 
ensuring that NZ remains distinct from US actions and policies. The point here is that while NZ 
wants to retain and improve its relationship with the US, it also needs to ensure it appears 
independent. Generally speaking, US legitimacy as a counterinsurgent is not contingent on NZ 
actions, at least no to the same degree as justification, which will be the focus here.  
 
3.2 AUDIENCES 
As noted in Chapter 2, modern counterinsurgents need to consider several audiences. During the 
ICAT, the NZ Government was, generally, not the insurgent support population’s government, 
meaning that both the insurgent and domestic support audiences must be considered. It is also 
important to examine the allied audience as NZ was a minor partner in the ICAT and the US were 
the dominant allied actor. Therefore, there are three key audiences for this thesis: the insurgent 
support audience, the domestic audience and the allied actor audience. This section will outline each, 
aiming to justify the necessary generalisations involved.  
 
The insurgent support audience is the largest and most diverse, encompassing roughly a billion 
Muslims. Thus, generalising about the insurgent support audience would seem the most difficult. 
However, Islam is “a complete comprehensive way of life” meaning any statement that has an 
impact on Islam or Islamic values, beliefs or identity can be assumed to have a widespread impact.59 
Nevertheless, some of the most common generalisations need to be explained, though supporting 
evidence will also be given in the main body analysis.  
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First, in practice, the analysis will not focus on ‘all Muslims’ but rather ‘swing voters’. That is, 
supporters who can be persuaded from their allegiance. Within the global Muslim community there 
is a wide range of individual, from active insurgents, to extreme supporters, though to less extreme 
and disengaged individuals through to extreme opponents. It is difficult for the counterinsurgent to 
legitimise their cause or delegitimise the insurgent’s with active insurgents; conversely, those extreme 
opponents are already essentially won over to the counterinsurgent’s cause, while the disengaged 
would be difficult to engage.60 Thus, the majority of the analysis will focus on the extreme and less 
extreme supporters.  
 
Another generalisation is that some Muslims will be sensitive to Western actions, especially with 
regard to their regions and their religion; this comes from the many decades of Western intervention 
in Muslim regions and the ongoing cultural hegemony of the West, the relative ‘decline’ of the Arab 
and Muslim worlds in comparison to the West, the perception of the West’s double standards and 
the negative focus on Muslims following the September 11 attacks.61 This means that while some of 
the analysis may appear to be ‘thin-skinned’, this is derived from the perceived sensitivity of the 
insurgent support population.  
 
Another assumption that is key to the analysis of the insurgent support population is that while it 
can be supposed that as a small actor almost all of NZ’s communications will go unheard and 
unread by the majority of the insurgent support population, their sensitivity means that one mistake 
by the NZ counterinsurgent could have disproportionate effects, such as the riots caused by the 
caricatures of the Prophet by a Danish newspaper and the attacks on the French paper Charlie 
Hebdo also provoked by cartoons.62 Therefore, the analysis will be conducted as if they were reading 
and hearing everything, even though it is acknowledged that this is not necessarily true.  
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The domestic audience refers to the NZ population. While this is a diverse group of individuals, as 
with any nation there are various national characteristics, beliefs, traits and values that can be 
assigned to the NZ population as a whole, though this will not apply equally to everyone. These will 
be referenced during analysis, particularly with regard to NZ’s national narrative, or the overarching 
story New Zealanders have about themselves and their place in the world, including key aspects of 
the NZ ‘identity’. Likewise, references will be made to the NZ national character, or the type of 
qualities that New Zealanders see themselves as having. In short, generalisations will be made and 
while they will not accurately reflect every New Zealander, they reflect the ‘average’ New Zealander. 
These will be backed up by varying surveys, polls and academic works. 
 
Briefly, the NZ national narrative is summarised as the following: NZ is a good international citizen 
that ‘swings above its weight’ when it comes to multilateral fora and collective security, and its 
foreign policy as guided by both principles and pragmatism.63 The NZ national character values the 
qualities of fairness, equality, liberal democracy, ingenuity, independence, hard work and 
‘mateship’.64 Also, it is understood that a certain percentage of the NZ audience are wary, suspicious 
and mistrustful of the US, something that both the National and, in particular, the Labour Party are 
aware of and work to contain.65 With regard to the Labour and National Party, a brief summary of 
their own beliefs and narratives is important as well, particularly as National came to power at the 
end of 2008, giving them three years of counterinsurgent communication. Generally speaking, the 
Labour Party favours a narrative of idealist-internationalism with a focuses on collective security, 
multilateralism, peacekeeping and ‘new’ expanded security concerns while the National Party employ 
a realist-nationalism that emphasises national security, bilateralism, military operations and 
traditional security.66 
 
The allied audience is by far the most narrow, comprising just the American Government and, in 
particular, the Executive Branch. The US Government was the most important international 
audience because it was the key actor in the conflict, the actor that set the discourse agenda and the 
actor that NZ had, arguably, the most to gain or lose from depending on its own communication. 
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As will be examined, one of Bush’s early pronouncements was that “you are either with us or against 
us” – a phrase that was his “principal legitimation technique”.67  
 
One critical generalisation of the allied audience regards Bush’s original narrative of the ICAT, 
which can best be defined as Manichean – that the US was fundamentally and exceptionally ‘good’ 
and was fighting a ‘war on terror’ against exceptionally ‘evil’ and ‘barbaric’ terrorists who threatened 
US ‘civilisation’ and ‘irrationally hated’ the US because of their ‘freedoms’ and their ‘existence’, 
attacking without ‘justification’ or ‘warning’.68 The ‘global war on terror’ was the floating signifier 
that provided the “holistic superstructure”, organising diverse events “into seamless and coherent 
chapters in the same account.”69 This was not a new narrative, but rather one built from existing 
tropes deeply embedded within the US national narrative, with antecedents in both World War Two 
and the Cold War, though many of the main components date back to the founding of the US.70 
This narrative will be referred to through the analysis and, where relevant, specifics will be given and 
examined. While this was not the sole narrative used by the US during this period, it was the 
defining one, both because it was how the situation was framed from the outset and because it was 
the dominant one; that is, this was the metanarrative of America’s ‘war on terror’, the one that 
provided the ‘holistic superstructure’.71 
 
Generally speaking, the allied audience is only interested in how NZ communication reflects on the 
US. This is because it is focused on its own interests and its aim is for NZ to portray itself as 
relatively independent whilst generally supportive of what the US says with regard to the ICAT. In 
practice, this means that the analysis for this audience will be more limited than for the other two. 
That said, the focus will not be limited to solely examining the allied actor as completely impersonal 
and interest-focused, as there will also be some aspects where the specific individual in power will be 
considered. Because the allied audience is so small, this personalisation is easily justified. President 
Bush was in power when the 9/11 attacks occurred and remained so until the beginning of 2009. In 
many respects, Bush set the tone for the discourse of the ICAT, particularly his Christianity and his 
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predilection for the ‘Wild West’, and where relevant these will be referred to, though only if they 
serve to reinforce US communication.72 
 
3.3 CONTENT ANALYSIS  
The next aspect to be outlined is content analysis, the research method used to examine the data set. 
If framing is the key analytical tool, then content analysis is the device that provides the raw material 
to be assayed. While framing provides the structure and analytical tools, content analysis enables the 
relevant data – specifically, framing tasks – to be extracted from the larger data set. It provides the 
content with which to apply the analytical tools. Content analysis refers to a diverse array of 
quantitative and qualitative analytical methodologies that can be used to examine discourse. It is, as 
Holsti explains, “any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying 
specified characteristics of messages”.73 Content analysis “classifies textual material, reducing it to 
more relevant, manageable bits of data”.74 Content analysis is the “systemic, and replicable 
examination of symbols of communication which have been assigned numeric values according to 
valid measurement rules and the analysis of relationships involving those values using statistical 
methods to describe the communication, draw inferences about its meaning, or infer from the 
communication to its context, both of production and consumption.”75 Hsieh and Shannon write 
that qualitative content analysis is “a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content 
of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or 
patterns”.76 Both approach the process of examining text in a similar way – though qualitative loos 
at context while quantitative generally does not and the qualitative usually develops hypothesis after 
analysis and the latter before – the main difference is in how conclusions are made, with quantitative 
using statistical measures and qualitative making subjective assertions. This thesis will use a mixture 
of both quantitative and qualitative approaches, looking at context and taking both objective and 
subjective conclusions from the data, though it will focus more on the qualitative. The actual 
approach is best explained in practice rather than by outlining the many different possible 
approaches laid out in various texts and guides.  
 
3.3.1 DATA SET SELECTION 
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The data was sourced from the official NZ Government site, www.beehive.govt.nz, using the search 
terms ‘terrorism’, ‘terrorist/s’, ‘Afghanistan’ and ‘Iraq’. Every press release given by the prime 
minister (or acting prime minister, where relevant), the foreign minister and the defence minister 
that contained one or more of these terms and devoted at least 50% of its space to the ICAT, or at 
least 300 words on the ICAT if it was over 600 words long, within the time range of September 
2001 to September 2011, was selected. This data set is relatively comprehensive, containing virtually 
every relevant press release regarding the ICAT. By sampling across 10 years the thesis was able to 
incorporate communications from both the Labour and National Governments who were involved 
in the ICAT. The course of this decade also saw an important shift in the ICAT for NZ and the 
National Party, with the second New Zealand Special Air Service (NZSAS) death in several months 
occurring in September 2011. The decision to include the prime minister (or acting prime minister), 
the foreign minister and the defence minister meant that most important speeches and situations 
were included. The reason speeches that contain at least 300 words regarding the ICAT, where these 
300 words did not comprise at least 50% of the total word count, were included was this meant 
significant speeches like the ones given at Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) to be 
included. These speeches covered numerous topics and would not have made it on the 50% 
threshold but were too important not to be included as they were given to key allies, including the 
US, often in the wake of major events. Also, any press releases relating to counter-terrorism 
measures such as the listing of terrorist entities or new legislation was excluded unless 50% of the 
content was in direct reference to the ICAT as the majority of these press releases were bureaucratic 
and technical in nature. The word counts include the titles of the press releases.  
 
Two datasets were created each containing all press releases. One dataset was used for events and 
the other for annual counts. The first data set split the press releases up into three categories: events, 
wider audience and domestic audience. These events were determined through examination of the 
data set as a whole. Any terrorist attack that received its own press release was considered an event, 
as was any intervention in another state. The exceptions to this were any attacks that occurred in the 
Middle East, aside from Iraq and Turkey – these were all excluded from the data set as a whole. The 
reason for this is that there are a great number of these and while they are relevant it was not 
practical to cover every single one. Iraq was included because it was the site of one of the major 
campaigns of the ICAT and Turkey can, arguably, be seen as ‘transcontinental’, particularly Istanbul, 
where the attack occurred. Furthermore, any attacks in Afghanistan were considered as part of the 
ICAT, rather than as separate events. The reason this was not done for Iraq was that NZ did not 
have a combat function in Iraq, nor was the deployment long enough to be classified as a 






3.3.1 Table 1 – List of events, their dates and the total word count of their press releases: 
Event Dates Word Count 
9/11  (11/09/2001) 1,454 
Afghan Invasion  (07/10/2001) 1,493 
Delhi  (13/12/01) 191 
Bali  (12/10/2002) 1,105 
Iraq Invasion  (19/03/2003) 5,542 
Baghdad (19/08/2003) 926 
Mumbai  (26/08/2003) 224 
Istanbul  (15/11/2003 – 20/11/2003) 133 
Madrid  (11/03/2004) 239 
Jakarta  (09/09/2004) 344 
London  (07/07/2005) 267 
Bali  (02/10/2005) 262 
Mumbai  (11/07/2006) 230 
Delhi  (14/09/2008) 259 
Islamabad  (20/09/2008) 271 
Mumbai  (26/11/2008 – 29/11/2008) 270 
Mumbai  (13/07/2011) 144 
 
All the press releases for each event were put into a single document, while all the press releases 
between chronologically-ordered events were placed into one of two documents depending on 
whether they were given to a domestic audience or a wider international one (this context-based 
division will be explained below). Events to divide the data set is because this project is focused on 
examining whether the counterinsurgent used the reactive narrative more often during events (and 
to wider audiences). However, because there were so many events, and there were vastly varying 
gaps between them, it was also important to break up the press releases into annual documents and 
these counts were used for both the reactive and deliberative analysis as yet another form of 
examination. Each of these events will be examined in the reactive chapter, while the deliberative 
chapter will not have a chronological focus, but will rather examine the varying framing tasks in 
general, though reference to timing will be made within analysis for each framing task. Also, while 
the reactive chapter will provide both overall context counts and yearly context counts, the 
deliberative will only offer the former. Deliberative framing tasks are by far more numerous and the 
yearly counts with have been laborious and were not felt necessary. The events, interims and the cut 










3.3.1 Table 2 – List of events and the interim periods with dates: 
 
  Event/Interim  Date/Period 
9/11  (11/09/2001 – 20/09/2001) 
Afghan, 2001  (21/09/2001 – 07/10/2001) 
Interim: Afghan, 2001 to Delhi, 2001 (07/10/2001 – 12/12/2001) 
Delhi, 2001  (13/12/2001 – 14/12/2001) 
Interim: Delhi, 2001-Bali, 2002 (15/12/2001 – 13/10/2002) 
Bali, 2002  (14/10/2002 – 15/10/2002) 
Bali, 2002 to Iraq, 2003 Interim (16/10/2002 – 11/03/2003) 
Iraq, 2003 (12/03-2003 – 20/03/2003) 
Interim: Iraq, 2003 to Baghdad, 2003  (21/03/2003 – 18/08/2003) 
Baghdad, 2003  (19/08/2003 – 24/09/2003) 
Mumbai, 2003  (26/08/2003) 
Interim: Mumbai, 2003 to Istanbul, 2003  (27/08/2003 – 14/11/2003) 
Istanbul, 2003  (15/11/2003 – 21/11/2003) 
Interim: Istanbul, 2003 to Madrid, 2004  (22/11/2003 – 10/03/2004) 
Madrid, 2004  (11/03/2004 – 12/03/2004) 
Interim: Madrid, 2004 to Jakarta, 2004  (13/03/2004 – 08/09/2004) 
Jakarta, 2004  (09/09/2004) 
Interim: Jakarta, 2004 to London, 2005  (10/09/2004 – 06/07/2005) 
London, 2005  (07/07/2005 – 10/07/2005) 
Interim: London, 2005 to Bali, 2005  (11/07/2005 – 09/10/2005) 
Bali, 2005  (02/10/2005) 
Interim: Bali, 2005 to Mumbai, 2006 (03/10/2005 – 10/07/2006) 
Mumbai, 2006  (11/07/2006 – 12/07/2006) 
Interim: Mumbai, 2006 to Delhi, 2008 (13/07/2006 – 13/09/2008) 
Delhi, 2008  (14/09/2008) 
Interim: Delhi, 2008 to Islamabad, 2008 (15/09/2008 – 19/09/2008) 
Islamabad, 2008  (20/09/2008 – 21/09/2008) 
Interim: Islamabad, 2008 to Mumbai, 2008  (22/09/2008 – 25/11/2008) 
Mumbai, 2008  (26/11/2008 – 29/11/2008) 
Interim: Mumbai, 2008 to Mumbai, 2011  (30/11/2008 – 12/07/2011) 
Mumbai, 2011  (13/07/2011 – 14/07/2011) 





As noted, the press releases were also divided up into one of three ‘contexts’. The first context 
applies to those given during an event. These are press releases given in the immediate wake of an 
attack or those given in the lead up to an invasion. The next context applies to those that are 
considered to be given to a ‘wider’ audience, that is they have either been delivered outside NZ – 
excluding those given in-theatre to NZ personnel – or have been given in NZ to a visiting audience 
from representatives of either the US or Australia. Those press releases given during an event are 
also considered to be given to a wider audience because these are ‘high stakes’ press releases and, at 
the least, the allied actor’s local embassy staff will focus on these, if not members of the allied actor 
administration themselves. However, while these are all seen as being given to a wider audience, 
those given during an event are kept separate to allow for a greater degree of analytical fidelity. The 
wider audience focus is maintained here because it allows analysis of the hypothesis regarding 
whether reactive frames are more likely to be used when speaking to a wider audience than when 
speaking to a domestic audience. This is particularly important for several reasons. First, NZ was 
not the primary victim of any of the attacks but rather the junior alliance partner of several of the 
direct victim states. Second, because the senior alliance partner had made it clear that not only were 
they aware of the fact that NZ politicians spoke differently depending on whether it was a domestic 
or wider audience and had informed them in private conversations that they should not do this if 
they want to improve ties between the US and NZ.77 The final context applies to those given in NZ 
to the domestic audience and while these press releases are likely to have been read by citizens and 
politicians from other states, they have been delivered to a NZ audience and are considered to have 
been crafted specifically for that audience.  
 
3.3.1 Table 3 – Total annual word count, word counts for each context annually and press release per year: 
Year Annual total (%) Event Wider Domestic Press Releases 
2001 9,612 (5%) 3,138 4,305 2,169 15 
2002 26,036 (15%) 1,105 13,553 11,378 22 
2003 27,854 (16%) 6825 9,541 11,488 25 
2004 13,082 (7%) 583 1,866 10,633 13 
2005 12,419 (7%) 529 2,230 9,660 12 
2006 28,813 (16%) 230 6,092 22,491 14 
2007 22,981 (13%) - 5,593 17,388 17 
2008 3,162 (2%) 800 620 1,742 8 
2009 14,371 (8%) - 4363 10,008 13 
2010 5,921 (3%) - 4307 1,614 6 
2011 13,639 (8%) 144 9,510 3,985 17 
Total 177,890 13,354 61,980 102,556 162 
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Of the 162 press releases, 29 were during events, 49 were given to a wider audience and 84 were 
given to a domestic audience (which are listed and marked as such in the appendices).  
 
Following the creation of the data set, a comprehensive read through with the aim of understanding 
what unit, or units, of analysis to work with was conducted. A unit of analysis is the “demarcated 
content about which we can define and observe one of more variables of theoretic interest.”78 
Generally speaking, content analysis focuses on a specific unit of analysis, which can be single words 
all the way up to entire bodies of content, such as articles, interviews etc. This thesis will use several 
different units of analysis, from manifest units such as single words and exact phrases to latent but 
conceptually congruent thematic units – that is framing tasks that have similar semantic subject 
matter without using the same words or phrases.79 While a manifest unit’s meaning “is easily 
understood or recognised”, latent content’s meanings “are present but… have not yet emerged or 
become visible”.80 A strictly quantitative analysis would not use manifest units as they are not 
‘objective’.81 This thesis will use manifest units because while much of the data lends itself to a focus 
on single terms and phrases, it was felt that some of the more important nuances of reactive and 
deliberative narratives would be lost if there was not a wider focus on thematic units. An example 
will help explain this reasoning. Take one of the reactive problem diagnoses, referred to as 
‘existential threat’ in the thesis. This particular diagnosis was not limited to a specific term or phrase 
but rather was expressed in a number of different manners – as a “threat to humanity”, as 
“catastrophic terrorism” and as a “threat to civilised people everywhere” being three examples. 
Thus, to only focus on the frequency of usage of one term or phrase would have limited the analysis 
of this diagnosis, meaning that some of the most important framing tasks would not be considered. 
That said, in most cases the framing task was a single term or phrase. However, because analysis 
beyond single terms or phrases was required, that is, because framing tasks are not limited to single 
terms or precise phrases, the entire corpus of the data set had to be read through in full to find all 
the examples of these thematic units. Thus, the method of obtaining the latent framing tasks was a 
comprehensive read through of the data set as a whole. As noted, the same data was divided up in 
two ways – chronologically by year and by event – and the frequency counts for both recorded, as 
was whether they were given during an event, to a wider audience or to a domestic one. It should 
also be noted that when a manifest unit is referred to in the thesis, its plural will be included in the 
analysis and any word count totals, even if not specifically mentioned, as in the interests of clarity 
and space it was felt that reference to plurals was distracting and unnecessary – though in some 
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cases plurals were used for stylistic reasons. Likewise, a decision was made to refer to the frequency 
counts using numerals even when referring to those less than ten because this provides greater 
clarity and consistency when discussing the counts. Another important detail is that in some cases a 
manifest and latent unit may be counted in more than one framing task – though this only occurred 
within a single narrative count, not across narrative counts. In certain cases this will be noted, 
particularly when a theme is made up of a number of other framing tasks, but other examples where 
this is due to either a semantic ‘bleed’ or a latent unit being made of a number of manifest units 
from another framing task, this will not be explicitly mentioned. To be clear, the latter examples are 
relatively rare and do not compromise overall numbers. 
 
Once the entire corpus had been read, a list of reactive and deliberative framing tasks was made. 
Each was categorised depending on whether it was reactive or deliberative using the five qualities 
and whether it was a problem/enemy, blame/ideology, actor/victim, or strategy/solution framing 
task. To be considered reactive or deliberative, a framing task had to display four of the five qualities 
of either narrative, including being either exclusive or inclusive with regard to the insurgent support 
audience. As almost every single word in these documents could be parsed in some way, this was an 
important means of limiting the analysis to the most fundamental elements. This process involved 
the rigorous delineation and operationalisation of the two narratives, but to ensure that this was as 
objective and reliable as possible, a test using inter-coder reliability was required.  
 
3.3.2 INTER-CODER RELIABILITY  
One of the key components of content analysis is inter-coder reliability. As Neuendorf explains, 
“given that a goal of content analysis is to identify and record relatively objective or inter-subjective 
characteristics of messages, reliability is paramount… without the establishment of reliability, 
content analysis measures are useless.”82 Inter-coder reliability involves two or more coders 
categorising units using an operationalised coding manual and then using these categorisations to 
compute a numerical index that measures the level of agreement between the coders.83 The aim is 
for the coders to get the same outcome from the same content using the same coding manual, thus 
establishing that the coding process is objective and repeatable. Ultimately, inter-coder reliability 
ensures that the process is reliable and, as Krippendorff and Bock note, “reliability is the extent to 
which data can be trusted to represent the phenomena”.84 They go on to explain that to make sure 
that the analysis is valid and reliable, it should have reproducible coding instructions, reliable data, an 
                                                 
82 Kimberly Neuendorf, The Content Analysis Guidebook (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2002), 141. 
83 Matthew Lombard, Jennifer Snyder-Duch and Cheryl Campanella Bracken, “Content Analysis in Mass 
Communication: Assessment and Reporting of Intercoder Reliability,” Human Communication Research 28, no. 4 (2002). 




agreement coefficient, a minimum level of agreement and testable distinctions.85  
 
The first step in the process was to write a coding manual, which can be found in the appendices. 
Both the deliberative and reactive were divided into the four framing tasks as outlined above: 
problem/enemy; blame/ideology; actor/victim; and, strategy/solution. These eight categories were 
then operationalised to ensure that the framing task for each narrative was objectively outlined. This 
process involves making sure that each category is rigorously defined and comprehensively outlined. 
It should be noted content analysis requires that categories are mutually exclusive and while the 
deliberative and reactive categories were, within the reactive there was a degree of cross-over.86 
There were two reasons for this. Firstly, some reactive strategies contained a reactive problem as a 
component, such as ‘eradicate terrorism’ where ‘eradicate terrorism’ is a strategy and ‘terrorism’ is 
the problem, while some reactive problem diagnoses contained reactive actor identifications, like 
Anderton’s ‘attack on all civilised nations’ where ‘civilised nations’ is the actor and the whole phrase 
is the problem.87 The other reason was that some terms – including words like ‘evil’ – have such 
semantic scope that they are understood to be both a enemy identification and a blame attribution. 
In all cases, the crossover is made clear and, critically, the key division between deliberative and 
reactive is mutually exclusive. To ensure that the coding manual was accurate, comprehensive, clear 
and specific enough, a test sample of five articles was conducted by the two coders. This process 
provides a means of refining the manual to ensure that it can be used with reliability and accuracy 
during the coding proper.  
 
Following the test code, both coders moved onto the full sample. There are 162 press releases in 
total. Lombard et al, state the sample size “should not be less than 50 units or 10%”; 50 units was 
felt too large, so 30 (with a total word count of 23,000, or 13% of total word count) were selected, as 
this is almost double the 10% minimum recommended.88 The sampling must be random, so the 
press releases were put in a chronological list, which can be found in the appendices, then a random 
start number (2) between 1-162 was acquired using an online service.89 A random interval number 
(7) between 4-20 was then acquired using the same online generator. The 30 articles were then 
selected by starting at the second press release on the list, which was the first selection, then 
counting down 7 to select the next press release and continuing in this fashion, without replacement, 
until the 30 were selected.  
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The 30 articles need to be coded by two coders, including the researcher. Once this was done, the 
results needed to be assessed. Lombard et al. review a number of different measures used to assess 
inter-coder reliability, examining the benefits of each.90 They quote Dewey, who refers to Cohen’s 
kappa as the “measure of choice”.91 Cohen’s kappa one of the most respected means of assessing 
intercoder reliability as it accounts for chance agreement, it is also commonly used for two coder 
situations and is recommended for nominal data.92 As such, it was selected as the measure of inter-
coder reliability.93 Deen Freelon has an online calculator that can work out Cohen’s kappa and this 
was used to obtain the results.94  
 
3.3.2 Table 1 – Reliability scores for deliberative and reactive narratives: 
Narrative Percentage agreement Cohen’s kappa 
Deliberative 90.8% 0.783 
Reactive 85% 0.663 
 
Landis and Koch, after examining a number of techniques for observer reliability measures, propose 
that the following scale be used to gauge the inter-coder reliability.95 
 
3.3.2 Table 2 – Landis and Koch’s strength of agreement scale: 





0.61-0.80 Substantial  
0.81-1.00 Almost perfect 
 
Landis and Koch work focused on the kappa statistic, and using their interpretation, the reliability 
between the two coders can be judged ‘substantial’, which reinforces the objectivity and reliability of 
the content analysis conducted in this thesis.96 With this, the analysis proper could be conducted.  
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The main component of this was acquiring the frequencies of all of the framing tasks. The latent 
units were counted manually, while the manifest unit frequencies were gathered using the 
concordance software, tlCorpus.97 The terms were inputted into the software and all the uses of the 
word or term were counted with particular reference to the context. This was considered particularly 
important as many of the words and phrases could be used for two or more different framing tasks. 
For example, ‘democracy’ can be used to identity an actor and a solution prognosis and it was 
important that these different usages were ascertained. Likewise, many of the framing task words 
and phrases were used as proper names, such the ‘Provincial Reconstruction Team’ and the ‘Security 
Council’ and ensuring these were not included in any counts was as important. The concordance 
software shows each use of the term or phrase in its context, ensuring the different framing tasks 
and usages were able to be accurately identified. The frequency counts for each word or phrase were 
then recorded for both the yearly and event-based data sets, as was whether they were given during 
an event, to a wider or domestic audience. In most cases, the framing tasks that comprised of a 
single term or phrase were then grouped into thematic units as well. For example, the terms 
‘security’, ‘stability’ and ‘peace’, when used as solution prognoses, sharing similar conceptual ground 
and were, therefore, grouped together for the qualitative analysis. These thematic units will be 
explained in full the body of the research where applicable.  
 
At this point, all the frequency counts and data regarding when a framing task was used and what 
context it was given in was known. To reduce the scope, any deliberative framing task that had not 
been used more than 8 times over the period was excluded from the analysis unless it had been used 
predominantly in a single year. The reason for this is that the deliberative framing task frequencies 
were, on the whole, far larger than the reactive and a lower threshold had to be set. Less than 8 uses 
over the period indicates a relatively insignificant impact on the deliberative narrative, though it 
would have more potential for impact if the uses were all clustered in one year. As noted, most 
framing tasks were put into thematic categories where this was prudent. The reason for this was not 
just issues of space, though this was considered important, but also because these thematic 
categories reduced repetition, as these thematically similar manifest and latent units shared many 
qualities. With the frequency counts and thematic categories, the application of framing as an 
analytical framework could begin. In the main body of the thesis, the majority of the analysis was 
qualitative, except for the focus on consistency of use for each framing task in the deliberative 
chapter and the conclusions of these chapters. In the concluding chapter, these two sets of 
quantitative counts are then brought together to examine the usage of deliberative and reactive 
frames. In these quantitative sections – at the end of the reactive chapter, during the deliberative and 
in the concluding chapter – the validity of the hypothesis was ascertained through the use of both 
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raw frequency counts and ratios obtained by dividing the frequency by word count (either total word 
counts depending on context, as will be explained below, or annual context word counts) so as to 
gain an insight into the relative frequency of the narratives irrespective of word count. Because these 
ratios are generally very small decimal numbers, they will all be multiplied by 100 to provide a more 
manageable number, which will be done consistently throughout. Also, these ratios will be given 
using four numbers, and only to three decimal places where relevant and Swedish rounding will be 
used. These ratios will be referred to during the analysis as a way of comparing usage.  
 
3.4 CONCLUSION  
The utility of the narratives will be examined using framing theory as its focus on how discourse can 
legitimate and motivate target audiences through the strategic use of language to frame reality 
provides an excellent means of examining NZ’s counterinsurgent discourse for the appearance of 
reactive and deliberative counterinsurgent frames. At the pragmatic level, it also a useful means of 
dividing the discourse up into more discrete elements that facilitate analysis as well as providing a 
flexible set of analytical tools that can be deployed to examine the discourse itself. While the 
tautological nature of resonance has been noted as a potential problem, the six components of 
resonance are useful tools with which to examine counterinsurgent discourse. Here the fidelity of 
analysis is provided by breaking down resonance into core components, as these offer a means of 
gauging ‘resonance’ as a whole without needing to have a single measure for this quality. Thus, by 
using these six components as analytical tools and the different framing tasks as a means of dividing 
the discourse into manageable discrete aspects, framing theory provides the central analytical core of 
the thesis.  
 
The thesis will examine three key audiences: the insurgent support, the domestic and the allied 
audiences. These three are being the key target audiences for counterinsurgent communication and 
the generalisations and justifications made will be referred to, and expanded upon, throughout the 
thesis. While making such generalisations does decrease the internal nuances of the audiences there 
is no other means of gauging the utility of counterinsurgent narratives for such large groups and 
even though there will always be contrary audience outcomes, that the generalisations made are 
accurate enough to provide a useful yardstick to assess utility as an aggregate measure.  
 
If framing is the key analytical tool, then content analysis is the device that provides the raw material 
to be assayed. The data set from which this raw material is mined provides a relatively 
comprehensive cache of NZ Government press releases from between 2001-2011, offering a time 
span and scope that enables key events and differing governments to be examined. As noted, the 
data set comprises a significant percentage of the total output on the ICAT across the decade in 
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question and this delivers a breadth of results that could not be gained from a small set. The division 
of the data set into the three contexts allows for the examination of several of the hypotheses 
outlined in the previous chapter while the division into yearly counts provided a baseline for the 
deliberative analysis. Content analysis enables the extraction of the framing tasks from the larger 
data set in a manner that delivers accuracy as it enables context to be ascertained to ensure that the 
term or phrase is actually being used in the manner perceived. It also offers a means of combining 
similar framing tasks into thematic groups. The use of content analysis means that the both 
quantitative and qualitative methods can be utilised to better understand the utility of deliberative 
and reactive narratives, which is important as while these narratives do have elements that make the 
use of a quantitative focus useful there are also components of these narratives that are not able to 
be examined without a qualitative understanding and content analysis is able to provide this balance 




REACTIVE COUNTERINSURGENT FRAMES 
This chapter will examine the reactive narrative by first providing a qualitative analysis of its 
occurrence during several key events and then by offering a quantitative examination of its use 
across the entire period. Most of the hypotheses relating to the reactive narrative are quantitative 
and their analysis can be achieved by simply gathering and assessing frequency counts. However, 
the hypothesis regarding the reactive narrative’s varying utility with different audiences and 
hypothesis focus on the simultaneous use of the reactive and deliberative narratives together 
require qualitative analysis of all of the reactive framing tasks used by NZ during the ten-year 
period. That said, while a total of 17 events were selected for the total data set, presentation of 
individual analysis of each would not provide any greater insight into these qualitative 
hypothesis. To explain why this is the case, and to justify the selection of those that will receive 
selection, a summary of all the events examined will be provided before the case studies are 
given. 
 
4.1 SUMMARY OF THE ICAT EVENTS  
This section will provide a summary of all the ICAT events that have been examined in the 
thesis and, in the process, will help justify the selection of the case studies that will receive a full 
qualitative analysis in this chapter. First, however, an explanation as to why only some events will 
receive a case study is required. The reason is that offering every single event as a case study 
would result in repetition rather than increased insight. This repetition comes directly from some 
of the key hypothesized qualities of the reactive. The reactive’s sudden appearance in the wake of 
a shocking attack and then decline in usage means that, while it is not necessarily fully formed 
when first delivered, it is not a narrative that develops much in scope or complexity over time. 
Rather, the reactive is quickly constructed from pre-existing tropes in the early phase of use, then 
solidifying into a coherent and relatively final form soon after, before then decreasing in its usage 
as the shock of the catalysing event decreases. Related to this, the reactive narrative is relatively 
simple in its form and content. This means it is able to be quickly comprehended, which is why it 
is used in the first place. This ability to be quickly understood is one of its main strengths, but to 
maintain this strength it cannot change much or vary wildly as it must remain simple and easily 
digestible. Hence, the reason only a few cases studies are required is that the reactive is 
hypothesized to arrive well developed and is simple in form and content. The reactive’s 
hypothesized qualities not only provide the rationale for only examining several case studies but 
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in much the same way also help justify which events will be analysed; however, this justification 
requires the summarising of all of the events first to provide the information necessary to outline 
the selections. Specifically, the case studies will be selected using three criteria drawn from the 
reactive narrative’s hypothesized nature – shockingness of the attack; the closeness of the victim 
state to NZ; and the temporal proximity to the catalysing event – as well as some more event-
specific rationale and pragmatic considerations, which will be detailed in the final part of this 
summary section.  
 
It is also important to note that while the individual qualitative examination of all the events will 
not be provided in this chapter, all events were examined using the same framework and this 
examination informs the conclusions made in this chapter and the overall conclusion to the 
thesis, particularly with regard to the qualitative hypotheses. This overarching examination 
provided insight into a number of important and interesting aspects of the reactive narrative, 
including the consistency of its use across different governments within NZ and its capacity to 
provide alliance maintenance in varying contexts. Thus, it is important to provide an overview of 
each event as this provides contextual information necessary to understand the reactive 
narrative’s nature and usage patterns. Also, the events not covered by case studies will be given 
consideration after all the case studies have been provided and the different reactive framing 
tasks have been explained and examined, meaning that some background information about each 
is required. 
 
As well as providing an overarching context, this summary will offer insight into how these 
sometimes disparate events were, largely, woven into a singular narrative that bound NZ, the US 
and the other allies/victims together. While the events selected can be considered as separate 
attacks, with some having very little to do with al Qaeda or 9/11, they can also be grouped 
together as ‘battles’ in the ‘war on terror’. That is, they are sequential components of a larger 
story and they were often rhetorically connected together, either through reference to 9/11, the 
wider ICAT or through some more subtle connection, though as will be shown this was not 
consistent. Furthermore, these events were frequently used as a way of forging connections 
between NZ and the direct victims of the attacks through the expression of sympathy or the 
pledge to work together. Thus, there was a twofold ‘grouping’ through the coverage, both of the 
events themselves and of NZ with the victim state. This summary will not only outline each 
event but will also show how many were rhetorically grouped together, and how NZ positioned 
itself as an ally or supporter of the victim state, starting with the US after 9/11 and then the 
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various victims states that followed during the following ten years, as well as providing an insight 
into those areas where the events were either not grouped together or where NZ did not want to 
associate itself with the victim state.  
 
9/11 – 2001 
On September 11, 2001, four hijacked commercial jets targeted the symbols of US political, 
economic and military might, killing almost 3000 people and destroying several landmark 
buildings. 9/11 deeply shocked the world, including NZ, it brought terrorism to the fore and 
gave America both a new cause and a new enemy.1 Only a few days after the attack, Osama bin 
Laden and al Qaeda had been identified as the perpetrators by Secretary of State Colin Powell.2 
Before the attacks, Bush was a relatively unpopular president with a deeply religious, neo-
conservative outlook and a unilateralist view of foreign policy; 9/11 shaped his presidency, 
boosting his popularity, enabling huge domestic leverage and pushing his administration onto the 
global stage.3 The Labour Party, who were to conduct NZ’s counterinsurgency for the first seven 
years of the ICAT, had come to power in 1999 for first time since passing the nuclear free 
legislation in 1987. While central to the development of NZ’s independent, principled and 
pragmatic foreign policy, this legislation had severely compromised the relationship between NZ 
and the US.4 9/11 can be seen as the beginning of a new era in relations between the two states. 
The attacks received an enormous amount of coverage in the NZ press, dominating the  news 
cycle for the two weeks after, and the shock across the nation is clear in this coverage.5 Within 
the first few days after 9/11, NZ had issued a number of lengthy press releases about the attacks, 
which together comprised 1,454 words.6 As 9/11 was the original event it could not be 
connected to any others, but in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, NZ expressed sympathy 
and strongly associated itself with the American cause. In their first responses, Anderton said, 
the NZ government “extended sympathy” and that the “people of New Zealand will share your, 
                                                 
1 Michael Cox, “American Power Before and After 11 September: Dizzy With Success?” International Affairs. 78, no. 
2 (2002).  
2 David Plotz, “What Does bin Laden Want?” Slate, September 14, 2001, accessed on 12/12/14, available from 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/assessment/2001/09/what_does_osama_bin_laden_want.html 
3 Clarke Rountree, The Chameleon President: The Curious Case of George W. Bush (Santa Barbara, Calif: Praeger, 2012), 
204.  
4 Paul Buchanan, “Deconstructing New Zealand Foreign Policy,” 36th Parallel, August 1, 2012, accessed on 
02/02/15, available from http://36th-parallel.com/2012/08/01/deconstructing-new-zealand-foreign-policy/; Nigel 
Thalakada, Unipolarity and the Evolution of America's Cold War Alliances (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 104-110. 
5 Based on a Factiva search that covered 14 days after the attack. 
6 Anderton, “New Zealand Response to US Attacks.”; Jim Anderton, “Ministerial Statement: Terrorist Attacks in 
US,” beehive.govt.nz, September 12, 2001, accessed on 12/03/2012, available from 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/ministerial-statement-terrorist-attacks-us; Helen Clark, “PM Condemns 
Terrorist Attacks in United States.”; Helen Clark, “NZ Pledges Support to United States,” beehive.govt.nz, September 
14, 2001, accessed on 12/03/2012, available from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/node/11793 
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and the international community’s, sense of outrage and pain”, while Clark said that “New 
Zealand’s thoughts tonight are with President George Bush, his government and the American 
people”.7 Likewise, both pledged to work with the US in these responses, with Anderton saying 
“we will stand ready to offer help in any way we can” and Clark proclaiming that “New Zealand 
will do whatever it can to help”.8 These sentiments were mirrored in their statements over the 
following days, 9/11 was an event that brought NZ and the US closer together.   
 
AFGHAN INVASION – 2001 
Afghanistan, as the refuge of bin Laden and much of al Qaeda, was quickly pinpointed as the 
first ‘front’ of America’s ‘war on terror’. US and UK forces launched the first military 
component of the ICAT in October, commencing with an aerial bombing campaign against the 
Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan before deploying ground forces in the following days. While 
not publically acknowledged at the time, the NZSAS were deployed later in the month, ushering 
in NZ’s active participation in the ICAT.9 The invasion followed a month of intense political 
manoeuvring from the Bush Administration, while the resultant occupation would last 
throughout the period covered by the thesis. In the weeks before, the invasion dominated the 
news cycle in NZ and the shock from 9/11 was still clear in the coverage.10 In the lead up to the 
invasion, NZ issued five in-depth press releases that accounted for 1,493 words in total, where 
they connected the invasion with 9/11 and professed support for the US and its campaign.11 For 
example, while in Washington, Goff offered “New Zealand’s unequivocal support for the global 
campaign which will be necessary to secure the world against future terrorist attacks”.12 Likewise, 
on the day of the invasion, Clark said, “New Zealand supports the United States… [and] 
endorsed the approach taken by the United States”, before explaining that the “Government 
believes that today’s military action is justified under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter 
                                                 
7 Anderton, “New Zealand Response to US Attacks.”; Clark, “PM Condemns Terrorist Attacks in United States.” 
8 Anderton, “New Zealand Response to US Attacks.”; Clark, “PM Condemns Terrorist Attacks in United States.” 
9 Hager, Other People’s Wars.  
10 Based on a Factiva search that covered 14 days before the invasion. 
11 Phil Goff, “Goff Meets Armitage in Washington,” beehive.govt.nz, September 26, 2001, accessed on 12/12/14, 
available from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/goff-meets-armitage-washington; Phil Goff, “Government 
Briefed by United States on Bin Laden Connection,” beehive.govt.nz, October 3, 2001, accessed on 12/12/14, 
available from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/government-briefed-united-states-bin-laden-connection; Helen 
Clark, “NZ Shares US Determination to Root Out Terrorism,” beehive.govt.nz, September 21, 2001, accessed on 
12/03/2012, available from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz-shares-us-determination-root-out-terrorism; 
Helen Clark, “PM Says Today’s Military Action Inevitable,” beehive.govt.nz, October 8, 2001, accessed on 
12/03/2012, available from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/pm-says-today%E2%80%99s-military-action-
inevitable; Helen Clark, “PM Receives Briefing From President Bush,” beehive.govt.nz, October 9, 2001, accessed on 
12/03/2012, available from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/pm-receives-briefing-president-bush.  
12 Goff, “Goff Meets Armitage in Washington.” 
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which enables a nation to act in self-defence”.13 NZ was clearly connecting 9/11 with the 
invasion, but more importantly was proclaiming its ‘unequivocal support’ for the US.  
 
DELHI – 2001 
In the first terrorist event following 9/11 to be covered by a NZ press release, on December 13, 
2001, the Indian Parliament in Delhi was attacked, killing 14.14 Two Islamic Kashmiri separatist 
groups were blamed for the attacks, part of a decades long conflict over the region.15 In their 
short press release of 191 words, while NZ did express “sympathies and condolences to the 
people of India”, they clearly framed this attack as if it was separate from the wider ICAT. Goff 
spoke of the problem as an “escalation of tensions in that part of the world”, his stated solution 
referred to “regional security” and of the need “to seek a peaceful solution to the entrenched 
problem of Kashmir dispute”.16 Unlike 9/11 and the Afghan Invasion, the Delhi attack did not 
receive any specific coverage from NZ newspapers in the aftermath, suggesting it would have 
barely registered with the public.17 This effort to delineate the attack as a purely local issue that 
required a requisite local solution was unsurprising if understood through the reactive narrative 
logic: India is not a major ally of NZ, also at this point in time NZ did not require any more of a 
threat to mobilise support, both because they did not openly have any forces deployed and 
because support and sympathy for the US cause was still high. Furthermore, the US specifically 
disconnected the Kashmir situation from the ICAT in their own response. Kampani explains 
that the US “disregarded the Indian government’s advice to forge a global coalition of 
democracies” after 9/11, deciding to “go it alone… and assemble a revolving coalition of 
partners” and “Pakistan’s emergence as a frontline state in the global campaign against terrorism 
caused enormous consternation in Delhi. Several senior Indian government leaders publically 
fulminated that the United States was out to pursue its own narrow agenda and that India would 
fight its battle against terrorism alone.”18 At this point, the US had such a wellspring of 
                                                 
13 Clark, “PM Says Today’s Military Action Inevitable.” 
14 The Hindu, “Parliament Attack Victims Remembered,” The Hindu, December 13, 2011, accessed on 10/10/14, 
available from http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Delhi/parliament-attack-victims-
remembered/article2711970.ece; Phil Goff, “Goff Deplores Attack on India's Parliament,” beehive.govt.nz, September 
26, 2001, accessed on 12/12/14, available from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/goff-deplores-attack-
india039s-parliament 
15 The Hindu, “Parliament Attack Victims Remembered”.  
16 Phil Goff, “Goff Deplores Attack on India's Parliament,” beehive.govt.nz, September 26, 2001, accessed on 
12/12/14, available from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/goff-deplores-attack-india039s-parliament 
17 Based on a Factiva search that covered 14 days after the attack. 
18 Gaurav Kampani, Placing the Indo-Pakistani Standoff in Perspective (Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey 




international support – and was more focused on the use of Pakistan as a base of operations for 
Afghanistan – that they did not want or need to connect these attacks to 9/11.  
 
BALI – 2002 
The next major attack occurred on October 12, 2002, when Jemaah Islamiyah members 
detonated three bombs across Bali.19 202 people were killed, including 88 Australian tourists, 
who had been the main target of the bombers.20 While experts disagree on the degree of 
relationship between Jemaah Islamiyah and al Qaeda, the former had received funding, training 
and advice from the latter.21 Australia was the state most affected by the attacks, aside from 
Indonesia and, as a key American ally, the bombings served to strengthen the Howard 
Government’s resolve in the ICAT as well as having a major psychological impact on the 
Australian populace, thus further reinforcing Howard’s public support for operations.22 The 
attacks also impacted the NZ public because of their geographic proximity, the closeness of the 
victim state and the fact three New Zealanders died in the attacks, with the attack receiving 
widespread coverage in the NZ newspapers.23 Despite lack of clarity over the actual connection 
between these Jemaah Islamiyah and al Qaeda, unlike Delhi, Bali was immediately connected to 
the broader ICAT. In the two press releases given after Bali, totalling 1105 words combined, 
Clark connected the attacks with 9/11 and the ICAT, explaining that these “events bring home 
to us the continuing threat of international terrorism and the need to work closely within the 
Asia Pacific and globally to counter this threat”.24 She also showed solidarity with the victims, 
saying that “New Zealanders’ thoughts today are with all those who have borne the brunt of this 
outrage, particularly Australia and Indonesia” and that she had conveyed, “our sympathy to 
Australia for the heavy toll of injuries and death it has sustained”.25  
 
IRAQ INVASION – 2003   
                                                 
19 Peter Chalk, Encyclopedia of Terrorism (Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-CLIO, 2013), 91-92. 
20 Ibid., 92-94. 
21 David Gordon and Samuel Lindo, AQAM Futures Project - Jemaah Islamiyah (Rep. Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Nov. 2011), 5, accessed on 12/04/13, available from 
http://csis.org/files/publication/111101_Gordon_JemaahIslamiyah_WEB.pdf 
22 William Maley, “The War in Afghanistan: Australia’s Strategic Narratives,” in Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and 
War Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War, ed. Beatrice De Graaf, George Dimitriu, Jens Ringsmose (Routledge: 
London, 2015), 86. 
23 Based on a Factiva search that covered 14 days after the attack. 
24 Helen Clark, “NZ Appalled by Bali Bombing,” beehive.govt.nz , October 14, 2002, accessed on 12/03/2012, 
available from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/node/15182; Helen Clark, “Ministerial Statement on Bali Bombing,” 
beehive.govt.nz , October 15, 2002, accessed on 12/03/2012, http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/ministerial-
statement-bali-bombing 
25 Clark, “NZ Appalled by Bali Bombing.”; Clark, “Ministerial Statement on Bali Bombing.” 
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From late 2002, the US had been indicating they wished to invade Iraq despite growing 
disagreement amongst allies and the wider international community. The lead up to the Iraq 
Invasion was a period of immense international tension, with the Bush Administration veering 
further and further from their post-9/11 multilateral approach to a more unilateral focus.26 Iraq 
was an integral part of Bush’s ‘war on terror’ from the outset and he referred to Afghanistan and 
Iraq as the “two fronts of our war against terror” just before the invasion of Iraq.27 The US made 
the case against Iraq at the UN and numerous other forums, attempting to make the connection 
between Iraq, WMDs and terrorism. The UN Security Council was divided over the situation 
and, despite their attempts to gain its mandate, the US ended up going the unilateral route. The 
invasion began on March 19, 2003 and while NZ did not support or contribute to the invasion 
proper, in the months following they did deploy troops in a non-combat role. NZ had been 
under pressure to contribute since early 2002, but despite the improving relations with the US, 
NZ were consistently opposed to any action that was not mandated by the UN. The Iraq 
Invasion could never be shocking like a terrorist attack, but there was widespread opposition to 
this invasion and the lead up received extensive coverage in the NZ newspapers.28 The NZ 
government issued a number of press releases that totalled 5,542 words outlining their position.29 
While Delhi in 2001 had not been connected to the wider ICAT by either NZ or the US, Iraq 
marked a far more major divergence and, consequently, saw some awkward references from NZ 
regarding the situation and its relationship with the US as well. NZ spoke of the “crisis over Iraq” 
several times, inferring the issue was not Iraq itself but rather the US handling of the situation.30 
Goff also warned that a “war judged by Middle Eastern and Islamic peoples as unjust risks 
creating sympathy and support for terrorists who would otherwise be condemned” and that a 
“war in Iraq would take attention” from the ICAT, directly contradicting Bush’s declaration that 
it was a ‘second front’.31 NZ was very careful in the way it referred to the US during this period, 
with the most overt statement of disagreement coming from Clark, who said that NZ considers 
                                                 
26 Michael J. Kelly, “The Bush Foreign Policy 2001-2003: Unilateralist Theory in a Multilateral World, and the 
Opportunity for Change Offered by Iraq,” 2 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 221 (2003). 
27 Hager, Other People’s Wars; George Bush, “War on Terror,” whitehouse.gov, March8, 2003, accessed on 11/11/14, 
available from http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030308-1.html 
28 Based on a Factiva search that covered 14 days before the invasion. 
29 Phil Goff, “NZ statement on Iraq to UN Security Council,” beehive.govt.nz, March 12, 2003, accessed on 
/03/11/14, available from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz-statement-iraq-un-security-council-0; Phil Goff, 
“Iraq Crisis: NZ's Position,” beehive.govt.nz, March 13, 2003, accessed on /03/11/14, available from 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/iraq-crisis-nz039s-position; Helen Clark, “Statement to Parliament on the Iraq 
Crisis,” beehive.govt.nz, March 18, 2003, accessed on /03/11/14, available from 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/statement-parliament-iraq-crisis; Helen Clark, “Statement to the House on 
Military Action in Iraq,” beehive.govt.nz, March 20, 2003, accessed on /03/11/14, available from 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/statement-house-military-action-iraq 
30 Goff, “NZ statement on Iraq to UN Security Council.”; Goff, “Iraq Crisis: NZ's Position.” 
31 Goff, “Iraq Crisis: NZ's Position.” 
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it “a matter of profound regret to us that some of our closest friends have chosen to stand 
outside the Security Council at this point”.32 Generally, opposition was couched in more vague 
phrasing, like the “government deeply regrets the breakdown of the diplomatic process” and that 
the “international community was regrettably unable to reach common agreement”.33 On the day 
of the invasion, Clark even said that the “Iraqi leadership must take its full share of responsibility 
for this”, suggesting where she saw much of the blame being laid without being explicit.34 Iraq 
marked the low point in relations between NZ and the US during this period and saw NZ 
actively disconnecting the invasion from the ICAT while somewhat more passively disassociating 
itself from the US decision-making regarding Iraq.  
 
BAGHDAD – 2003 
Only a few months later, Iraq had descended into civil war. On August 19, 2003, a bomb was 
detonated at the UN Headquarters in Baghdad, killing 22 people, including the UN Special 
Representative in Iraq, and wounding at least 100.35 This was to be the most deadly attack to date 
as resistance towards the occupying Coalition grew.36 While it did receive a number of articles in 
the local newspapers, in the two weeks following this attack there were a number of other 
incidents in Iraq that also received coverage within NZ, suggesting this attack would more likely 
have been perceived as part of the wider civil war rather than a single shocking event.37 NZ 
issued several releases focused on the attack, with one given by Goff at the UN during a session 
on Iraq for a total word count of 926.38 In these press releases, NZ sought to reinforce its 
previous statements about what it saw as the problems of the Iraq Invasion while simultaneously 
beginning to connect events in Iraq with the wider ICAT. For example, Goff said that “over the 
last year we have witnessed ongoing terrorist attacks including in Casablanca, Riyadh and Jakarta, 
as well as Baghdad.”39 While they were not willing to express support for the US, Goff did say 
that “the international community must work together”, again reaffirming the unified approach 
                                                 
32 Clark, “Statement to Parliament on the Iraq Crisis.” 
33 Clark, “Statement to Parliament on the Iraq Crisis.”; Clark, “Statement to the House on Military Action in Iraq.” 
34 Clark, “Statement to the House on Military Action in Iraq.” 
35 BBC, “2003: UN Envoy Dies in Baghdad Bombing,” BBC, accessed on 16/09/15, available from 
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of the allies.40 Thus, only a few months after NZ had actively disconnected Iraq from the ICAT 
and more subtly rebuked the US, they were now beginning to make connections and fall back 
into the ‘work together’ narrative.  
 
MUMBAI – 2003 
Only a few days after the Baghdad bombings, on August 25, 2003, there were two car bombings 
in Mumbai, killing 54 and injuring 244 people.41 The Pakistan-based Kashmir rebel group 
Lashkar-e-Toiba was blamed for the attack, which were the latest in a string of similar, if less 
lethal, attacks in the city, with five previous bombings since December 2002, which had not been 
covered by NZ press releases.42 This attack was not even covered in any of the major NZ 
newspapers, suggesting it probably barely registered amongst the general NZ public.43 This 
marked the second attack in India the counterinsurgent had responded to since 9/11 and as 
Rabasa notes, “[a]lthough similarly violent events have occurred in the past… After 9/11, 
militant Islamic groups operating in India have developed a perspective more integrated with 
that of international terrorist groups regarding philosophical objectives and terrorist targets.”44 
Similarly, the alliance had also begun to see these groups and attacks as part of the wider ICAT. 
NZ issued a 224 word press release where it said it “extended his sympathy to the families of 
victims… [and] extends its support to Indian authorities in their on-going efforts to combat 
terrorism”.45 Thus, as well as offering sympathy, we see what had previously been seen as 
unrelated incidences of terrorism being woven into the US-led ‘war on terror’ through NZ’s 
offer of ‘support’, even if it seems to be limited to an intangible, rather than tangible, form. 
Admittedly this is a relatively tenuous connection, but compared to Delhi in 2001, where the 
incident was actively isolated from the wider ICAT, even this intangible support offers a degree 
of unity.   
 
ISTANBUL – 2003  
Later that year, on November 15 and 20, 2003, four truck bombs killed 60 people and wounded 
700 in Istanbul. The attacks were conducted by a range of groups with various motivations 
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working in concert, including some retaliating for the Iraq Invasion and others with their own 
interests.46 This would mark a new trend, from Istanbul on, a number of attacks outside Iraq 
would be motivated by the invasion. The ICAT had been expanded, as had resistance to it. The 
attacks received a few newspaper articles in NZ, which suggests some shock amongst the NZ 
public.47 Despite the stated causational links to Iraq and the fact it had suggested this could be a 
possibility after the invasion, the NZ government did not make these connections apparent in its 
133 word press release regarding the attacks.48 It did, however, connect the attacks to the wider 
ICAT, explaining that it was “important that the international community continues to work 
together to counter terrorism. New Zealand will continue to do whatever it can to help”. 49 
Likewise, it used the attacks as a means of bonding with allies, stating that the “government is 
sending messages of sympathy to the Turkish and British governments, whose people have 
borne the brunt of this outrage.”50  
 
MADRID – 2004  
Just a few months after Istanbul, on March 11, 2004, three days before Spain’s general elections, 
there were nine simultaneous, coordinated bombings against the commuter train system of 
Madrid; 191 people were killed and 1800 wounded from explosions on four trains.51 While both 
ETA and al Qaeda were initially suspected, eventually a group of al Qaeda-inspired Spanish 
Muslims were charged.52 Nevertheless, al Qaeda stated: “We declare our responsibility for what 
happened in Madrid exactly two-and-a-half years after the attacks on New York and 
Washington. This is an answer to the crimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. If your injustices do not 
stop there will be more if god wills it”.53 The attacks marked a transition in tactics. Madrid was 
the first of a number of public transport attacks and its success at provoking the withdrawal of 
Spanish troops from Iraq was probably one of the reasons that this particular terrorist tactic was 
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used several more times during the period.54 The coverage by NZ newspapers was relatively 
significant, with numerous articles during the news cycle, suggesting there would have been a 
relatively high degree of shock.55 By comparison, although the attacks were on a significant 
European ally, were tactically-innovative and had a relatively high death toll, NZ only issued a 
single 239 word press release, which suggests that by this point, responding to terrorist attacks 
had become somewhat routine. In his press release, Goff connected these attacks with the wider 
ICAT, expressed solidarity and framed a united allied front, explaining that the bombing “clearly 
justifies the intensive efforts that New Zealand is making, including in Afghanistan and the Asia-
Pacific region, against terrorism. It also once again emphasises the need for the entire 
international community to cooperate and to maximize efforts to defeat terrorist organisations”, 
also stating that “government has expressed its deep sympathy on behalf of all New 
Zealanders”.56 
 
JAKARTA – 2004  
Later that year, on September 9, 2004, the Australian Embassy in Jakarta was attacked, killing 9 
people and wounding over 150 more, though no Australians were injured or killed.57 The attacks 
occurred just before the final stage of the Indonesian presidential elections on September 20 and 
the Australian elections on October 9.58 According to the Indonesian charged with the attacks, 
the operation was financed by al Qaeda and “Australia was targeted because its government 
supported the US in Iraq”.59 This was the second significant attack in Indonesia since 9/11 and it 
received a high degree of coverage in the NZ newspapers, suggesting there would have been a 
consequent amount of shock amongst the public.60 The NZ government issued one 344 word 
press release in response in which Clark brought the attacks under the wider ICAT umbrella and 
committed to the united allied front, explaining that the “New Zealand Government condemns 
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all acts of terrorism and will continue to work with the international community” and that she 
had called “Howard to convey New Zealand’s deep concern at the attack”.61  
 
LONDON – 2005  
On July 7, 2005, suicide bombers detonated devices across the London transport network, killing 
52 citizens and injuring over 700.62 The four British national ‘cleanskin’ bombers were 
autonomous yet shared “an ideological affinity with the original Al Qaeda network, [operating] in 
the absence of any institutionalized training or recruitment”.63 As with Bali, Istanbul and Madrid, 
the bombers were largely motivated by the ICAT, in this case particularly the UK’s involvement 
in Iraq.64 The bombings occurred during the G8 Summit, and they strengthened the allied 
leaders’ resolve to continue the ICAT, reinforcing the ‘global’ nature of the conflict and the 
dangers of ‘homegrown’ terrorism.65 Across Europe, the fear of ‘homegrown’ terrorist attacks 
increased due to the large Muslim populations in most EU states.66 Another impact was the 
increase in racially-motivated attacks on European Muslims and their resultant increase in fear 
and alienation.67 The attacks received extensive coverage in the NZ newspapers and this, plus the 
high numbers of NZ citizens living in London, suggest this would have been a shocking event to 
most New Zealanders.68 Despite NZ’s close relationship with the UK and the shock of the 
public, NZ issued only two short press releases regarding the London bombings, totalling just 
267 words combined, further showing how relatively routine these events had become.69 Even 
more interesting, unlike previous attacks, NZ did not connect the London bombings with the 
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wider ICAT despite the bombings’ striking similarity to Madrid and the perpetrator’s stated 
motivation regarding the Iraq Invasion, which NZ had predicted would cause more terrorist 
attacks. They did, however, “convey the sympathy and deep concern of the government and 
people of New Zealand to the office of British Prime Minister Tony Blair”.70 One possible 
reason that the connection to the ICAT was not made could be that the association would be 
political untenable for the UK – that it was the close relationship between NZ and the UK that 
prevented this association.  
 
BALI – 2005  
Later that year, on October 1, 2005, there was a series of suicide attacks in Bali that killed 20 
people and injured more than 100. The attacks occurred just before the third anniversary of Bali, 
2002 and involved the same planners.71 The attacks received a relatively high degree of coverage 
from the NZ press, with a number of articles detailing risks to New Zealanders travelling, 
suggesting the shock would have been relatively high.72 There had been a number of other 
terrorist incidents across Indonesia between these two events, but none NZ had commented on 
directly, while for this attack NZ issued a press release of 262 words, probably because these 
attacks were symbolically connected to Bali, 2002, and the most deadly in Indonesia since those 
attacks.73 Clark did connect these with the wider ICAT, or at least the previous Bali attacks, 
explaining that they “occurred just days before the third anniversary of the October 2002 
terrorist attacks on the same island.” 74 She also expressed solidarity, explaining that NZ 
“thoughts are first and foremost with the families and friends of those who have borne the 
brunt” of the attacks and “offered whatever assistance Indonesia requires”.75 This attack marks 
the last event covered by the thesis that did not occur in the Indian subcontinent. 
 
MUMBAI – 2006 
On July 11, Mumbai was struck by coordinated bomb blasts on seven trains, which killed 209 
and injured over 700 people.76 As the New York Times noted at the time, “[t]he attacks bore an 
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obvious resemblance to the terrorist attacks on the London public transportation system last July 
and the Madrid train bombings in March 2004”.77 A number of groups and organisations have 
been alleged as the perpetrators, including Lashkar-e-Taiba as well as Pakistan’s ISI, though to 
date there has been nothing conclusive.78 The NZ press gave the attacks a moderate degree of 
coverage, though much was focused on one New Zealander’s ‘lucky escape’, suggesting there 
would have been a moderate degree of shock amongst the populace.79 NZ issued a 230 word 
press release regarding the attacks, but again did not specifically link them with the wider ICAT 
despite the fact that they so closely resembled the two previous attacks. NZ did, however, frame 
a unified front, saying “New Zealand joins with the rest of the international community in utterly 
condemning this deplorable act of terrorism”. 80  This unified front helps to rhetorically connect 
the attacks with the wider ICAT. NZ also expressed sympathy, “Our thoughts at this time are 
with the victims and families of all those affected – including those members of the Indian 
community in New Zealand who may have links with those who may have been killed or injured 
in the blasts.”81  
 
DELHI – 2008 
On September 13, 2008, five synchronised explosions hit Delhi, killing 30 and injuring 10 more. 
The attacks were claimed by Indian Mujahideen, a homegrown Indian Muslim terrorist group 
who had struck earlier in 2008.82 Because these were not conducted by an external group, there 
were fewer global security issues from these attacks than from others on the sub-continent. 
Three bomb attacks had already occurred the same year in India, which NZ had not issued press 
releases for. The NZ press barely covered this attack, with only one article that referenced the 
government’s press release, suggesting this would not have had much impact amongst the NZ 
public.83 Clark issued a 259 word press release in response a day after the Delhi attack, again not 
connecting it to the wider ICAT. 84 She did, though, express solidarity with India, saying that the 
“Governor-General’s visit has underlined the strong bonds between India and New Zealand. We 
extend our sympathy to India at this sad time.”85 Unlike Delhi 2001 or even Mumbai in 2003 or 
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2006, the solidarity expressed with India had gone from simply offering sympathy to also stating 
the two countries had a ‘strong bond’, which was probably because NZ had started discussions 
regarding a free trade agreement with India the year before.86  
 
ISLAMABAD – 2008 
Only a week later, on September 20, a truck filled with explosives detonated in front of the 
Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, killing 54 and injuring at least 266.87 The attack occurred only hours 
after President Asif Ali Zardari had made his first speech to the Pakistani parliament.88 The 
Taleban denied any involvement and while some commentators saw the attack as having 
‘hallmarks’ of an al Qaeda attack, the motives and affiliation of the suicide bomber are as yet 
unknown.89 The press coverage in NZ was minimal, with only a few of articles and one of those 
focusing on the NZ cricket team’s tour, implying the shock was relatively limited in NZ.90 Clark 
issued a 271 word press release on September 21 in what would be her last statement on an 
event as Prime Minister before National took power on November 19. She did not connect this 
with the wider ICAT, going as far as to refer to the event as “internal terrorism”.91 However, she 
did express solidarity, saying that “New Zealand offers its sympathy to the people and 
government of Pakistan at this sad time. I know this is also a very worrying time for members of 
the Pakistani community in New Zealand, who fear for their loved ones, friends, and 
communities at home” before adding that “New Zealand and Pakistan have a longstanding 
relationship”.92 Again, Clark went beyond sympathy to express a shared bond, which was 
probably also due to trade, where NZ trade with Pakistan had jumped from below $30 million in 
2003 to $80 million in 2008.93 
 
MUMBAI – 2008 
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Beginning on Wednesday, 26 November and lasting until Saturday, 29 November 2008, 10 
Pakistani members of Lashkar-e-Taiba conducted a series of 12 coordinated shooting and 
bombing attacks across Mumbai, killing 164 people and wounding at least 308.94 The attacks 
brought Pakistani-Indian relations to the brink of war and had “a significant impact on counter-
terrorism strategies around the world, with security services put on high alert to the risk of 
‘Mumbai-style’ incursions on soft targets.”95 Following on from the attacks a few months before 
in Delhi and Islamabad, this event marked the end of a violent year on the subcontinent. There 
was a lot of coverage in the NZ press, with most focused on the New Zealanders caught up in 
the event, suggesting that this would have elicited a relatively high degree of shock in the 
country.96 NZ issued a 270 word press release, given by the new Foreign Affairs Minister, Murray 
McCully, whose government had taken power just over a week earlier.97 As with the previous 
attacks in 2008, McCully did not try to connect these attacks with the ICAT, nor, however, did 
he express any form of solidarity. This lack of connection or solidarity is somewhat surprising 
considering the ongoing attacks in the region; McCully’s newness to the position – having only 
taken office a week before – could help explain the lapse.   
 
MUMBAI – 2011  
In July, 2011, the final attack covered occurred in Mumbai. This attack involved a series of three 
coordinated bomb explosions at different locations, leaving 26 dead and 130 injured.98 The same 
group who were responsible for Delhi, 2008 have been charged with the attacks, which it is 
suspected were timed to derail the Indo-Pakistani peace talks.99 There was no coverage of the 
attacks in the NZ press, suggesting there was a limited shock amongst the populace.100 Prime 
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Minister John Key, who had only just returned from a trip to India, issued a 144 word press 
release the next day in which he expressed both a united front and solidarity with India, stating 
that he was “shocked and saddened” and he joined “with other world leaders in condemning the 
perpetrators while sending Prime Minister Singh and the people of Mumbai my heartfelt 
condolences”.101 Key’s recent trip to India to start negotiations on a free trade deal may help 
explain why he was more vocal in his expression of unity and solidarity than McCully.102 
 
4.1.1 SELECTION AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE CASE STUDIES 
Events – specifically terrorist attacks – are fundamental to the reactive narrative, so having an 
event-focused analysis is crucial for understanding the reactive’s development and use, 
particularly with regard to assessing the qualitative hypotheses. The reactive, it is hypothesized, is 
able to overcome the politically-dangerous confusion, concern and anger that terrorist attacks 
generate amongst the domestic support population and, if the counterinsurgent is not the direct 
victim, it is also able to deliver alliance maintenance with the direct victim as they are likely to be 
using a reactive narrative as well for the same reasons. This means that not only are events 
crucial to understanding the reactive narrative, but that not all events are equal. As hypothesized, 
the reactive is more likely to be used in events that display certain qualities. First, it is more likely 
to be used  the more shocking the attack is because this generates more potentially troubling 
emotions that the counterinsurgent needs to deal with. Second, the reactive is more likely to be 
used the closer the victim state is to the counterinsurgent communicator because it helps 
reinforce relationships between the states. Third, the reactive is more likely to be used the closer 
in time later events are to the first instigating event because once the reactive has been 
introduced into the domestic rhetoric it influences discourse for a limited duration. To be clear, 
these are somewhat complementary qualities. If an event is particularly shocking, then the 
reactive narrative is likely to be used no matter how close NZ is to the victim. Likewise, an event 
would not need to be very shocking to evoke a reactive response if it targeted one of NZ’s 
closest allies.  
 
These three criteria – shockingness of the attack; the closeness of the victim state to NZ; and the 
temporal proximity to the catalysing event – form a key set of criteria in the selection of the 
events to be examined as case studies. Events that met these criteria generally got more coverage 
and this coverage usually contained more original reactive framing tasks while events that did not 
                                                 
101 John Key, “PM Condemns Mumbai Bombings,” beehive.govt.nz, July 14, 2011, accessed on 12/10/15, available 
from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/pm-condemns-mumbai-bombings 
102 See https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/agreements-under-negotiation/india/ for details. 
99 
 
meet these criteria received less coverage and the reactive frames used were variations of the 
same framing tasks rather than new types. While all three of these criteria contribute to these 
varying outcomes to differing degrees, the amount of coverage can be seen as being 
predominantly influenced by the level of shock and relationship of the victim state with NZ, 
while the originality or repetition of reactive framing tasks is influenced more by the proximity of 
events to the catalysing event. These three criteria form the main justifying framework for case 
study selection, but there were also some event-specific reasons behind the selection. These will 
all be examined below with respect to the four events selected as case studies: 9/11, the Afghan 
Invasion, Bali 2002 and the Iraq Invasion.  
 
9/11 was the most deadly and shocking terrorist attack of the decade, creating an almost 
unprecedented level of confusion, concern and anger. More than just shocking for the US, 9/11 
was a global event, one that was televised around the world in real time and was experienced by 
many millions. It also struck one of NZ’s closest allies at a time when NZ’s relationship with the 
US was beginning to mend after it had been severely strained by the nuclear free legislation NZ 
passed in the 1980s. As the first event, the instigating attack that saw NZ politicians use what 
was for them an uncharacteristically reactive narrative, 9/11 stands out as the most important of 
all the events the thesis covered and requires a case study analysis because was the catalyst event 
that not only saw NZ use the reactive narrative but also had many consequent events rhetorically 
connected to it.   
 
The Afghan Invasion came less than a month after 9/11, when NZ support for the US was at an 
all-time high and the confusion, concern and anger caused by the attack was still widely felt. 
Thus, while the invasion was not shocking itself, the emotive impacts of 9/11 were still being 
felt. In fact, distinguishing between the aftermath of 9/11 and the lead up to the invasion is 
difficult and this proximity alone justifies the invasion as a case study as the full parameters of 
the reactive were still to be given at this point. Equally importantly, at this point in time, NZ was 
just beginning to rebuild its relationship with the US and there was a global consensus behind 
the US-led invasion, meaning that NZ’s continuing use of the reactive narrative was 
unsurprising. Also of specific interest here is that as a response to 9/11, the Afghan Invasion 
offers new solution-oriented framing that would not necessarily be produced immediately after 




Bali was one of the first follow up attacks after 9/11 and it was one of the most deadly. It was 
also the geographically closest to NZ and the one that was directed at NZ’s closest ally and 
friend, meaning it generated more confusion, concern and anger in NZ than most of the other 
attacks covered. As well as qualifying as a case study because of the shock levels, closeness with 
the victim state and the short time span from 9/11, Bali also stands out because it provides an 
insight into how the closeness of the victim state may influence the way reactive narrative is 
used. The interplay between NZ and Australia’s framing of the event potentially provides insight 
into important characteristics of the reactive narrative and this in itself justifies its inclusion as a 
case study. As the only attack that successfully targeted a large number of Australians, it provides 
a unique perspective on the hypothesis regarding the closeness of the relationship between NZ 
and the victim state.  
 
Finally, the Iraq Invasion, which does not conform with all three of the reactive-related criteria. 
While it was not shocking in the way a terrorist attack was, it came relatively early in the ICAT, 
as only the fifth event in the chronology of 17 and was included because this and, in particular, 
because of its unique status as the only time the reactive narrative was used against the US rather 
than directed at the enemy. Iraq stands out as it was the first time NZ opposed the US in their 
‘war on terror’. It was felt useful to examine the Iraq Invasion as a case study as it marked the 
relative low point in NZ-US relationship during the ICAT, which had improved significantly 
following 9/11 and provides insight into how the reactive can be turned against an erstwhile ally.  
 
Amongst these four case studies, then, are the most shocking attacks to NZ. They also all 
involve close allies of NZ and are, chronologically speaking, the first, second, fourth and fifth 
events in the sequence of 17 events in total. Because of this, it is unsurprising that these were the 
events that received the most coverage. 9/11, the Afghan Invasion, Bali and the Iraq Invasion all 
received over 1000 words – and Iraq received over five times this – while the other events 
received an average of 289. It is too premature to cover the originality of the framing for each 
event in detail as this will become clear throughout the rest of the chapter, though it can be said 
here that as they comprise four of the first five events, they inevitably contain the most original 
reactive framing.  
 
Finally, several omissions need to be explained. First, while most of the other events are easily 
excluded as case studies – because they were not that shocking, because the victim state was not 
a close ally of NZ or because they occurred long after 9/11 – one does stand out as exceptional 
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in its exclusion: London. While the attack happened almost four years after 9/11, it was directed 
at one of NZ’s closest allies and was, relatively speaking, quite shocking as it struck in the heart 
of one of the world’s ‘global cities’, mirroring the 9/11 attacks on New York in this way. While 
this would suggest London would require its own case study, the reality was that across two 
press releases it received only 267 words and NZ did not even attempt to connect it with the 
wider ICAT. While this was somewhat surprising, it does suggest that the hypothesis regarding 
closeness of victim to communicator is not an absolute and that the three criteria outlined above 
have a relative relationship with each other.   
 
Secondly, it may also seem surprising that none of the events that the new National Government 
covered are included as case studies as they could potentially provide extra insight into how the 
reactive was used by a different administration. However, they were not included because they 
did not add anything new to the analysis, mostly because they did not fit the criteria. Both 
Mumbai 2008 and 2011 were relatively unshocking for NZ, particularly because they were part of 
an ongoing series of attacks on the Indian subcontinent that predated 9/11 but also because 
none were as dramatic or extreme as events like 9/11 or even Bali 2002, Madrid or London. 
Likewise, they struck a state that NZ was not that close with, India, and while there was an 
increase in expressions of solidarity over that period, this growing relationship did not result in 
any added reactive framing. Obviously, they came seven or more years after the catalysing event 
as well. Furthermore, neither of the attacks had any unique points of interest. As will be 
explained at the end of the case studies, neither of these events provided any new reactive 
material, which reinforces the importance of the hypothesized qualities of the reactive used as 
the selective criteria and, with regard to the growing closeness in relations with India, reinforces 
the hypothesized relative relationship between the three mentioned in the paragraph above.    
 





4.2 – 9/11, 2001 
9/11 was the event that led to NZ’s use of the reactive narrative and as such this section will 
begin to layout its development using Clark and Anderton’s four first press releases to review 
NZ’s initial response to 9/11. Anderton issued two releases on the 12th of September and Clark 
issued one that day and one on the 14th, which together comprised 1,454 words. 103 Many of the 
most significant reactive framing tasks were used in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and their 
analysis is useful for showing how they frame the events.  
 
4.2.1 PROBLEM/ENEMY 
This section will examine how the counterinsurgent diagnosed the problem and identified the 
enemy using the reactive narrative. The following are all considered exclusive and all embody at 
least three other key qualities of the reactive – figurative, absolute, hyperbolic and emotive. The 
last press release used in this section was issued only several days after the attacks, before any 
significant details were known regarding the enemy, their motivation or objectives, meaning the 
counterinsurgent was communicating at a time where there was little known information outside 
the obvious and instantly apparent – that there had been several major, coordinated terrorist 
attacks. These reactive problem and enemy framing tasks served a powerful mobilisation role for 
the domestic audience by providing a diagnosis of the situation that helped reduce confusion, 
alleviate concern and direct anger for the domestic audience. They also reinforced the alliance 
with the US, especially as many of the diagnoses and identifications were similar or identical to 
Bush’s statements at the time. However, as will be shown, many had potentially negative 
consequences for the insurgent support population and while the domestic and allied audience 
were more important for the counterinsurgent at this point, it must be remembered that even in 
the immediate aftermath many of the globally-dispersed insurgent support population were 
already suffering from backlash. 
 
4.2.1.1 EXISTENTIAL THREAT DIAGNOSES 
In his first press release, Anderton framed the threat as existential: “We must see this attack not 
only as an attack on the United States, but as an attack on all civilised nations”.104 Later on 
September 12, Clark claimed the “attacks against the United States were attacks against all 
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civilised nations.”105 In his second press release, Anderton diagnosed the attacks as an “act 
against humanity”.106 As will be examined below, these latent threat diagnostic framing tasks are 
figurative, absolute, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusive – the binary component will be dealt with 
in the actor/victim section.  
 
CONTENT 
Before the enemy or their objective was known, these diagnoses verge on discreditable; even 
later, they remain questionable, as al Qaeda’s aggression was primarily directed against American 
hegemony rather than ‘civilisation’ or ‘humanity’. Their pre-attack fatwas specify the main target 
was the US for largely geopolitical reasons; neither fatwa referenced ‘civilisation’ or ‘humanity’, 
or included NZ.107 As figurative identifications, they cannot be discredited, though this does 
mean their accuracy is problematic, as the attacks targeted the US, not ‘civilisation’ or ‘humanity’ 
– something apparent not just from the physical location but in the choice of symbolic targets of 
US political, military and economic power. 108 Ramsey reinforces this: “The terrorist threat was 
portrayed as an unprecedented, catastrophic, and existential one, as a challenge to our values, to 
our way of life, to civilization itself... None of the terrorist attacks in the US... literally threatened 
the life of the nation or freedom or democracy, still less ‘civilization’” or ‘humanity’.109 The 
accuracy was also stretched because these diagnoses exaggerate the scope from being a US 
problem to a far bigger, figurative threat that encompasses NZ.110 This ignores the tangible 
weakness of the enemy, meaning it also serves to exaggerate not just the problem but also the 
enemy, and does not inform regarding the reasons that insurgents generally use these tactics.  
 
AUDIENCE  
These identifications fit al Qaeda’s own ‘clash of civilisations’ narrative, suggesting they would be 
salient for the insurgent audience.111 The emotional aspect will be examined in the actor section, 
here the key impact is that these diagnoses help legitimise the insurgent’s cause by increasing 
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their apparent capacity.112 It was the allies’ response, as much as the attacks themselves, that 
exaggerated a “fundamentally trivial group... [due to their] tendency to inflate al-Qaida’s 
importance and effectiveness”.113 These diagnoses meant that “the remnants of this tiny group 
have even been held to present an ‘existential’ threat”.114 The counterinsurgent’s “apocalyptic 
rhetoric and confrontational policies helped to fuel a self-fulfilling prophecy driving toward bin 
Laden’s vision of a clash of civilization.... [so that by] the mid-2000s, al Qaeda’s core arguments 
enjoyed widespread support”.115 These diagnoses exclude the population from the 
counterinsurgent’s cause by boosting the insurgent’s legitimacy, meaning they would not have a 
positive impact on the counterinsurgent’s justification or legitimacy.  
 
These diagnoses appeared to match most New Zealanders’ experiences after the attacks as letters 
to newspapers immediately afterward show. One letter stated that: “I can’t help but wonder 
what, if anything, our Government plans to do to deter such attacks here.”116 Another wrote: 
“New Zealand’s naive Prime Minister says our country faces no threat. It seems to me that after 
the dastardly acts in New York and Washington, no country can be safe from attack by air or 
land or sea. Not even little ol’ New Zealand.”117 One correspondent, however, did refer to 
“nauseating patriotic drivel about how an attack on the US is an attack on all of us”.118 These 
letters suggest these diagnoses would have been salient to many, though not all. By diagnosing 
the risk as existential the counterinsurgent exacerbates potential for fear as the NZ audience are 
implied to be threatened. Crucially, however, these diagnoses play into common tropes, 
particularly the ‘clash of civilisations’ and ‘crimes against humanity’, meaning they would help 
reduce confusion following the attack. They are easily digested concepts that quickly inform the 
domestic audience of the nature of the conflict. As such, they also portray the counterinsurgent 
as understanding the threat, reducing concerns regarding their competency. Finally, these 
identifications redirect anger toward the insurgent because they suggest NZ is threatened, which 
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would deliver powerful mobilisation at a time when NZ was actively considering going to war 
and would justify virtually any response.  
 
Critically, these diagnoses fit Bush’s own narrative.119 For example, on September 11, he said 
“our way of life, our very freedom came under attack” and then the next day that the “enemy 
attacked not just our people but all freedom-loving people everywhere in the world”.120 On 
November 10, 2001, he said “Civilization itself – the civilization we share – is threatened.”121 
This shared vocabulary suggests that NZ agrees with the US threat diagnosis, and helps obscure 
the reasons the US was targeted just when the US needed their own particular culpability 
overlooked, especially in a country like NZ, where many on the left are generally suspicious and 
mistrustful of the US.122 Critically, by exaggerating the scope of the threat these diagnoses serve 
to mobilise support for the US in NZ, meaning that they would justify US efforts gather their 
global coalition, reinforcing the alliance.  
 
4.2.1.2 TERRORISM AS AN IRRATIONAL TACTIC 
On September 12, Clark described the attacks as “utterly incomprehensible violence”, a 
statement that implies terrorism is an irrational tactic, as ‘incomprehensible’ infers that there is 
no rationality underlying terrorist tactics.123 As will be analysed below, this latent diagnostic 
framing task is binary, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusive.  
 
CONTENT  
The term ‘incomprehensible’ cannot be discredited, as it can refer to the counterinsurgent’s 
inability to comprehend the ‘violence’ and, to be  clear, there are a number of ways the terms 
that will be grouped under this framing task can be examined, however, the ‘irrational’ reading is 
seen an important possible reading to examine as it connects with deeper Orientalist narratives 
of East-West relations, furthermore Clark does refer to terrorism as ‘irrational’ several times 
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during the ICAT.124 Read as ‘irrational’, there are accuracy issues with ‘incomprehensible’ as it 
exaggerates the threat by invoking the rational-irrational binary. This binary obscures the reason 
terrorist tactics are utilised by ignoring the motives of the enemy and the mechanics of terrorism 
as a rational strategy used by a tangibly weak actor.125 The irrational diagnosis ignores the political 
nature of insurgency and the utility of terrorist strategy and tactics as a means for non-state 
actors to challenge states.126 Thus, these identifications are not informative as they imply anyone 
who uses terrorist tactics is inherently irrational, which in turn exaggerates the scope of the 
problem because there is no logic behind it, making it akin to a natural disaster that could occur 




Referring to terrorism as an irrational tactic implies that the insurgents are irrational and that 
there are no grievances or logic underlying the actions, which would not appeal and could 
provoke anger in the insurgent support population. This is a common Orientalist portrayal, 
reinforcing the binary of the West as rational and the East as irrational.127 That said, a Gallup poll 
found that 93% of Muslims thought 9/11 was not justified and a Pew poll found that 72% 
believed violence against civilians was never justified, which suggests many among the audience 
may also have seen the attacks as irrational and ‘incomprehensible’.128 However, the 7% and 28% 
are of more interest here and even some who thought it was not justified may still have seen it as 
rational; as will be examined in the deliberative chapter, there are many strongly held grievances 
towards the US that even moderate Muslims share. As this diagnosis reinforces the negative 
Orientalist stereotype, obscures grievances and, consequently could provoke anger, it helps 
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justify the insurgent’s actions and may exclude the insurgent support population from the 
counterinsurgent’s cause, delegitimising them as the right actor.  
 
The sudden and violent nature of terrorism means this diagnosis would match the experiences of 
the domestic audience. This is, after all, one of terrorism’s empowering factors, shocking the 
target audience with ‘incomprehensible’ violence.129 This diagnosis could reinforce the fear of the 
domestic audience, by portraying terrorism as an irrational tactic with no internal logic, the 
counterinsurgent extended the threat so as to make it all-pervasive. However, the main function 
of this diagnosis is justifying why the counterinsurgent did not predict or prevent the attack, 
addressing the confusion and reducing concern about their capability, as there is no way a 
counterinsurgent could predict the actions of an irrational enemy. It suggests the attacks had no 
logic, which also directs anger toward the enemy. As such, this diagnosis would aid mobilisation 
but they create issues for the justification of deliberative non-military solutions as it is impossible 
to reason with an irrational enemy.  
 
This diagnosis fits their narrative of the US as innocent and good by precluding any focus on 
blame beyond the irrationality of the enemy.130 As noted, this would be particularly important for 
the US in NZ, where since the 1970-1980s the public have not been wholehearted supporters 
but whose political support they rely on for justifying their actions and policies. Also, as it helps 
mobilise support in NZ, effectively suggesting that any other state – including NZ – could be the 
next victim, it would be of utility for the US and would, in turn, would have a positive impact on 
the alliance.  
 
4.2.1.3 TERRORISM AS THE ENEMY 
Anderton and Clark identified ‘terrorism’ as the enemy. Both referred to the “scourge of 
terrorism” on September 12.131 Anderton also spoke of “suppressing terrorism” on the 12th.132 
Then, on the 14th, Clark talked of the need to “combat terrorism”.133 ‘Terrorism’ here is being 
used as an enemy stand-in. These latent threat diagnosis framing tasks are, as will be examined 
below, figurative, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusive.  
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While not discreditable, experts agree that, as an enemy stand-in, the term ‘terrorism’ is not 
accurate or informative.134 The term is being used figuratively, rather than technically as 
“[t]errorism is a tactic, not an enemy”.135 It is inaccurate to refer to ‘terrorism’ as an enemy that 
can be directly fought when it is a method of organised violence used by a wide variety of 
groups. This diagnosis is not accurate as it “fails to make the distinction between the differing 
objectives of those who practice terrorism and the context surrounding its use”.136 The 
conflation of enemy and strategy exaggerates the scope of the threat by making it “amorphous 
and diffuse”.137 While al Qaeda has limited resources, ‘terrorism’ is essentially limitless in scope. 
These diagnoses misinform by obscuring the actual enemy with a generic method of violence, 
meaning any usage of ‘terrorism’ can be associated with this specific problem, so that various 
unrelated events or actors may become connected. The conflation of enemy and method has led 
COIN experts to suggest that politicians “distinguish Al Qaeda and the broader militant 
movement it symbolizes – entities that use terrorism – from the tactic of terrorism itself.”138 Also, 
used in this manner, the qualities of the enemy are transferred to the method of conflict they are 
using: this form of threat diagnosis anthropomorphises ‘terrorism’, further misinforming.  
 
AUDIENCE 
These identifications are unlikely to be salient for the insurgent support population as they 
conflate a specific enemy with a maligned method of conflict, essentially applying the negative 
aspects of ‘terrorism’ to the support population. In interviews with British Muslims, McGovern 
found that the “term ‘terrorism’ itself was seen to be one that ‘de-contextualised, de-politicised 
and demonised’”.139 It limits any understanding of motive, ascribing an a priori negative 
descriptor. It could also provoke anger as it makes every Muslim suspicious in the eyes of the 
Western public, an issue that would have many real world consequences for Muslims around the 
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globe after 9/11. Also, used in this manner, it exaggerates the potential scope of the threat, thus 
potentially legitimising the insurgent cause, as rather than delineating a limited enemy it provides 
an unlimited threat, magnifying their capacity. Because these identifications conflate the 
insurgent with a negative method of conflict, thus reducing any understanding of motive, they 
are exclusionary as well, effectively making all Muslims ‘the enemy’, which compromise the 
legitimacy of the counterinsurgent as an actor.  
 
These diagnoses would probably match the domestic audience’s experience as the actual enemy 
was unknown, the only referent the domestic audience had was that ‘terrorism’ has occurred. By 
anthropomorphising the threat they could provoke fear, the counterinsurgent applies frightening 
qualities and abilities, such as ‘scourge’, to a more amorphous and diffuse threat, exaggerating 
rather than limiting scope. They help reduce confusion, however, as the counterinsurgent is able 
to specifically blame ‘terrorism’ for the problem, which is the only visible threat at this point in 
time. They also may help reassure the population that the counterinsurgent is competent and 
understands the problem, helping direct anger towards ‘terrorism’ as it is made more sinister in 
these identifications. Because of the threat exaggeration, address concern and direct of anger, the 
counterinsurgent would gain mobilising potential from these identifications, though there are 
long-term justification issues because they clash with deliberative framing tasks.  
 
These identifications fit the US narrative of the ‘war on terror’ as they make the same conflation, 
Bush used ‘terrorism’ as an enemy-stand in from the very start, talking of the “war against 
terrorism” on September 11, a “comprehensive assault on terrorism” on September 15 and the 
‘scourge of terrorism” on September 18.140 They also of utility as they exaggerate the scope of 
the threat and obscure the motives of the enemy, helping to justify the US global ‘war on terror’ 
and mobilise support amongst the NZ population and beyond through both functions. Also, 
these diagnoses create a situation where the domestic audience can be mobilised to support the 
US cause at a later date by proxy as this generic enemy identification can applied to almost any 
threat/group. As such, they would aid the alliance.  
 
4.2.1.4 THE MOST SERIOUS GLOBAL THREAT 
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On September 12, Anderton diagnosed the threat as ‘global’ when he said “no country can be 
complacent”.141 This is the weaker component of the overall thematic grouping where terrorism 
is described as either ‘the most serious’ or ‘global’ threat. The diagnosis of terrorism as ‘the most 
serious global threat’, as will be examined below, is absolute, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusive.  
 
CONTENT 
Terrorism is not the ‘most serious’ threat; in every key metric it ranks far below many other 
threats.142 Nor is it a ‘global’ threat, with the Global Terrorism Index Report concluding that the 
majority of attacks are concentrated in just a few areas and have relatively localised outcomes – 
certainly outliers like 9/11 have a more global impact but even then the impact comes largely 
from the reaction and not the attack itself.143 However, even sceptics of these absolute 
identifications agree there is “no way of making objective assessments”, meaning they cannot be 
discredited despite their unqualified nature.144 They are not accurate diagnoses though as they 
grossly exaggerate the risk: terrorism does not threaten ‘all of us’ but is rather more often a 
localized threat and, up to 2009, there had “been a decrease in terrorist incidents over the past 
two decades, global terrorism-related deaths average no more than a few hundred per year and, 
in contrast to the tens of millions killed by disease, small arms, state repression, famine, 
automobile accidents, global warming, crime, natural disasters and numerous other phenomena, 
terrorism ranks extremely low as a risk to personal safety”.145 These descriptions become even 
more troubling when the international response to 9/11 is considered, as they immediately 
reduced the threat from terrorism after the attacks.146 They are not informative either as they do 
not clearly convey the underlying calculus of this method of political violence. Terrorism is 
generally used by the weak against the strong, yet these descriptions portray it in a way that 
obscures this completely.  
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141 Anderton, “Ministerial Statement: Terrorist Attacks in US.” 
142 Ronald Bailey, “How Scared of Terrorism Should You Be?” Reason, September 6, 2011, accessed on 18/03/2013, 
available from http://reason.com/archives/2011/09/06/how-scared-of-terrorism-should; Jim Harper, “You’re 
Eight Times More Likely to be Killed by a Police Officer than a Terrorist,” Cato Institute, August 10, 2012, accessed 
on 18/03/2013, available from http://www.cato.org/blog/youre-eight-times-more-likely-be-killed-police-officer-
terrorist; Richard Jackson, “The Study of Terrorism after 11 September 2001: Problems, Challenges and Future 
Developments,” Political Studies Review 7 (2009): 175. 
143 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism 
(Sydney, New York and Oxford: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014). 
144 Jackson et al., Terrorism: A Critical Introduction, 129. 
145 Jackson, “The Study of Terrorism after 11 September 2001,” 175. 
146 Mueller. and. Stewart, “The Terrorism Delusion,” 81-110; John Mueller, “The US Terrorist Threat Is 
Overblown,” New Perspectives Quarterly 25 (2008): 65. 
111 
 
This diagnosis fits the insurgent’s own narrative and in so doing legitimises the enemy as the 
absolute formulations exaggerate their capabilities, ascribing them a massively inflated capacity as 
the ‘most serious’ and ‘global’ threat. This is something recognised by a number of academics 
and military practitioners alike, including Nagl: “By using language that inflated the threat from al 
Qaeda and bin Laden, the United States only glamorized and empowered them.”147 Pecastaing 
reiterates this: “the hysterical narrative about the threat of global jihad has been a self -fulfilling 
prophecy. It is the American public discourse on al Qaeda that has made al Qaeda what it is.”148 Kilcullen 
also emphasises this: “By treating terrorism as the number one national security concern and al 
Qa’ida (AQ) as its most important proponent, we have in effected elevated Usama bin Laden 
and his core leadership group, lending prestige and credibility to his claims of importance by 
treating him as worthy of our attention, resources, and blood.”149 One of al Qaeda’s main aims 
was to be seen as the ‘most serious’ and ‘global’ threat and these descriptions reinforce their 
legitimacy as an actor.150  
 
Diagnosing terrorism as the ‘most serious global’ threat would fit with the audience’s experience 
at this time. As noted above, the attacks were shocking in scope and audacity and left many with 
a new or enhanced fear of terrorism. These diagnoses strengthen the terror the insurgents want 
to cause rather than mitigating it; as Jackson writes, they serve to “empower terrorism and 
amplify its impact far beyond its objective capabilities to cause material harm”.151 Critically, 
however, they help reduce confusion because of their experiential commensurability, their 
centrality means that having the counterinsurgent describe it in this way would reinforce the 
audience’s perspective. They would have a mixed impact on the concern regarding the 
counterinsurgent’s capacity, as while they do help portray them as having a firm understanding 
of the situation, there are issues regarding why they could not predict or prevent the ‘most 
serious threat’. These diagnoses also help direct anger at the enemy as they are portrayed as 
posing the ‘most serious’ and ‘global’ threat to the domestic audience. Because of the fear 
exacerbation and anger direction, these diagnoses would aid in mobilising support for the 
counterinsurgent’s cause. They also help justify virtually any response because they exaggerate 
the seriousness but do not restrict the possible solutions as other reactive diagnoses do.  
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These identifications fit the US narrative; on September 20, Bush referred to al Qaeda as a 
“global terror network” with a “global reach”.152 Likewise, they would appeal to their belief of 
their ‘invincibility’, as they explain that the US was attacked by the ‘most serious global’ threat 
rather than a lesser threat.153 This diagnoses immediately after 9/11 would have been of utility 
for the US as it would have helped mobilise international support for the US cause as ‘no 
country can be complacent’ and justify virtually any response. Thus, they would have a positive 
impact on the alliance. 
 
4.2.1.5 ALIENATING PROBLEM/ENEMY DIAGNOSES 
Anderton and Clark used a number of alienating diagnoses in the wake of the attacks. Both used 
the term “scourge” on September 12, Clark also referred to the attacks as “cold-blooded” and 
“cowardly” on September 12.154 In his second press release, Anderton said that “[t]his has been 
an evil act. Evil people have conspired together to commit a cold and vicious act”.155 As will be 
examined, these manifest diagnostic framing tasks are binary, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusive.  
 
CONTENT 
None of these terms can be fully discredited because they all have a broad variation of accepted 
definitions, which also makes them relatively accurate. They are not informative, however. 
Firstly, all the terms delineate binary readings, specifically human-inhuman for ‘scourge’ and 
‘cold-blooded’, good-evil for ‘evil’ and brave-cowardly for ‘cowardice’, thus exaggerating the 
threat, as they imply that the terrorists’ actions are not limited by culture, rationality, morality or 
humanity and obscuring the real nature of the conflict and the underlying motivations. In turn, 
these binaries exaggerate: ‘scourge’ “invokes notions of infection, dirt, squalor and sickness” and 
‘cold-blooded’ portrays the attacks as being motivated by something other than emotion, at the 
extreme end as being inhuman – both reduce agency and humanity, transporting “terrorism from 
its specific historical and geographical location... to an abstract moral plain”.156 ‘Evil’ is not 
informative as it applies a label that refutes introspection or analysis, to condemn “all terrorism 
as unconditionally evil strips it of political context and ignores its inherent attraction to the 
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militarily helpless”, thus directing all blame at the enemy.157 ‘Cowardice’ portrays the situation as 
a binary of brave-cowardly, exaggerating the qualities of the actors where the allies are brave and 
the enemy ‘cowardly’. The ultimate outcome of this is all these terms obscure the grievances and 
motives that underpin the enemy’s actions and exaggerate the qualities of the actors.  
 
AUDIENCE  
Inferring that the insurgents lack bravery, morality and even humanity would not appeal to the 
insurgent support population’s self-view as they reinforce the ongoing ‘Orientalism’ of Muslims 
that portrays the West as wholly ‘good’ and Muslims as wholly ‘bad’.158 This could incite anger as 
“[a]ll traits of aggression and wickedness are thus projected onto the Other while constituting 
oneself as good and pure.”159 This language is exclusionary, it casts anyone who supports the 
insurgents as wholly negative and “profoundly devalues” them.160 A key component of ongoing 
Muslim anger is not just their physical domination by Western states, but the ongoing 
psychological and cultural oppression.161 These terms also help justify enemy actions and 
legitimise their capacity, as they not only delineate the conflict in similar terms to those they use 
but also exaggerate the limitlessness of the threat, thus extending it both physically and 
psychologically, implying a greater capacity to achieve outcomes than they really possess.162  
 
These descriptors would be salient for the domestic population as they fit the common NZ 
political and media narrative.163 Also, NZ’s national character values ‘stoicism’ and ‘fairness’, 
making ‘coward’ an appealing slur.164 The use of the binary ‘evil’ would reassure the domestic 
audience that they are ‘good’, which would appeal in the wake of the attacks. However, while the 
everyday nature of these terms may make them seem innocuous, when connected to such a 
dramatic and frightening event they take on a more menacing air. Excluding ‘cowardly’, which 
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helps lessen the threat, these terms could increase fear by exaggerating the threat as the enemy 
are portrayed as immoral and even inhuman.165 That said, they would alleviate confusion, as they 
portray the situation in a Manichean manner using easily parsable terms. Furthermore, they 
would help address concerns of competency as the counterinsurgent appears to understand the 
situation and these terms imply that there was nothing the counterinsurgent could have done to 
predict or stop the attacks. Finally, they direct anger as they apportion all the blame on the 
enemy; as Kellner notes, these types of identifications provoke “violent militaristic responses” 
because of their anger-directing capacity.166 Therefore, these terms deliver powerful mobilisation. 
However, they could cause issues for legitimacy as when the enemy is depicted in this manner it 
suggests that non-military solutions such as diplomacy may not work as the enemy are not moral, 
rational or even human, thus limiting justification of the counterinsurgent’s proposed 
deliberative solutions.167  
 
These identifications would be salient for the US as they fit their own narrative, Bush referred to 
“evil, despicable acts of terror”, ‘evil acts” and said “[f]reedom itself was attacked this morning 
by a faceless coward” on September 11, then on September 12 said that “[t]his will be a 
monumental struggle of good versus evil”.168 Bush used the term ‘evil’ in 319 speeches between 
taking office and June 2003, with 914 noun uses versus 182 for adjectives – for him, ‘evil’ is a 
‘thing’.169 ‘Evil’ also reinforces the US’s self-identification as ‘good’, a binary deeply entrenched in 
the US national narrative.170 It is not just a part of the US narrative, but is more personal, as 
“Bush uses the word in an aggressively in-your-face born-again manner that takes its resonance 
from a long Judeo-Christian tradition of radical evil embodied in heroically diabolical figures.”171 
Likewise, the “conventions of American political rhetoric oblige presidents to denounce terrorist 
attacks as ‘cowardly’.”172 Portraying the enemy as ‘cowardly’, immoral and inhuman and 
obscuring any blame that could be directed toward the US justifies any US response and would 
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have a positive impact on the alliance, particularly as the counterinsurgent is using terms that go 
against NZ’s usually more internationalist neutral rhetoric. They are essentially mimicking US 
rhetoric, embedding it into the NZ population’s view of this conflict by aligning NZ’s worldview 
with the America’s.  
 
4.2.2 BLAME/IDEOLOGY 
This section will examine how the counterinsurgent attributed blame for the attacks using the 
reactive narrative. Again, as the press releases were issued before any significant information 
about the identity of the actors was known, this would appear to be a difficult task, especially the 
absolute aspect. However, as hypothesized one of the key functions of the reactive is to help 
direct blame towards to enemy after an emotionally shocking attack, so despite not having any 
concrete information it is unsurprising that the counterinsurgent will attempt to attribute blame 
in the immediate aftermath. This section draws on many of the same terms and phrases from the 
problem/enemy section as these also attribute blame.  
 
4.2.2.1 IRRATIONAL  
Anderton stated on September 12 that “no cause that can justify this”.173 This statement suggests 
that there is no rational justification for the enemy’s action. More ambiguous, but also 
reinforcing this, was Clark’s reference to “utterly incomprehensible violence” on September 
12.174 Likewise, the alienating problem identifications of ‘evil’, ‘scourge’ and ‘cold-blooded’ blame 
an irrational enemy through their implication of immorality and dehumanisation. As will be 
outlined below, the irrational blame identification is absolute, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusive. 
This section will focus on the manifest ‘no cause’ attribution framing task both because it has 
not been examined and because it best embodies the irrational blame attribution. 
 
CONTENT 
While the ‘no cause’ phrase is an absolutist statement, it is difficult to discredit as the 
counterinsurgent is referring to the 9/11 attacks rather than terrorism in general, and justifying 
the summary killing of thousands of random people is extremely difficult. Furthermore, as with 
the irrational problem identification, there are many ways these could be read, but due to the 
embedded nature of the Orientalist narrative and the fact that the counterinsurgent is dealing 
with a Muslim insurgency, this interpretation must be considered. That said, it is not accurate or 
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informative as it obscures the enemy’s grievances and motivations by invoking the rational-
irrational binary, which not only overstates the scope of the threat, as an irrational enemy has no 
limits and their actions are illogical and thus random, but also judges any and all causes as a priori 
unjustified, exaggerating the irrationality of the enemy to occlude any other causational factors. 
Specifically, it does not inform regarding the enemy’s actual motivations, for, if they are 
irrational, they can have no rational reasons for the attack and the counterinsurgent need not go 
any deeper to attribute blame.  
 
AUDIENCE 
These identifications would have limited salience for the insurgent support population as they 
reinforce the Orientalist stereotype that Muslims are irrational, obscuring genuine grievances.175 
As will be explored in the deliberative blame section, there is widespread resentment and anger 
over what are perceived as genuine grievances against the West, as well as the already noted 
widespread perception in the wider Muslim community, let alone the insurgent support 
population, that the West has a double standard when it comes to grievances, and these types of 
blame attribution match this experience.176 The irrational blame negates genuine grievances, 
considered central to causation, and could therefore provoke anger amongst the insurgent 
audience.177 That said, as already noted, a majority of Muslims thought that 9/11 was not 
justified, so these identifications would probably only appeal to the 7% who thought it was 
justified. Nevertheless, because they discount the legitimate grievances and reinforcing the 
irrationality of the enemy, this type of blame identification excludes the insurgent audience from 
the counterinsurgent’s cause and helping reinforce the justness of the insurgent’s actions, 
especially as it conforms to al Qaeda’s narrative regarding the West.178 
 
This sentiment would probably appeal to the domestic audience beliefs; as one letter to The 
Evening Post on the 18th exclaimed: “As for attacking the World Trade Center, I cannot see the 
justification for that at all”.179 However, it could exacerbate fear as it implies that the enemy is 
irrational and their attacks have no logic underlying them. As an absolute, however, it would help 
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reduce confusion by providing the audience with a blanket statement regarding blame which, in 
turn, would direct anger toward the enemy as this blame infers that they have not justification for 
acting in the way they did. The main beneficial outcome for the irrational blame identification, 
though, is its ability to address concerns about the competency of the counterinsurgent as they 
remove any possibility the counterinsurgent’s actions are connected to the attacks and portray 
events as completely unpredictable and thus unpreventable – if the enemy is irrational there can 
be no understanding their actions. These identifications would mobilise support, though they 
could negatively impact justification of counterinsurgent deliberative non-military solutions as 
they are not consistent with this blame attribution. A study found that when “terrorists were 
depicted as biased and irrational (vs. as objective and rational), participants were more likely to 
advocate military action against terrorism and less likely to advocate diplomacy.”180  
 
The irrational blame attribution has a strong fit with the US narrative; as noted, Bush used the 
term ‘evil’ a number of times in the first two days and he also inferred the enemy was irrational 
when he stated on September 11 that “America was targeted for attack because we’re the 
brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world”.181 Bush would later state, on 
November 10, 2001, that “they hate, not our policies,-but [sic] our existence”.182 As already 
noted of the many problem and enemy diagnoses and identifications, in using this blame 
attribution NZ justifies US actions and helps mobilise support for the US amongst the NZ 
population, which is of utility for the US actor as they needed as much international support for 
their coming actions in Afghanistan and beyond. Such was the US’s desire for the blame for 
9/11 to be directed solely at the enemy that in 2004 the US Embassy personally put a stop to a 
Labour Minister hosting a fundraiser where Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit9/11 was to play, with the 
cable explaining that “it is probable that this potential fiasco may only have been averted because 
of our phone calls”.183 If there was concern at a film screening at a fundraiser three years after 
the fact, the use of phrases like ‘no cause’ in the immediate aftermath would have significant 
beneficial impacts on the alliance.  
  
4.2.3 ACTOR/VICTIM 
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This section will seek to examine how the counterinsurgent identified the various actors, 
excluding the enemy but including the victims, themselves and their allies, using the reactive 
narrative. In contrast to the previous two sections, these were ‘knowable’ attributes at this point. 
Considering the US was seeking to build a coalition, the actor identifications are a key mobilising 
tool as they help delineate in and outgroups.  
 
4.2.3.1 ALIENATING ACTOR IDENTIFICATIONS 
Anderton stated on September 12 that “New Zealanders share the despair and terrible loss that 
the whole of the civilised world feels... [and share] A determination felt by all decent people... 
[that] civilised societies everywhere – must work together” and that NZ would “stand with all 
other democratic countries”.184 Also as already noted, the attacks are referred to as attacks on 
both “all civilised nations” and “humanity”.185 As will be examined, these manifest actor 
identification framing tasks are figurative, binary, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusive. 
 
CONTENT 
These identifications are credible, all have a wide range of meanings and both ‘humanity’ and 
‘civilised’ are used figuratively.186 It is when they are used in absolute formulations, such as the 
‘whole civilised world’, ‘all decent people’ and ‘all other democratic countries’, their credibility 
becomes problematic, particularly the last one. Referring to ‘all other democratic countries’ is not 
a creditable identification as its scope and totality are illogical. Many of the states, including 
Pakistan, Russia, Oman, Qatar, Tajikistan, United Arab Emirates, that ‘stood together’ following 
9/11 were not democratic, making this a discreditable statement. None of these are informative 
but rather they mask any actual qualities the actors and victims may possess, though, of the four, 
‘democratic’ is the most detailed. All invoke binaries – human-inhuman, civilised-barbaric, 
democratic-undemocratic and decent-indecent – furthering the belief that no ‘human’, ‘civilised’, 
‘democratic’, ‘decent’ person would commit terrorism. As a figurative term, ‘civilisation’ is 
“conceptually barren”, fulfilling an ideological function, rather than a semantic one.187 ‘Humanity’ 
is so broad it provides no actual information at all, while the terms ‘civilised’ and ‘decent’ are 
tautological identifications as people who were shocked by the attacks will self-identify as 
‘civilised’ and ‘decent’. The main issues with ‘democratic’ is that the way it is used connects with 
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‘civilisation’ and also suggests that every single one of the allied actors are democratic, and also 
therefore ‘civilised’, that this is a defining difference between the allied actor and the enemy 
when it is demonstrably not. All the terms exaggerate the actor, especially in the absolute 
formulations, by giving them idealised qualities and inferring that all of them always act in a 
‘human’, ‘civilised’, ‘democratic’, and ‘decent’ manner.  
 
AUDIENCE  
These terms would not fit the insurgent audience’s narrative, especially for Middle Eastern 
Muslims as their region was, at least up until several centuries ago, the ‘centre of civilisation’ and 
they are likely to see Western claims of embodying ‘civilisation’ as contrary to their worldview.188 
This ‘civilised’ mantle passed on from the region itself to Islam, with the ‘Islamic golden age’ a 
key symbol of hope for resurgence amongst the insurgents and their support population.189 
Likewise, while to non-Muslims a Sharia theocracy may seem ‘uncivilised’ and ‘undemocratic’, 
for Muslims this is not necessarily the case: Qutb, al Qaeda’s ideological inspiration, envisioned a 
“government based on free choice, popular consensus and the application of laws prescribed by 
God [as it is] bound to promote confidence in its citizens”.190 These terms would not control 
emotion as they create an ingroup-outgroup situation where any insurgent supporter is instantly 
categorised as inhuman, uncivilised, undemocratic and indecent, which, considering their 
perception of the West’s history of suppressing ‘democratic’ movements around the world using 
what might be considered by some as inhuman, uncivilised and indecent methods, could also be 
parsed as hypocritical – as Bin Laden said: “Let us not forget one of your major characteristics, 
which is your duality in both manners and law. Your manners and policies have two categories: 
one for you and one for the others.”191 Also, they have an inescapable connection with 
colonialism and Orientalism.192 Ryan suggests that the source of Muslim anger is the 
“subjugation of most Muslim peoples of the Middle East, Asia and Africa to colonial rule by 
Europeans in the 19th and early 20th centuries”, while Mirsepassi states that many Muslims 
struggle to differentiate between colonisation of the past and the West’s actions during the war 
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on terror.193 These terms could compromise the legitimacy of counterinsurgent as an actor as the 
language is exclusive rather than inclusive, portraying the counterinsurgent’s cause as an 
existential ‘clash of civilisations’.  
 
These terms would be salient for the domestic audience because they are all ‘positive’ terms 
when the audience is part of the ingroup. In particular, ‘democracy’ would appeal as NZ self-
identifies as a country of strong democratic values.194 In the wake of the attacks it would also be 
comforting to be told the way they are feeling is common across the ‘whole of the civilised 
world’. They also fit within the common tropes of a ‘clash of civilisations’ and ‘crimes against 
humanity’. They help to reduce confusion because they provide an obvious and easily parsed 
explanation for the attacks, that the enemy are inhuman, uncivilised and indecent, which helps 
address concerns regarding the counterinsurgent, as does the fact they make them appear to 
know how the whole ‘civilised world’ feels, and they direct anger because they absolve the actor 
of blame and direct it at the enemy. In turn, they would marshal support; as Huntington writes, 
in lieu of ideological motivation governments will seek to “mobilize support by appealing to 
common religion and civilization identity.”195 There are possible justification issues for 
deliberative solutions as many are incompatible with an inhuman, uncivilised and indecent 
enemy, though these identifications do help legitimise the counterinsurgent as the right actor 
because they are part of ‘civilisation’ and ‘humanity’.  
 
These terms appealing to key US values and fit their narrative as the US portrayed the conflict as 
one between ‘civilisation and barbarians’ and sees itself as the embodiment of ‘civilisation’ and 
‘democracy’ – the “city upon the hill”. 196 Bush used this shared vocabulary on September 13, 
stating that “[c]ivilized people around the world denounce the evildoers”.197 As noted, on 
September 14 Bush said “these were attacks on the basic democratic values in which we all 
believe so passionately”. Also of interest is his statement on September 11, where he invokes 
both sides of the binary: “our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature. And we 
responded with the best of America.”198 ‘Civilisation’, in particular, is central to the US narrative, 
the counterinsurgent is mimicking US forms of political dialogue, embedding them into the NZ 
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population’s understanding of the conflict. Here, NZ’s identifications fit perfectly with Bush’s 
and help portray the US in a positive light, as ‘civilised’, ‘humane’, ‘decent’ and ‘democratic’ to 
the NZ audience, which helps mobilise domestic support, justifies US actions and positions 
them as a legitimate fount of ‘civilisation’. As noted in many WikiLeaks cables, the US wanted 
NZ to express friendship and solidarity with them to the NZ public, and these actor 
identifications deliver this by using this salient ingroup collective actor identification.199 By 
appealing to key US tropes, reinforcing the US interpretation of the situation to the domestic 
audience, connecting NZ to the US as well as justifying and legitimising the US, these would aid 
the alliance.  
 
4.2.3.2 ALIENATING VICTIM DESCRIPTION 
Anderton referred to “the loss of so many innocent lives” and “innocent civilians” on September 
12.200 While considered borderline reactive, this manifest victim identification framing task is, as 
will be shown below, binary, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusionary.  
 
CONTENT 
Using ‘innocent’ to describe the victims of the attacks is credible. Its use here is literal, as it refers 
to the victims’ ‘innocence’ with specific regard to the attacks rather than attempting to identify 
them as completely ‘innocent’. However, while it is credible it lacks accuracy because it creates a 
binary of innocent-guilty – and the portrayal of ‘innocent’ victims inevitably frames one side as 
‘good’ and the other as ‘evil’ – and the binary nature exaggerates the situation.201 By portraying 
the victims in this manner, the counterinsurgent is representing the conflict in a Manichean 
manner wherein the victims and the allied actors are ‘innocent’ and the enemy is guilty. This is 
one of the rare reactive frames that are literal but have a binary and hyperbolic nature. The 
reason for this is because the term has a fluidity of applicability. While the implicit scope here is 
that the direct victims are ‘innocent’ of any direct causative connection to the attacks, it also 
frames the wider actor as well, implying the US were totally ‘innocent’ as well, expanding its 
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scope in a binary and exaggerated manner. As Jackson notes, this term suggests ‘exceptional 
grievance’, divesting the US of “moral responsibility for counter-violence” and portraying the 
situation in a black and white manner.202  
  
AUDIENCE 
Referring to the victims as ‘innocent’ would probably have mixed appeal for the insurgent 
support population. While it is likely that the more limited specific reference to the actual victims 
as ‘innocent’ of any causative link to the attacks would fit with their own experience, the wider 
implication that the US is ‘innocent’ is unlikely to appeal. As will be discussed in the deliberative 
blame section, many amongst the insurgent support population see the US as guilty of 
perpetrating many grievances and for this reason this identification has the potential to alienate 
and anger, excluding the insurgent support population from the counterinsurgent’s cause. The 
issue is that while the insurgent support population would understand that the actual victims 
were ‘innocent’ the use of this term within the wider reactive narrative gives the term a greater 
scope, implying the US have suffered an ‘exceptional grievance’ and are ‘innocent’ of all blame, 
and this is potentially incendiary. However, while this may be true for some, for others amongst 
the audience the term ‘innocent’ could compromise the justness of the insurgent’s actions as the 
killing of ‘innocents’ is prohibited by the Koran. After the attacks Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 
issued a fatwa that stated that “[e]ven in times of war, Muslims are not allowed to kill anybody 
save the one who engages in face-to-face confrontation with them”.203 
 
These identifications would appeal to most of the domestic audience as the targeting of 
‘innocent’ victims is a key part of the underlying calculus of terrorism. Though representative, a 
number of letters to the editor after 9/11 across NZ referred to the ‘innocence’ of the victims.204 
One wrote: “The general reaction, at least in the western world, to the September 2001 
destruction.... cannot possibly be understood without noting the importance, for the majority of 
the public, of the perception that these were above all else attacks on innocent victims.”205 With 
regard to controlling emotion, this term is seen having a moderate negative impact on fear, not 
so much because of its own meaning but largely because it reinforces the binary representation 
of the conflict. It does serve to reduce confusion as it labels the victims in a binary manner that 
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fits with the general understanding of terrorism as targeting ‘innocents’. This is also helps reduce 
concern about the counterinsurgent’s capacity as it connects with the wider ‘evil and irrational’ 
framing that suggests there was no way to predict or prevent the attacks. It also serves to direct 
anger at the enemy as it portrays them attacking ‘innocent’ people. Overall, it delivers a high 
degree of mobilisation for the domestic population and helps justify military responses.  
 
This identification fits the US narrative, Bush spoke of “an enemy who preys on innocent and 
unsuspecting people” on September 12.206 It also fits the deeper US narrative of exceptionalism 
and exceptional grievance, placing American suffering above all other suffering and helping to 
redirect any blame from the US.207 Commentators have noted 9/11 was described as the day that 
America ‘lost its innocence’, which connects the direct victim and the blameless actor aspects 
together.208 Bennett, writing in the NBR days after the attacks explained that the US “are likely to 
think of themselves as vulnerable, as victims and take many more measures of self-
protection.”209As noted, the NZ public has a mixed view of America’s general ‘innocence’, 
something that the US is keenly aware of, so the US would appreciate this victim identification’s 
expanded implication as it aided mobilisation in NZ and, therefore, justifies the US response and 
legitimises them as an actor, delivering alliance maintenance.  
 
4.2.4 STRATEGY/SOLUTION 
This section will examine the reactive strategies and solutions proposed by the counterinsurgent. 
These were, at this point in time, all essentially hypothetical and aspirational, though again this 
did not prevent the counterinsurgent from describing them in an absolute manner. That said, 
these were vague strategies and solutions, rather than specific ones, and they were all couched in 
a way that implied they were to be implemented in the future. While they may have some 
negative impacts for the insurgent audience, they deliver a range of positive outcomes with 
respect to the domestic and allied audience, particularly that they make the counterinsurgent 
appear competent, thus helping to reduce any concern about their capability.  
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4.2.4.1 WAR ON AN ABSTRACT NOUN 
On September 12, Clark stated that we need to “fight the scourge of terrorism”, while, on 
September 14, Clark said we need to “combat terrorism”.210 Declaring war on an abstract noun, 
which can be both a strategy and a solution, is figurative, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusionary, 
as will be shown below.  
 
CONTENT 
These declarations of war on an abstract noun are used figuratively and cannot be discredited.211 
As Lakoff argues, war – or any form of military action – on an abstract noun can only ever be 
metaphorical.212 Accuracy, then, is an issue, the use of a metaphoric solution obscures reality – as 
Record notes: “terrorism is not a proper noun”, asking how “you defeat a technique, as opposed 
to a flesh-and-blood enemy?”.213 At best, it only provides a single aspect of a much larger 
necessary strategy; it exaggerates the military component of the strategy at the expense of the 
political, economic and diplomatic solutions and, in so doing, exaggerates the ease of the 
solution.214 At worst, it is deceptive because it delineates an impossible metaphoric solution. As a 
strategy, it does not inform about the complex and multifaceted actions required to counter 
terrorism, as COIN principles dictate an expanded mandate rather than a military-first approach 
that this framing task infers.215 
 
AUDIENCE 
These strategies would not appeal to the insurgent audience as the ‘war on terror’ has been 
equated by many Muslims as being a war on Islam, suggesting that the use of martial terms by 
NZ may connect their strategy to the ‘war on terror’ itself.216 Al Qaeda have promoted this 
conflation as it serves their strategic interests: “Much al-Qaeda propaganda argues that “war on 
terrorism” is synonymous with ‘war against Islam’”.217 The United Kingdom (UK) Foreign 
Office asked its diplomats to stop using it to “avoid reinforcing and giving succour to the 
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terrorists’ narrative”.218 In a 2012 letter bin Laden explained: “(the enemies) have largely stopped 
using the phrase ‘the war on terror’ in the context of not wanting to provoke Muslims, because 
they felt that saying the war on terror could appear to most people to be a war on Islam.”219 
Thus, these strategies could incite anger and exclude the insurgent support population from the 
counterinsurgent’s cause. They could also legitimise the enemy, as any ‘war-like’ terms confer de-
facto combatant status on the enemy.220 War proper, that is conflict between two states, involves 
two or more legitimate opponents as “acting on behalf of a state has constituted the primary 
means of attaining combatant, and therefore legitimate, status.”221  
 
A poll on September 13, 2001, found only 42% of New Zealanders were in favour of a military 
attack while a 2012 survey found that only 35% of the NZ population sees “[c]ombating 
terrorism around the world” as a “very important” foreign policy goal, though this increases to 
75% when “quite important” is included.222 Still, it was ranked as less important than NZ’s 
economy, supporting international human rights, countering climate change and improving 
international living standards.223 This suggests these strategies would have had limited appeal to a 
majority of the population. They could provoke fear amongst the domestic population as they 
focus on the most violent aspect of the solution, Brzezinski has commented that the “‘war on 
terror’ has created a culture of fear”.224 Critically, however, because of their figurative simplicity 
they help reduce confusion. They would also help alleviate concerns about the 
counterinsurgent’s capacity as they make the overall solution appear extremely easy and they 
infer the counterinsurgent already has a strategy to achieve it ready. This is probably their key 
appeal for the counterinsurgent, indicating they have moved the nation to a war-footing, 
delivering short-term mobilisation and justifying their response. Conversely, they do not control 
expectations as they outline an impossible solution, meaning that the counterinsurgent can never 
actually achieve the outcome they are identifying, creating a situation where expectations will not 
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be met. As the counterinsurgent cannot actually ‘fight’ or ‘combat’ terrorism, these failed 
expectations create an issue for long-term legitimacy as failure would reflect poorly on the 
counterinsurgent. COIN principles recommend a counterinsurgent delineates achievable goals as 
operational success is a key aspect in creating and maintaining domestic support for troop 
deployments.225 As Larson states, ‘‘operations failing to achieve their objectives tend to lose 
support” and by describing an impossible to achieve solution the counterinsurgent is creating 
conditions that could cost it public support in the long-term.226 Another issue is that ‘war’ implies 
a rational enemy, yet the reactive narrative portrays the enemy and their tactics as irrational.  
 
As noted, Bush used the ‘war on terrorism’ formulation on September 11, then on September 12 
he stated these “were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war”.227 The ‘war on terror’ was 
the defining phrase of the era, the ‘floating signifier’ for the entire conflict.228 Thus, these 
strategies fit the US narrative. Also, the US has a history of declaring war on abstract nouns, with 
wars being declared on drugs, cancer, teen pregnancy and drunk driving; it is a part of their 
national narrative.229 Further, it would match the US experience as they felt they were ‘at war’ 
after the attacks. NZ’s use of similar terms in the wake of the attacks would have appealed, 
particularly as it has been noted in cables from the US Embassy that Labour were “ideologically 
drawn to a peace-keeping role” and that the combat force had been re-geared for these 
operations.230 Thus, by using such out-of-character bellicose terminology and mobilising their 
own population for ‘war’, the counterinsurgent helped justify US actions and would probably 
have improved their alliance with the US, particularly as the military component of their strategy 
was the most obvious response from the US in the wake of the attacks.  
 
4.2.4.2 JUSTICE 
On September 12 Anderton said that “the perpetrators of this violence must be brought swiftly 
to justice” while on September 14 Clark stated that NZ and the international community need 
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“combat terrorism and to bring to justice the perpetrators”.231 While ‘justice’ can have a range of 
meanings, from court-based, ethical and deliberated process to frontier-style, violence-oriented 
retribution, as used here it embodies the latter, it refers to the “eradication of a threat”.232 That 
Clark connects the war on an abstract noun solution to this otherwise incompatible solution 
reinforces this point. As will be explored below, this manifest solution framing task is figurative, 
binary, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusive.  
 
CONTENT 
This solution cannot be discredited, at least this early on, not just because ‘justice’ is used 
figuratively – justice in this sense involves an air campaign rather than a court room – but also 
because it has an aspirant quality at this point and its accuracy is impossible to gauge. However, 
this solution is not informative as the counterinsurgent does not provide any information other 
than the term and ‘justice’ is, at best, “controversial and subjective”.233 That it can either an air 
campaign or a court room is highly problematic; it does not convey any useful details about the 
solution. As well as being figurative, it invokes the binary of just-unjust, exaggerating the allied 
actors’ ability to ‘bring justice’ whilst simultaneously making it their sole domain. ‘Justice’, as 
used here, is not an objective process but rather something one side possesses and the other 
does not, one that the allied actor can ‘bring’.  
 
AUDIENCE  
As used here, this solution would not fit the insurgent support population’s narrative as it implies 
the allies are the source of ‘justice’. In turn, it could incite anger as it not only reinforces the just-
unjust binary but also the good-evil and civilised-barbaric binaries.234 Holland explains that Bush 
“loaded the term [justice] to broadly equate with removing the terrorist threat to America”.235 In 
other words, ‘justice’ is something that the allies are able to deliver, American/Western ‘justice’ is 
paramount and it is arbitrary. The US and allies are the source of justice and they define its 
parameters. Also, any ‘unjust’ action would discredit this identification, generating more anger 
because of the inconsistent use of this term. These factors could have negative implications for 
the counterinsurgent’s legitimacy as they exclude the insurgent support population by implying 
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only the allies posses justice, and that this justice is violent. In turn, this legitimises the insurgent 
as the ‘bringer of Muslim justice’. 
  
The ‘justice’ identification would appeal to the domestic audience as it is argued that justice is a 
relative, the domestic audience would associate with their proximate perspective – most would 
believe their government is a legitimate ‘bringer of justice’. An article in the Nelson Mail days 
after 9/11 stated that the “perpetrators must be brought to justice. And according to some, it has 
to be justice of an equal measure, an eye for an eye. For others it is more traditional civilised 
justice”.236 This suggests that even though this usage is read as the ‘eye for an eye’, some in NZ at 
the time may have still seen it as a court-based process. An article in the NBR on September 14 
reinforces the former interpretation, “Justice in America is not a merciful figure... Undoubtedly 
the US will lash out in this instance”.237 An article in the Dominion backs this up, Bush has 
“promise the country justice against cowardly terrorists, invoking the Battle Hymn of the 
Republic and its ‘terrible, swift sword’”.238 Either way, this solution would also alleviate concern 
as it reassures that the counterinsurgent is going to rectify the situation, portraying a complex 
reality with a simplistic and uncompromising solution. Stating they will ‘bring them to justice’ 
belies the incredible complexity of the necessary solution. This would also aid in mobilising 
support for the counterinsurgent’s cause at this point in time. However, there could be long-term 
issues for justness of the response if the counterinsurgent is not seen to actually ‘bring justice’ in 
either the violent or deliberative manner.  
 
This solution would appeal to the US as Clark essentially mimics Bush’s statements on 
September 11, who stated they would “bring them to justice”.239 This mimicking reinforced his 
solution parameters and cemented the perception that the US can ‘bring justice’ to a somewhat 
suspicious NZ audience.240 Furthermore, this identification fits with the US narrative of the ‘Wild 
West’ and the “American myth of frontier justice” that is deeply ingrained in the American 
psyche.241 West and Carey believe that the Bush Administration were deliberate in their use of 
these myths to mobilise their support for their actions, not just because they hold such a strong 
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appeal but also because they drastically simplify a complex solution.242 By using the same 
identification as Bush, Clark reinforces the US perspective, justifies the US response and helps 
legitimise Bush as the ‘cowboy in chief’ who can ‘bring them to justice’ for the NZ audience, 
mobilising support for their cause which would deliver alliance maintenance.  
 
4.2.4.3 NO TOLERANCE 
On September 12 Clark stated that “[t]here can be no tolerance of such deliberate and cowardly 
acts of terrorism”.243 As will be examined below, this strategy is absolute, hyperbolic, emotive 
and exclusionary.  
 
CONTENT 
This strategy is not considered credible as it is an uncompromisingly absolutist. Governments are 
rarely as intransigent as this statement makes them appear, Neumann notes that despite the 
rhetoric democratic states often negotiate with terrorist groups and while these are not the same, 
negotiation implies a degree of ‘tolerance’.244 Also, it is further discredited by the 
counterinsurgent’s own statements regarding their own ‘tolerance’ as an actor and the need for 
‘tolerance’ as a strategy, which will be examined in the deliberative section. As an absolute 
position it is not informative, it is devoid of details or specifics, rather their real position, which 
is that they show ‘little tolerance’ rather than ‘no tolerance’. Furthermore, for a state that refers 
to itself as ‘tolerant’, as COIN expert Kilcullen explains, the real damage is “not the damage 
inflicted by terrorist attacks themselves but the damage inflicted by the reaction from societies 
that terrorists attack” and “our response to terrorism could cause us to take measures that, in 
important ways, we could cease to be ourselves”.245  
 
AUDIENCES 
This strategy is unlikely to appeal and could incite anger in the insurgent support population. It 
implies that the counterinsurgent’s ‘tolerance’ to terrorism is contingent on who is using this 
method of violence, invoking the Orientalist binary that everything the West does is ‘good’ and 
‘tolerable’ and everything the insurgent does is ‘evil’ and ‘intolerable’. The ‘no tolerance’ strategy 
is exclusive as it reinforces this binary view. This is clear in Aziz’s report: “As the government 
adopted a no-tolerance policy, a fear-stricken public watched as images of nefarious dark-
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skinned, bearded Muslims flashed across millions of television screens. The message was, if there 
had ever been any doubt, the 9/11 attacks confirmed that Muslims and Arabs are inherently 
violent and intent upon destroying the American way of life.”246 Thus, it excludes the insurgent 
support population from the counterinsurgent’s cause, not only compromising the justness of 
their response but also justifying the insurgent’s ‘intolerant’ actions.  
 
Because it creates a binary where ‘tolerance’ is the only other option, this would appeal to the 
domestic audience who would be unlikely to want ‘tolerance’ in the wake of 9/11. It also serves 
to reassure the domestic population’s concerns regarding the counterinsurgent’s response as it 
portrays the strategy as simple and easily achievable and, in turn, gives the counterinsurgent the 
appearance of unwavering competency. However, it fails to delineate a realistic or achievable 
objective meaning that it does not limit expectation. It would deliver mobilisation at this point in 
time, but there are long-term justification issues if the counterinsurgent chooses to pursue 
‘tolerant’ strategies, which could in turn impact legitimacy.  
 
This strategy would appeal as a central pillar of the Bush Doctrine was ‘no tolerance’ for 
terrorism.247 It also fits the US narrative as it is common trope in their rhetoric: in 1985 Regan 
said, “America will never make concessions to terrorists” while in 1997 Clinton, after a suicide 
bombing in Jerusalem, said “there must be no tolerance for this kind of inhumanity”.248 By using 
this uncompromising language, the counterinsurgent would also enhance their alliance with the 
US because, as noted, the US have long running concerns over Labour’s affinity with 
peacekeeping and that NZ has a tendency for “ideologically motivated, self-congratulatory 
policies”.249 Furthermore, as a 2005 cable made clear, the US was worried that NZ Government 
was ‘tolerating’ extremists within the country, so these declarations would appeal.250 As this 
strategy would help mobilise NZ audience support and justifies US-led military action, it would 
deliver alliance maintenance.  
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4.3 – AFGHAN INVASION, 2001 
In the five weeks between 9/11 and the Afghan Invasion, NZ issued a five press releases 
accounting for 1,493 words in total. The press releases studied in this section are Goff’s two 
given in the US on the 26th of September and the 3rd of October and Clark’s three given in 
Wellington on the 21st of September and the 8th and 9th of October.251 The invasion can be seen 
as a continuation of 9/11, in many ways, as the shock and emotion of the attacks was still widely 
felt and by now the RCF had begun to coalesce. 
 
4.3.1 PROBLEM/ENEMY 
In the lead up to the Afghan Invasion the counterinsurgent used a number of reactive frames 
covered in the 9/11 section to diagnose the problem and identify the enemy. Thus, we see that 
‘terrorism’ was used as an enemy stand-in a number of times, it was referred to as an existential 
threat, terrorism was diagnosed as ‘the most serious global’ threat, it was also referred to as an 
irrational tactic several times and a number of alienating identifications were also used. Also, as 
will be shown, the counterinsurgent used a number of new reactive problem and enemy frames.  
 
The term ‘terrorism’ was used as an enemy stand-in 11 times in total over the press releases, 
reinforcing the nebulous nature of the threat and ascribing the negative qualities of this maligned 
method of violence to the enemy.252 What makes this more troubling is the counterinsurgent 
now knows who the enemy is, having explained that they believe it is bin Laden and al Qaeda in 
a press release leading up to the invasion and thus targeting Afghanistan.253 Immediately after 
9/11, it was not known who was responsible, but at this point the counterinsurgent knew, 
making this particular usage more problematic. However, it does fulfil several of the main 
objectives of the reactive narrative, which is to reduce confusion and alleviate concern as the 
counterinsurgent is able to appear knowledgeable by using a highly simplistic and easily parsed 
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linguistic conflation that avoids the complexity of the actual enemy. At the same time, this 
justifies the US response on the eve of the invasion, delivering alliance maintenance.  
 
Goff stated on September 26 that the attacks represented a “threat to civilised people 
everywhere”, framing them as an existential threat.254 As with immediately after 9/11, attacks that 
targeted the symbols of US political, economic and military power were exaggerated to infer a 
threat to ‘civilisation’. Goff even reinforced this exaggeration by stating that it threatened 
‘civilised people everywhere’, explicitly increasing the scope. This could, admittedly, make it more 
inclusive for the insurgent support population, but as will be seen by his use of ‘brutal’ in the 
same press release, the binary component of this statement is strong and would still create 
legitimacy issues for the counterinsurgent amongst the insurgent support population. For the 
domestic and allied audience, the main outcome here is the mobilisation of support and 
justification of the impending invasion as the threat is existential and requires an extreme 
response.  
 
On September 26, Goff said that “events of a fortnight ago have brought home the vulnerability 
of all of us to the threat posed by international terrorist organisations” and that “[t]errorism on 
the scale witnessed on 11 September is in our view the most serious current threat to 
international peace and security”.255 Here we see the full scope of the diagnosis that terrorism is 
‘the most serious global’ threat, while the former statement matches Anderton’s ‘no country can 
be complacent’ as a ‘global’ threat, the second frames terrorism as the ‘most serious’. While the 
insurgent audience impacts would be the same here, on the eve of the Afghan Invasion these 
diagnoses would help justify US the solution, mobilising support for the domestic audience while 
framing the situation in a way that is of strategic utility for the US.  
 
Also, Clark referred to 9/11 as “random acts of violence” on September 21, then on September 
26 Goff called the attacks “indiscriminate”.256 Both diagnoses reinforce the belief that terrorism 
is an irrational tactic – like ‘incomprehensible’, they portray the use of terrorism as having no 
rational underpinning. ‘Indiscriminate’, in particular, an even stronger version of this reactive 
framing for several reasons. Firstly, it has a veneer of credibility as it infers a random nature and, 
while the victims may be ‘indiscriminate’, the targeting is ‘discriminate’. This apparent 
randomness is a quality of terrorism that increases the emotive shock of attacks and it gives this 
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term a semblance of credibility. Second, it invokes the venerable Just War Theory and connects 
with the many laws of war, it would match the domestic audience’s shared Western narrative. 
These terms help reduce confusion, alleviate concern and direct anger, and these functions are 
enhanced by the fact that ‘indiscriminate’ is contrasted by the counterinsurgent with the term 
‘targeted’ to refer to their own actions in these press releases, which will be examined below. The 
diagnosis of terrorism as an irrational tactic would appeal to the US as they absolve them of 
blame, the word ‘random’ in particular infers this, and the US would appreciate NZ stating this 
to their own audience. This diagnoses also reaffirms the US position, helping justify the Afghan 
Invasion, as military force is the logic solution against an illogical tactic. However, this does 
create internal inconsistencies with the war as the solution, as for the West, war is rational. 
 
Goff, on September 26, spoke of the “brutal repression of the Taleban regime” and, as ‘brutal’ 
can mean everything from “cruel” to “savage” to “inhuman”, this is classified as an alienating 
identification that invokes the civilised-barbaric and human-inhuman binaries.257 While Taleban-
ruled Afghanistan may appear ‘brutal’ to the West, there are several issues with this description. 
Firstly, it occludes the West’s long and problematic role in Afghanistan as well as their support 
of many regimes around the world responsible for ‘brutal repression’. Secondly, it carries an 
Orientalist judgment that a government run under Islamic sharia laws is inherently uncivilised 
and even inhuman. Certainly the Taleban’s rule was ‘repressive’, especially toward women, but 
the term ‘brutal’ is binary, exaggerated, emotive and exclusionary. By referring to the Taleban as 
‘brutal’ the counterinsurgent may exclude the insurgent support population by delegitimising 
them as the right actor. It does help reduce confusion, alleviate concern and direct anger for the 
domestic audience. In this particular context, the term helps to justify the invasion of an entire 
state by the US, as it conflates the Taleban with the already referenced barbarity and inhumanity 
of the enemy, reinforcing the ‘justness’ to the NZ population, delivering alliance maintenance. 
As will be shown in this section, the conflation of the Taleban with al Qaeda was a powerful 
mechanism of justification at this particular juncture, collapsing a complex relationship into a 
singular homogenous mass.  
 
4.3.1.1 ACTS OF TERROR 
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On September 26 Goff referred to “acts of terror”.258 This section will examine the manifest unit 
of ‘terror’ and the manifest unit of ‘acts of terror’. As will be assessed below, these manifest 
diagnostic framing tasks are figurative, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusionary.  
 
CONTENT 
‘Acts of terror’ is figurative, these would literally be identified as ‘acts of terrorism’ or even more 
literally as ‘acts of terrorists’.259 Nevertheless, it is not discreditable because it is a common 
figurative usage.260 However, it is not accurate for several reasons. First, ‘terror’ can refer to a 
huge range of phenomena, with terrorism as a subset, meaning that it does not provide a targeted 
understanding.261 Even more problematic, the way this particular usage is formulated uses ‘terror’ 
as a stand-in for the enemy meaning that it anthropomorphises the threat and limits 
comprehension. Also, the term ‘terror’ serves “political and normative ends admirably despite 
hindering description of the social phenomena at which they point”.262 In other words, it 
obscures motives; while ‘terrorism’ conveys a range of details about actors, motives and 
outcomes, ‘terror’ only informs that an emotion that has been generated. As fear is a key 
emotion generated by terrorism, this is a piece of information that is unnecessary to 
communicate, unlike the other varied aspects of the problem that are not immediately apparent. 
While the use of the term ‘acts’ does provide some boundaries, it is also an exaggerated 
identification as it places all the emphasis on nebulous term that does not constrict the situation 
in the same way that ‘acts of terrorists’ does.  
 
AUDIENCE 
This phrase is unlikely to appeal to the insurgent audience as it conflates the insurgent with 
‘terror’, effectively turning them into ‘terror’ and thus insinuating all Muslims are suspicious, and 
obscures their underlying motives. While not a major impact on its own, it works in conjunction 
with the same phrasing around ‘terrorism’. In turn, this could provoke anger amongst the 
insurgent support population as it portrays them as simply ‘bad’ rather than having any real 
grievances. This delegitimises the counterinsurgent as an actor as it excludes the insurgent 
population.  
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This identification would fit the domestic audience’s experiences as the aim of the attacks was to 
generate ‘terror’, meaning that use of the term becomes self-fulfilling. In turn, however, this term 
could provoke fear because it exaggerates the threat, its vagueness is in itself ‘terror’ inducing. 
Henaff writes that this “formulation allegorizes the public’s anguish into a threatening and 
indeterminate entity: ‘Terror.’ The threat is allegedly constant, unlimited, faceless, perverse, and 
implacable”.263 Because ‘terror’ is produced by the attacks, it does help reduce confusion as the 
counterinsurgent is using an obvious label that fits the experience of the audience, this also gives 
them the appearance of competency as they have used such a self-evident term. As it is a 
pejorative phrase, it would also direct anger at the enemy and would help to mobilise support for 
the counterinsurgent’s cause and justifies the military response to ‘terror’.  
 
This phrase fits Bush’s own narrative, as noted he used this exact formulation on September 11, 
and the overarching ‘war on terror’ name, which is particularly important as they are about to 
launch their first major campaign of this war.264 The ‘of terror’ formulation is not one common 
to NZ rhetoric and this is a case of the counterinsurgent mimicking the US. NZ’s diagnosis 
connects the threat to the US solution in an almost inevitable way. These diagnoses make the 
threat seem more amorphous and widespread and obscures the motivations underlying the 
attack, which helps mobilise their cause with regard to the NZ population, and beyond. Like the 
word ‘evil’, it helps to portray the US in a positive light in NZ, helping limit any negative 
sentiment toward the superpower. It also exaggerates the threat, obscuring the real enemy, in a 
way that justifies the US invasion of the whole state of Afghanistan, meaning it would have a 
positive impact on the alliance.  
 
4.3.1.2 NEW ERA  
Goff cast the 9/11 attacks as the beginning of a ‘new era’ on September 26 when he stated that 
“further attacks were a real possibility”, these “attacks represent a new generation of security 
threat”, then went on to refer to “the next wave of terrorist attacks”.265 This latent unit will focus 
on any diagnosis that infers 9/11 marked the beginning of a new era or that more similar attacks 
were probable. As will be examined, these identifications are absolute, hyperbolic, emotive and 
exclusionary.  
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Diagnosing the attacks as a ‘new era’ is impossible to discredit at this point as they make absolute 
statements about an unknown and unknowable future.266 They are not accurate though, as to 
describe the threat as “a rupture with... past and present uncharted challenges... is unsupported 
by evidence” is a task for future historians not contemporaneous politicians.267 Friedman believes 
that “September 11 was more an aberration than a harbinger of an age of deadlier terrorism”.268 
As absolute representations at the most extreme end of the spectrum of possibilities they also 
inaccurately exaggerate the threat level dramatically. These are not informative identifications 
either as they suggest the attacks were markedly different from previous events when they were a 
combination of plane hijacking and suicide bombing. 269 As Crenshaw writes: “Today’s terrorism 
is not a fundamentally or qualitatively “new” phenomenon but grounded in an evolving 
historical context.”270 The exaggerated nature of the threat obscures the reality, that terrorist 
attacks of this scope were probably less likely after 9/11, – especially because even only a few 
weeks after 9/11, terrorism had become the single most important global security issue and 
numerous solutions had already been put in place. Also the ‘newness’ constructs the attacks 
without a ‘history’, “severing all links between this act of terrorism and countless others that had 
preceded it, and by de-contextualizing it from the history of al Qaeda’s previous attacks.”271  
 
AUDIENCE  
Even though the ‘new era’ identification obscures the motives for the attack it does fit with the 
insurgent’s narrative that they are the ‘new era’ for Islam. More problematic, these identifications 
legitimise the insurgent’s cause by giving the threat, and the enemy who pose it, a de facto status 
as a peer enemy. International relations is full of defined eras with recognised competitors, the 
Cold War was a distinct epoch, one where the US and USSR were peer enemies. Describing this 
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as a ‘new era’ connects the current conflict with the Cold War, by describing the problem in this 
way the counterinsurgent confers legitimacy on their opponent.  
 
The scale and shocking nature of the attacks suggest these descriptions would fit with the 
domestic audience’s experience.272 Ackerman explains that terrorist attacks of the 9/11 scale 
make audiences confront the shock of the unknown – stressing that no one knows what will 
happen next.273 One letter to a newspaper in NZ stated: “it is likely... that this type of terrorism 
witnessed in the United States [will hit] New Zealand.”274 Likewise, a New Zealander in New 
York at the time said, “[t]here was a feeling like anything could happen – that there could be 
another attack at any moment”.275 These diagnoses fail to manage the audience’s fear; claiming 
the attacks herald a ‘new era’ of terrorism would inflame public worry as they suggest more 
similar attacks are coming. However, they do alleviate confusion as it makes the 
counterinsurgent appear to be able to predict the future. Because they imply they were ‘new’ they 
also address concerns that the counterinsurgent was unable to predict or prevent them, justifying 
inaction. These diagnoses help direct anger at the enemy, who are portrayed as the next peer 
competitor following the USSR’s demise, framing them as a considerable threat. As such, they 
would provide aid in mobilising support and justifying action, as identifying the attacks as the 
beginning of a ‘new era’ of conflict would be more effective way of gaining domestic support for 
action than stating that they were an aberration. As McGovern writes: “This representation of a 
discontinuity with the past and the rise of a supposedly unprecedented threat has an evident 
instrumental purpose. It is one of the primary means by which new anti-terror law and policy is 
given justification, often giving more extensive and sweeping powers to the state.”276 
 
This diagnosis fits the US narrative, Bush talked about how “night fell on a different world, a 
world where freedom itself is under attack” on September 20 and referred to “today’s new 
threat” on October 7.277 Likewise, it fits with the US narrative of exceptionalism, while other 
attacks are part of an ongoing pattern, these attacks were so much more that they started a ‘new 
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era’. It would also appeal to their belief that the “perceived rules of the game were fundamentally 
and irrevocably altered” by 9/11.278 By exaggerating the threat and portraying an unknowable 
future in absolute terms this diagnosis helps justify the US response to the attacks, as well as 
mobilising NZ support. As such, it would aid the alliance and even suggests that NZ will be 
ready to support the US for this entire ‘era’.  
 
4.3.1.3 ENEMY BINARY 
On September 21 Clark stated “President Bush delivered a clear and unequivocal message [that] 
the Taliban and other governments who harbour terrorists... should hand them over or share 
their fate”, then made an almost identical statement on the 8th.279 As will be examined below, 
these identifications are binary, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusionary.  
 
CONTENT 
The binary representation of actors is not discreditable, but is not accurate. From this point 
onward in the narrative, the Taleban are entwined with al Qaeda, they are “depicted as being cast 
from the same mold as al-Qaeda... [which] is a gross distortion”, as aside from a shared faith and 
origins in the Soviet-Afghan conflict they have little in common.280 As Fergusson notes, the two 
“have always been very different beasts”.281 It exaggerates the two’s closeness which in turn 
exaggerates the seriousness of the threat. This identification also creates a false dichotomy, ‘with 
us or against us’ portrays this as a situation with only two options when there is actual a 
spectrum of differing positions.282 This conflation reduces the potential for understanding, two 
separate and distinct actors are collapsed into one and then the spectrum of possible positions is 
reduced to a false dichotomy. 283 Zalman and Clarke see this as a major flaw: “The central fallacy 
at the heart of the current narrative is that it employs a single prism to view a complex world”.284  
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The ‘with us or against us’ identification is one of the most potentially damaging descriptions 
with regard to the insurgent population. It does not match the complex array of positions within 
the Muslim world that the insurgent audience would experience, so would not be salient except 
for the most extreme, who also see the situation in this binary manner. In turn, this simplified 
conflation could anger many because it reinforces the Orientalist narrative of the West as ‘good’ 
and the East as ‘evil’ – all the negative components of the binary are attached to this Other 
through this identification. In this way it serves as the principal legitimation technique for the 
ICAT, casting ‘all’ who oppose the US and allies as ‘evil’.285 It is also exclusionary, implying that 
no “middle ground is possible” and leaving the insurgent audience no room to equivocate on an 
incredible complex reality with a multitude of possible positions.286 The counterinsurgent could 
exclude members of the insurgent support population because these identifications portray the 
situation in such a simplistic, reductionist manner. Even Huntington believes that the ‘with us or 
against us’ formulation has had “catastrophic implications” because it incorporated local wars 
between Muslims and non-Muslims into a “broad clash of civilizations”287 Thus, by connecting 
these actors together the counterinsurgent also helped to legitimise the enemy as it is gave them 
the appearance of having a far greater capacity and justified their existential strategy. As 
Killcullen explains: “Al-Qa’eda’s claim to aggregate ‘dozens of local movements, grievances and 
issues’ into a single universal struggle constituted its seminal strategic achievement.”288 
 
Conflating the Taleban and al Qaeda would match most New Zealanders’ experience as few 
would be able to distinguish between them at this point. However, this binary representation 
could exacerbate fear; as Rothe and Muzzatti argue, the description promotes the belief that 
there are “enemies everywhere” which in turn helps to promote general panic amongst the 
population.289 It does, though, drastically reduce confusion as it grossly simplifies a complex 
situation. By reducing the complexity and offering a simplified enemy and consequent solution, 
the counterinsurgent also appears competent. Finally, it also helps to direct anger at a now 
monolithic and easily graspable enemy. This would aid short term mobilisation, and in particular, 
it would help justify the decision to wage a war rather than conduct a police action, as it connects 
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a shadowy terrorist network to a national government. However, because of this, it compromises 
the justification of non-military solutions.  
 
Bush had used the ‘share their fate’ phrase the day before Clark and also said: “[e]ither you are 
with us, or you are with the terrorists”.290 That Clark mimics Bush’s identification, even referring 
to him as a source of information, suggests this would be salient for the allied actor as it not only 
fits their own narrative, but reinforces his articulator credibility to the NZ audience. Also, as the 
US are launching an invasion of Taleban-governed Afghanistan, this conflation is vital in 
justifying US action as otherwise they are simply ignoring sovereignty to get to a terrorist 
network, rather than legitimately waging war against a binary enemy. As such, these 
identifications would aid the alliance.  
 
4.3.2 BLAME/IDEOLOGY 
Blame attribution is vital on the eve of the invasion and the counterinsurgent used the same 
irrational blame as after 9/11, showing how this aspect of the RCF was solidifying into a key 
attribution. The above diagnoses of terrorism as an irrational tactic attribute blame. This is a 
particularly important function at this juncture. While the impacts on the insurgent support 
population would be the same as after 9/11, for the domestic and allied audience there is a 
heightened need for the counterinsurgent to emphasise the enemy as irrational at this point in 
time as they need to justify the invasion and these terms help to suggest that there could be no 
other option than the use of force because an irrational enemy cannot be reasoned with. Thus, 
the main function of these terms here is to mobilise support domestically through the reduction 
of confusion and the direction of anger and to reinforce the allied position by framing the blame 
in such a manner that their actions seem to be the only logical solution. They reinforce the 
developing RCF that the counterinsurgent alliance are rational and the enemy are irrational.  
 
4.3.2.1 NOT MUSLIMS 
Clark, on September 21, said that “President Bush made it clear that the teachings of the Islamic 
faith are good and must be distinguished from the terrorists who have blasphemed that faith and 
tried to hijack it.”291 This ‘not Muslims’ blame attribution is interesting, as it was an attempt to 
add nuance by differentiating between the enemy and Islam the religion; however, as will be 
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shown, because these attributions are absolute and hyperbolic, they do have potentially emotive 
and exclusive outcomes. 
 
CONTENT 
The ‘not Muslims’ attribution is discreditable when it comes to identifying ideology as the enemy 
do identify as Muslims and while they are at the ‘radical extremist fringe’ they are still a part of 
Islamic Umma.292 It renders a spectrum of possible beliefs into an absolutist dichotomy. This 
absolute attribution is not credible as the enemy consider themselves Muslim. Claiming the 
enemy have ‘blasphemed that faith’ is not accurate either as it does not provide any useful details 
about their ideology as the enemy’s actions are intrinsically linked to their faith; attempting to 
completely disassociate the enemy and their religion is a false portrayal, it delineates the situation 
as if there is a single, homogenous ‘Islam’ when the reality is that there are numerous schisms.293 
This attribution exaggerates a simplified version of the religion, obscuring the reality that while 
many of Islam’s tenets can be used to discredit terrorism others can be used to justify it – just as 
with other religions, internal textual contradictions and personal and schismatic interpretations 
provide fuel for many different readings of the same documents of faith.294 These are not 
informative either as the key to winning any conflict, as Sun Tsu said, was to ‘know thy enemy’. 
Using this attribution also limits the solutions the counterinsurgent can propose, such as the 
Interfaith dialogues they promote later in the ICAT. If the enemy are ‘not Muslims’ then these 
Interfaith dialogues are pointless.  
 
AUDIENCE 
Even though many Muslim leaders expressed similar sentiments after 9/11, having an Anglo-
Christian making statements of faith would not appeal to some of the insurgent support 
population – though obviously it would appeal to the majority of Muslims in general.295 The ‘not 
Muslims’ attribution could provoke anger as the counterinsurgent is judging a situation that they 
do not have the expertise to prognosticate on and, as Nayak and Malone explain, it furthers the 
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Orientalist outlook that the West ‘knows’ more about Muslims’ own culture and beliefs.296 The 
counterinsurgent is not considered as having the credibility to make statements on the Islamic 
faith.297 As Gompert writes, for “non-Muslims to suggest religious interpretations to convince 
radicalized Muslims not to become terrorists is perilous and ineffectual.... Only Muslim 
condemnation will work”.298 While for many Muslims, including many in NZ, this attribution 
would be welcomed, for the more extreme supporters, it would not.299 Use of the ‘not Muslims’ 
attribution could alienate as it “implies that other Muslims see them as apostates, which is simply 
wrong”.300 This Orientalism would reinforce the insurgent’s legitimacy as it bolsters their 
position regarding Western hegemony.301 These attributions are exclusive, even excluding those 
in the population who practice a similar form of Islam from their own faith. As such, they would 
reduce the counterinsurgent’s legitimacy.  
 
This attribution would not fit with the domestic audience’s experience as most would probably 
equate al Qaeda with Islam, an assertion backed up by the experiences of many Muslim New 
Zealanders after 9/11, who found that they were being judged because of their religion.302 It 
could exacerbate fear as it reinforces the irrational blame – the enemy are not guided by a 
religion, they have ‘blasphemed’ and even ‘hijacked’ their faith, all of which suggests they are 
irrational. However, it helps to clarify the situation by explaining that they are ‘no Muslims’ even 
though the reality is much more complex. This also makes the counterinsurgent appear 
knowledgeable and thus would reduce concerns regarding their competency. It would also help 
direct anger at the enemy as they are portrayed as ‘hijacking’ their own faith, of acting outside its 
rational parameters. Aside from the issue of centrality, these factors would aid in the 
mobilisation of the domestic audience, though because of the gross simplifications involved it 
could create justification issues later on for certain deliberative solutions, such as the 
aforementioned Interfaith dialogues.  
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The speech Clark referred to was on September 20, when Bush said that Islam’s “teachings are 
good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of 
Allah... The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself”.303 
Clark not only mimicked Bush but also again name checked him, suggesting this attribution 
would appeal because it helps cement his articulator credibility in NZ and beyond. At this point, 
the US was wanting to narrow down the blame from ‘Muslims’ to the conflated binary of al 
Qaeda and the Taleban and this statement by NZ helps to achieve this targeting of attribution. 
In doing this she not just reinforces the US’s enemy, justifying the ‘war on terror’, but also 




The counterinsurgent used several already examined reactive actor identifications in the prelude 
to the Afghan Invasion, showing how the RCF was beginning to form. These identifications fit 
the overarching binary narrative of the ICAT as a battle between good and evil, between 
civilisation and barbarians. The first of these was when Goff referred to the “threat to civilised 
people everywhere” on September 26, using an alienating actor/victim definition.304 The timing 
of this statement on the eve of the invasion is particularly interesting, as the alliance were about 
to bring another era of suffering upon the Afghan people whilst referring to themselves as 
‘civilised’. The problems with this identification are summed up by the former Marxist turned 
supporter of interventionist policies Christopher Hitchens’ troubling statement in November 
2001: “‘Bombing Afghanistan back into the Stone Age’ was quite a favourite headline for some 
wobbly liberals. The slogan does all the work. But an instant’s thought shows that Afghanistan is 
being, if anything, bombed OUT of the Stone Age.”305 Hitchens’ is stating that Taleban 
Afghanistan was so ‘barbaric’ that even carpet bombing the country will ‘civilise’ them, his 
position is empowered by the belief that the allied actor is inherently ‘civilised’, something that 
NZ’s actor identifications supported on the eve of the invasion. At this time, this identification 
has the potential to provoke anger in the insurgent support population, coming as it does while 
the allied actor prepares to invade Afghanistan and reinforced by the fact that it was another 
Western state that ‘bombed Afghanistan into the Stone Age’ several decades ago. It does, 
however, serve to not just exaggerate the size of the coalition but also exaggerates their 
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virtuousness, which would help with mobilising domestic support by increasing fear and 
directing anger as well as justifying the response. Likewise, it would help with the alliance as it 
present the US in the manner they want to be portrayed to the NZ population – as the fount of 
civilisation – which serves to justify their response and reflects positively on their legitimacy as 
the ‘civilised’ actor.  
 
On September 21, Clark contrasted the enemy who were ‘not Muslims’ with NZ’s “people of 
many faiths, and all those faiths and those of peaceful intent”, using another form of the 
alienating actor identification, and further showing how the binary RCF had begun to coalesce.306 
Though ‘peaceful’ may not seem reactive, because she contrasts NZ with the enemy it creates a 
binary of passive-aggressive. Bush had spoken about this issue on the 17th, which Clark was 
referring to in her speech. Bush had explained that “Islam is peace. These terrorists don’t 
represent peace. They represent evil and war”, fleshing out the binary aspect.307 This binary lacks 
accuracy as it obscures the underlying motives of the conflict as it implies that the allied actor 
could not have done anything aggressive to warrant any form of attack. The emphasis on being 
‘peaceful’ precludes any examination of why the attack happened. It therefore exaggerates the 
‘peaceful’ nature of the allied actor, portraying them as totally non-aggressive. The promotion of 
the allied actor as ‘peaceful’ could incite anger as many in the insurgent support population 
would consider the invasion of Afghanistan as an aggressive action, and the West’s long history 
of violent interventions and invasions of Muslim countries would mean this type of identification 
would come across as hypocritical. Framing the enemy and allied actor in binary form is 
exclusionary and would not aid the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent’s cause. This identification 
fits the domestic national narrative of NZ as a fair international actor that uses multilateral 
forums rather than force to achieve its aims and there is a pacifist strain to it that rose to 
prominence during the anti-nuclear movement.308 The main perceived utility of this identification 
is that it would help reduce confusion by providing a clear cut understanding of the conflict as 
one of good versus evil, where the evil enemy are the aggressor and the good allies are the 
defender, which in turn would help direct anger toward the enemy. This would aid mobilisation, 
though there are potential justification issues depending on how an audience member reads the 
‘peacefulness’ of the Afghan Invasion. However, the main purpose of this identification in the 
                                                 
306 Clark, “NZ Shares US Determination to Root Out Terrorism.” 
307 George Bush, “Islam is Peace, Says President,” whitehouse.gov, September 17, 2001, accessed on 23/09/15, 
available from http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010917-11.html 
308 Sibley et al., “Pluralistic and Monocultural Facets of New Zealand National Character and Identity.”, 2; Peter 
Skilling, “The Construction and Use of National Identity in Contemporary New Zealand Political Discourse,” 
Australian Journal of Political Science 45, no. 2 (2010): 186. 
145 
 
lead up to the invasion is that it reinforces the US interpretation of events, mirroring Bush’s own 
statements regarding the attack. Furthermore, its blame-obscuring nature would also appeal. This 




There were several examples of already examined RCF strategies and solutions used in this 
period, with both the war on an abstract noun and the justice aspects being reinforced as the 
alliance prepared to bring war from the abstract to the real and to bring the enemy to justice 
through the war. On the eve of the invasion, the reactive strategies and solutions went from 
rhetoric to reality, becoming embedded as key RCF components. This places the internal conflict 
between an irrational enemy and tactic and the rational solution of war into a more stark light. 
 
The counterinsurgent used the war on an abstract noun framing task numerous times. Clark 
deployed the most troubling version, claiming NZ would work to “eradicate terrorism” on 
September 21.309 This formulation is particularly troubling as it not only proposes to fight an 
abstract noun as a strategy but suggests that it is possible to completely destroy the abstract noun 
as a solution – the idea that terrorism can be ‘eradicated’ is totally discreditable. This has one 
particularly interesting emotive consequence for the domestic audience, one that the other forms 
do not have to the same degree: it alleviates the domestic audience’s concern by reassuring them 
– in a manner akin to a parent reassuring their child – that the counterinsurgent will completely 
put an end to terrorism. In turn, though, it does not control expectation, which could have issues 
for justification and, ultimately, legitimacy with regard to the domestic audience. Goff also used 
“defeating terrorism”, “defeat terrorism” and the “fight against terrorism” on September 26, and, 
on October 8, Clark referred to the ‘campaign against terrorism’ several times, which while not 
as preposterous as ‘eradicating terrorism’ are still reactive as they propose a ‘war’ solution and 
actually emphasise the problem of fighting a war against an irrational tactic.310 There is a 
disconnect between ‘fighting’ an irrational tactic and enemy. While there was widespread support 
for the invasion, there was also already resistance and wariness to the US overreacting and 
seeking vengeance by force, with a number of editorials in leading NZ papers and numerous 
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letters all rallying against ‘war’.311 Therefore, these solutions have a mixed impact for the 
domestic audience, though they would deliver alliance maintenance for the allied audience as the 
counterinsurgent is portraying the situation to their own population in a way that suits the US 
agenda.  
 
On September 21, Clark also proposed that as well as ‘eradicating terrorism’ NZ would help 
“bring the perpetrators to justice”, while on October 8 she again reiterated the aim to “bring to 
justice the perpetrators”, echoing language used by Bush in the lead up to the invasion.312 Here 
again, the counterinsurgent is framing the solution in a reactive manner, though as the invasion is 
yet to begin these still have an aspirant quality to them which somewhat mitigates their issues. 
Said in conjunction with the ‘eradicating terrorism’ solution, this appears aimed at reducing the 
domestic audience’s concerns as together these solutions delineate a future where those 
responsible have all been ‘eradicated’ and there is no more terrorism. In particular, this reinforces 
the alliance, as the counterinsurgent is reiterating the two key components of the US-focused 
solution to their own public, justifying their response.  
 
4.3.4.1 TARGETED 
On September 26 Goff explained that “any military action would be targeted and not 
indiscriminate” before referring to the “indiscriminate and appalling acts of terror”.313 This 
strategy, as will be examined below, are binary, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusive.  
 
CONTENT 
Despite the high level of collateral damage of the allied response, with up to 4000 Afghani 
civilians killed during the first three months, these were accidental rather than deliberate civilian 
casualties, meaning that this statement is not discreditable.314 However, it is inaccurate for a 
number of reasons. First, Goff presents it as a binary of discriminate-indiscriminate, meaning 
these terms are used to differentiate the actions of the two as much as possible through linguistic 
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manipulation. The binary pairing exaggerates the qualities of the two actors, limiting the capacity 
for the solution identification to deliver any useful information. Finally, the binary nature of the 
term overemphasises the nature of the two actors, implying that every aspect of the allied 
solution is ‘targeted’ and discriminate and that every aspect of the insurgent’s action is not 
‘targeted’ and ‘indiscriminate’. Secondly, as a binary, the term ‘targeted’ has an obscurant quality 
as it emphasises the counterinsurgent’s own apparent justness and the enemy’s immorality that is 
based on the manipulation of language rather than a factual basis – and in so doing invokes the 
central dichotomy of good-evil. While the counterinsurgent action is ‘targeted and not 
indiscriminate’ the enemy’s is ‘indiscriminate and appalling’.  
 
AUDIENCE 
This identification would not fit with many of the insurgent audience’s experience, particularly 
with those who have directly suffered from allied bombing, who may feel that ‘targeted’ and 
‘discriminate’ is not an accurate summation. This could generate anger as the juxtaposition 
between the two reinforces the binary division of the conflict, generating its own binary of 
discriminate-indiscriminate. Overall, this identification has the potential to be alienating. In turn, 
this would negatively impact the counterinsurgent’s legitimacy as they are delineating an 
exclusive reality where everything the insurgent does is ‘indiscriminate’ and everything the 
counterinsurgent does is ‘discriminate’. This apparent hypocrisy could also justify the insurgent’s 
actions.  
 
The early reports in NZ newspapers reinforced the ‘targeted’ nature of the allied solution, 
suggesting it would fit with domestic experience.315 It also matches the common Western 
narrative of ‘surgical strikes’. Nevertheless, by November New Zealanders were writing letters 
speaking of those who “have died already as direct casualties of the bombing. The euphemism 
for these horrors is ‘collateral damage’”.316 Thus, salience is mixed as people’s experiences, 
knowledge and understandings vary. The main function, however, of this solution is that it 
reduces confusion by portraying the allies and enemy in easily parsed binary terms. It also allays 
concerns regarding the counterinsurgent’s competency, not just because they are responding in a 
moral manner but also that they are technically capable of ‘targeting’ their response. This binary 
also helps direct anger toward the enemy as they are the ones that act ‘indiscriminately’. While 
                                                 
315 Alan Perrott, “Superpower’s Opening Move Well-Calculated,” The New Zealand Herald, October, 9, 2001, accessed 
on 23/12/15, [online] available from Factiva. 




there is a danger that as the civilian casualties mount during the invasion a say-do gap could 
appear, overall these descriptions would help justify the counterinsurgent’s actions.  
  
Bush used the same language on September 20, speaking of “carefully targeted actions”, the US 
has long made much out of their ability to “conduct ‘clean’ or ‘surgical’ wars” and these 
solutions fit the US narrative, meaning that they would be salient for the allied actor as they 
reinforce this to the NZ audience, who as noted above were in some cases sceptical of this 
capacity.317 They would be particularly salient for the US just as their planes were about to start 
bombing the country as it would help minimise the negative publicity of any ‘collateral damage’. 
By helping reinforce the US narrative and sanitising their actions, this solution helps justify the 
US response and would aid the alliance.  
 
4.3.4.1 ALIENATING SOLUTION 
On October 8, Clark referred to NZ supporting the US determination to “root out” al Qaeda.318 
As will be outlined below, this strategy is figurative, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusionary. 
 
CONTENT 
To ‘root out’ is literally to pull an entire plant out of the ground, meaning it is being used 
figuratively here. It is often used to mean “to remove or eliminate completely”.319 In the US, it 
can also refer to a pig ‘rooting out’ a plant, but the etymological source is still the same, as is the 
outcome – the elimination of the plant. As such, the term implies the complete eradication of the 
enemy, the escape of bin Laden and most of al Qaeda show it was not an accurate representation 
of the actual solution as applied in Afghanistan.320 However, it is not discreditable as the phrase 
is vague, having a broad range of applications.321 Its colloquial nature limits its accuracy though. 
It contains no useful information about the actual strategy that the counterinsurgent is 
implementing, the phrase does not provide any details about the scale or type of operations the 
counterinsurgent would use to attempt to capture al Qaeda members. This phrase exaggerates 
the ease of finding and either capturing or killing al Qaeda as it analogises the process to pulling 
a plant out. Its vernacular style, as will be explained below, also fits the Wild West narrative. This 
strategy is not informative either, as it is essentially diametrically opposed to the key 
                                                 
317 Bush, “President Declares ‘Freedom at War with Fear’.”; Jeremy Moses, Healing Humanity: Global Biopolitics and the 
Surgical Strike (Paper presented at the Ethics of War and Peace Workshop, University of Canterbury, July 3, 2007), 1. 
318 Clark, “PM Says Today’s Military Action Inevitable.” 
319 Root out: http://www.thefreedictionary.com/root+out 
320 Hager, Other People’s War, 40-42. 
321 A search of stuff.co.nz shows numerous such uses of the phrase.  
149 
 
counterinsurgency principles, both the US COIN Field Manual and British Army Field Manual 
stress the importance of ‘tolerance’.322  
 
AUDIENCE 
The term ‘root out’ suggests the enemy are a weed that needs to be removed, it is a 
dehumanising metaphor that would not be central to their perspective as it reinforces the 
human-inhuman binary.323 This dehumanising quality, as well as the term’s use to refer to largely 
negative and unwanted entities mean it could also anger the insurgent support population. 
Because of this, the phrase excludes the insurgent support population, thus compromising the 
justness of their response and delegitimising the counterinsurgent.  
 
The phrase is central to most New Zealanders as it is commonly used by media, with numerous 
articles on stuff.co.nz using the phrase for crime and a letter in The Evening Standard on the 18th 
referring to ‘rooting out’ terrorism.324 This phrase helps reduce confusion as it portrays an 
extremely simplistic solution. It would address concern as it implies the solution is relatively easy, 
this glib phrase masks the vast physical and financial outlay required for a COIN operation 
involving hundreds of states, millions of personnel and billions of dollars. Because it is almost 
always used to refer to something negative it would help direct anger towards the enemy. It’s 
figurative nature makes it appear that the strategy is as simple as pulling a plant out. At this point 
in time, this solution would help mobilise support for the counterinsurgent. This suggestion of 
ease could have long-term issues for the justness of their response, however, as it does not 
control expectation.  
 
These terms fit with an important aspect of the US national character and grand narrative: the 
American Wild West and the cowboy legend. The phrase ‘root out’ is colloquial, fitting into the 
‘tough hombre’ vernacular of the Wild West. Bush had used the ‘root out’ strategy on September 
19: : “the mission is to root out terrorist activities. And there’s a variety of ways in which that can 
happen. Clearly, one of our focuses is to get people out of their caves, smoke them out”.325 Here 
he connects this ‘rooting out’ with ‘smoking out’, another powerful cowboy trope. As noted in 
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the 9/11 chapter, the Wild West grand narrative a powerful one for the general US public and 
particularly for Bush, who “[identified] himself as a cowboy [and] associated his presidency with 
the story of the mythic cowboy”.326 In mimicking Bush’s own cowboy rhetoric, Clark is speaking 
in a way that would be central to the US President and his own self-image and justifies the US 
response, which would in turn help with alliance maintenance.  
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4.4 – BALI, 2002 
Clark issued two press releases, on October 14 and 15, referring to the Bali Bombing.327 This 
section will contrast NZ’s counterinsurgent with Australia’s because it informs the understanding 
of how reactive framing works, particularly the possibility of shared vocabulary and mimicking. 
Clark’s first press release featured just 3 reactive frames but the one on the following day 
contained 16 examples, where the former was 300 words the latter was 805. Even more 
revealing, all these reactive frames were similar or identical to those that Howard had used 
previously in a press release on October 13th and an address to parliament the next day, 
suggesting there is a degree of mimicking occurring.328  
 
4.4.1 PROBLEM/ENEMY 
There were several instances where the counterinsurgent used already examined reactive frames, 
showing how the now-well developed RCF was able to be applied to a separate attack. What 
makes these diagnoses interesting is that they include several that show a clear mimicking of 
Howard. Firstly, Howard referred to the attacks as “brutal and very barbaric”, spoke of the 
“brutal and despicable way in which lives have been taken away on this occasion by an act of 
barbarity” and labelled them a “brutal reminder” in his press release.329 Then in his address he 
referred to them as “barbaric terrorist bombings”, a “brutal and despicable attack”, “brutal” and 
“barbaric brutal mass murder”.330 The day after Howard, on October 15, Clark used identical 
alienating problem identifications, referring to the events as both a “barbaric terrorist attack” and 
a “brutal attack”.331 Aside from Goff’s single use of ‘brutal’ in the lead up to the Afghan 
Invasion, these terms had not been used by NZ during the ICAT and while Clark used neither in 
her release on October 14, she then used both on October 15, which suggests Howard 
influenced her reactive framing of the attacks. Just as with ‘brutal’, ‘barbaric’ reinforces the 
civilised-barbaric binary underlying the reactive framing, both exaggerate the nature of the threat 
by portraying it as a ‘clash of civilisations’, generating negative emotions and excluding the 
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insurgent audience from the counterinsurgent’s cause while reducing confusion, addressing 
concern and directing anger for the domestic audience. Here Clark’s statements help deliver 
alliance maintenance for both America and Australia, as these diagnoses fit both Howard and 
Bush’s interpretation of the threat, reinforce these to the NZ population and justify the ongoing 
ICAT.  
 
Another interesting instance of Clark’s mimicking was after Howard referred to “those who 
employ terror and indiscriminate violence against innocent people” on October 14, the next day 
Clark talked of “those who use terror and indiscriminate violence against innocent people.”332 
The use of ‘indiscriminate’ will be discussed below, but of interest is the fact Clark’s statement is 
one word off being verbatim. As well as being almost identical, they also use the same rhetorical 
method that obscures the enemy, referring to them as ‘those who’ rather than as ‘terrorists’ or 
any direct referent. The way ‘terror’ was used here is somewhat different to the earlier example, 
here it is also absolutist as it creates a binary between ‘those who use’ it and the allied actor when 
‘terror’ is a common aspect of all conflict; there can be no argument that strategic bombing 
campaigns of World War Two involved the use of ‘terror’.333 In using it in this way, they make it 
even more exclusive, implying that the allies are ‘good’ and ‘civilised’ actors who do not ‘use 
terror’. This identification reduces confusion as it makes a clear delineation between actors and 
by inferring that the enemy are the ones who ‘use terror’ the counterinsurgent is also able to 
direct anger. It also succeeds in delivering alliance maintenance for both America and Australia, 
reinforcing the position that these states do not ‘use terror’ to the NZ population, helping justify 
their actinos.  
 
Another previously examined example of the reactive narrative where Clark appeared to be 
influenced by Howard was in her framing of terrorism as an irrational tactic. Howard referred to 
the attacks as ‘indiscriminate’ 6 times and said that terrorism could ‘strike anywhere’ in his two 
press releases.334 On October 15 Clark also referred to the “indiscriminate terrorist bombing” 
and stated that “[t]errorism has no boundaries. It can strike any place at any time”.335 Not only 
had she not used either problem diagnosis in the press release the previous day, she had even 
referred to the attack as ‘deliberate’, and while the term ‘indiscriminate’ had been used several 
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times in the lead up to Afghanistan, the usage pattern still suggests that Clark was influenced by 
Howard’s statements the preceding day. This is particularly true for the ‘strike anywhere’ 
configuration, which is a particularly problematic. As Wolfendale writes: “Claims that terrorism 
is an ongoing, omnipresent threat that might strike at any time are not true reports of genuine 
risk assessments but are designed to instil anxiety and fear in the general population, leading to a 
generally held belief that a terrorist attack is inevitable.”336 It has a veneer of authenticity because 
the random victims of terrorist attacks makes the targeting appear random when they are actually 
chosen in a calculated and rational manner.337 The identification also severs the connection 
between the terrorist’s targeting and their motivations and objectives.338 The underlying 
implication of this identification is that states are not targeted because of specific actions and 
policy decisions, that terrorism is a random phenomenon and there is no way of predicting 
where it could strike next, which will be furthered discussed in the blame section below. While 
these types of identifications may help with domestic confusion and anger, what they really 
achieve is the addressing of concern, for if the attacks are as random as they are portrayed then 
there is nothing that the counterinsurgent could have done to prevent them. They justify allied 
actions and inactions, which could otherwise threaten legitimacy.  
 
As well as mimicking Howard, Clark also used a number of other reactive frames, including 
referring to the attacks as ‘cowardly’ and using ‘cold-blooded’ 3 times in both press releases.339 
While the latter has the same potentially mobilising, alienating and legitimising ramifications for 
the differing audiences here as it did after 9/11, the former has a different context here. When 
examined after 9/11 it was considered inaccurate because these were suicide attacks. The Bali 
Bombings were not suicide attacks and, while there are still issues of the counterinsurgent’s 
binary representation of all of its actions as ‘brave’ and all of the enemy’s actions as ‘cowardly’, in 
this specific case the attacks can more accurately be labelled ‘cowardly’.  
 
Another already examined reactive frame that Clark used was terrorism as an enemy stand-in 4 
times, all on October 15, referring to the need to “thwart terrorism”, that “[t]errorism has no 
boundaries”, the “global effort against terrorism”, and the “campaign against terrorism”.340 The 
major issue here is that she is conflating different enemies under the same signifier. Where 
before this metaphor had a slight degree of accuracy only because there was just a single enemy 
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at this point, after Bali it becomes more diffuse and complex. At this point the identity of the 
Bali attackers was not even known, but already Clark has connected them to al Qaeda, effectively 
legitimising the enemy’s capacity as an actor for the insurgent audience while boosting the 
possible fear in the domestic audience. This does help reduce confusion, give the 
counterinsurgent the appearance of understanding the threat and direct anger at ‘terrorism’, but 
as will be examined it does so at the expense of clarity and actually helps increase the apparent 
size, cohesion and capacity of the enemy. This linguistic device helps the alliance, however, 
connecting Bali to 9/11 and in the process aiding not just the US but also Australia by creating a 
united threat which enables them to justify their united response.  
 
4.4.2 BLAME/IDEOLOGY 
The RCF was clearly developed by Bali, centring on the attribution of sole blame on the enemy 
because they are ‘irrational’. Clark evoked the ‘irrational’ blame attribution when she said the 
attacks were ‘indiscriminate’ and stated that ‘terrorism has no boundaries. It can strike any place 
at any time’ on October 15, after Howard’s speeches.341 One of Howard’s uses of the ‘strike 
anywhere’ formulation reveals the flaws of this as a blame: “This event is a terrible reminder that 
terrorism can touch anybody anywhere and at any time and any country or any people, any leader 
or any nation that imagines that in some way they have secured immunity from terrorism 
because of this or that attitude or this or that part or position in the world, or this or that 
accident of geography is deluding themselves.”342 The Sari Club in Bali was chosen as a target 
because it was frequented by Westerners, particularly Australians and Americans. As noted, in 
November 2002 bin Laden made this clear, stating that “Australia was warned about its 
participation in Afghanistan, and its ignoble contribution to the separation of East Timor. It 
ignored this warning until it was awakened by the echoes of explosions in Bali.”343 Bin Laden has 
also publically stated that “any nation that does not attack us will not be attacked”.344 The 
planner of the attack said they wanted to target the club the night before because there were a 
large number of Australian Football League players there and less locals on the street, showing 
the desire to increase Australian casualties and reduce local casualties.345 The ‘strike anywhere’ 
formulation directs blame solely at the ‘irrational’ enemy as it implies that there is no connection 
between the actions of the victim state and the terrorist attacks. As noted above, these 
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identifications help reduce concern about the counterinsurgent’s competency. Certainly they help 
reduce confusion and redirect anger, but Howard’s formulation makes it clear that the main aim 
is to limit political damage by insinuating that they had nothing to do with the counterinsurgent’s 
own actions and there was nothing that could have been done to predict or prevent the attacks. 
They are, ultimately, focused on preserving the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent. By mimicking 
Howard at this junction, Clark would have reinforced the NZ-Australian alliance as she 
effectively deflects any blame from him to the NZ audience and beyond.  
 
4.4.3 ACTOR/VICTIM 
Clark spoke of “working with other countries who like us value freedom and democracy” on 
October 15, again invoking the alienating actor identification.346 Howard used similar language in 
his address, speaking of an “Australian community bound together by common values of 
openness, individual liberty and individual freedom”, explaining that “[w]e fight terrorism 
because we love freedom; we fight terrorism because we want to preserve the way of life that this 
country has; we fight terrorism because we share the values of other countries”.347 The term 
‘freedom’ is also a key component of Bush’s rhetoric, as can be seen in his already quoted 
statement that ‘freedom and fear are at war’. Again, Clark appears to mimic Howard, who in turn 
is using the same vocabulary as Bush, using a frame that she had not used in the previous day’s 
press release. The West’s support of non-democratic states that restrict freedoms means that this 
is discreditable and valuing ‘freedom’ is an essentially meaningless statement as it can have many 
different meanings and applications, there are numerous academic attempts to define the 
concept whose very preponderance reinforce the trouble of defining the term.348 Clark’s 
statement appears falsifiable as it is logically inconsistent. The use of the term ‘freedom’ here is 
potentially even more problematic for accuracy as ‘democracy’ can at least be measured. While 
not framed as an absolute, the use of these binaries implies that the enemy does not value either 
‘freedom’ or ‘democracy’, creating a hypocritical, obscurant, alienating and potentially excluding 
narrative for the insurgent support population. While ‘democracy’ would appeal to the NZ 
population, the ‘freedom’ component would have far less appeal as this a core American value.349 
Fisher sees the division so starkly it is the main focus of his book on the relations between the 
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two countries, Fairness and Freedom, where he sees the key difference between the two state’s 
character as being NZ’s focus on fairness and the American’s on freedom.350 Thus, while the 
emotional impacts are similar for the domestic audience as they were after 9/11, the use of 
‘freedom’ largely delivers a positive outcome with regard to the allied actor as it is such a core 
American value – as noted, Bush framed the ICAT as a war between “freedom and fear” and 
frequently conflates the US with ‘freedom’.351 It is also of utility as it frames the allied actor in a 
way that supports the US blame framing, that they are not responsible in any way for the 
insurgent’s actions, that rather than being provoked because of US foreign policy the insurgents 
acted because they are inherently evil. It also suggests that the alliance is one based on values 
rather than interesting, giving it the appearance of permanency to the NZ audience. By absolving 
the allied actor of blame and portraying the alliance as a values rather than interest-based one, 
the frame justifies both the US and Australian actions and legitimises them, providing alliance 
maintenance.  
 
Clark also used the term ‘innocent’ to describe the victims 3 times, all on October 15.352 In 
general, the impacts are the same as after 9/11, though when she condemned “those who use 
terror and indiscriminate violence against innocent people” she connected the victim 
identification with the irrational blame and this reinforces the binary delineation of the conflict. 
Whereas after 9/11 the connections were less explicit, here the contrast is more clear. On one 
side there are ‘those who use terror and indiscriminate violence’ and on the other are the 
‘innocent people’. This has the capacity to further exclude the insurgent support population, 
while delivering greater mobilisation for the domestic audience and absolution of blame for the 
allied actor.  
 
4.4.4 STRATEGY/SOLUTION 
The counterinsurgent used a number of already examined reactive strategy and solution frames 
after Bali, the interesting point here is that while after 9/11 and in the lead up to Afghanistan, 
these solutions were all yet to be implemented, Bali occurred a year later and not only had there 
been operations in Afghanistan but Iraq had already been mooted by the US and allies as a 
possible second front of the ICAT. Thus, the strategy and solution components have had time to 
be put into place.  
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In one of the few pieces of reactive framing she used in the first press release, Clark stated there 
would be “no tolerance”, again casting the strategy as absolute, hyperbolic, emotive and 
exclusive.353 It does, however, succeed in allaying the domestic audience’s concerns about the 
counterinsurgent’s capability as it is forceful and simplistic. This is one of the most powerful 
reactive strategies as it actually requires no extra components and presents an uncompromising 
stance. It also helps with the alliance as Howard and Bush saw Bali as a reason to continue with 
the military campaign, meaning that Clark’s statement justified this to the NZ population and 
beyond.  
 
Using an alienating strategy, Clark stated that those responsible need to be “hunted down” on 
October 15.354 Similar to ‘root out’, this phrase dehumanises as its etymological origins are in 
hunting animals, it also reduces a complex set of strategies to a simplified colloquial phrase that 
implies finding al Qaeda is as easy as ‘hunting down’ an animal and it also serves to allay 
concerns about the counterinsurgent as it makes a complex reality sound extremely simple to 
achieve and is couched in terms that are easily parsed. As Holland explains, “Bush’s first promise 
was to ‘hunt down’ the perpetrators. ‘Hunting down’ would become Bush’s preferred metaphor 
for capturing or killing terrorists”, meaning it would appeal to the US and help justify their 
response.355  
 
Clark said that those responsible must be “brought to justice” on October 15, again using this 
reactive solution.356 Its previous usages were difficult to discredit because they had an aspirant 
quality. However, Bali occurred over a year after 9/11 and its credibility as a solution had 
become increasingly questionable. Hager writes regarding Operation Anaconda in 2002: “[t]he 
plan was to wipe out the opposing force. Taking prisoners was not a priority” going on to 
explain that at the end of the first SAS deployment the invasion had “not assisted in bringing 
Osama bin Laden and anyone else responsible for the September 11 attacks to justice”, 
suggesting while not discreditable it was already questionable.357 As NZ and its allies were shown 
to be involved in the illegal transferring of enemy prisoners, the torture of suspects, the 
questionable detention of enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay and the “unlawful” killing of 
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Osama bin Laden, a say-do gap would appear, further discrediting this identification.358 The 
“systematic mistreatment of prisoners under the Bush Administration [that] had begun in 
Afghanistan” discredits claims of ‘justice’, even by NZ, and could compromise the justness of 
the NZ response.359 Again, this term reduces a complex solution to something extremely simple 
and gives the counterinsurgent the appearance of competency. It also helps justify the US 
solution to the NZ population, delivering alliance maintenance.  
 
As noted, Clark used the war strategies and solutions on October 15, offering the weaker 
“campaign against terrorism” formulation.360 Nevertheless, the ‘campaign’ aspect carries military 
connotations and reinforces this particular solution identification. This has essentially the same 
impacts as after 9/11, except that over a year has passed and the NZ Government had already 
stated that they were “directly involved in Afghanistan in military, peacekeeping and 
development assistance capacities” meaning that there is a lack of internal consistency within the 
rhetoric between this war solution and NZ’s deliberative framing that was not present 
immediately after 9/11.361 While it could be argued that ‘campaign’ could be taken in a broader 
manner, it still reinforces the more absolute versions such as ‘eradicate terrorism’. This particular 
solution also helps connect Bali and 9/11, justifying the overarching ‘war on terror’.  
                                                 
358 Johan Steyn, “Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 53, no. 1 
(Jan., 2004); The Telegraph, “Amnesty International: Osama bin Laden Raid was Illegal,” The Telegraph, May 24, 
2012, accessed on 29/04/2014, available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-
qaeda/9286544/Amnesty-International-Osama-bin-Laden-raid-was-illegal.html; The Economist, “Unjust, Unwise, 
UnAmerican,” The Economist, June 10, 2003, accessed on 03/05/14 , available from 
http://www.economist.com/node/1908281 
359 Hager, Other People’s Wars, 64. 
360 Clark, “Ministerial Statement on Bali Bombing.” 
361 Phil Goff, “Address to No 43 Staff Course on Foreign Affairs and Trade,” beehive.govt.nz , September 27, 2002, 




4.5 – IRAQ, 2003 
The Iraq Invasion was the first time since 9/11 that NZ’s framing was diametrically opposed to 
the US, the only form of reactive framing used was actually used to differentiate NZ’s position 
from that of the US and the other key allies. It was actually the US narrative that had changed in 
the lead up to Iraq, as they had swung from their more deliberative set of solutions focused 
around multilateralism to focus more on the unilateral NZ issued a number press releases leading 
up to the 20th – Goff’s statements on March 12 and 13 and Clark’s on March 18 and 20, though 
only Goff’s on the 13th contained RCFs. 1  
 
4.5.1 PROBLEM/ENEMY 
What makes the use of the reactive problem/enemy framing tasks in the lead up to Iraq so 
interesting is that they are being used in a completely different context. While the US and other 
allies were using them as a means of connecting Iraq and Hussein to 9/11, NZ was trying to use 
them as a means of disconnecting these two. Here the RCF faces a huge challenge, it is being 
stretched by different actors in a way that sets it in diametrically opposing directions.  
 
A rare example of reactive framing in the lead up to Iraq was Goff’s statements on March 13, 
that a “war in Iraq would take attention from the primary threat to international security, which 
is terrorism”.2 When this diagnosis was used before the Afghan Invasion its main function was 
to mobilise support, here the counterinsurgent used it to argue against the Iraq Invasion because 
it detracts from the ‘primary threat’ of terrorism. Its impact on the insurgent support population 
would be mixed, while it still helps legitimise the enemy’s cause by exaggerating capacity, it has 
greater nuance as it was used in contrast to Iraq. With regard to the domestic audience, this 
would appeal as there was a relatively high level of opposition, with 32% of New Zealanders 
opposed to military action under any circumstances and 51% opposed to NZ offering any 
support at all. 3 It also has the potential to evoke fear whilst reducing confusion and concern and 
directing anger. Here the reactive diagnosis justifies NZ inaction. The major difference in impact 
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is for the allied actor; before this diagnosis would have aided alliance maintenance, but now it is 
being used to oppose US actions, here it would not have that outcome but rather could damage 
the alliance. It directly contrasts with Bush’s already quoted move to include Iraq as a front of 
the ‘war on terror’. A WikiLeaks cable from 2004 titled “New Zealand Condemns Terrorism, 
Hostage Taking in Iraq -- but Keeps Its Distance from USG on Iraq” shows how damaging this 
differentiation was, with Ambassador Swindells noting “Goff’s pointed reference to New 
Zealand’s opposition to the invasion of Iraq and that the GoNZ [Government of New Zealand] 
has no desire to be associated with USG actions in Iraq”.4 Despite using the same RCF as 
before, in this case framing terrorism as the ‘primary threat’ would not have delivered alliance 
maintenance because it was used to oppose US actions.  
 
The counterinsurgent also used the terrorism as an enemy stand-in 2 times during the lead up, 
with Goff referring to the “campaign against terrorism” and the “coalition against terrorism” on 
the 13th.5 The flaws of this particular formulation are apparent at this point in the ICAT. As will 
be discussed in the solution section, NZ used this to distinguish its actions from US choices, 
while the US are used the same formulation as a method of connecting Iraq together with al 
Qaeda into a single threat. As well as using the same rhetorical method in the already referenced 
framing of Iraq as the ‘second front in the war on terror’ in his State of the Union speech, Bush 
referred to Hussein as a “brutal dictator... with ties to terrorism”.6 Thus, while NZ is referring to 
al Qaeda and related terrorist groups in this conflated problem and enemy identification, their 
ally was connecting Hussein to the threat, an association NZ refuted. This reveals the issues of 
this particular rhetorical device, it is unable to specifically identify an enemy and can be used in a 
variety of ways by different actors to such a degree that they contradict each other. It was 
relatively accurate after 9/11, when there was a ‘single’ enemy. It became less so after Bali when 
a new-yet-affiliated group was added into this rhetorical catchall, but by Iraq, when the US 
forced Iraq into this catchall diagnosis it became virtually nonsensical. This would be a relatively 
subliminal issue, with the only real impact that it would have compromised the justness of the 
US operation for the domestic audience.  
 
4.5.2 ACTOR/VICTIM 
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The only reactive frame used in the actor/victim category was in reference to victims. In some 
respects, this is unsurprising as NZ was attempting to distance itself from US actions. The 
counterinsurgent used the term ‘innocent’ to refer to both possible victims of the invasion and 
terrorist victims 2 times in the Iraq Invasion press releases.7 The counterinsurgent used this RCF 
in contrasting ways. The reference to terrorist victims fits into the wider ICAT narrative, while 
the reference to how the US can avoid loss of ‘innocent lives’ directed blame at the US using the 
same binary expansion mechanism, with ‘innocent’ inferring the US would be guilty of these 
deaths. This inversion has a more inclusive outcome for the insurgent support population as it 
infers that the US are culpable, it also serves to mobilise support for the domestic audience 
against the Iraq Invasion as it casts the situation in the same stark moral terms, and it is unlikely 
to appeal to the US as it compromises the justness of their cause to the NZ population, with a 
potentially negative impact on the alliance.  
 
4.5.3 STRATEGY/SOLUTION 
Goff’s war on an abstract noun uses, noted above, were particularly interesting in the lead up to 
Iraq as they sought to delineate a different position from the US.8 Whereas before this aspect of 
the RCF had been used in a manner positive to the alliance, during the lead up to Iraq NZ 
deployed it to question US actions. This can be seen when he addressed “the question of 
whether the crisis over Iraq challenges the relevancy of the United Nations”, with Goff 
explaining that there “are of course many other questions of concern in the world today 
[including] the on-going campaign against terrorism”.9 Goff used this strategy to argue against 
the Iraq Invasion in both uses, while the US used it to connect Afghanistan with the invasion. 
These uses may help justify NZ’s actions to the insurgent audience, showing they are able to 
differentiate between Iraq and the al Qaeda, giving their cause credibility. While in general these 
constructions deliver a certain ease of comprehension and reduce concern that the 
counterinsurgent is capable, here this is counterweighted by the fact the two erstwhile allies are 
able to use the same metaphoric construction to argue contradicting cases, suggesting that at this 
point in time this strategy may actually increase the confusion within the domestic audience 
rather than reducing it, which may also reflect negatively on their competency as a 
counterinsurgent. As will be examined in the several following sections on terrorist events in 
Iraq, it also shows how the RCF’s figurative nature means that it can be applied in conflicting 
ways.  
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4.6 OVERVIEW OF THE REACTIVE USE IN THE OTHER EVENTS 
Before providing the concluding analysis of the reactive frame, it is germane to offer a brief 
overview of the reactive frames used in the events that did not receive individual case study 
analysis before the chapter conclusion. These events were not examined individually because 
they failed to meet the key criteria given at the outset of this chapter. Generally speaking, the 
events not covered by case study were not as shocking as other attacks, the victim state was not 
that close an ally of NZ and/or they were a long time after the catalysing event of 9/11. The 
consequences of not meeting these criteria were that these events received less coverage and that 
the reactive frames used were variations of the same framing tasks rather than new types. While 
all three criteria contribute to these two consequences in differing degrees, the relative brevity of 
coverage can be seen as being predominantly influenced by the level of shock and relationship of 
victim state with NZ, while the repetition of frames is influenced more by the events coming 
later in the cycle.  
 
Rather than describe all the reactive frames used in these events, this section will seek to outline 
the most important and interesting aspects. Firstly, looking at these events as a collective there 
were two dominant trends in the reactive framing usage, the two most commonly evoked were 
the irrational problem/enemy identification and corresponding blame/ideology attribution and 
the alienating problem/enemy identification. The frames that terrorism and, consequently, 
terrorists are irrational was invoked in 6 of the 13 events not covered: Delhi, 2001; Baghdad, 
2003; Istanbul, 2003; Madrid, 2004; Bali, 2005; and London, 2005. As can be seen, the irrational 
problem/enemy and blame/ideology framing tasks were not used after 2005, despite there being 
5 more events from 2006 on. This could be because the regularity with which these attacks were 
occurring and the growing problem of discriminating between regular and irregular conflict in 
Afghanistan and, in particular, Iraq meant that ‘irrationality’ had lost credibility as a label. While 
this is probably partly true, it could also be that by 2006 NZ was no longer using reactive 
framing to the same degree. This interpretation is backed up by the other major trend in these 
events, which was that there was only one framing task used after 2006 – ‘cowardly’ – which was 
one of the more mild, but also resonant with the domestic audience. While ‘cowardly’ had been 
used several times early on in the ICAT, it was to dominate as the reactive problem/enemy 
identification of choice in the latter half of the ICAT, also being used in 6 of the 13 events not 
covered: Bali, 2005; Mumbai, 2006; Delhi, 2008; Islamabad, 2008; Mumbai, 2008; and Mumbai, 
2011. Thus, there appears to have been a type of switch from ‘irrationality’ to ‘cowardly as the 
pejorative descriptor of the enemy and their tactics. So popular was ‘cowardly’ that this was the 
163 
 
only reactive frame used for last four events: Delhi, 2008; Islamabad, 2008; Mumbai, 2008; and 
Mumbai, 2011. What makes this even more interesting is that 2008 marked the transition from 
Labour to National, with 2 of those 4 being issued by the Key Government. This was, to a 
degree, evidence of a degree of bipartisan consistency, although as it only involved the use of the 
same word several times it is hard to draw too strong a conclusion. 
 
There were also several interesting aspects of certain events that deserve mention. First, the 
Baghdad bombing in 2003 saw Goff implore that the ICAT “should not become an excuse to 
justify actions that do not conform to international standards of humanity”. What makes this 
interesting is that it was directed at the US rather than the enemy, continuing the inversion of the 
reactive seen in the lead up to Iraq a few months earlier. In this particular context, as the ill-
advised invasion was turning into an ineptly run occupation, it can be read as a veiled reference 
to the American role in Iraq, inferring their actions did not ‘conform to international standards 
of humanity’. By inverting the application of the binary pairing, Goff questions the justness of 
Iraq and contradicts the reactive narrative’s general delineation of the entire conflict, where the 
allies are inherently ‘just’. This shows that the reactive does have some malleability, that it is able 
to be obliquely redeployed against erstwhile allies even as it is being used against the enemy. The 
other event which is notable is Bali in 2005. This occurred just before the third anniversary of 
the 2002 attacks and saw a far higher number of reactive frames used than in most of the other 
unexamined events and also marked the turning point in communications, from the ‘irrational’ to 
the cowardly’. The higher usage of the reactive could be an ‘echo’ of Bali, 2002. Also, while only 
conjecture, National had just conceded defeat the day of the attack, after a closely fought 






4.7 REACTIVE FRAMING CONCLUSION 
This section will examine the frequency of the reactive counterinsurgent frames for the entire 
period, seeking to assess the validity of the relevant hypotheses. Both the raw frequency of the 
framing tasks and the ratio, that is the frequency divided by either the total context word count, 
the annual context word count or the event word count and then multiplied by 100, will be used 
to assess these hypotheses. To be clear, raw and ratio counts serve as useful indicators that can 
be seen as complementary means of examining frequency. First, will be an overview of reactive 
framing across the entire period, before each framing task is examined individually, to explore 
the underlying frequencies and contexts of use as well as to provide an outline of the manifest 
and latent unit parameters of each framing task. To reiterate, the reactive hypotheses that were 
outlined in Chapter 2 that are be examined here were: 
 
• The frequency of the reactive narrative will be higher during events. 
• The reactive narrative will be used more frequently when there is a wider international 
audience than a domestic audience. 
• The frequency of the reactive narrative will be higher for more deadly and shocking attacks. 
• The frequency of the reactive narrative will be higher for attacks on NZ’s allies. 
• Over the entire course of the period the reactive frequency will drop from 2001.  
• The reactive narrative will predominantly focus on problem diagnoses and enemy 
identifications. 
• The reactive narrative will be of limited utility for the insurgent audience, mixed utility for 
the domestic audience and utility for the allied audience. 
 
4.7.1 OVERVIEW 
In general, the varying frequencies of usage for the reactive narrative show a clear pattern that 
confirm the above hypotheses. It should be noted that the actual frequency of usage for the 
reactive counterinsurgent frames was low, but still inferences can be taken that help reinforce the 
position of the hypotheses.  
 
First, the hypothesis that the frequency of the reactive narrative will be higher during events 
appears to be confirmed by the data, as does the hypothesis that it will be used more for a wider 
audience than a domestic one. 
 
4.7.1 Table 1 – Total RFC frequencies for the different contexts, their word counts and each ratio: 
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Context Frequency Word Count Ratio 
Event  191 13,354 1.430 
Wider 178 61,980 0.287 
Domestic 187 102,556 0.183 
 
As can be seen in the table above, not only was the event context the highest usage as a raw 
number, but when the total word counts for each context are considered, it was just over five 
times as frequent as the wider context and almost eight times as frequent as the domestic 
context. Likewise, while the raw count is higher for the domestic audience than the wider 
audience, once the word counts have been taken into account, RCFs were one and a half times 
more likely to be given to the wider audience. The line graph below uses the annual RCF ratio 
frequency for each context using yearly context word counts to show the predominance of the 
reactive narrative during events as well as showing the slight dominance of the wider audience 




It was also hypothesised that the frequency would be higher for more deadly and shocking 
attacks and that it would be higher for attacks on NZ’s allies, both of which the raw data 
suggests are accurate, though the ratio results are less conclusive.  
 
4.7.1 Table 2 – Raw total frequencies for RCFs for each event, event word counts and ratio frequencies: 
Event Total Word Count Ratio 
9/11 41 1,454 2.820 
Afghanistan, 2001 42 1,493 2.813 
Delhi, 2001 2 191 1.047 
Bali, 2002 35 1,105 3.167 
Iraq, 2003 6 5,542 0.108 






















Mumbai, 2003 4 224 1.786 
Istanbul, 2003 5 133 3.759 
Madrid, 2004 5 239 2.092 
Jakarta, 2004 1 344 0.291 
London, 2005 5 267 1.873 
Bali, 2005 10 262 3.817 
Mumbai, 2006 4 230 1.739 
Delhi, 2008 1 259 0.386 
Islamabad, 2008 2 271 0.738 
Mumbai, 2008 4 270 1.481 
Mumbai, 2011 3 144 2.083 
 
As can be seen, the highest frequency occurred during Afghanistan, 2001, with a total of 42 
reactive framing tasks used, the second highest was 9/11 (41), followed by Bali, 2002, (35) at 
third. 9/11 and Bali, 2002, impacted NZ’s two most important allies, the US and Australia, 
respectively, while Afghanistan can was the extenuation of 9/11. After that, the data shows that 
the events with the most reactive framing were: Baghdad, 2003 (21), Bali, 2005 (10) and Iraq, 
2003 (6), which impacted both the US and Australia. Likewise, while a subjective measure, 
9/11was the most ‘shocking’ of the events and duly had the highest raw frequency of any event, 
especially when Afghanistan, 2001 is included. The relatively limited reactive framing frequency 
for London, 2005 (5) is somewhat surprising. The following bar graph shows the raw frequencies 
of reactive frame tasks for each event.  
 
 
The ratio frequency gained using the event word counts reveals a slightly different outcome. As 
the bar graph below shows, the highest frequency event was Bali, 2005, followed by Istanbul, 


























While this hypothesis was not completely validated by both raw and ratio frequencies, it is still 
felt to be relatively accurate because, aside from Istanbul, 2003, the top five events using the 
ratio frequency were still those considered the most important to NZ’s two key allies, the US and 
Australia. The reason that Iraq, 2003 did not feature higher is no doubt because of NZ’s 
opposition to that conflict.  
 
It was also hypothesised that over the course of the ICAT the frequency of reactive framing 
tasks would drop from 2001. This hypothesis is also reinforced by the data, both raw and ratio. 
 
4.7.1 Table 3 – Total raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of RCFs per year for all contexts: 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Event 84 36 36 6 15 4 - 7 - - 3 191 
Wider 37 71 7 18 7 14 6 2 4 2 10 178 
Dom. 11 50 27 25 20 23 20 4 4 2 1 187 
Total  132 157 70 49 42 41 26 13 8 4 14 556 
Ratio 1.441 0.607 0.255 0.382 0.338 0.142 0.113 0.411 0.056 0.068 0.103 - 
 
As can be seen in the above table, the peak year for RCFs was 2002 when considered as a raw 
frequency count, with 2001 second only to 2002. The following line graph shows these raw 
frequencies for all contexts and in total. As can be seen, the general trend was for a spike up to 
2002, before a precipitous drop by 2003 and then gradual decline from then on, with a slight rise 
in 2011. It should be noted, however, that as 9/11 occurred in September there was only roughly 
16 weeks’ worth of press releases while the 2002 raw frequency comes from a full 52 weeks. 
Thus, while 2002 had a slightly higher raw count, if these differing time spans are accounted for 

































However, once the annual frequencies are divided by the annual word counts, the ratio figure 
shows that 2001 was the most frequent year for RCFs, with 2002 as the second most frequent. 
In fact, RCFs were over twice as common in 2001 than they were in 2002, once the differing 
word counts have been accounted for. What makes this drop fascinating is that while the attacks 
were never as big in scale or as audacious as 9/11, because of the increasing number of victim 
states, the reactive actually became more accurate over time, at least those framing tasks that 
exaggerated the scope. As can be seen in the graph below, the hypothesis that RCFs would drop 












































Ratio frequency of RCFs annually for all contexts 
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That said, the drop is not so clear when the ratios are divided out by context, as is shown in the 
line graph below. In particular, the event context shows a peak in 2002, followed by a drop in 
2003-2004, before more peaks in 2005 and 2011. On the other hand, both the wider and 
domestic contexts are far more stable, though wider does show a slight peak in 2004. The reason 
that the event context was so uneven is probably due to a combination of there being no events 
in certain years, with 2007, 2009 and 2010 all eventless and all being the lowest and the relative 
significance of events, with those that were the most shocking and that targeted NZ’s closest 
allies occurring in the years that were the highest, particularly 2001, 2002 and 2005. Essentially, it 
is to be expected that the event RCFs would fluctuate depending on the number or scale of 




It was also hypothesised that the reactive narrative would be used most for the problem/enemy 
framing tasks, which is also supported by the data.  
 
4.7.1 Table 4 – Total frequencies of RCFs for each framing task: 





Total  556 
 
Gaining any ratio is impossible as these are not mutually-exclusive and the discourse cannot be 
divided into distinct framing task word counts, so the raw numbers will have to suffice. Ratios 






















table above, the problem/enemy framing task was almost three times as frequent as the next 
most common, solution, and accounting for almost 60% of the total uses. The below bar graph 




The final RCF hypothesis, that reactive narrative components would be of limited utility for the 
insurgent audience, mixed utility for the domestic audience and utility for the allied audience, 
rests on assessing utility. The metrics of utility for the audiences are different; firstly, utility for 
the insurgent support audience comes from the counterinsurgent legitimising themselves as an 
actor and justifying their own cause as well as delegitimising the insurgent and compromising the 
justness of their cause; for the domestic audience, utility comes from how well the 
counterinsurgent’s communication mobilises support, justifies action and legitimises their role as 
a counterinsurgent within the domestic audience; while for the allied audience, utility comes 
from how well the counterinsurgent’s communication justifies the allied cause and how well it 
mobilises the domestic population. Thus, assessing this part of the hypothesis requires the 
examination of how well the reactive narrative achieved these outcomes for the three audiences.  
 
The first part of the hypothesis, that the reactive narrative would be of limited utility for the 
insurgent audience, was well supported by the analysis. The reactive narrative compromised the 
justness of the counterinsurgent’s cause, delegitimised them as an actor and justified the 
insurgent’s cause while legitimising them as an actor. With regard to the first two components, 
the conclusion is derived from the exclusive nature of the reactive narrative. The reactive 
narrative had the potential to alienate, anger and exclude the insurgent audience for a number of 



















Reactive frequency for each framing task 
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reinforced the Orientalist narrative, portrayed the enemy, their religion and their culture as 
negative outgroup and, consequently, placed all the blame on them. The reactive narrative could 
also be perceived as hypocritical because the allies’ actions struggled to match their hyperbolic 
self-descriptions; for example, the identification as ‘civilised nations’ implies a standard of 
civilised behaviour that the allied actors have not always maintained from the insurgent support 
population’s point of view. Finally, the solutions proposed by the reactive could be parsed by the 
insurgent audience as a ‘clash of civilisations’ and even a ‘war on Islam’. It was a ‘war on 
terrorism’, where terrorism was conflated with the enemy, ‘hunting the enemy down’ with ‘no 
tolerance’ so they can be ‘brought to [frontier] justice’. Ultimately, the reactive narrative excluded 
the insurgent support population by not including them. Therefore, an important conclusion is 
that the reactive has an inverse utility for the domestic and insurgent support populations. In 
creating a positive ingroup that helped mobilise the domestic audience and reaffirm bonds with 
the allied actor, the reactive also generates a negative outgroup.  
 
The reactive narrative also helped justify the insurgent’s cause and legitimise them as an actor. 
There are two aspects to this. With regarding to justifying their cause, the reactive narrative 
reinforced the insurgent’s own narrative by portraying the conflict in the same apocalyptic 
Manichean manner, by reinforcing the enemy’s portrayal of the West as hypocrites and through 
the use the Orientalist narrative that’s origins lie in the Western subjugation of Muslim-
dominated areas and figures as an underlying grievance. This portrayal helps make the 
insurgent’s own apocalyptic cause appear more just. With regard to legitimacy, as well as the 
previous component feeding in, the reactive exaggerated the capacity of the insurgent, helping 
position them as a peer competitor and legitimising them as a political actor. It framed the 
enemy as the ‘most serious existential’ threat of a ‘new era’, unnecessarily inflated al Qaeda’s 
capacity as an actor akin to the Cold War-era USSR. For an insurgent group that wanted to 
create a pan-Islamic Caliphate, this inflation would have had a positive impact on their 
legitimacy.  
 
A final observation is that while the utility of the reactive narrative was perceived to have 
changed over the course of the period for both the domestic and allied audiences, as will be 
examined below, this was not as apparent for the insurgent audience. Certainly, there was a small 
blip in framing around the Iraq Invasion when the counterinsurgent used the reactive to oppose 
the US, but only months later they reverted to using it to refer to the insurgent support 
population again. Also, there was a decline in the usage of the reactive narrative over time, but its 
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impacts on the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent’s cause did not change significantly. Referring 
to the insurgents as ‘evil’ was no less problematic in 2011 as it was in 2001.  
 
It was also hypothesised that the reactive narrative would be of mixed utility for the domestic 
audience. The focus, then, is on how the reactive narrative mobilised support, justified the 
counterinsurgent’s action and legitimised them as an actor within that audience. The findings 
support this hypothesis, as while the reactive narrative delivered mobilisation for the 
counterinsurgent, it did so at the risk of compromising the justness of their cause over the long 
term, and consequently their legitimacy as a counterinsurgent. The reactive narrative’s capacity 
for mobilising support for the counterinsurgent’s cause comes from its five key qualities. By 
delineating the situation in a figurative, absolute, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusive manner, NZ 
counterinsurgents were able to create the sense of an overwhelming, immediate and personal risk 
in the domestic audience through the portrayal of an apocalyptic threat posed by an evil, barbaric 
and irrational enemy against their own good civilisation. This was apparent in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11, when NZ counterinsurgents framed the events as an ‘unjustifiable’ ‘attack on 
all civilised nations’ by ‘evil people’. The reactive narrative is able to defuse the potentially 
problematic emotional impacts of a terrorist attack while harnessing the more useful emotional 
outcomes to mobilise support. With regard to the problematic impacts, it reduces confusion by 
framing the situation in an easily parsed manner, using binaries and absolutes as well as figurative 
language that sacrifice nuance and accuracy for simplicity and clarity. It also allays concerns 
regarding the capacity of the counterinsurgent as it portrays the events as unpredictable and 
unpreventable, the enemy as totally to blame and the response as comprehensive, 
uncompromising and easily achieved. It also harnesses, and even exacerbates, the fear generated 
by attacks by extending the scope of the threat and portraying the enemy as evil and irrational 
and the victim state as innocent and good. This in turn, helps direct the anger towards the 
enemy, mobilising support for action. The supposition in Chapter 2 that the emotive shockwave 
that follows a terrorist attack was a component in explaining the reactive narrative’s use was 
largely supported by the examination. The reactive helps deal with the problematic emotions 
whilst harnessing and directing those that can be used to provide support in the domestic 
audience. In particular, the fear generated by a terrorist attack does not appear to be the most 
important emotive consequences of a terrorist attack, as the counterinsurgent use of the reactive 
appears to use and even amplify the fear in their own support population as it provides an 
effective means of mobilisation. If fear was really as dangerous an outcome of a terrorist attack 
as hypothesised by a number of scholars, then the counterinsurgent would not use the reactive 
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narrative after an attack.  
 
The utility of the reactive narrative as a means of mobilising support for the counterinsurgent 
cause is clear: the state is essentially a protection racket, citizens look to their government to 
protect them from threat, exchanging security for revenue, and the reactive narrative diagnosed 
the threat after 9/11 as clear and present. NZ counterinsurgents’ use of the reactive narrative 
framed the threat in such a way that almost any response would be reasonable within the 
narrative’s own logical parameters. In fact, one important conclusion is that the reactive 
narrative’s main function is mobilising support, as it creates just such a situation; its central 
function is to generate the necessary political capital needed for action in the wake of an attack, 
which it does by utilising and even amplifying the sense of fear in its own constituency whilst 
simultaneously portraying the situation in simplistic manner that reduces any concern regarding 
the counterinsurgent’s capacity and directs all the anger following a terrorist attack towards the 
enemy. Delhi, 2001, was an interesting anomaly, as neither the US nor NZ framed the attack in 
an expansive manner that connected it to the wider ICAT; however, by Mumbai, 2003, attacks 
within India by the same group had been brought into the ICAT proper. The reason for this was 
probably that in 2001 this extension was not required to mobilise support. This reinforces the 
conclusion that the reactive narrative’s key function is mobilisation. As noted in Chapter 4, the 
reactive is often empowered by its apparent salience. Terrorist attacks are designed to create fear 
in the target audience and the counterinsurgent employs this fear to mobilise support. In fact, 
this apparent salience could help partially explain why the reactive narrative declined over the 
period, even though NZ did expand the scope of the threat none of the following attacks ever 
matched 9/11’s scale or audacity and, in turn, this meant that it increasingly lost its utility 
because of the decrease in salience for the domestic audience, particularly after 2005 when the 
last attack on a close ally occurred.  
 
However, while the reactive narrative has a powerful mobilisation capacity, it also has the 
potential to compromise the justness of the counterinsurgent’s cause for the domestic audience, 
and their legitimacy as a counterinsurgent, for a number of reasons. The first can be understood 
by contrasting how NZ counterinsurgents portrayed the 9/11 attacks as an existential threat and 
yet only ever deployed around 40 NZSAS combat personnel at a time, starting several months 
after the event, then in the coming years added at most several hundred NZDF personnel in 
largely noncombat roles. There was a major incongruence between the way NZ diagnosed the 
threat and their response. If the threat really was existential, then the prudent response would 
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have been far more immediate, more significant in scope and with a greater focus on combat. 
The reasons that the reactive narrative can compromise the justness of the cause and the 
counterinsurgent’s legitimacy can be drawn from that contrast between threat and response: the 
reactive did not match NZ’s actual response. The reactive narrative is a powerful means of 
mobilising support in the wake of a shocking terrorist attack, but its salience was short-lived 
following 9/11. Not only did ‘normality’ resume for most soon after, and the scale and audacity 
of subsequent attacks decreased over the coming years, but the reactive was also almost totally 
incompatible with NZ’s ongoing response. When the enemy is portrayed as evil, irrational and, 
consequently, extremely dangerous, non-military solutions are essentially illogical. Thus, another 
conclusion is that, for NZ, the mobilisational utility of the reactive narrative appears to have had 
an inverse relationship with its capacity to justify and legitimise. That is, while the reactive 
narrative may have helped marshal support, particularly in the immediate wake of 9/11, overall 
the reactive narrative would have had a detrimental impact on the ‘rightness and properness’ of 
the counterinsurgent’s cause, and consequently their legitimacy as a counterinsurgent, as the 
political and military action the counterinsurgent engaged in over the next ten years was largely 
inconsistent with the narrative components they had used to mobilise support.  
 
Another reason the reactive narrative caused potential justness issues for the counterinsurgent 
was that, by its nature, it is not consistent. One of the most striking examples of this was the 
ongoing framing of terrorism as an irrational tactic and, consequently, of the enemy as irrational, 
which became more and more tenuous as the enemy reused successful tactics, refined other less 
successful ones and struck specific targets of its enemies. This issue became magnified when NZ 
framed attacks by the Iraqi insurgency as irrational, having only months earlier predicted them as 
a logical outcome of the invasion. Also, as the line between war and insurgency blurs, what was a 
‘rational’ tactic in the former was still being framed as ‘irrational’ for the latter, further revealing 
the inconsistency. Likewise, inconsistencies became apparent as the use of terrorism as an enemy 
stand-in became ever more problematic over time as it had to encompasses increasingly diverse 
enemies within its semantic domain, particularly as different allies began using it in different ways 
before the Iraq Invasion. These issues revealed how the use of a figurative, absolute and 
hyperbolic narrative could come to compromise the justness of the counterinsurgent cause and, 
ultimately, their legitimacy, particularly over time and when the narrative is being used by an 
array of different actors.  
 
The reactive narrative was also hypothesised as being of utility for the allied audience. This was 
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well supported by the analysis. There are two aspects to this, that the reactive narrative mobilised 
the domestic audience and justified the allied cause. The former has largely been discussed 
above; however, one reactive narrative quality is fundamental: the hyperbolic nature of the 
reactive. The exaggeration of the threat and enemy – aided by other reactive qualities – was of 
fundamental utility for the allied actor as it helped engender a sense of personal risk in the NZ 
population. It helped mobilise NZ by making the American problems NZ’s problems. The 
reactive narrative’s capacity to heighten the potential threat in such a geographically remote 
population delivered the greatest mobilisational utility for the allied audience, turning what could 
have been considered an attack specifically targeting the US into one that also targeted NZ. For 
the allied audience, the reactive narrative’s capacity to extend the threat so that it could help 
mobilise even a distant and relatively unthreatened population was its most powerful asset.  
 
Generally, the reactive narrative also helped justify the allied actor’s cause, largely because it 
reinforced the Bush Administration’s own original narrative. That is, the reactive narrative 
helped make the US cause appear right and proper because it reiterated many of the same 
framing tasks that were central to the US ‘war on terror’ narrative. In particular, the many aspects 
of the reactive that helped to obscure any blame that could be directed at the US helped make 
their cause appear right and proper. By diagnosing the threat, identifying the enemy and actors 
and attributing blame in the same figurative, absolute and hyperbolic manner, NZ, as a 
geographically isolated state, gave the US’s own framing greater credibility and NZ’s position as 
an apparently independent actor would serve to empower the US cause. The reactive 
components of NZ’s narrative were, in most cases, so similar to the US narrative that they were 
virtually indistinguishable. Often, NZ reactive framing tasks overtly mimicked US rhetoric, with 
US President Bush identified as the source in some cases. There were enough clear cases of 
mimicking, particularly early on in the ICAT, that these alone are considered important 
reinforcements of the US cause. Interestingly, it was actually Clark’s mimicking of Howard after 
Bali, 2002, that revealed the influence the victim state’s rhetorical response can have on other 
allied counterinsurgents. While the response to 9/11 was not as clear cut, mimicking was more 
apparent in the lead up to the Afghan Invasion, where most of the explicit mimicking of Bush 
occurred, including the binary ‘with us or against us’ enemy identification considered a key 
justification of the US ‘war on terror’. While some aspects of the reactive narrative no doubt 
came from a shared vocabulary between NZ and the US, there were a number of clear cases of 




Critically, however, NZ’s use of the reactive narrative in the lead up to the Iraq Invasion did 
have potential issues for the justness of allied actor’s cause. It was at this point that NZ’s reactive 
framing diverged in intent from the US cause, even if did not actually shift in content. While the 
US was using the rhetorical device of substituting terrorism for an enemy as a means of 
connecting 9/11 with Iraq, NZ used this same device to question the impending invasion. Thus, 
at this point, NZ’s references to the ‘campaign against terrorism’ were proposing the opposite 
solution to the US’s uses of this formulation. Likewise, whereas before NZ’s framing of 
terrorism as the primary threat justified the US cause, in the lead up to Iraq, NZ used it to frame 
their opposition to US actions. NZ also inverted the human-inhuman binary, implying the US 
had not met ‘international standards of humanity’. The same figurative, absolute and hyperbolic 
qualities that enable the reactive to be of utility for an allied audience also allow it to be turned 
against them. Thus, while generally the reactive narrative had a positive impact on the alliance, 
there were issues from early 2003 onward, once NZ had used it against the US. 
 
The analysis will now turn to each reactive framing task individually. 
 
4.7.2 PROBLEM/ENEMY 
The hypothesis that the most RCFs would be problem diagnoses and enemy identifications has 
been demonstrated. These framing tasks far outweighed any of the others. In this section, the 
frequency of each problem and enemy framing task over the entire period will be examined and 
the relevant hypothesis – that RCFs will be used more for events than other contexts and more 
to wider audiences than domestic; and that they would decline over the period – will be assessed. 
Also, rather than assessing the hypothesis that the frequency would be higher for more shocking 
attacks and higher for close allies as few of the frequencies for each individual framing task are 
high enough for that type of analysis, it will rather state whether the framing task first appeared 
after a shocking event that targeted a close ally of NZ as this is a derivative component of this 
hypothesis.  
 
4.7.2.1 EXISTENTIAL THREAT 
To be considered in this section an identification must diagnose the threat as existential, implying 
that either humanity or civilisation was threatened. This latent unit can be expressed in a range of 
ways. The majority stated that there was an attack on or threat to ‘humanity’, ‘civilisation’, 
‘civilised nations’, ‘civilised societies’ and ‘civilised people’. The other examples were: ‘the threat 
of catastrophic terrorism’ and “vulnerability of all of us to the threat posed by organised 
177 
 
international terrorism”.  
 
4.7.2.1 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of existential threat RCF: 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Ratio 
Event 5 - - - - - - - - - - 5 0.037 
Wider 2 5 - - - - 1 - - - - 8 0.013 
Dom. - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 0.001 
Total 7 5 - - 1 - 1 - - - - 14 - 
Ratio 0.073 0.019 - - 0.008 - 0.004 - - - - - - 
 
The usage patterns for the existential threat diagnosis fit most of the RCF hypotheses. While 
36% of all uses were during events and 57% given to a wider audience in raw frequency, the ratio 
comparisons indicate events three times as frequent as wider and 37 times as frequent as 
domestic. Likewise, it was more commonly used in wider than domestic context when 
considered in both raw and ratio form. Also, the first use appeared in the immediate wake of 
9/11 and 50% of all uses were in 2001. When considered as a ratio RCFs were almost four times 
as frequent in 2001 as in the next most frequent year, 2002. This frame task almost disappeared 
after 2002, with just several of what could be called ‘echoes’ appearing in 2005 and 2007. These 
echoes are reappearances of the reactive narrative in a non-event context long after the 
significant event that caused the use of RCFs, often with a strategic function. For example, the 
2007 echo – “New Zealand was shocked that terrorists had struck at the heart of the United 
States, and saw it as an attack against all humanity” – was given by Clark to an American 
audience at the height of the NZ-US rapprochement, referring back to 9/11, suggesting that it 
had a strategic alliance maintenance function.10  
 
4.7.2.2 TERRORISM AS AN IRRATIONAL TACTIC  
This section will focus on statements that specifically imply that terrorism is an irrational tactic. 
While alienating problem/enemy identifications could be considered to indirectly imply terrorism 
is not rational because they suggest the enemy is irrational, these are not included here but are in 
the irrational blame section. The identifications included here are specifically directed at 
terrorism as a tactic. In practice, this latent unit will focus on the specific references that 
terrorism is ‘incomprehensible’, ‘irrational’, ‘indiscriminate’, ‘pointless’, ‘senseless’, that it ‘can 
strike any place at any time’, that ‘‘distance is no guarantee of protection’ and that ‘no one is 
immune from the threat’. 
 
4.7.2.2 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of terrorism as irrational tactic RCF: 
                                                 
10 Clark, “Address to Asia Society Luncheon.” 
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Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Ratio 
Event 4 4 2 1 2 - - 1 - - - 14 0.105 
Wider - 4 - 2 - - - - - - 1 7 0.011 
Dom. - - - - - - 3 - - - - 3 0.003 
Total 4 8 2 3 2 - 3 1 - - 1 24 - 
Ratio 0.042 0.031 0.007 0.023 0.016 - 0.013 0.032 - - 0.007 - - 
 
The usage patterns conform to most of the RCF hypotheses. This RCF was used more for 
events than other in other contexts. It was twice times as likely to be used during an event than 
given to a wider audience and almost five times as likely than the domestic context when 
considered as a raw figure, and almost 10 times more frequent than wider uses and 35 times 
more frequent than domestic uses when word count is considered. Likewise, it was more 
commonly used in a wider context than domestic in both raw and ratio forms. Also, the first use 
appeared during the immediate response to 9/11 and while the highest raw frequency was 2002, 
when considered as a ratio it was one and a half times as frequent in 2001 as the next most 
frequent year, which was 2002. Over time, usage gradually declined, with only 2 uses after 2007. 
All 3 uses in 2007 were versions of the ‘strike anywhere’ identification that suddenly reappeared 
after not being used since Bali, 2002. They were given by Clark and Goff in the last half of 2007 
to domestic audiences and while there could be any number of reasons for the reappearance, 
their clustering within a six month period suggests the first usage influenced the others, that they 
are ‘echoes’ of the first 2007 ‘echo’. These 3 uses in 2007 make the results for this RCF 
somewhat ambiguous but generally speaking it still appears to match the relevant hypothesis that 
RCFs will decline over time.  
 
4.7.2.3 TERRORISM AS THE ENEMY 
This section will consider all examples where the term ‘terrorism’ is used as an enemy stand-in. 
Specifically, cases where the name of the enemy organisation would be more accurately used 
than the word ‘terrorism’ as a problem diagnosis. 
 
4.7.2.3 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of terrorism as the enemy RCF: 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Ratio 
Event 15 6 11 1 - - - - - - - 33 0.243 
Wider 20 27 3 4 3 9 3 1 2 2 4 78 0.126 
Dom. 1 21 15 11 9 7 5 4 1 2 1 77 0.075 
Total 36 54 29 16 12 16 8 5 3 4 5 187 - 
Ratio 0.393 0.207 0.104 0.122 0.097 0.556 0.034 0.158 0.020 0.068 0.037 - - 
 
Terrorism as an enemy stand-in fits some of the hypothesised RCF patterns. While in raw 
frequencies, event frequency is the lowest, when word count is accounted for it was two times 
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more common than wider uses and over three times more common than domestic uses. Also, 
while wider and domestic contexts are equal as raw counts, it was almost twice as common as a 
ratio for wider contexts. Part of the reason it was used so often to a domestic audience is 
probably because this particular formulation was found in the operational names used by the 
counterinsurgent, including the most common versions: ‘campaign against terrorism’ and 
‘international campaign against terrorism’. These account for 29 uses, while the other 
formulations that use this ‘against terrorism’ format account for another 25. This RCF was first 
used in the immediate wake of 9/11. Its use as campaign name helps explain why 2006, a key 
year for the NZ-US rapprochement, was the highest ratio usage rather than 2001 – the 
counterinsurgent was seeking to reinforce their credentials as an active participant in the ICAT 
to the allied audience, which is reinforced by the 9 uses to a wider audiences versus the 7 to a 
domestic (0.149/0.031), showing this RCF was almost five times as likely to be given to a wider 
audience that year than to a domestic one as a ratio count.  
 
4.7.2.4 MOST SERIOUS GLOBAL THREAT 
This section will examine the usage patterns of all references to the threat from terrorism as 
being ‘primary’, ‘principal’, ‘the most serious’, ‘the greatest’, or ‘global’. The first four are 
manifest units, while the last latent unit requires the threat to be described as either threatening 
all of the countries in the world or threatening at a global level, as encapsulated by Anderton’s 
already noted statement that “no country can be complacent”.11  
 
4.7.2.4 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of most serious global threat RCF: 
 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Ratio 
Event 3 - 2 - - - - - - - - 5 0.037 
Wider - 2 - 2 - 2 - - - - - 6 0.010 
Dom. - 2 1 2 1 1 1 - - - - 8 0.009 
Total 3 4 3 4 1 3 1 - - - - 19 - 
Ratio 0.031 0.015 0.010 0.039 0.008 0.010 0.004 - - - - - - 
 
These identifications do not follow the hypothesised RCF patterns as strongly as others have, 
with more given to a domestic audience than during an event or to a wider audience individually 
as a raw frequency. However, the ratio shows it was still almost four times more commonly 
given during an event than to a wider or domestic audience. Also, while it was higher in raw 
count for the domestic audience, it was slightly more commonly given to a wider audience than 
                                                 
11 Anderton, “Ministerial Statement: Terrorist attacks in US.” 
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domestic as a ratio – suggesting it has a strong mobilising potential for the domestic audience. 
While it was first used immediately after 9/11, this RCF did not fit the decline from 2001 
pattern, as 2004 was highest both in raw and ratio frequencies, though it did disappear from use 
by 2007. The ‘global’ component made up 9 of the ten uses from 2004 onwards and this could 
be explained by something that will be discussed in greater detail in the deliberative chapter, 
which is the ideological influence of the ruling party on the framing of the ICAT. To wit, the 
Labour Party have a strongly internationalist focus and this leads them to refer to many aspects 
of the conflict in terms that emphasise the international and global nature of the threat, the 
actors and the solution. The ‘most serious’ aspect fits the declining usage hypothesis better, with 
all but a single use in the first three years of the period.  
 
4.7.2.5 ALIENATING PROBLEM/ENEMY DIAGNOSES 
The section will be focused on the use of alienating terms applied to both the problem and 
enemy. Distinguishing between those applied to the problem and those applied to the enemy is 
difficult as even those terms not specifically applied to the enemy transfer to them. For example, 
when an attack is referred to as an ‘evil act’, it also infers the perpetrator is ‘evil’ too. NZ used 
alienating identifications – specifically the manifest terms ‘evil/s’, ‘barbaric’, ‘brutal/ity’, ‘cold 
blood/ed’, ‘scourge’, ‘plague/d’, ‘symptom’, ‘cowardly’ and ‘cowardice’ to refer either to 
terrorism or the enemy. 
 
4.7.2.5 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of alienating problem/enemy RCF: 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Ratio 
Event 8 7 4 2 5 2 - 3 - - 1 29 0.217 
Wider - 1 - 2 - - - - - - - 3 0.005 
Dom. 1 - 1 - 1 1 2 - - - - 6 0.006 
Total 9 8 5 5 6 3 2 2 - - 1 38 - 
Ratio 0.094 0.031 0.018 0.039 0.049 0.010 0.008 0.063 - - 0.007 - - 
 
These diagnoses followed most of the hypothesised RCF patterns. In particular, context, as it 
was predominantly used during events when considered in both raw and ratio frequencies. For 
the former it was almost 10 times more likely to be used during an event than to a wider 
audience and almost five times more likely than to a domestic audience, while for the latter it was 
roughly 44 times more likely to be used during an event than to either a wider audience or 
domestic audience. That said, this RCF was used more in domestic contexts than wider ones in 
both raw and ratio counts, though both of these figures are negligible when compared to the 
dominance of use during events. Also, these diagnoses first appeared right after 9/11 and peaked 
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in 2001, before gradually disappearing from the counterinsurgent’s vocabulary both in raw and 
ratio frequencies, being almost twice as likely to be used in 2001 than the next highest year, 2005, 
in ratio.  
 
4.7.2.6 TERROR 
This section will consider all uses of the manifest unit ‘terror’ including when it is used as part of 
a phrase like ‘acts of terror’.  
 
4.7.2.6 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of terror RCF: 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Ratio 
Event 1 1 2 - - - - - - - - 4 0.030 
Wider 3 1 - - - - - - - - - 4 0.006 
Dom. - 3 1 2 - - 1 - - - - 7 0.007 
Total 4 5 3 2 - - 1 - - - - 15 - 
Ratio 0.044 0.019 0.011 0.015 - - 0.004 - - - - - - 
 
The usage patterns are relatively consistent with the RCF hypothesis, with the main issue being 
the predominance of uses to domestic audiences. However, while the raw frequency is higher for 
domestic audiences, the ratio count fits the hypothesis regarding use during events. That said, the 
domestic context was more common than the wider context in both raw and ratio counts. This 
RCF does fit the hypothesised decline over time, appearing on the eve of the Afghan Invasion, 
peaking in 2002 for the raw count and peak in 2001 for ratio count before fading from usage by 
2007. The raw and ratio counts for this RCF suggest it may be a weaker form of the reactive 
narrative.  
 
4.7.2.7 NEW ERA THREAT 
This section will focus on any identification that infers that these attacks marked the beginning 
of a new generation of terrorist attacks, one that specifically or indirectly implies that the attacks 
were not an aberration but rather the beginning of a new era.  
 
4.7.2.7 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of new generation threat RCF: 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Ratio 
Event 2 - - - - - - - - - - 2 0.015 
Wider 3 - - 1 - - - - - - - 4 0.006 
Dom. - - - - - - 1 - - - - 1 0.001 
Total 5 - - 1 - - 1 - - - - 7 - 
Ratio 0.052 - - 0.008 - - 0.004 - - - - - - 
 
The ‘new era’ identification largely fits the hypothesised RCF patterns. It was mostly given 
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during an event, while only 29% of raw uses were during events, the ratio frequencies show it 
was almost five times as commonly used during events than to a wider audience and 15 times 
more frequent for event than domestic uses. Likewise, it was more likely to be used in a wider 
context than domestic in both raw and ratio counts. It was first used on during the lead up to the 
Afghan Invasion and the majority of uses occurred in 2001 when considered in both raw and 
ratio frequencies, with the ratio frequency showing it was six times more common than the next 
highest year, 2004. The usages in 2004 and 2007 are ‘echoes’, remnants of the reactive frame 
used in the wake of 9/11, fulfilling a strategic function. The first was given during an APEC 
conference and the second during the NZ-US rapprochement, suggesting they were focused on 
alliance maintenance and domestic mobilisation, respectively.12 This particular identification has a 
powerful mobilising capacity as it portrays the threat as ongoing. What makes this particular 
identification interesting is that while it was discreditable after 9/11, it could be argued it actually 
became more credible over time as there were a number of related attacks though none of these 
came close to matching 9/11 in scale. Its virtual abandonment after 2001 reinforces the 
hypothesis that the reactive narrative is adopted in the wake of a particularly shocking attack but 
its extreme nature means that it is not maintained.  
 
4.7.2.8 ENEMY BINARY 
This section will examine the usage of the enemy binary which conflates two separate enemies 
into a single category. This latent unit was first expressed using the phrase ‘share their fate’ 
during the Afghan Invasion. The other way it was expressed was when the counterinsurgent 
referred to al Qaeda and the Taleban without distinguishing between them. To be clear, a 
statement such as Clark’s in 2007 regarding “Al Qaeda elements being sheltered by the Taliban” 
is not a conflation.13 Goff’s statement from 2006 about “[v]iolence from Taliban and al Qaeda 
insurgents” is, because it does not differentiate between these two different actors.14 The enemy 
binary was used 19 times: 
 
4.7.2.8 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of enemy binary RCF: 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Ratio 
Event 2 - - - - - - - - - - 2 0.015 
Wider - - - 1 1 - 1 - - - - 3 0.005 
Dom. - 4 - 1 2 5 1 - 1 - - 14 0.014 
                                                 
12 Helen Clark, “Address at CEO APEC Summit,” beehive.govt.nz, November 20, 2004, accessed on 02/03/15, 
available from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/address-ceo-apec-summit; Phil Goff, “Meeting Contemporary 






Total 2 4 - 2 3 5 2 - 1 - - 19 - 
Ratio 0.021 0.015 - 0.015 0.024 0.017 0.009 - 0.007 - - - - 
 
This identification does not fit all the hypotheses. It was used most to the domestic audience in 
raw count and was only used marginally more often during events than to a domestic audience 
when considered as a ratio. Also, it was used more to a domestic audience than wider one in 
both raw and ratio counts, which could be because it was a necessary simplification when 
referring to a complex enemy in a domestic context. It was used first in the lead up to the 
Afghan Invasion, though also problematic for the RCF hypotheses was that its use peaked in 
2006, in raw count, and 2005, in ratio count. The reason for this could be that during the 2005-
2006 period the Afghan insurgency had become worse, the NZ PRT mandate had been extended 
and the counterinsurgent wanted to reinforce the need for the extended deployment.15 
 
4.7.3 BLAME/IDEOLOGY 
4.7.3.1 IRRATIONAL BLAME 
This section will examine the usage patterns of the irrational blame identification, which is 
categorised as a statement that infers the enemy are irrational. Some negatively connect the 
enemy’s ideology or motivation and their strategy and tactics, though the parameters of this 
blame identification are broad, including all the terms identifications that infer terrorism is an 
irrational tactic plus all of the alienating problem identifications, references to ‘agendas of hate’ 
and other blame frames that imply the insurgent enemy are irrational actors such as having “no 
bottom line” to the action they will take.  
 
4.7.3.1 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of irrational blame RCF: 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Ratio 
Event 11 7 4 1 6 1 - 1 - - - 31 0.232 
Wider 1 5 - 3 - - - - - - 1 10 0.016 
Dom. 3 2 2 3 1 2 4 - - - - 17 0.017 
Total 15 14 6 7 7 3 4 1 - - 1 57 - 
Ratio 0.156 0.054 0.022 0.054 0.056 0.010 0.017 0.032 - - 0.007 - - 
 
The irrational blame identification fits most of the RCF hypotheses. It was used most during 
events, with the raw frequency for events showing it was used almost four times more often than 
to a wider audience and almost twice as much as to a domestic. The ratio count shows it was 
                                                 
15 For the mandate extension, see Scoop, “New Zealand Troops Off to Afghanistan,” Scoop, January 27, 2005, 
accessed on 12/12/15, available from http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO0501/S00201.htm, for the insurgency 
increase see Seth G. Jones, “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad,” International Security 32, 
no. 4 (Spring 2008): 7–40. 
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used during an event just over 14 times more often than either other context. However, it was 
given more to a domestic audience than wider one, in both raw and ratio counts. This was 
unexpected, especially as the deliberative blame framing tasks were so frequently given to a 
domestic audience. This RCF fits the decline hypothesis, it appeared in the immediate wake of 
9/11, and peaked in 2001 in both raw and ratio frequencies and then faded from that point on. It 
was almost three times as frequent in 2001 as the next highest year, 2005, when considered as a 
ratio. Also telling is that 2001 and 2002 account for 51% of the total uses, when they are only 
20% of the total word count.  
 
4.7.3.2 NOT MUSLIMS 
This section will examine the frequency and pattern of use for any identification that stated that 
the enemy were ‘not Muslims’, including inferences they have ‘hijacked their faith’ or that they 
‘discredited the cause they claim to represent’. 
 
4.7.3.2 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of not Muslims RCF: 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Ratio  
Event 1 - - - - - - - - - - 1 0.007 
Wider - 1 - 1 - - - - - - - 2 0.003 
Dom. - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1 0.001 
Total 1 1 - 2 - - - - - - - 4 - 
Ratio 0.010 0.003 - 0.015 - - - - - - - - - 
 
This RCF fits some of the hypotheses. While it was not used most during events when 
considered in raw form it was used more during an event than in other contexts when 
considered as a ratio frequency. Furthermore, it was used more to a wider audience than to a 
domestic one in both raw and ratio form. However, while it was used in the lead up to the 
Afghan Invasion, it does not fit the declining usage as it was used more in 2004 than any other 
year in both raw and ratio frequency counts, which can be explained by the interfaith conference 
in 2004, which both uses referenced.16 
 
4.7.4 ACTOR/VICTIM 
5.19.4.1 ALIENATING ACTOR IDENTIFICATION  
This section will focus on this latent unit by examining the usage patterns of any identifications 
that identify the allied actors as ‘civilised’, ‘humanity’, ‘freedom’, ‘peaceful’ or ‘decent’, including 
                                                 
16 Clark, “Address at CEO APEC Summit.”; “Phil Goff, “Eminent New Zealanders to Attend Inter-Faith Meeting,” 




all lexemes of civilised. With regard to ‘democratic’, the identification must specify that all the 
allied actors are ‘democratic’ or at least infer this, with the statement after Bali-02 regarding 
“other countries who like us value freedom and democracy” was the weakest form of this.  
 
4.7.4.1 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of alienating actor RCF: 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Ratio 
Event 9 2 1 - 1 - - - - - 1 14 0.105 
Wider 2 7 - - - - 1 - 1 - - 11 0.018 
Dom. - 2 1 1 - 1 - - - - - 5 0.005 
Total 11 11 2 1 1 1 1 - 1 - 1 30 - 
Ratio 0.114 0.042 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.003 0.004 - 0.007 - 0.007 - - 
 
These identifications fit all the RCF hypotheses. They were used most during events in both raw 
and ratio counts. The ratio counts show that they were almost six times more common during 
events than to a wider audience and 21 times more common during events than for domestic 
contexts. Also, this RCF was more commonly used in a wider context than a domestic one in 
both raw and ratio counts. Likewise, the first examples were given immediately after 9/11, and 
2001 was the highest year for both raw and ratio frequencies, with the 2001 uses almost three 
times that of 2002, the next highest year, when the frequencies are adjusted for word count. In 
total, 73% of all uses occurred in the first two years of the ICAT though they only account for 
20% of the total word count.  
 
4.7.4.2 ALIENATING VICTIM DESCRIPTION 
This section will examine all the uses of the term ‘innocent’ and ‘good’ to refer to victims. To be 
counted, they have to be referring to actual victims of attacks rather than in the abstract.  
 
4.7.4.2 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of alienating victim RCF: 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Ratio 
Event 2 4 3 1 1 1 - 2 - - 1 15 0.112 
Wider 2 3 - 1 - - - - - - 1 7 0.011 
Dom. - - 1 1 1 1 1 - - - - 5 0.005 
Total 4 7 4 3 2 2 1 2 - - 2 27 - 
Ratio 0.042 0.027 0.014 0.023 0.016 0.007 0.004 0.063 - - 0.015 - - 
 
This RCFs fits several of the hypothesised patterns. They were used most during events when 
considered in both raw and ratio counts. They were almost 10 times as likely to be used during 
an event than to a wider audience and 22 times more likely to be used during an event than to a 
domestic audience, when word count is accounted for. Likewise, they were more likely to be 
given to a wider audience than a domestic one in both raw and ratio counts. However, while they 
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did appear in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, they did not peak in 2001, but were actually most 
common in 2002 as a raw frequency and in 2008 as a ratio, though 2001 was second highest in 
both raw and ratio.  
 
4.7.5 SOLUTION 
4.7.5.1 WAR ON AN ABSTRACT NOUN  
This section will focus on all solution identifications that use the terrorism as enemy stand-in 
formulations that then propose to use military means against the abstract noun, specifically the 
manifest units: ‘war against terrorism’, ‘campaign against terrorism’, ‘fight against terrorism’, 
‘fight/ing terrorism,’ ‘defeat/ing terrorism’, ‘eradicate terrorism’, ‘combat/ing terrorism’ and 
‘fight the scourge of terrorism’.  
 
4.7.5.1 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of war on abstract noun RCF: 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Ratio 
Event 11 2 5 - - - - - - - - 18 0.135 
Wider 2 14 4 1 3 3 - 1 1 - 3 32 0.052 
Dom. 2 13 4 3 4 5 1 - 1 - - 33 0.032 
Total 15 29 13 4 7 8 1 1 2 - 3 83 - 
Ratio 0.156 0.111 0.047 0.031 0.056 0.028 0.004 0.032 0.014 - 0.022 - - 
 
These solutions fit the most of the hypothesised RCF patterns. With regard to context, these 
solutions were roughly half as likely to be used during an event as to a wider or domestic 
audience in raw numbers, but as a ratio it was almost three and almost five times more likely to 
be used during an event than to a wider or domestic audience, respectively. Also, while more 
commonly given to domestic audiences than wider as a raw figure, the opposite was true as a 
ratio count. Likewise, it was first used in the wake of 9/11 and while it peaked in 2002 as a raw 
frequency, 2001 was the highest year as a ratio frequency, with usage essentially declining over 
time. The reason the raw frequencies do not fit as well is probably due to ‘campaign against 
terrorism’ being used as the campaign name for the overall operation, hence the number of uses 
to domestic audiences and spike in 2002 when the counterinsurgent was mobilising support for 
their own deployments.  
 
4.7.5.2 JUSTICE 
This section will examine the usage patterns of the term ‘justice’. To be included here this 
manifest unit must either refer to the need to ‘bring’ the enemy to ‘justice’ or for the enemy to be 




4.7.5.2 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of justice RCF: 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Ratio 
Event 4 1 1 - - - - - - - - 6 0.045 
Wider 2 2 - - - - - - - - - 4 0.006 
Dom. 1 - - - - - - - 1 - - 2 0.002 
Total 7 3 1 - - - - - 1 - - 12 - 
Ratio 0.073 0.012 0.004 - - - - - 0.007 - - - - 
 
This solution fits the hypothesised RCF patterning. The context usage shows that this was far 
more prevalent during events for both raw and ratio; in particular, the ratio counts are revealing, 
with the ‘justice’ solution eight times more likely to be used during events than to a wider 
audience and almost 23 times more likely to be used during event than to a domestic audience. 
Also, it was more commonly given to a wider audience than domestic one when considered in 
both raw and ratio counts. The framing task first appeared after 9/11 and there was a rapid 
decline from the 2001 peak, in both raw and ratio frequencies, also fits the pattern. This RCF 
was six times more likely to be used in 2001 than in the next highest ratio frequency year, 2002, 
and essentially disappeared after 2003 except for a single use in 2009, when it was used by the 
National Government in their ‘snap debate on Afghanistan’ when the new government is 
attempting to remobilise support for the Afghanistan deployment.17 
 
4.7.5.3 NO TOLERANCE 
The ‘no tolerance’ solution is a manifest unit, to be included here this exact phrase must be used.  
 
4.7.5.3 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of no tolerance RCF: 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Ratio 
Event 1 1 1 - - - - - - - - 3 0.022 
Wider - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Dom. - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Total 1 1 1 - - - - - - - - 3 - 
Ratio 0.010 0.004 0.004 - - - - - - - - - - 
 
This solution identification fits several of the RCF hypotheses perfectly. It was only used during 
events and was not used in a wider or domestic context at all. The only hypothesis it does not fit 
is that wider context uses would be more prevalent than to domestic but considering how well it 
fits the other hypotheses this is not problematic as in some respects this hypothesis is 
subordinate to the one relating to the reactive narrative being used most during events. Also, it 
                                                 




appeared in the immediate wake of 9/11 and disappeared by 2003. While it was equal in usage as 
a raw count across these first three years, as a ratio it peaked 2001, declining by 2003.  
 
4.7.5.4 TARGETED  
This section will examine the frequency of solution descriptions as ‘targeted’. To be included, 
this manifest unit must either use the word ‘targeted’ or phrase ‘not indiscriminate’.  
 
4.7.5.4 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of targeted RCF: 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Ratio 
Event 2 - - - - - - - - - - 2 0.015 
Wider - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Dom. 3 3 1 - - - - - - - - 7 0.007 
Total 5 3 1 - - - - - - - - 9 - 
Ratio 0.052 0.012 0.004 - - - - - - - - - - 
 
This solution largely fits the hypothesised patterns for the RCF. With regard to events, while the 
raw figures favour the domestic context, the ratio shows that it was twice as frequently used 
during an event as to a domestic audience. That said, it was not used at all in a wider context and 
was used frequently for a domestic audience. This was probably due to the counterinsurgent’s 
desire to portray their own military action in a minimised manner to their domestic population, 
something that will be explored in the deliberative chapter. The annual pattern fits better, with 
both raw and ratio counts matching the hypothesis of peaking in 2001 and declining after that. 
 
4.7.5.5 ALIENATING SOLUTIONS 
This section will analyse the frequency of alienating solutions. Specifically, this section will 
examine the manifest usages of the phrases ‘root out’ and ‘hunted down’.  
 
4.7.5.5 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of alienating solutions RCF: 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Ratio 
Event 3 1 - - - - - - - - - 4 0.030 
Wider - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Dom. - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Total 3 1 - - - - - - - - - 4 - 
Ratio 0.031 0.004 - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
These solutions follow most of the hypothesised RCFs patterns. They were only used during an 
event, though this does of course go against the hypothesis that they would be more commonly 
used for a wider audience than a domestic one, but as noted this is subordinate to the hypothesis 
that suggested they would be used most often for events. They were also first used in the lead up 
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to the Afghan Invasion and were used most often in 2001 in both raw and ratio counts, before 
declining very rapidly and leaving the discourse by 2002.  
 
The thesis will now examine the deliberative narrative.  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
DELIBERATIVE COUNTERINSURGENT FRAMES 
This chapter will examine the use of deliberative counterinsurgent frames (DCFs). The reason 
for this is that the deliberative narrative is not a ‘reactive’ one, but rather is relatively consistent 
and cohesive over time and thus does not require the same event-centric focus. That said, there 
will be reference to changes over time where relevant but this will be done within framing task 
sections and does not determine the structure of the chapter. Because of this structure, the 
annual and context word counts will be provided with each framing task and some preliminary 
examination of consistency will be given, though this will vary depending on relevance for each 
specific framing task. With regard to consistency, here it is taken as being used with little 
variation over the entire period. The word counts exclude any reactive uses – for example, the 
term ‘terrorism’ is reactive when used as an enemy stand-in but deliberative when used otherwise 
as a problem diagnosis. Also, the ratio, that is the raw frequency divided by the total or annual 
context word count times 100, will be referred to where relevant in this chapter but due to 
readability will not be given in the tables. With regard to explanation of latent units, while this 
will occur in the introduction to a framing task, in some cases this will be relatively limited as 
there will be also be examples given during the full analysis that are intended to help provide the 
parameters of these units.  
 
5.1 PROBLEM/ENEMY 
The purpose of this section is to examine the use of DCFs to diagnose the problem and identify 
the enemy. The main criteria for inclusion here is that the framing task is inclusive for the 
insurgent audience, with that inclusivity coming largely from the other four qualities of the 
deliberative narrative – literal, nuanced, constricted and restrained. That said, of all the framing 
task categories, the problem/enemy section includes the most borderline DCFs, in that 
sometimes their inclusivity came as much from them not being exclusive as being explicitly 
inclusive. This is largely due to their focus, as they still seek to diagnose problems and identify 
enemies, which is difficult to do in an overtly inclusive manner.  
 
5.1.1 DIAGNOSING THE PROBLEM  
This section will look at how the counterinsurgent diagnosed the problem using the manifest 
units: ‘terrorism’, ‘insurgency’, and what will be referred to as the ‘attack’ terms of ‘terrorist 
attack’, ‘act of terrorism’, ‘act’ and ‘event’. As will be assessed below, these are literal, nuanced, 
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constricted, restrained and inclusive, though there is some variation.  
 
5.1.1 Table 1 – Diagnosing the problem, annual totals: 
Year terrorism insurgency terrorist attack  act of terrorism  act event 
2001 58  - 17  2 9 7 
2002 85  - 21  1 7 10 
2003 30  - 7  3 - - 
2004 32  - 3  1 2 1 
2005 20  - 4  - 1 - 
2006 26  2  7  6 3 2 
2007 24  2  2  - - 4 
2008 6  - 3  1 2 - 
2009 5  3  3  - - 3 
2010 4  - 1 - - - 
2011 8  1  2  - - 11 
Total  298 8 70 14 24 38 
 
5.1.1 Table 2 – Diagnosing the problem, context totals: 
Context terrorism insurgency terrorist attack  act of terrorism  act event 
Event 32  - 23  10  3  6  
Wider 88  4  17  1  3  13  
Domestic 178  4 30  3  18  19  
 
CONTENT 
None of these fit the hypothesis of consistent use in either raw or ratio counts. This is probably 
explained by their nature as problem diagnoses, they would drop over time as less attacks 
occurred. When considered as raw numbers, the majority of these diagnoses fit the hypothesised 
DCF pattern regarding domestic over wider use, but as ratios most do not. That said, ‘terrorist 
attacks’, the second most common, was used most for a domestic audience in both raw and 
ratio. ‘Terrorism’ and ‘terrorist attack/s’ formed the key aspects of the DCF problem diagnosis, 
comprising 83% together. The usage of ‘insurgency’ is also insightful as it only entered the 
lexicon in 2006 and was only applied to Afghanistan for the final 4 uses.  
 
These diagnoses are credible as they all literally describe the situations to which they refer – 
technically speaking, the occurrences of 9/11 and the ongoing violence are all examples of 
‘terrorism’, ‘terrorist attacks’, ‘acts’, ‘events’ and ‘insurgency’. In general, they are all considered 
accurate, though ‘terrorism’ and ‘insurgency’ do have issues as neither are as nuanced or 
constricted as the other terms. With respect to nuance, both have a political ‘taint’ to them that 
limits their accuracy. Tilly explains: “terrorism is so ‘real’ that it requires no extra definition, so 
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‘true’ that no interpretation is necessary, so ‘concrete’ that no meaning need to be inferred”.1 
“Insurgency’ is also problematic; it only began to be used by NZ after the US started using it in 
Iraq and the US used the term in a cynical manner to obscure what was occurring in the 
occupied state.2 NZ’s decision to begin using this term, first for Iraq and then for the ICAT, is 
troubling because this use by the US as a means of avoiding more politically problematic labels 
like ‘civil war’. The pejorative nature of ‘terrorism’ and insurgency’ means they label “violence of 
which we do not approve”, but then the counterinsurgent is trying to direct opprobrium.3 More 
problematic is that they leave scale and scope open to interpretation, such that while not 
exaggerated, they are not constricted either. Despite these issues, they are not seen being as 
problematic as the reactive diagnoses, they are just not as nuanced or constricted as the other 
‘attack’ terms. In particular, the other terms are more informative as they specify an actual 
situation – an ‘act’, ‘attack’ or ‘event’. Admittedly, used without ‘terrorist’ these are less nuanced 
as they don’t specify the nature of the situation, but they are very constricted in their scope. 
‘Terrorist attack/s’ is the most accurate and informative as in a single phrase it provides three 
key details – that it was an ‘attack’ by ‘terrorists’ that used ‘terrorist’ methods, giving nuanced 
details while narrowing the possible scope of the threat.  
 
AUDIENCE 
While all these diagnoses would probably match the insurgent support population’s experience, 
the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘insurgency’ may have mixed salience because they prejudge the 
situation and are not restrictive enough to exclude even the less extreme supporter. This 
pejorative, all-encompassing nature was something British Muslims commented on in 
interviews.4 Bin Laden’s position was mixed, he said that “the United States brands as terrorist 
anyone... opposed to its imperialist policy and hegemony” but also stated “if liberating my land is 
called terrorism, this is a great honour for me”.5 Still, all these diagnoses convey the 
counterinsurgent’s opinion in a relatively restrained manner that avoids provoking negative 
emotions in the insurgent support population, with ‘terrorism’ and ‘insurgency’ inferring an 
inclusive agency and humanity on the enemy. The ‘attack’ terms aid the justness of the 
counterinsurgent’s cause as they are unlikely to alienate, anger or, consequently, exclude the 
                                                 
1 Joseba Zulaika and William A. Douglass, Terror and Taboo: The Follies, Fables and Faces of Terrorism (New York: 
Routledge, 1996), 5. 
2 Anthony R. DiMaggio, Mass Media, Mass Propaganda: Examining American News in the "War on Terror” (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2009), 109.  
3 Alex P. Schmid and A. J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, & 
Literature (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 3.  
4 McGovern, Countering Terror or Counter-Productive? 38.  
5 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, “Compilation of Usama bin Laden Statements 1994 – January 2004,” FBIS 
Report, 2004, 3, 29, 51, 66, accessed on 05/10/15, available from https://fas.org/irp/world/para/ubl-fbis.pdf 
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insurgent audience, but there are issues for ‘terrorism’ and ‘insurgency’ as they are pejorative and 
their lack of scope means unconnected situations can be linked, increasing the insurgent’s 
apparent capacity, legitimising them.  
 
These diagnoses would be salient for the domestic audience. As Tilly notes, ‘terrorism’ requires 
no extra definition because it is such a dominant descriptor and for this reason it would fit New 
Zealanders’ narrative and match their experiences.6 Likewise, the other descriptors would match 
as they are commonly experienced terms, excluding ‘insurgency’, which is more obscure and 
specialised. While ‘terrorism’ and ‘insurgency’ provide nuanced information on the situation, they 
do not totally limit fear as they do not constrict scope and can be applied to many groups and 
attacks across time and geography. The other terms are all control fear as they refer to a specific 
‘act’, ‘event’ or ‘attack’, constricting the scope to the specific situation. All of the terms are able 
to reduce confusion as they provide literal labels, but they offer limited reduction of concern 
and, aside from ‘terrorism’ and ‘insurgency’ would not direct anger as they are not pejorative. 
Their lack of scope means ‘terrorism’ and ‘insurgency’ can be connected to unrelated COIN 
situations, which can cause legitimacy issues depending on those linked situations.7 Overall, 
however, these identifications would justify the counterinsurgent’s cause though, with the 
exception of ‘terrorism’ and ‘insurgency’, their literal, nuanced, constricted and restrained nature 
means they have limited mobilisational power.  
 
Generally, these diagnoses would have a limited salience for the allied actor. They do not fit the 
US narrative as these terms all suggest that the threat is posed by an actor with agency, which 
implies that there are causal factors underlying the acts. Overall, they are all technical 
descriptions of the threat and while ‘terrorism’ and ‘insurgency’ do not constrict scope, they do 
not exaggerate it. However, ‘insurgency’ appears to have been mimicked, so its salience and 
utility would be greater as it did help downplay negative aspects of the ICAT when the US 
desired this suppression later in the period. While they are not specifically counterproductive to 
the US cause, these diagnoses do not aid it as they do not mobilise support within NZ and 
actually denote underlying causational factors to a somewhat sceptical domestic audience. As 
such, they are unlikely to have a positive impact on alliance maintenance.  
 
5.1.2 IDENTIFYING THE ENEMY 
The counterinsurgent used many DCF terms to identify the enemy, specifically the manifest 
                                                 
6 Tilly, “Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists.”  
7 Jackson, Writing the War on Terror; Pecastaing, “Rethinking the War on Terror,” 81. 
194 
 
units ‘terrorist’, ‘insurgent’, ‘perpetrator’, ‘al Qaeda’, ‘bin Laden’ and ‘Taleban’ – excluding any 
reactive references of the last two.8 As will be examined below, these DCF identifications are 
literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive, though there is some variation.  
 
5.1.2 Table 1 – Identifying the enemy, annual totals: 
Year terrorist insurgent perpetrator bin Laden al Qaeda Taleban 
2001 63  - 4  8  5 27 
2002 72  - 4  - 5  6 
2003 22  - 2  - 4  7  
2004 21  - - - 1 1  
2005 12  - - - 9 6  
2006 15  3  - - 2 3 
2007 24  6  - - 7 9 
2008 5  - - - - - 
2009 13  1  - - 5 7 
2010 2  - - - 1 - 
2011 3  5  - - 4 2 
Total  252 15 10 8 43 68 
 
5.1.2 Table 2 – Identifying the enemy, context totals: 
Year terrorist insurgent perpetrator bin Laden al Qaeda Taleban 
Event 61  - 4  8  3  8  
Wider 60  5  1  - 10 27 
Domestic 131  10  5  - 30  33  
 
CONTENT  
Generally, these identifications were not used consistency over the period in raw or ratio counts, 
except for ‘al Qaeda’, which was consistent in both, excluding a spike in 2005. This lack of 
consistency was probably due to their focus on the enemy, which would decline with reduced 
attacks. Most, however, were used more to a domestic rather than wider audience as both raw 
and ratio figures, excluding ‘perpetrator’ and ‘Taleban’. The most common DCF aspect used to 
identify the enemy was ‘terrorist’, accounting for 65% of all identifications. One point of interest 
is the total disappearance of ‘bin Laden’ from the discourse after 2001, which probably relates to 
the failure to capture or kill him in Afghanistan. Also, ‘insurgent’ matches that of ‘insurgency’, 
but unlike ‘insurgency’ was only ever applied to Afghanistan.  
 
In general, all of these terms are impossible to discredit as they are literal representations, 
especially the proper names. However, there are the same accuracy issues for ‘terrorist’ and 
                                                 
8 These uses exclude any binary forms counted in the reactive section.  
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‘insurgent’ as with their diagnostic lexemes. They are not totally nuanced or constricted because 
they lack scope and serve as pejorative political labels that are selectively applied.9 Also, for 
‘terrorist’, “[d]efining them via their use of a certain tactic (terrorism), which they share with 
every other insurgent movement in history, is less analytically useful than defining them in terms 
of their strategic and tactical approach.”10 It “erases any incentive that an audience might have to 
understand the point of view of those individuals and groups so that it can ignore the history 
behind their grievances”.11 However, ‘insurgent’ is also problematic as the US cynically used it to 
control perception of the situation in Iraq.12 As with ‘terrorism’ and ‘insurgency’, however, the 
counterinsurgent is attempting to denigrate these actions and these terms help deliver this. More 
troubling, they provide no scope and obscure differences amongst enemies, reducing nuance.13 
Of particular interest with regard to accuracy is ‘perpetrator’ as this means to “be responsible for; 
commit: perpetrate a crime”.14 Many have argued that the attacks should have been described as 
crimes and this term provides nuanced information about the nature of the event, specifically 
agency and guilt.15 ‘Perpetrator’ causatively connects the enemy to the event by denoting that 
they are responsible for the crime. Use of the proper names is as nuanced and constricted as an 
enemy identification can get; it is also informative as it shows they are able to determine 
responsibility for events, which is essential in COIN.16  
 
AUDIENCE 
These identifications would probably be of mixed salience for the insurgent audience. ‘Terrorist’ 
and ‘insurgent’ would have the same varied appeal as their diagnostic lexemes. ‘Perpetrator’ 
would be salient as even the most extreme supporter is likely to see the insurgent actions as a 
crime. They are restrained identifications that do not provoke the insurgent audience as they 
                                                 
9 Kapitan and Schulte, “The Rhetoric of 'Terrorism' and its Consequences,” 177; Omar Swartz, “Political Identities 
in the Imperial Practices of the United States,” in Transformative Communication Studies: Culture, Hierarchy and the Human 
Condition, ed. Omar Swartz (Leicester, UK: Troubador Pub. Ltd, 2008), 266.  
10 David Kilcullen, “Balanced Response: A National Security Strategy for the Protracted Struggle Against 
Extremism,” in Beyond Bullets: Strategies for Countering Violent Extremism, ed. Alice E. Hunt, Kristin M. Lord, John A. 
Nagl and Seth D. Rosen (Washington: Center for New American Security, 2009), 29. 
11 Kapitan and Schulte, “The Rhetoric of ‘Terrorism’ and its Consequences,”178.  
12 Jeffery H. Michaels, “Conflict Characterization and the US Military,” in The Character of War in the 21st Century, ed. 
Caroline Holmqvist-Jonsa ̈ter, and Christopher Coker, (London: Routledge, 2010), 44-46. 
13 Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism,16.  
14 The Free Dictionary, accessed on 11/12/13, available from http://www.thefreedictionary.com/perpetrator 
15 Greg S. Weaver and Janice E. Clifford Wittekind, “Categorizing September 11,” Homicide Studies 6, no. 4 
(11/2002): 375; Sean D. Murphy, “Terrorism and the Concept of Armed Attack in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,” 
Harvard International Law Journal 43, no. 1 (2002); Leila Nadya Sadat, “Terrorism and the Rule of Law,” Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review 3, no. 1 (2004); Miriam J. Aukerman, “War, Crime or War Crime? Interrogating 
the Analogy Between War and Terror,” in Enemy Combatants, Terrorism, and Armed Conflict Law: A Guide to the Issues, 
ed. David K. Linnan (Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International, 2008), 149. 
16 Sherifa Zuhur, Precision in the Global War on Terror: Inciting Muslims through the War of Ideas (Philadelphia: Strategic 
Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2008), 116.  
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portray the enemy in a manner that infers humanity and agency. That said, ‘terrorist’, and to a 
lesser degree ‘insurgent’, are pejorative, but the counterinsurgent is trying to convey a negative 
opinion of these actors.17 ‘Perpetrators’, by contrast, is extremely restrained as it is not a 
pejorative or expansive label but rather links the insurgent to a crime. The terms ‘bin Laden’, ‘al 
Qaeda’ and ‘Taleban’ are unlikely to provoke any major negative emotions in the insurgent 
audience as they are proper names. While ‘terrorist’ and ‘insurgent’ may harm the 
counterinsurgent’s legitimacy with some of the support population their credibility and accuracy 
would help limit this outcome. Conversely, ‘perpetrators’ could delegitimise the insurgent, ‘al 
Qaeda’ wanted to be seen as combatants as this portrays them as peer competitors, conferring 
legitimacy.18 The use of the proper names reduces their apparent scope and thus legitimacy; it 
also helps to ‘taint’ them with their actions; over time, bin Laden realised the “al Qaeda brand 
had become a problem” when the US began to use the name specifically. 19  
 
These would be of varying salience for the domestic audience. Anderton’s statement on 
September 12, 2001, that “[t]errorists have carried out devastating attacks” and reference to the 
“the perpetrators of this violence” would probably have matched the domestic audience’s 
experiences and appealed to their beliefs regarding the situation. ‘Insurgent’ does not have the 
same everyday commonality and, particularly early on, the proper names would not match 
audience experiences. With regard to emotions, the term ‘terrorist’, and to a lesser degree 
‘insurgent’, could generate fear in the domestic audience by “[exploiting] the fears of its own 
citizens” because of its negative connotations.20 ‘Perpetrator’ is commonly used to refer to a 
range of domestic criminals in NZ and this quotidian nature suggests it could manage fear.21 This 
is reinforced by the technical tone of the term ‘perpetrator’, which, has a less emotive character 
than similar terms such as ‘murderer’ or ‘killer’. Also, these terms help to control emotions by 
limiting expectation; wars are finite but crime fighting is ongoing, as counter-terrorism actions 
will be.22 These terms all help reduce confusion by labelling a largely invisible enemy. In 
particular, the use of proper names would help reduce concern regarding the counterinsurgent’s 
capacity as it shows they know who the enemy is. They are also seen as directing anger, either by 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 177. 
18 Aukerman, “War, Crime or War Crime?” 149; Watkin, Warriors Without Rights?. 
19 Pecastaing, .“Rethinking the War on Terror,” 81; David Ignatius, “The bin Laden Plot to Kill President Obama,” 
The Washington Post, March 17, 2012, accessed on 12/04/2014, available from 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-bin-laden-plot-to-kill-president-
obama/2012/03/16/gIQAwN5RGS_story.html  
20 Kapitan and Schulte, “The Rhetoric of ‘Terrorism’ and its Consequences,” 178-179.  
21 Search of stuff.co.nz for ‘perpetrators’, accessed on 11/12/13, available from http://www.stuff.co.nz  
22 Michael Sherry, “American Vengeance Goes Global,” in Force and Legitimacy in World Politics, ed. J. D. Armstrong, 
Theo Farrell, and Bice Maiguashca (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 258. 
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use of negative labels or proper names that give the anger a focus. Thus, they would help 
mobilise support and justify the counterinsurgent’s cause.  
 
Generally, these terms have some salience for the allied actor even though they do not fit the 
Bush’s original narrative identifications like “evil-doers” and ‘barbarians’.23 However, the 
disappearance of ‘bin Laden’ fits the US narrative, whose name disappeared so precipitously that 
a journalist told Bush in 2002, “Mr. President, in your speeches now you rarely talk or mention 
Osama bin Laden”.24 Also, ‘terrorist’ fits aspects of the narrative, particularly the ‘war on terror’ 
name – though they lack utility for the US cause as they confer human agency, inferring that 
there may be genuine grievances motivating the events, which could be problematic for the US, 
particularly with regard to the sceptical elements of the NZ population. Overall, while somewhat 
salient, these terms do not help justify the US cause and would have a limited impact on the 
alliance. 
 
5.1.3 DESCRIBING THE SCOPE OF THE THREAT  
The counterinsurgent diagnosed the scope of the threat in both a limited and expanded manner. 
There were two types considered for the former: ‘asymmetric threat’ and ‘no increased threat’. 
‘Asymmetric threat’ diagnoses uses the manifest units of ‘asymmetric’ or ‘non-state’. The latent 
‘no increased threat’ identification specified that there was no major change in NZ’s threat 
environment after 9/11. There were also two types of expanded scope diagnoses: 
‘internationalised’ and ‘globalised’. The first comprised manifest diagnoses of the threat as 
‘international/global/trans-national terrorism’. The latter involved latent diagnoses of a 
‘globalised threat’, where terrorism was described as having global impacts or effecting global 
security.25 As will be examined below, these are all literal, nuanced and inclusive threat 
descriptions, with the limited also considered constricted.  
 
5.1.3 Table 1 – Describing the scope of the threat, annual totals: 
Year asymmetric no increase internationalised globalised 
2001 - 2 2 1 
2002 7 - 12 9 
2003 1 - 9 1 
                                                 
23 CNN, “Bush Vows to Rid The World of 'Evil-Doers',” CNN, September 16, 2001, accessed on 04/09/15, 
available from http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/gen.bush.terrorism/; George Bush, “President Urges 
Readiness and Patience ,” whitehouse.gov, September 16, 2001, accessed on 11/11/14, available from 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010915-4.html 
24 George Bush, “President Bush Holds Press Conference,” whitehouse.gov, March 13, 2002, accessed on 11/12/14, 
available from http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020313-8.html 
25 This contrasts with the RCF that diagnosed terrorism as threatening the world as a whole. 
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2004 - 1 3 8 
2005 - 1 2 3 
2006 - - 8 2 
2007 - 4 3 5 
2008 - - 1 1 
2009 - - 3 2 
2010 - - - - 
2011 - - 6 5 
Total  8 8 49 37 
 
5.1.3 Table 2 – Describing the scope of the threat, context totals: 
Context asymmetric no increase internationalised globalised 
Event - 2  5  1  
Wider - - 12  17  
Domestic 8 6  32  19  
 
CONTENT 
Neither of the limited scope diagnoses were used with any consistency in either count. Both of 
the expanded scope diagnoses were, though, particularly as raw figures. Even as ratio counts they 
were relatively consistent. One interesting spike for both of these occurred in 2011, where they 
were both the second highest annual ratio frequencies. As will be explored later, this was 
probably due to both the general need to mobilise and legitimise the domestic support audience 
this late in the ICAT and specifically due to the deaths of NZ soldiers in that year.  
 
These are all credible as they are literal threat diagnoses, they all provide an accurate 
understanding of the threat as it stands, that it was not limited to a specific state or region, was 
yet at the same time NZ did not face a dramatically heightened threat from this ‘asymmetric’ 
threat. The credibility and accuracy was proven over the course of the ICAT, with attacks 
occurring throughout the world and no major incidences in NZ. The accuracy can be seen in 
Clark’s in 2002 ‘globalised threat’ identification – that the “tragedy of September 11 created an 
international sense of vulnerability as never before. Terrorism poses a threat not only to the 
security of nation states, but also has serious ramifications for global security and economic 
stability” – which provides a nuanced understanding of the threat without exaggerating it.26 
While the ‘internationalised’ diagnoses do not constrict the threat, though they do not exaggerate 
it either and are useful components in justifying NZ’s involvement in the ICAT, which can all be 
seen in Clark’s 2002 statement that “last month’s tragic events in Bali reminded New Zealanders 
                                                 
26 Helen Clark, “Address to Symposium on World Terrorism,” beehive.govt.nz, May 13, 2002, accessed on 09/09/14, 
available from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/address-symposium-world-terrorism 
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of the continuing threat of international terrorism and the need to work closely with others 
globally to counter the threat.”27 Likewise, Anderton’s 2001 identification that “[t]here is no 
indication of any increased security threat within New Zealand” immediately after 9/11 provides 
a nuanced and constricted threat description that is considered accurate and informative.28 
‘Asymmetric’ references help constrict the threat by portraying it in a numerically limited 
manner, which is also informative regarding COIN.  
 
AUDIENCE 
In general, these identifications would match the insurgent audience’s experiences, especially the 
expanded scope diagnoses, as the Muslim community has experienced a significant proportion of 
terrorist attacks and ‘globalised’ violence, and as the ICAT went on this would be reinforced by 
the subsequent attacks.29 These identifications all control emotion as they describe the threat in a 
manner that infers agency and humanity, one that has a rational underpinning. Because of this 
they are all inclusive, helping legitimise the counterinsurgent’s cause. That said, the lack of threat 
constriction from the expanded scope diagnoses could provide some legitimacy to the insurgent 
as implies an enhanced capacity; as Marsden and Schmid explain, they imply “a far greater reach 
than [al Qaeda] is capable of.”30  
 
The ‘no increased threat’ and ‘globalised threat’ are common components of NZ’s pre-9/11 
narrative, suggesting they would fit for the domestic audience. However, the ‘no increased threat’ 
may not have matched experiences immediately after 9/11 due to the audience’s perception of 
the threat as examined in the reactive chapter. The term ‘asymmetric’ was probably too technical 
to be salient, something Burton acknowledged in 2002: “Terms such as ‘Asymmetric Warfare’, 
which were once completely unknown to the general public, are now occasionally referred to in 
media reports.”31 The expanded scope diagnoses could provoke some fear, but this is relatively 
moderate as they do not specifically imply a direct threat to NZ, while the limited scope 
diagnoses help control fear. These diagnoses reduce confusion by accurately describing the 
threat, thus delivering a degree of certitude to the counterinsurgent’s capacity, though at the 
same time by minimising the scope of the threat they do infer that the counterinsurgent should 
                                                 
27 Clark, “NZ Navy and Air Force to Join International Campaign Against Terrorism.” 
28 Anderton, “New Zealand Response to US Attacks.” 
29 Clement M. Henry, “The Clash of Globalisations in the Middle East,” in International Relations of the Middle East, ed. 
Louise Fawcett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 105–112. 
30 Marsden and Schmid, “Typologies of Terrorism and Political Violence,” 184.  
31 Mark Burton, “Opening Address at NZDF Symposium, Trentham,” beehive.govt.nz, May 14, 2002, accessed on 
12/03/2012, available from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/opening-address-nzdf-symposium-trentham 
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be able to counter the threat relatively easily. They do not direct anger, though. In turn, the same 
quality that creates the potential for fear aids mobilisation and the ‘globalised threat’ delivers the 
highest mobilising potential of all of these as it accurately explains how the repercussions work, 
while the limited scope diagnoses provide the lowest. 
 
These identifications would be of varying salience for the US. The expanded scope diagnoses fit 
the US narrative, but the limited scope diagnoses do not, and a 2006 cable reveals the negative 
light in which the ‘no increased threat’ identification would have been received: “the lack of a 
geographic threat also enables Kiwis to view the world with a sense of detachment and a bit of 
moral superiority... the official charged with international policy at the Ministry of Defense 
almost laughed out loud when Polcouns once suggested New Zealand might one day appreciate 
the option of U.S. military assistance”.32 The limited scope diagnoses would have a negative 
impact on the alliance, but the expanded scope diagnoses help the alliance as they give threat a 
fluidity of application and mobilise the NZ population. A Selchow explains, Bush used the term 
‘global’’ strategically as a means of justification, its very broad scope and ambiguity enabled it to 
be used as a catchall term.33 
 
5.1.4 DESCRIBING THE SCOPE OF THE ENEMY 
The counterinsurgent described the scope of the enemy using a range of different size referents 
from limited to intermediate to expanded. Examples of these latent units are: “a narrow group of 
fanatical extremists” as limited, “terrorist organizations” as intermediate and “international 
terrorist networks” as expanded.34 As will be examined below, these are all literal, nuanced and 
inclusive threat descriptions, with the limited and intermediate also constricted. 
 
5.1.4 Table 1– Describing the scope of the enemy, annual totals: 
Year limited intermediate expanded 
2001 2 12 3 
2002 2 21 5 
2003 - 4 - 
2004 2 2 - 
2005 1 5 1 
                                                 
32 Wikileaks, “The Nuclear Ban and New Zealand's Identity,” Wikileaks, cable date, April 5, 2006, accessed on 
12/05/15 , available from https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06WELLINGTON260_a.html 
33 Sabine Selchow, “Language And ‘Global’ Politics: De-Naturalising The ‘Global,” in Global Civil Society 2007/8: 
Communicative Power and Democracy, ed. Martin Albrow, Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius, Monroe Price and Mary 
Kaldor (London: Sage, 2008), 239.  
34 Goff, “Goff Meets Armitage in Washington.”; Phil Goff, “Multilateralism in NZ Foreign Policy,” beehive.govt.nz, 
April 19, 2005, accessed on 01/11/14, available from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/multilateralism-nz-
foreign-policy; Helen Clark, “Address to Symposium on World Terrorism.” 
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2006 - 4 1 
2007 1 4 - 
2008 - - - 
2009 - - - 
2010 - - - 
2011 - - - 
Total  8 52 10 
 
5.1.4 Table 2 – Describing the scope of the enemy, context totals: 
Context limited intermediate expanded 
Event 1  8  3  
Wider 3 22  3  
Domestic 4  22  4  
 
CONTENT 
None of these identifications was used with any consistency over the period in either raw or ratio 
count. Also, while they were all used equally or more to a domestic audience in raw count, the 
ratio scores do not fit the DCF pattern. The other main points of interest are that the limited 
identifications were the least frequent while intermediate identifications were so predominant 
and that by 2008 none of these were used at all.  
 
All three versions are credible, even the most expanded is literal and accurate, as technically al 
Qaeda can be considered a ‘international terrorist network’.35 Similarly, it is credible to describe 
them as a ‘narrow group’, even if their peak numbers were, at the upper estimate, 60,000.36 The 
three referents used in all the enemy scope identifications – ‘group’, ‘organisation’ or ‘network’ – 
all are literal descriptions and cannot be discredited, nor can the use of terms that provide extra 
scope like ‘small’ or ‘international’. However, the fact they are all credible does suggest that there 
are minor accuracy issues, as this variance shows there is a lack of precision, particularly at the 
expanded end where the terms could refer to a 1000 people or a 100,000; however, the use of 
‘terrorist’ in all the intermediate and expanded forms would moderate the scope as terrorist 
groups’ never have a large membership as they are, by their nature, clandestine extremists who 
use this method of conflict precisely because of their small size. The limited identifications are 
the most informative as they explain that the enemy is far smaller than the counterinsurgent. 
These descriptions reduce the enemy as far as possible, drastically minimising their scope and in 
                                                 
35 Yonah Alexander and Michael S. Swetnam. Usama Bin Laden's Al-Qaida: Profile of a Terrorist Network (Ardsley, NY: 
Transnational Publishers, 2001); Justin Magouirk, Scott Atran & Marc Sageman, “Connecting Terrorist Networks,” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 1 (2008); Kevin Siqueira and Todd Sandler, “Terrorist Networks, Support, and 
Delegation,” Public Choice 142, no. 1-2 (January 2010).  
36 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Al Qaeda and the Iraq Conflict,” in Al-Qaeda: An Organization to Be Reckoned With, ed. 
Lawrence J. Bevy, (New York: Novinka Books, 2006), 43. 
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so doing giving the descriptions real nuance and informing on the asymmetric nature of the 
enemy in a COIN.37 Clark gave one particularly informative example, where she explained that 
terrorism “is a threat by the small and often faceless against the strong”, not just providing a 
scope identification but connecting it with the use of terrorism.38 
 
AUDIENCE 
These terms would probably match the insurgent audience’s experience, even the most extreme 
supporter would know they were a limited group and the expanded descriptions match the 
nature of the insurgent’s actions in varying locations around the world. Also, they are restrained 
descriptions that help control emotion by identifying the scope in a literal, nuanced and restricted 
manner. All are considered inclusive and would aid the counterinsurgent’s legitimacy and, 
importantly, help reduce the legitimacy of the insurgent’s cause by portraying their capacity in a 
constricted manner, in particular references to a ‘narrow group of fanatical extremists’.  
 
These identifications would be salient for the domestic audience because they have a high degree 
of experiential commensurability.39 They may have varying salience depending on the timing – 
expanded scope identifications would better match domestic experiences after major events. 
They also serve to control emotion as they portray the scope of the enemy in a restrained 
manner. That said, the expanded descriptions do have the potential to exacerbate fear, 
particularly when used like Goff did in 2005 where he connected the scope with capacity, 
“September 11 was a watershed in demonstrating both the willingness and ability of an 
international terrorist group to engage in the mass murder of 3000 civilians to promote their 
cause”.40 These enemy identifications would not reduce confusion and they question the 
competency of the counterinsurgent because if the enemy is small in scope they should be 
relatively easy to beat. These enemy scope identifications do not direct anger at the enemy either. 
As such, they do not deliver mobilisation as they portray, as Clark said, a ‘small and often 
faceless’ enemy, though the expanded identifications have a greater mobilisation potential. They 
would have little impact on the justness of the cause, aside from those that use ‘international’, as 
it fits with Labour’s international narrative.  
 
                                                 
37 FM 3-24. 
38 Clark, “Address to the NZ Apec Business Coalition.” 
39 Assaf Moghadam, Ronit Berger, and Polina Beliakova, “Say Terrorist, Think Insurgent: Labeling and Analyzing 
Contemporary Terrorist Actors,” Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 5 (2014), accessed on 12/09/15, available from 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/374/html 




These scope descriptions do not fit Bush’s original narrative of existential threat and the limited 
descriptions would not appeal as they imply the US was hurt by a ‘narrow group’, countering US 
beliefs of invicibility.41 In turn, this has justification issues by inferring the US response may be 
overkill. The expanded references to an ‘international terrorist network’ would have a better fit 
and appeal. Generally, they are not of mobilisational utility either as they outline the enemy in a 
constricted manner that would not help generate support in remote NZ. For these reasons, they 
would have little positive impact on the alliance.  
 
5.1.5 CONSTRICTED PROBLEM DIAGNOSES 
The counterinsurgent used the manifest units: ‘violence’ and ‘murder’ to diagnose the problem. 
These are, as will be examined below, literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive.  
 
5.1.5 Table 1 – Constricted problem diagnoses, annual totals: 
Year violence murder 
2001 5 1 
2002 5 4 
2003 - 1 
2004 2 - 
2005 1 1 
2006 2 1 
2007 4 2 
2008 - - 
2009 - - 
2010 - - 
2011 1 - 
Total  20 10 
 
5.1.5 Table 2 – Constricted problem diagnoses, context totals: 
Context violence murder 
Event 6  - 
Wider 11  4 
Domestic 3  6 
 
CONTENT 
Neither of these fits the hypothesis of consistent use over time, with both disappearing from use 
by 2008. As with other problem diagnoses, this is probably due to their use during events. 
Likewise, while ‘murder’ was used more to a domestic audience in raw form, neither fits the 
context hypothesis as a ratio count.  
 
                                                 
41 Snow, National Security for a New Era.  
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These terms are considered credible and are used literally. ‘Violence’ refers to the “intentional 
use of physical force or power” while murder is the “killing of another person without 
justification or excuse, especially the crime of killing a person with malice aforethought or with 
recklessness manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life”.42 Critically, they are 
accurate, describing events in a way that contains nuanced information about a number of key 
factors: that they were a carefully planned and targeted use of force that result in death. Neither 
term has loaded meaning beyond their literal definitions. They inform rather than obscure by 
explaining critical aspects relating to the attacks, directing opprobrium whilst retaining human 
agency, and, in turn, constrict the threat through their use of nuanced terminology as can be seen 




These diagnoses would probably match with even the most extreme supporter when describing 
the various attacks. As Rabasa explains, most “Muslims were horrified by the death and 
destruction wreaked by the September 11 attacks but many – particularly in the Arab world – 
found some satisfaction in the idea that America’s nose had been bloodied and the United States 
had felt some of the pain that they believe had been inflicted on Muslims.”44 They also help 
control anger as while they negative they still emphasise human agency, as can be seen in Goff’s 
reference to the “willingness... to engage in the mass murder of 3000 civilians to promote their 
cause”, which clearly infers agency.45 As such, these descriptions aid the justness of the 
counterinsurgent’s cause because they are inclusive, or rather not exclusive. The term ‘murder’ 
also compromises justness of the insurgent’s cause, reducing their actions from war to crime.  
 
These diagnoses would be salient for the domestic audience, a number of articles in NZ papers 
referred to 9/11 as “mass murder”, while the term ‘violence’ would be self-evident.46 At the same 
time they manage fear as they constrict the threat diagnosis and reinforce the human agency by 
explaining they are deliberate – for example, in 2002 Clark referred to “[t]hose responsible for 
                                                 
42 Ministry of Justice, “Definition of Violence” accessed on 23/09/2014, available from 
http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global-publications/s/safer-communities-action-plan-to-reduce-
community-violence-sexual-violence/definition-of-violence; ‘Murder’: http://www.thefreedictionary.com/murder 
43 Phil Goff, “The Role of Defence Forces in Development,” beehive.govt.nz, July 30, 2007, accessed on 05/03/15, 
available from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/node/29949 
44 Rabasa, The Muslim World After 9/11, 50.  
45 Goff, “Defence and NZ Foreign Policy.” 
46 Editorial, “Risk of Hasty Retaliation.”; Julie Middleton, “Mass Murder in the Living Room,” New Zealand Herald, 
September 13, 2001, accessed on 01/10/15, available from Factiva 
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the horrific violence of 11 September”, labelling the enemy ‘responsible’.47 This, in turn, 
describes events in a powerful manner that does not portray the situation as beyond normal 
human parameters. This would address confusion, though the emphasis on human agency could 
call into question the counterinsurgent’s failure to predict or prevent the attacks. However, the 
emphasis on agency does help direct anger, as it infers they made a rational choice to ‘murder’ 
people. Neither diagnosis would mobilise support as they are unexceptional and their constricted 
nature means the domestic audience would not feel threatened. They would help justify the non-
military solutions, but would have a limited capacity to justify more bellicose responses.  
 
While these terms do not fit Bush’s original narrative, he did refer to 9/11 as “mass murder” on 
September 11, 2001, and as ‘violence’ a number of times in the aftermath and their degree of 
opprobrium would appeal.48 The main issue is that they are not of mobilisational utility, as they 
limit the threat. Also, because they reinforce the agency and rationality of the enemy they would 
not aid US justness and could reinforce the suspicion many of the NZ population has towards 
the US regarding the underlying causes of the attacks. As such, they would probably have a 
neutral to positive impact on the alliance.  
 
5.1.6 CONNECTING TERRORISM WITH OTHER PROBLEMS 
The counterinsurgent connected terrorism to ‘other problems’. For example, in 2007 Clark 
connected “terrorism” to other “traditional transnational concerns, like infectious diseases, drug 
trafficking, refugees, environmental degradation, and humanitarian disasters.”49 One key issue 
that terrorism was connected to is WMDs which will be considered separately. As will be 
assessed below, these identifications are literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive, 
with some variation.  
 
5.1.6 Table 1 – Connecting terrorism with other problems, annual totals: 
Year other problems WMDs 
2001 1 6 
2002 6 5 
2003 3 3 
2004 1 4 
                                                 
47 Helen Clark, “PM to Open Symposium on Terrorism,” beehive.govt.nz, May 12, 2002, accessed on 01/10/15, 
available from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/pm-open-symposium-terrorism  
48 Bush, “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation.”; George Bush, “President Bush Addresses the 
Nation,” Washington Post, September 20, 2001, accessed on 01/10/15, available from 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html 
49 Helen Clark, “Address to Asia Society Luncheon,” beehive.govt.nz, March 21, 2007, accessed on 05/06/14, available 
from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/address-asia-society-luncheon; Bush, “President Declares ‘Freedom at 
War with Fear’.” 
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2005 2 5 
2006 8 4 
2007 3 4 
2008 1 - 
2009 - - 
2010 - - 
2011 2 2 
Total  27 33 
 
5.1.6 Table 2 – Connecting terrorism with other problems, context totals: 
Context other problems WMDs 
Event 4 3 
Wider 7 11 
Domestic 16 19 
 
CONTENT 
The both sets of diagnoses were made fairly consistently in raw count, though while ‘other 
problems’ was also consistent as a ratio count, the ‘WMD’ identification was more sporadic, with 
several peaks and troughs. While the ‘other problems’ and WMD diagnoses fit the context 
hypotheses, both in raw and ratio form, being used more in domestic than wider contexts. One 
area of interest is the drop for ‘WMDs’ in 2003 – the same year the allied counterinsurgent often 
made this connection – it was the lowest raw and ratio count for the first seven years. 
 
The linking of terrorism with other literally referenced problems is credible as terrorism does not 
exist in a vacuum but is one of the many often interrelated issues that a counterinsurgent faces. It 
has long been acknowledged that states face a diverse array of national security threats from 
environmental to economic to military.50 Even the most extreme of the connections, with 
WMDs, is not discreditable even though Al Qaeda’s “attempts [to acquire WMDs] failed”.51 
These connections are accurate as they place terrorism in context, constricting its threat, with the 
best showing how terrorism and the other problems are connected, such as Goff’s 2002 
statement about “transnational issues such as drugs, arms trafficking, money-laundering, people 
smuggling, which have gained prominence as elements of the support structure for transnational 
criminal activity and terrorism”.52 These connections offer a nuanced understanding of how 
terrorism connects to the wider world and also constricts by contextualising and humanising it. It 
also helps the counterinsurgent offer accurate blame attributions and solutions that encompass a 
                                                 
50 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner Pub, 1998). 
51 Friedman, “Managing Fear,” 82. 
52 Goff, Address to No 43 Staff Course on Foreign Affairs and Trade.” 
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range of related problems. One issue with accuracy is how the counterinsurgent connects 
terrorism with WMDs, which, while credible lacks nuance and constriction as the 
counterinsurgent never explains how difficult this would be or how unlikely this eventuality is. 53 
It is also always framed in a way that presumes terrorists would immediately use the WMDs 
rather than take advantage of their powerful deterrent capacity, inferring they are irrational.54 
This can be seen in Goff’s 2001 statement that“[t]hose responsible for it foreshadow a 
willingness to use biological, chemical and nuclear weapons of mass destruction.”55 Not only is 
identifying a number of other concerns facing the state and the world credible and accurate, but 
it is also informative as often these other security issues have either a direct or indirect 
connection with terrorism and many of the issues the counterinsurgent lists, such as drug, gun 
and people smuggling, poverty, organised crime, over-population and climate change.56 
 
AUDIENCE 
These diagnoses would match the insurgent support population’s experience as these other 
problems are ones that they perceive as being troubling (as will be explored in the blame 
section). In turn, this would help to control the anger as they do not alienate but rather offers a 
problem diagnoses that makes terrorism just one problem among many, humanising it and 
making these diagnoses inclusive. The connection between terrorism and WMDs, however, 
could alienate as it portrays the insurgent as an actor who would irrationally drop a nuclear bomb 
rather than rationally use it for deterrence. While the other connections help justify the 
counterinsurgent’s cause, the WMD connection is more problematic because it connects with 
the rational-irrational binary. In fact, this identification could legitimise the enemy as they imply 
they have the capacity and skill to make and use WMD. Nuclear weapons are an almost 
unrivalled “currency of power” in international relations; they confer upon those entities that 
possess them a degree of influence that overshadows every other weapon.57 Only a few states 
possess them and “[f]or some, nuclear weapons clearly are a status symbol, an indicator or 
attribute of major power.”58 
                                                 
53 Mueller, “Harbinger Or Aberration?”..  
54 Robert Ayson, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33, 
no. 7 (2010): 577.  
55 Goff, Goff statement to UN General Assembly.” 
56 Kimberley L. Thachuk, Transnational Threats: Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs, and Human Life (Westport, 
Conn: Praeger Security International, 2007); Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost, The Global Century: Globalization 
and National Security (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2001). 
57 Anne Harrington de Santana, “Nuclear Weapons as the Currency of Power: Deconstructing the Fetishism of 
Force,” Nonproliferation Review 16, no. 3 (2009): 325.  
58 Andrew L. Ross, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons in International Politics: A Strategic Perspective,” Foreign Policy 





Polls of the domestic audience have shown that these types of problems are all important, 
suggesting these identifications would appeal to NZ values.59 While listing other threats to 
national security may not seem like a good method of controlling fear, because it contextualises 
and humanises the threat it helps limit fear as they make terrorist attacks more ordinary and 
interconnected, as can be seen in Goff’s above 2002 statement where he connects terrorism with 
the relatively banal ‘drugs, arms trafficking, money-laundering, people smuggling and criminal 
activity’. This would also help address confusion and allay concern, though it does not direct 
anger. The WMD connection could, however, increase fear, though it does help make the 
counterinsurgent appear competent and direct anger. Also, the regular connections could help 
justify the cause because it provides articulator credibility, showing that the counterinsurgent is 
able to see the ‘big picture’ rather than just narrowly focusing on terrorism, and it would also 
legitimise the more diverse solutions proposed as it helps reinforces the broad spectrum solution 
required. While the ‘other problems’ identification is unlikely to mobilise support, the ‘WMD’ 
identification would, as it exaggerates the threat.  
 
Aside from the ‘WMD’ identifications, these diagnoses are unlikely to be salient for the allied 
actor as they contextualises and humanises the threat, which does not fit Bush’s original 
narrative. There are also justness issues as these identifications create the same causal connection 
between the enemy and the victim that infers there may be grievances underlying the attacks. 
With respect to the ‘WMD’ identifications, while the drop is only minor, it is interesting that 
2003 is the lowest frequency of usage in the first seven years, right when the US was making this 
connection the most, which suggests that while this identification may appeal in the abstract, 
NZ’s seeming strategic reduction in its use when the US needed it the most would not appeal to 
the allied actor. In abstract, then, the ‘WMD’ identification would help the alliance as it mobilise 
NZ support and justifies the US cause, while the ‘other problems’ identification achieves neither 
and would not have a positive impact on the alliance.   
 
5.1.7 WIDER THREAT ENVIRONMENT  
The counterinsurgent described the wider threat environment a number of times, specifically 
referring to it as a ‘changed or ‘complex’ security environment. The first set refers to changing 
periods of international relations, using phrases like ‘post-Cold War’, explaining how 9/11 
‘changed’ the security environment, with the main difference between this and the ‘new 
                                                 
59 Headley and Reitzig, “Does Foreign Policy Represent the Views of the Public?” 79.  
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generation’ reactive frame being that there is no implication 9/11 was the first of many attacks. 
The ‘complex’ identification is a subset of the ‘changed security’ and involves any descriptions of 
the this ‘changed’ environment being ‘complex, the figures are mutually exclusive. These 
identifications, as will be examined below, are literal, nuanced, restrained and inclusive, with 
some variation.  
 
5.1.7 Table 1 – Wider security environment, annual totals: 
Year changed  complex 
2001 - - 
2002 4 - 
2003 - - 
2004 4 1 
2005 - 1 
2006 7 8 
2007 8 1 
2008 1 1 
2009 4 - 
2010 - - 
2011 2 - 
Total  30 12 
 
5.1.7 Table2 – Wider security environment, context totals: 
Context changed  complex 
Event - - 
Wider 9 2 
Domestic 21 10 
 
CONTENT 
Neither of these wider security diagnoses were used with any consistency over the period and 
both spiked in 2006, and 2007 for ‘changed’ in raw and ratio counts. These spikes occurred 
during the rapprochement between NZ and the US when the former was trying to convince the 
latter, and their own population, of the value of this renewed relationship and this probably 
explains why NZ was used these so frequently in that year. They do both fit the hypothesis that 
the deliberative would be used more to a domestic than wider audience in raw and ratio 
measures, which suggests they were more interested in convincing their own population than the 
US.  
 
These are all credible as they are literal representations of the wider threat environment, 
identifying that the security environment has changed and that it is complex. More importantly, 
they are accurate and informative as they deliver nuanced detail, as can be seen in Peters’ 2006 
210 
 
statement regarding the “complex set of overlapping international, trans-national and sub-
national challenges”, which helps provide contextualised nuance in a constricted manner.60 While 
references to the ‘changed’ and ‘complex’ security environment are not constrictive, they are 
informative as they indicate areas of instability in the international system and label or identify a 
new phase in international relations and how the events of 9/11 impacted the wider security 
environment and how it connects with the ‘post-Cold War’ period, both of which are critical 
pieces of data for audiences to understand not just the threat but solutions also.  
 
AUDIENCE 
These diagnoses would match the insurgent support population’s experience, especially 
references to the changing security environment, which many would be experiencing first hand. 
Likewise, they would help to control emotion, particularly the connections between a ‘post-Cold 
War’ world and a ‘changed’ security environment as they contextualise the threat, humanising it. 
However, it could be argued that reference to 9/11’s impact on the security environment could 
help legitimacy the enemy as a significant actor.  
 
The diagnoses of a ‘complex new security environment’ in the post-Cold War world would 
match the domestic audience’s experience of the changing world after 9/11. These diagnoses 
also help limit fear as they offer a causal understanding of the wider security environment, which 
in turn would help reduce the confusion. Even simple statements, such as Goff’s 2007 one that 
the “security outlook for the world has changed fundamentally in the post-9/11 era” help reduce 
confusion.61 However, while this would also help reduce the concern regarding the 
counterinsurgent’s capacity. None of these diagnoses direct anger at the enemy as they make it 
more of a systemic rather than personalised issue. Thus, while they help justify action over the 
long-term, especially with regard to many of the deliberative solutions, they do not have a high 
mobilisation potential as they do not portray the threat in an imminent or existential manner. 
 
These identifications do not fit the US narrative as they ground it in history; however, they 
would appeal to a degree as they reinforce the belief within the US that 9/11 was era-defining 
event, which suggests a mixed salience. This in turn means that they would help justify the US 
cause as this could be seen as the defining reality of the ‘post 9/11’ world. Thus, while they do 
                                                 
60 Winston Peters, “Security Policy Responses to a Challenging World,” beehive.govt.nz , December 13, 2006, accessed 
on 12/03/2014, available from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/security-policy-responses-challenging-world 
61 Phil Goff, “Constructive Discussions at Pentagon and National Security Council,” beehive.govt.nz , May 12 2007, 
accessed on 12/03/2014, available from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/node/29304 
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not mobilise the domestic population, because they aid the US cause they would provide a 
positive impact on the alliance.  
 
 
5.1.8 PROBLEM/ENEMY CONCLUSION 
The problem diagnoses and enemy identification usage frequencies and ratio counts will now be 
examined, as well as the context usages.  
 
5.1.8 Table 1 – Problem/Enemy DCF annual frequency totals and ratio counts: 
Year Problem/Enemy  Ratio 
2001 235 2.444 
2002 291 1.118 
2003 97 0.348 
2004 90 0.688 
2005 75 0.636 
2006 114 0.396 
2007 117 0.509 
2008 22 0.696 
2009 49 0.341 
2010 8 0.135 
2011 54 0.396 
Total  1152 - 
 
The hypothesis that DCFs would be used consistently during the period is not borne out by the 
raw annual totals, which show 2002 to be the year they were used most frequently. This can be 

























The same is true with the ratio, though only 2001 (2.444) stands out as a real aberration and the 
next ten years are relatively flat, with less variation between all of those years than between 2001 




The hypothesis that DCFs would be more frequent in a domestic than wider context by the data 
for problem diagnoses and enemy identifications. 
 
5.1.8 Table 2 – Problem/Enemy DCF context frequency totals and ratio counts: 
Context Frequency  Ratio 
Event 191 1.430 
Wider 330 0.532 
Domestic 631 0.615 
Total  1152 - 
 
The raw frequencies fit with this hypothesis, showing that domestic uses accounted for 55% of 




















This hypothesis was also supported by the ratio counts, where the domestic audience uses still 










































This section will examine how the counterinsurgent attributed blame using DCFs. These 
attributions can be either direct or indirect, meaning they either identify aspects that specifically 
motivated the enemy or they describe background context that facilitated in some way. The 
deliberative narrative had far more blame attributions and they were more diverse in scope than 
those of the reactive. Again, the main criteria for inclusion here is that the framing task includes 
the insurgent support audience, with that inclusivity coming largely from the other four qualities 
of the deliberative narrative – literal, nuanced, constricted and restrained. 
 
5.2.1 GRIEVANCES AND ANGER  
A common set of deliberative blame identifications referenced grievances, and anger generated 
by these grievances. ‘Grievances’ are the manifest units: ‘poverty’, ‘governance’, ‘ethnic tension’, 
‘inequality’, ‘corruption’, ‘repression’ and ‘injustice’. To be included as a blame factor, the 
grievances must be connected to the problem of terrorism, though this can be an indirect 
inference rather than a direct connection. The latent unit of ‘anger’ covers any negative emotions 
generated by grievances, as contrasted with the ‘irrational’ anger of the reactive narrative. As will 
be examined, these are considered inclusive, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive.  
 
5.2.1 Table 1 – Grievance and anger, annual totals: 
Year grievance anger 
2001 4 1 
2002 24 8 
2003 1 - 
2004 7 1 
2005 23 1 
2006 28 - 
2007 35 - 
2008 1 - 
2009 4 - 
2010 - - 
2011 - - 
Total  127 11 
 
5.2.1 Table 2 – Grievance and anger, context totals: 
Context grievance anger 
Event 0 0 
Wider 28 0 





Neither was used that consistently as a raw or ratio count. Grievances spike in 2002, 2005, 2006 
and 2007 in both counts, while anger peaked in 2002. The 2002 spike could be explained coming 
from the counterinsurgent’s need to legitimise deployment while the spike during the 
rapprochement is probably related to NZ’s drive to be seen as a competent counterinsurgent. 
Both fit the context hypothesis in both counts, with anger only given to a domestic audience. 
Also of interest here is the almost total lack of usage by the National Party, who account for 3% 
of uses when their total word count percentage is 19%.  
 
All of these grievances and resulting anger were given using literal descriptions and are credible, 
especially when the ‘grievances’ are given together as they often were because they are root 
causes, or preconditions, for terrorism rather than direct, trigger causes. Anger is also credible as 
bin Laden referred to the humiliation of the Islamic world as a motivation.62 These 
identifications offer literal identifications of genuine underlying grievances that can be connected 
to a wide range of resulting social ills that include but are not limited to terrorism. Likewise, 
referring to ‘anger’ as an outcome of grievances like poverty and corruption is self-evident as 
reacting to these problems in this manner is part of human nature. These attributions are also 
accurate as they offer a nuanced understanding of the underlying blame factors. Specifically 
listing the grievances that motivate insurgents provides diverse underlying economic, political, 
legal and social factors, which are all important to providing an overall understanding of how 
and why insurgencies emerge. Connecting these to anger is also accurate as it helps to make the 
blame identification more understandable as the grievances are shown as generating a negative 
emotion which leads to the insurgency. They are also nuanced and constricted as they describe 
the underlying blame factors in a humanising manner, describing genuine grievances that 
virtually anybody could empathise with and then connecting them with a resulting anger, 
humanising the causational realties underlying the conflict. These are also informative as they are 
commonly referenced underlying attributions in the COIN and conflict literature, the 
‘grievances’ listed by the counterinsurgent are the same as those listed in the literature.63 
 
AUDIENCE 
                                                 
62 Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc. Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden (New York: The Free Press, 2001), 17-22. 
63 FM 3-24; Gurr, Why Men Rebel; Ted Robert Gurr, “Why Men Rebel Redux: How Valid are its Arguments 40 years 
On?” E-International Relations, November 17, 2011, accessed on 15/01/15, available from http://www.e-
ir.info/2011/11/17/why-men-rebel-redux-how-valid-are-its-arguments-40-years-on/; Tim Krieger and Daniel 
Meierrieks, “What Causes Terrorism?” Public Choice 147, no. 1/2 (2011): 10; Kilcullen, “Countering Global 
Insurgency,” 601; Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 75; Matthew Simpson, “Terrorism and Corruption,” International Journal 
of Sociology 44, no. 2 (07/2014): 100. 
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Esposito and Mogahed’s 2007 review of Gallup Poll data of 10 predominantly Muslim countries 
found that one of the main causes of support for terrorism were issues of inequality and injustice 
between Muslims and the West, suggesting these attributions would be salient for the insurgent 
audience.64 Likewise, Marsalla argues that global economic inequalities are an important 
grievance to Muslims.65 Also, governance issues also appear to be important, particularly for the 
more extreme supporters, with Gallup finding that “50 percent of the politically radicalized feel 
more strongly that their progress will be helped by ‘moving toward governmental democracy’.”66 
Pew also found that predominantly Muslim countries identified government corruption as a 
major issue in their lagging development.67 With regard to anger, Gallup found that alienation is a 
big issue amongst Muslim populations.68 Because these blame identifications accurately match 
the insurgent support population experiences while humanising the situation, they avoid 
provoking negative emotions. As such, these attributions are inclusive and would help justify the 
counterinsurgent’s cause, though they do also reinforce al Qaeda’s own narrative, suggesting they 
may positively impact the insurgent’s legitimacy as well.69  
 
These would appeal to New Zealanders as fairness and equality are key component of the 
national character, so any blame that mentions injustice, inequality, corruption and other related 
concepts is salient.70 Because they humanise the situation they also limit any fear and help reduce 
confusion. However, as these attributions would not reduce concern as they describe a range of 
long-term issues that have been known for decades, implying that the counterinsurgent should 
have worked harder to prevent and predict the anger from these grievances. Also, these 
attributions do not direct anger because they humanise the underlying situation. Overall, these 
attributions would not deliver mobilisation, though they do have potentially positive impacts on 
the long-term justness of the counterinsurgent’s deliberative solutions, particularly those that are 
designed to remedy these ‘grievances’. 
 
These would not be salient for the allied actor because they contradict Bush’s original narrative 
that the enemy ‘hates their freedoms’. While the counterinsurgent does not make it explicit, some 
                                                 
64 Esposito and Mogahed, “Battle for Muslims’ Hearts and Minds: The Road Not (Yet) Taken,” 38-40.  
65 Anthony J. Marsella, “Reflections on International Terrorism: Issues, Concepts, and Directions,” in Understanding 
Terrorism: Psychosocial Roots, Consequences, and Interventions, ed. Fathali, Moghaddam, and Anthony J. Marsella 
(Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2004), 11–47. 
66 Esposito and Mogahed, “Battle for Muslims’ Hearts and Minds: The Road Not (Yet) Taken,” 37.  
67 Pew Research, “Muslim-Western Tensions Persist”. 
68 Esposito and Mogahed, “Battle for Muslims’ Hearts and Minds: The Road Not (Yet) Taken,” 39.  
69 Schmid, Al-Qaeda’s “Single Narrative” and Attempts to Develop Counter Narratives. 
70 Sibley et al., “Pluralistic and Monocultural Facets of New Zealand National Character and Identity,”, 21; Fischer, 
Fairness and Freedom.  
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in the NZ audience would probably connect certain grievances, particularly injustice, poverty and 
inequality with US global political and economic domination, as occurred in a number of articles 
by NZ journalists.71 The identification of these grievances and the resulting rational anger also 
negatively impact the justness of the US cause as it was premised on irrational anger, which 
means these attributions would not have a positive impact on the alliance.  
 
5.2.2 IDEOLOGY AND RELIGION 
The counterinsurgent used a number of ideological and religious terms, or terms that could 
imply religious aspects including intensity or degree of belief, specifically the manifest units 
‘extremist’, ‘fanatic’, ‘radical’, ‘zealot’ and ‘Islamic fundamentalist’, referred to as the ‘extremist’ 
terms from here on. This section will examine these, showing that they are literal, nuanced, 
constricted, restrained and inclusive.  
 













Total  29 
 






                                                 
71 Dennis Small, “Globalisation, Capitalism And Crisis: Contesting The New Social Darwinism,” Converge, accessed 
on 12/01/16, available from http://www.converge.org.nz/watchdog/22/06.htm; Dennis Small, “Globalisation into 
Global War? Terrorism and the Capitalist State,” Converge, accessed on 12/01/16, available from 
http://www.converge.org.nz/watchdog/98/05.htm; Manuel Valenzuela, “George W. Bush And The Stealing Of 
America,” Scoop, January 25, 2004, accessed on 12/01/16, available from 
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0401/S00113/george-w-bush-and-the-stealing-of-america.htm; Martyn 
Bradbury, “Post Paris – How Do We Fight Terrorism?” The Daily Blog, November 17, 2015, accessed on 12/01/16, 




None of these attributions were used consistently over the period as raw or ration count. The 
reason for this inconsistency was probably due to their use in the wake of attacks, causing them 
to cluster in those years. However, the extremist terms were given more to a domestic audience 
than wider one, as both raw and ration counts.  
 
The extremist terms are credible as they refer to the intensity of belief, the degree to which their 
beliefs conform to the mainstream or the willingness to act for their belief, and statements 
regarding al Qaeda’s ‘fringe’ beliefs and willingness to act on these beliefs are highly creditable.72 
None of them define the doctrinal correctness of the enemy’s beliefs, which also delivers 
articulator credibility.73 While the these identifications are credible, ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ lacks 
accuracy, as not all fundamentalists are violent. Aside from this, the extremist terms have a 
degree of nuance and constriction, they inform that the enemy is outside the mainstream in their 
beliefs and that they are willing to act on them, all of which is critical information regarding 
ideology and religious belief and particularly connecting it to blame – these terms help explain 
why the enemy have used terrorism as a method of violence.  
 
AUDIENCE 
As noted, most Muslims have a relatively similar view on grievances, but differ on how to act on 
these and this is clearly related to the extremist terms. These terms contextualise how ‘fringe’ 
terrorist actions are, meaning the more extreme supporter may find these terms unappealing 
though they may appeal to the less extreme. These attributions are relatively unemotive, 
particularly for pronouncements that make strong statements about people’s faith and beliefs, 
meaning they would be inclusive for the less extreme. One of the main outcomes of these 
attributions is that they reduce the scope of the enemy, portraying them in a limited manner, 
implying that the insurgent is a ‘fringe’ group with limited wider support and, thus, delegitimising 
them.  
 
Use of the extremist terms would be salient for most New Zealanders as killing oneself and 
others for a cause would be far outside their own beliefs and experiences and these terms capture 
this accurately. That said, issues of religiosity would not be salient as in general New Zealanders 
                                                 
72 ‘Extremist’: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/extremist; ‘Fanatic’: http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/fanatic ; ‘Radical’: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/radical ;‘Zealot’ : 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/zealot: ‘Fundamentalism’: http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/fundamentalism. 
73 Betz, “The Virtual Dimension of Contemporary Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” 511. 
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lack knowledge about Islam and this debate is beyond most people’s experience.74 These 
attributions constrict the scope of the ideology as they imply there is a limited number of 
possible adherents so they control fear, as can be seen in Goff’s 2004 statement that “[w]e must 
not allow a minority of extremists to turn religious differences into a clash of civilisations”.75 
They also help reduce confusion as they explain why the enemy acted in the way that they did. 
However, because they describe the enemy in such a limited manner, they would not help with 
concern about the counterinsurgent’s capacity, though they do help direct anger. In general, they 
provide a degree of mobilisation, though because they portray the enemy is a limit way this 
would not be very substantial. They would help justify the deliberative solutions as this blame 
requires solving. 
 
The extremist terms do not fit Bush’s original narrative as they reduce the scope of the blame to 
a small ‘fringe’ group rather than as an ‘existential threat’. That said, Bush did use similar 
language from the outset, though even then he mixed narratives. On September 20, 2001, he 
explained that the insurgents practice a “fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected 
by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics; a fringe movement that perverts the 
peaceful teachings of Islam.”76 Despite this, as these terms do not justify the US cause and do 
not mobilise the domestic population, they are not seen as aiding the alliance.  
 
5.2.3 FAILED STATES  
The counterinsurgent also blamed ‘failed states’ for creating ‘havens’ for terrorist groups. This 
blame attribution must use the terms ‘failed’, ‘failure’, ‘weak’, ‘fragile’ or ‘haven’ to refer to states, 
connecting this to terrorism, as Clark did in her 2004 statement that as “a failed state 
Afghanistan had become a haven for, and source of, extremism”, which counts as 2 uses for 
‘failed state’ and ‘haven’.77 These blame identifications, as will be examined below, are literal, 
nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive.  
 
5.2.3 Table 1 – Failed states, annual totals: 
Year failed states 
2001 2 
2002 3 
                                                 
74 Zain Ali quoted in Philip Matthews, “Is New Zealand Discriminating Against Muslims?” stuff.co.nz, December 6, 
2014, accessed on 23/03/15, available from http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/63881273/is-new-zealand-
discriminating-against-muslims  
75 Goff, “Eminent New Zealanders to Attend Inter-Faith Meeting.” 
76 Bush, “President Bush Addresses the Nation.” 
77 Helen Clark, “Address to the NZ Institute of International Affairs,” beehive.govt.nz , June 23, 2004, accessed on 












Total  41 
 
5.2.3 Table 2 – Failed states, context totals: 






This blame attribution was used quite consistently, both in raw and ratio count. As a ratio count, 
though, there was a spike in 2008 but, excluding this, the overall trend was for consistent usage. 
The context usage is between the ratio and the DCF, though there were no uses during an event. 
One interesting aspect is that National accounted for 35% of uses of the term ‘haven’ when their 
word count is only 19% of the total. One point of interest is that the more technocratic ‘failed 
state’ formulations were used exclusively by Labour, while National showed a predilection for 
the ‘haven’ phrasing, accounting for 11 of the 19 uses (58%) when their word count was only 
19% of the total.  
 
While there has been much academic debate about whether ‘failed states’ facilitate terrorism, this 
blame is impossible to discredit as it is generally depends on semantics. However, there is issue 
with this description’s specific authenticity: the governance of the Taleban was the most 
coherent and effective the country had had in decades, including the post-invasion era of the 
period covered in this thesis.78 As Atkins writes, “Omar had his Islamist Taliban regime firmly in 
control of most of Afghanistan”.79 That said, it could be argued much of this stability was due to 
al Qaeda support. The identification is particularly troubling as it serves as a component of the 
invasion and occupation justification, a process that itself has failed to create a functioning 
                                                 
78 See Fergusson, Taliban, 74-89, and Stephen E. Atkins, The 9/11 Encyclopedia. 2 2 (Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-CLIO, 
2011), 400, for a discussion on Afghanistan under the Taleban. See Teresa de los Reyes and Vazquez del Pino, 
“Afghanistan: The ‘Failed State’ as Status Quo?” European View 10 (2011), for discussion on Afghanistan as a failed 
state following the invasion. 
79 Atkins, The 9/11 Encyclopedia. 2 2, 400.  
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state.80 These attributions lack accuracy as they obscures the true relationship between al Qaeda 
and the Taleban, instead honing in on one particular component.81 They are “vague and 
imprecise, selectively and politically applied, founded on a number of highly contested 
assumptions and narratives, and functions in part to obscure state sources of terror”.82 They 
exaggerate the geopolitical component and obscures the politico-social aspect of the connection 
between states and terrorists.83 Bin Laden swore an oath to help the Taleban fight the Northern 
Alliance in the last stand out region, in return the Taleban let al Qaeda build training camps in 
Afghanistan.84 The reason that al Qaeda was in Afghanistan was not because it was a failed state 
but rather because of an allegiance made between them and the Taleban.  
 
AUDIENCE 
These attributions would have a mixed salience for the insurgent audience. In one sense they 
insinuate that certain non-Western areas are “‘breeding grounds’ of terrorism”, which would not 
appeal to their beliefs as they reinforce the Orientalist narrative that these areas are inherently 
‘bad’.85 However, many may have direct experience of living in a ‘failed state’ and this 
identification may carry some salience, particularly for the less extreme supporter who would not 
necessarily blame everything on the West. Depending on salience, they attributions could 
provoke anger by implying the states ‘failed’ because they are non-Western or they could be 
perceived as an accurate identification that matches the supporters’ own experience. While the 
former interpretation may provoke anger, the latter would help control it. These attributions are, 
if not inclusive then, not exclusive and would have a relatively neutral impact on justness and 
legitimacy.  
These attributions would be salient for the domestic audience, matching their experience and 
fitting the general international security narrative as well, though it would have probably 
increased in salience over the course of the ICAT as their exposure to the narrative grew. These 
attributions may provoke some fear as they imply that all ‘failed states’ are hothouses for 
                                                 
80 Aurelie Campana and Benjamin Ducol, “Rethinking Terrorist Safe Havens: Beyond a State-Centric Approach,” 
Civil Wars. 13.4 (2011): 398 
81 Campana and Ducol, “Rethinking Terrorist Safe Havens,” 396-397. 
82 Richard Jackson, The State and Terrorist Sanctuaries: A Critical Analysis, paper prepared for the British International 
Studies Association (BISA) Annual Conference, 18-20 December, 2006, University of Cork, Ireland, 2, accessed on 
12/04/2014, available from http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/1948/BISA-Paper-2006-
Jackson-Final.pdf?sequence=1  
83 Campana and Ducol“Rethinking Terrorist Safe Havens,”. 
84 Atkins, The 9/11 Encyclopedia. 2 2, 400-401; Vahid Brown, “The Facade of Allegiance: Bin Ladin’s Dubious Pledge 
to Mullah Omar,” CTC Sentinel, January 13, 2010, accessed on 04/04/2014, available from 
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-facade-of-allegiance-bin-ladin%E2%80%99s-dubious-pledge-to-mullah-omar  
85 Jackson, The State and Terrorist Sanctuaries, 6.  
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terrorism, though this is not serious as ‘failed states’ are not that common. They do reduce 
confusion by providing an easily parsed and clear cut connection, as can be seen in Goff’s 
linkage that Afghanistan was “a failed state in which terrorists such as Al Qaeda could thrive”.86 
However, they do not allay concerns as if the connection was as obvious as this blame makes out 
then the counterinsurgent should have predicted and prevented the attacks. These attributions 
do not direct anger, as they blame the abstract concept of governance. Overall, then, they would 
have limited mobilisation potential, but critically they helps with the long term justification of the 
response, particularly of any governance-related solutions. 
In his second speech on the 11th of September, Bush said the “US Government will make no 
distinction between the terrorists who extreme the acts and those who harbor them” and 
referred to “nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism” on the 20th.87 This suggests these 
attributions would be salient as they fit Bush’s original narrative. These threat diagnoses also fit 
with their focus on ‘nation-building’ in Afghanistan.88 As Hager argues, Bush made the 
‘harbouring’ bridge so early on because of the administration’s underlying and pre-existing goals 
of invading both Afghanistan and Iraq.89 Thus, these attributions help justify the US cause to the 
NZ audience, particularly the Afghan Invasion, meaning they would have a positive impact on 
the alliance.  
 
5.2.4 ISRAEL AND PALESTINE 
The Israel-Palestine conflict was referenced as an underlying blame factor that had played a part 
in motivating the insurgency by the counterinsurgent. This latent unit must refer to both actors, 
their conflict and its influence on terrorism or international security in general, such as in Goff’s 
2002 attribution that “failure to resolve differences between Israeli and Palestinian people in the 
Middle East continues to be a catalyst for recruitment into terrorism”.90 As will be explored 
below, this is literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive.  
 
5.2.4 Table 1 – Israel and Palestine, annual totals: 
Year Israel/Palestine 
2001 2 
                                                 
86 Phil Goff, “Trade, Defence and Disarmament Policy Over The Next Five Years,” beehive.govt.nz , February 22, 
2006, accessed on 12/03/2014, available from http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/trade-defence-and-
disarmament-policy-over-next-five-years 
87 Bush, “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation.”; Bush, “President Declares ‘Freedom at War 
with Fear’.” 
88 Paul Miller, “Bush on Nation Building and Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy, November 17, 2010, accessed on 
09/09/13, available from http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/11/17/bush-on-nation-building-and-afghanistan/  
89 Hager, Other People’s Wars, 22.  













Total  14 
 







This attribution was not used with a great degree of consistency, measured in either raw or ratio 
count. In both it spiked in 2002 and then disappeared by 2006. It does not match the hypothesis 
regarding context either, used equally to domestic and wider audiences as a raw form and more 
to a wider audience as a ratio form. The reason for both of these issues is probably explained by 
the 4 uses by NZ to oppose the Iraq Invasion.  
 
This blame identification is given literally by the counterinsurgent, both actors are named and the 
ongoing conflict between the two is referenced as one blame factor and is considered a very 
credible blame identification as the Israel-Palestine conflict is one of the most prominent and 
long-lasting grievances of the Islamic world and was a key component of bin Laden’s 1998 
fatwa.91 Even if, as some contend, this was a symbolic rather than specific motivation, its 
credibility is still sound as it forms a substantial component of bin Laden’s rhetoric regarding al 
Qaeda’s grievances.92 Furthermore, the Israel/Palestine situation is often referenced as one of the 
drivers of terrorism beyond al Qaeda.93 It, as Lebovic writes, “serves as a touchstone in a broader 
                                                 
91 Osama bin Laden, “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” FAS. February 28, 1998, accessed on 01/12/14, available 
from http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm 
92 Barak Mendelsohn, “Al-Qaeda's Palestinian Problem,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 51, no. 4 (2009): 73-74.  
93 Robert T. Imre, Brian Mooney, and Benjamin Clarke, Responding to Terrorism: Political, Philosophical and Legal 
Perspectives (Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2008), 31; Alfred G. Gerteiny, The Terrorist Conjunction: The 
United States, the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, and Al-Qa ̄'ida (Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International, 2007), xvii-
xviii; James H. Lebovic, Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US National Security Policy After 9/11 (London: 
Routledge, 2006), 115.  
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pan-Arab and/or pan-Islamic struggle.”94 This attribution is also accurate and informative as it 
connects the current events to a major source of tension in international politics, whilst never 
only blaming this conflict or directly connecting them. Goff’s use of the term ‘catalyst’ embodies 
this, and all of the identifications make similar linkages. This provides a fidelity of understanding, 
as the counterinsurgent never totally blames the Israel-Palestine conflict but indicates that this is 
one of many causes that motivate the enemy. Not only does this provide nuance, but it also 
constricts the scope of the threat as it humanises the enemy by explaining that they have been 
impacted by this well known crisis.  
 
AUDIENCE 
These attributions would probably be salient for the majority of the insurgent support 
population. A number of polls show most people in predominantly Muslim countries have 
strong views of Israel and Palestine and do not believe there can be peaceful Israeli-Palestinian 
coexistence.95 Another poll of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates states found that “larger majorities, 
in each country, disagree with the notion that ‘Arab countries should pay more attention to their 
own internal issues than to the Palestinians.”96 The proportions who reject that assertion range 
from 60 percent of Kuwaitis, to 63 percent of Emiratis, to 65 percent of Saudis’.97 These polls 
suggest that mention of the Israel/Palestine problem as a cause that motivated al Qaeda would 
be salient for most of the insurgent support population. Because of this, and because the 
counterinsurgent always referred to it as one of many underlying factors, these identifications 
help control emotion and, as they display an understanding of how the Israel-Palestine conflict 
generates negative emotions, are inclusive as well, justifying the counterinsurgent cause. 
 
This attribution would probably match New Zealanders’ experiences as well because of its 
position as one of the most well known crises in international relations and resultant ongoing 
ubiquity in the media. A report by an undoubtedly biased interest group noted that there were 
over 300 items of news and opinion regarding Israel-Palestine in a 13 month period to 
                                                 
94 Lebovic, Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States, 115.  
95 Pew Research Center, “Despite Their Wide Differences, Many Israelis and Palestinians Want Bigger Role for 
Obama in Resolving Conflict,” Pew Research Center, May 9, 2013, accessed on 14/11/14, available from 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/09/despite-their-wide-differences-many-israelis-and-palestinians-want-bigger-
role-for-obama-in-resolving-conflict/ 
96 David Pollock, “Jordanian Public Keen on Hamas, But Not ISIS or the Muslim Brotherhood,” Washington Institute, 
October 30, 2014, accessed on 14/11/14, available from http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/jordanian-public-keen-on-hamas-but-not-isis-or-the-muslim-brotherhood 
97 David Pollock, “New Poll Shows Majority of Saudis, Kuwaitis, Emiratis Reject ISIS, Back Two-State Solution 





December 2010.98 Including the above organisation, there are six interest groups active in NZ on 
the topic, some that have been operating for over 30 years.99 This blame attribution controls fear 
as it humanises the enemy and it also helps to reduce the confusion as it explains why the enemy 
are conducting an insurgency. It does not reduce concern regarding the counterinsurgent’s 
capability, however, as the conflict is prominent and long-running, suggesting the 
counterinsurgent should have been able to predict the problems. It does not direct anger, either, 
as by humanising the blame it makes it more understandable. Thus, there are limited mobilisation 
benefits from this, though it may help justify certain solutions targeting this particular conflict.  
 
This attribution would probably not be salient for the US, largely as it does not fit the Bush’s 
original narrative because it humanises the underlying causes of the conflict and, in turn, directs 
attention at a conflict that the US have had a long and problematic involvement with. Another 
issue is that several of the uses were specifically targeted at arguing against the US-led invasion of 
Iraq, with NZ suggesting that rather than Iraq the US and allies should be trying to remedy 
issues that they believed actually led to terrorism. Almost third of all the uses were openly critical 
of US action, meaning they question the justness of the allied cause and, thus, would be unlikely 
to have a positive impact on the alliance.  
 
5.2.5 BLAME/IDEOLOGY CONCLUSION 
This section will examine the relevant hypothesis of the DCF for the blame and ideology 
identifications.  
 
5.2.6 Table 1 – Blame/Ideology annual frequency totals and ratio counts: 
Year Problem/Enemy  Ratio 
2001 17 0.179 
2002 45 0.173 
2003 9 0.032 
2004 15 0.115 
2005 28 0.225 
2006 34 0.118 
2007 51 0.222 
                                                 
98 Kiwis for Balanced Reporting on the Middle East, “Anti-Israel Bias In The New Zealand Press,” Kiwis for Balanced 
Reporting on the Middle East, 2011, accessed on 23/12/14, available from 
http://www.kbrm.org.nz/Posts/2011/Report_Herald_PC.pdf 
99 For the pro-Palestine groups see, New Zealand Palestine Human Right Campaign, website: 
http://palestine.org.nz/phrc/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=36; NZ Palestine Solidarity Network, 
website: http://psn.net.nz/;Auckland University Students for Justice in Palestine, website: 
https://uoasjp.wordpress.com/; Students for Justice in Palestine: Victoria University of Wellington, website: 
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Students-for-Justice-in-Palestine-Victoria-University-of-
Wellington/606313072771510; Kia Ora Gaza, website http://kiaoragaza.net/ 
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2008 6 0.190 
2009 11 0.077 
2010 2 0.034 
2011 4 0.029 
Total  22 - 
 
The hypothesis that DCFs would be used consistently throughout the period is not well 
substantiated by the raw frequencies. As the data shows, there were several peak years, including 
2002, 2005, 2006 and 2007, and several trough years, such as 2003, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011. 




The hypothesis was not well supported by the ratio count either, with a similar peak and trough 
























5.2.6 Table 2 – Blame/Ideology context frequency totals and ratio counts: 
Context Frequency  Ratio 
Event 9 0.067 
Wider 52 0.084 
Domestic 161 0.157 
Total 222 - 
 
The hypothesis that DCFs were more likely to be given in a domestic context is support by the 
data, both in terms of raw frequency and ratio count. The raw numbers show that the domestic 
uses of blame and ideology account for 73% of all uses and were 18 times more frequent than 
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The hypothesis is also supported by the ratio counts, which show that the domestic context was 
























The section will examine how the counterinsurgent identified itself, its allies and the victims 
using the deliberative narrative. The actor/victim section is of interest here as the reactive 
narrative was not used often for these framing tasks. As with the other sections, the main criteria 
for inclusion is that the framing task was inclusive for the insurgent audience, though in this 
section the criteria are somewhat more broad, as many of these relate to the allied actor and the 
inclusivity will be ascertained on whether the framing task is credible, accurate, informative and 
measured. Because this section is focused on actor descriptions, there will be a greater focus on 
legitimacy as these framing tasks reflect on this in the most direct manner. 
 
5.3.1 COLLECTIVE ACTOR IDENTIFICATIONS  
The counterinsurgent referred to the collective actor using the terms ‘international community’, 
‘coalition’, and the, from now on, ‘broad coalition’ terms of ‘broad/est coalition’, ‘global 
coalition’, ‘international force’ or ‘multinational force’.100 While all ‘international community’ uses 
included NZ, ‘coalition’ was used both inclusively and exclusively. Goff’s statement that “[o]ur 
SAS personnel are regarded as being among the best in the field by other coalition forces” is an 
example of the former while in his explanation that “[w]e are not, however, a member of the 
coalition in Iraq” is an example of the latter.101 As will be examined, these collective actor 
identifications are literal, nuanced, restrained and inclusive.  
 
5.3.1 Table 1 – Collective actor terms, annual totals: 
Year intl. community coalition broad coalition 
2001 13 5 6 
2002 23 9 5 
2003 28 27 2 
2004 20 3 2 
2005 9 4 6 
2006 21 3 3 
2007 10 4 2 
2008 2 1 1 
2009 2 2 2 
2010 3 - - 
2011 1 - - 
Total  132 58 29 
 
                                                 
100 ‘Coalition’ counts and ‘broad coalition’ are mutually exclusive.  
101 Phil Goff, “SAS Troops Return from Afghanistan,” beehive.govt.nz , November 22, 2005, accessed on 12/03/2014, 
available from http://beehive.govt.nz/release/sas-troops-return-afghanistan; Phil Goff, “NZ Defence Policy and 




5.3.1 Table 2 – Collective actor terms, context totals: 
Context intl. community coalition broad coalition 
Event 20 3 3 
Wider 48 16 9 
Domestic 64 39 17 
 
CONTENT 
These were used with a degree of consistency over the period, in raw or ratio counts. 
‘International community’ was used relatively consistently until 2007, but saw a precipitous drop 
from 2008 on, ‘coalition’ spiked in 2003 and ‘broad coalition’ declined from 2009. These can be 
explained by ideology and strategy. ‘International community’ and ‘broad coalition’ both fit the 
Labour Party internationalist narrative and the drop in usage once National came to power in 
2008 fits their nationalist narrative. The spike for ‘coalition’ occurred in the year that NZ 
deployed the PRT and used the term to differentiate between itself and the US-led ‘coalition’ in 
Iraq – though only 7 of the 27 uses in 2003 were for the latter. While ‘international community’ 
only fits the context hypothesis in raw count, both ‘coalition’ and ‘broad coalition’ fit for both 
raw and ratio.  
 
These terms are credible as they are literal descriptions of the collective actor. While some argue 
that ‘international community’ is figurative, as used here it is considered literal.102 It is argued that 
for most people, the focus of the ‘international community’ would be a ‘community of states’ 
and not some idealistic ‘universal community of individuals’ as some have argued – and a 
‘community of states’ is literally what the counterinsurgent is referring to when they use this 
term.103 These descriptions all attempt to label a collective actor in a manner that reflects their 
true nature. This gives these identifications an accuracy, particularly as NZ used ‘international 
community’ to refer to the larger grouping that incorporates like-minded states that may not 
actually be playing an active part in the ‘coalition’ and then used ‘coalition’ to refer to those states 
actively working together. This provides a degree of fidelity as the counterinsurgent used 
different terms to refer to different groupings they are involved with, allowing them to hone in 
depending on what grouping they are referring to. The ‘broad coalition’ identifications are also 
accurate as they add extra nuance about the scope of the alliance. However, these terms were not 
always used accurately. As noted above, ‘coalition’ has been used by NZ to refer to itself and 
                                                 
102 Michael P. Marks Metaphors in International Relations Theory (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 54-55; Jeremy 
Seabrook, “Whose International Community?” Third World Network, April 1999, accessed on 20/03/14, available 
from http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/1885-cn.htm  




allies and then to differentiate between itself and the US-led ‘coalition’ in Iraq and this flexibility 
reveals a certain lack of accuracy. While NZ did not use ‘international community’ in the same 
manner during the ICAT, it also has the same inherent flexibility as it provides no concrete 
parameters regarding membership. While they are nuanced, these terms do not provide a 
constricted focus as they do not have specific referents; however, this is not as critical when the 
actor is referring to themselves and these descriptions do not unrealistically exaggerating the 
scope either.  
 
AUDIENCE 
‘International community’ has a flexibility that would be broad enough to be salient for the 
insurgent support population. The more extreme supporter may see this grouping as “dignifying 
the west, of globalising it, of making it sound more respectable, more neutral and high-
faluting”.104 The less extreme supporter may focus more on how “Muslim nation-states have 
insisted on full participation in the Western-authored ‘international community’” during the 
ICAT.105 It appeals either way, though the former may be angered by it as a euphemism for the 
West. The term ‘coalition’ is less flexible, though here it did include many Muslim-majority 
states, at least for the ICAT, and the term is relatively neutral so while possibly not salient it 
would not repel. References to a ‘broad coalition’ mitigate the inflexibility of ‘coalition’, though 
have the same potential salience issues as ‘international community’. Overall, they are seen as 
relatively measured actor descriptions and their use would have a mixed outcome for the 
insurgent audience, they may alienate some, pushing them away from the counterinsurgent’s 
cause, while for others may see them as inclusive. Both ‘international community’ and ‘broad 
coalition’ identifications are inclusive, as Gompert et al. note, broad-based participation 
“promote[s] acceptance by the contested population”.106 Still both are seen as inclusive as they 
are able to encompass the insurgent support population and they, therefore, help legitimise the 
counterinsurgent. At the same time, they may also delegitimise the insurgent as they “heighten[s 
their] sense of isolation” and imply that they do not have as widespread support as the 
counterinsurgent. Essentially, by emphasising the size of the allied actor they constrict the scope 
of the enemy, suggesting that these types of identifications are indirectly constrictive. 
 
                                                 
104 Martin Jacques, “What the Hell is the International Community?” The Guardian, August 24, 2006, accessed on 
18/03/14, available from http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/aug/24/whatthehellistheinternati  
105 Tim Winter, “Terrorism and Islamic Theologies of Religiously-Sanctioned War,” in Just War on Terror?: A 
Christian and Muslim Response, ed. David Fisher and Brian Wicker, (Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2010), 16.  
106 David C. Gompert, John Gordon, Adam Grissom, Dave Frelinger, Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki, Edward 
O'Connell, Brooke K. Stearns, and Robert Edwards Hunter, War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced 
Capabilities for Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica, CA [u.a.]: Rand Corp, 2008), 249. 
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These identifications would probably appeal to most New Zealanders, particularly ‘international 
community’ as the belief that the country is an international actor that contributes to 
international peace and security and is an effective member of the ‘international community’ is a 
key part of the national narrative.107 While ‘coalition’ does not fit the national narrative to the 
same degree, it still connects into the same sense of an international grouping acting together, 
though this is somewhat tainted during the ICAT when NZ start using it to differentiate between 
themselves and the US-led alliance in Iraq. The ‘broad coalition’ helps make ‘coalition’ more 
salient for the domestic audience. All three would help control emotion as they refer to large 
groups acting to counter the threat. They also help to reduce confusion as they are all commonly 
used terms with a pedigree that goes back beyond the ICAT. As such, they would also help 
reduce concern about the counterinsurgent’s capabilities. They do not direct anger, however. 
‘International community’ has a powerful mobilising potential as it is as much an aspirational 
term as it is an accurate identifier. It would also help justify the cause, and, particularly, legitimise 
the actor, Herbst refers to ‘international community’ as an “all-purpose legitimizing device in 
matters of foreign policy” and Eichenberg concluded, after looking at a quarter of a century of 
public opinion polls, that “multilateral sentiment does matter” for legitimacy.108 ‘Coalition’ has a 
lesser degree of mobilisation, justification and legitimisation potential due to its relative 
neutrality.  
 
It has been argued that ‘international community’ would appeal to the US as “it is immediately 
apparent that the international community is America’s most loyal ally, supporting each and 
every of our aspirations, preferences, complaints or demands.”109 However, while this may be 
true, the term does not fit Bush’s original narrative for the ICAT, which is more focused on the 
‘good civilisation’. Also, the way NZ used ‘coalition’ to distinguish itself from those states acting 
in Iraq suggests that this term would not appeal. However, NZ’s use of this identification to 
argue against Iraq means that, in practice, by 2003, this would have limited positive impact on 
the alliance. As US Ambassador Swindells said publically: “For the first time in our shared 
history, New Zealanders were not with us in a major military conflict... Traditional allies – 
                                                 
107 Capie, “Bridging Asia and Europe? Australia and New Zealand Membership in ASEM,” 106.  
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Australians, British and Americans – fought side by side”.110 Privately, in a 2004 cable, he noted 
that NZ “was careful to acknowledge the [Government of New Zealand’s] clearly stated position 
that New Zealand is NOT/NOT a member of the Coalition.”111 However, overall, these terms 
justify the US cause due to their venerability and were of utility as they mobilised the NZ 
population, but would have a relatively limited impact on the alliance relationship.  
 
5.3.2 ACTOR DESCRIPTION  
NZ described itself in a number of ways. It referred to its ‘values’ and ‘interests’, that it was 
‘sovereign/independent’. It also used the latent identifications of being a ‘multilateralist’, a ‘good 
international citizen’ and explained how its ‘size dictates foreign policy’. Respectively, these 
described NZ as preferring to work with other states on foreign policy, having a pragmatic and 
principled foreign policy and described how NZ’s foreign policy was shaped by its particular 
geopolitics. These actor descriptions are, as will be shown, literal, nuanced, constricted, 
restrained and inclusive, though with some variation. 
 
5.3.2 Table 1 – Actor description, annual totals:  
Year interests/values sovereign multilateralist intl. citizen size/FP 
2001 - - 2 - - 
2002 8 3 10 6 7 
2003 6 2 15 15 3 
2004 3 1 7 7 1 
2005 7 1 14 5 2 
2006 16 4 28 15 8 
2007 6 7 13 5 4 
2008 1 - 3 - - 
2009 10 - - 3 - 
2010 1 - - 1 - 
2011 5 - 3 2 - 
Total  63 18 95 59 25 
 
5.3.2 Table 2 – Actor description, context totals:  
Context interests/values sovereign multilateralist intl. citizen size/FP 
Event - 1 - - - 
Wider 27 7 34 27 6 
Domestic 36 10 61 32 19 
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The identifications of ‘interests’ and values’, ‘multilateralist’ and ‘good international citizen’ were 
used with a degree of consistency in raw and ratio form, though there was a drop in for the last 
two when National took power. This fits with the differing ideologies of the two parties. Also of 
interest is the near absence of any of these framing tasks in 2001, as is the predominance of 
‘sovereign/independent’ and ‘multilateralist’ framing tasks in the years of rapprochement. All 
were used more to a domestic audience in raw form, though only ‘multicultural’, ‘multilateralist’ 
and ‘size dictates foreign policy’ matched this hypothesis as ratio counts. NZ’s consistency 
regarding multilateralism – both in rhetoric and reality – contrasts with the US, which swung 
towards a unilateralist position regarding Iraq as the two states’ relations dropped to a post-9/11 
low.  
 
These actor descriptions are all credible, NZ can literally be identified as ‘multicultural’, 
‘sovereign/independent’ and a ‘multilateralist’, furthermore, its ‘size dictates foreign policy’ and 
its ‘interests and values’ play an important role in its actions in general and as a counterinsurgent. 
That said, there is a slight issue with the ‘sovereign/independent’ identification and, in turn, the 
‘multilateralist’ one. These identifications spiked during the years of rapprochement when NZ 
could arguably be said to be the least ‘sovereign/independent’, and more bilateral than 
‘multilateral’. The post-9/11 period marked a change in NZ’s foreign policy, where the 
principled pragmatism that had marked the previous several decades began to change and as a 
number of commentators have suggested there has been a weakening, or perceived weakening, 
of NZ’s ‘independent view’ in the years since 2001.112 However, this does not discredit these 
statements, as objectively NZ was still a ‘sovereign’ state that was acting ‘multilaterally’. 
 
These descriptions are highly accurate as they help to delineate not just a detailed but a useful 
description that provides an explanation of why it acts in the way it does. The references to how 
‘size dictates foreign policy’ and NZ’s ‘interests’ add particular nuance as they are informative 
about the pragmatic aspects of foreign policy in general and counterinsurgency in particular. This 
provides a degree of candour, as the concept of ‘national interest’ as a key aspect of international 
relations and one that guides every states’ actions.113 The references to ‘values and interests’ is 
more accurate and informative when the counterinsurgent explains how this shapes their actions, 
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as Goff did in his 2002 speech: explaining that “[f]or New Zealand, the basic national objectives 
are to protect and promote our national interests and values while ensuring that we play a 
positive role in world affairs.”114 As well as providing a detailed set of ‘values and interests’ that 
provide a relatively comprehensive delineation of the counterinsurgent and showing how they 
influence solutions, these descriptions are also constricted, in that they do not exaggerate NZ’s 
status. Even the ‘good international citizen’ description is relatively constricted, with 
international politicians stating NZ has ‘punched above its weight’ in the international 
community, working harder than most states to be perceived as a strong supporter of 
multilateralism though there is admittedly a degree of self-promotion involved.115 
 
AUDIENCE 
These identifications would have a degree of salience for the insurgent audience, not because the 
‘values’ such as ‘multiculturalism’ and a ‘multilateralism’ would appeal but rather because NZ 
credibly and informatively explains how their ‘values’, ‘interests’ and ‘size’ influence their actions, 
which would match insurgent experience. However, the identification as 
‘sovereign/independent’ is somewhat problematic, it is unlikely that this would match experience 
because of NZ’s allied actions during the ICAT. As Tariq Ali wrote, “[e]ssentially there is no 
such thing as a New Zealand foreign policy... Politically, psychologically and mentally the 
Australian and New Zealand elites are firmly attached to the United States”.116 On the other 
hand, the ‘multicultural’ identifications are being directed, to a degree, at the insurgent audience, 
as they appear designed to reinforce NZ’s tolerance of different ethnicities and religions. In 
general, these descriptions would not generate negative emotions as they are self-referential and 
do so in a manner that is not exclusive or alienating. Thus, they provide justify the 
counterinsurgent’s cause.  
 
These identifications would have a powerful appeal for the domestic audience, especially the 
‘sovereign/independent’ and ‘multilateralist’ ones, as they go to the very core of NZ’s national 
character.117 NZ’s “identity is underpinned by its position as an independent and principled 
player on the world stage”.118 These descriptions also control emotion, ameliorating fear as they 
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emphasise NZ acts ‘multilaterally’ for its own interests and is guided geopolitical realities. Also 
critically, they would reduce concern as they help to explain the pragmatic underpinning of NZ 
foreign policy, connecting with the concept of collective security. The ‘multilateral’ descriptions 
would also help to allay any concerns regarding the counterinsurgent’s competency, particularly 
the pragmatic descriptions and the ‘multilateralism’. They do not, however, direct anger. Despite 
this lack of anger direction, these identifications would have a degree of mobilisation capacity as 
the actor descriptions connect with a justification of certain deliberative solutions, particularly 
‘multilateral’ solutions. They also have a powerful impact on the legitimacy of the 
counterinsurgent, portraying NZ as a principled and pragmatic collective global actor.  
 
The major issue for the US comes from the ‘multilateral’, ‘sovereign/independent’ and ‘good 
international citizen’ identifications. A number of US Embassy cables from WikiLeaks reveal 
how the US felt about these identifications. Firstly, with respect to ‘multilateral, a cable from 
2004 stated the US believes “the [NZ] government’s view of multilateralism as a means to limit 
U.S. power”.119 Likewise, another cable stated that “Goff’s unacceptable response [was] that New 
Zealand is happy working around the edges of the status quo.”120 Also, with regard to NZ’s 
‘independence’ a 2004 WikiLeaks cable that explained that NZ’s “decision to sit out the invasion 
of Iraq was a reminder of how far its security policies and interests have drifted from those of its 
traditional allies”.121 Another 2004 cable explained NZ “is loathe to take actions that would 
identify it as a supporter of Israel and, by proxy, the United States.”122 US irritation at NZ’s 
‘independence’ can be seen in a cable in 2005, which was reacting to Labour’s use of anti-
American rhetoric in the election, stating that “a vote for the National Party means a vote against 
NZ’s independent foreign policy.”123 Also, a 2006 cable noted that NZ preferred distant 
deployments as they are “keeping with New Zealand’s identity as a global good citizen, always 
ready to pitch in” before noting that “the entire defense outlay this year is included in the 
portion of the budget entitles [sic] “national identity””, with the tone suggesting the US find the 
‘good international citizen’ identification idealistic and problematic.124 This is confirmed by a 
2005 cable where the ambassador wished NZ would move “from ideologically motivated, self-
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congratulatory policies to a clear vision of New Zealand’s role in the world”.125 Reference to 
‘interests’ would appeal, in a 2005 cable Swindells explained the US wanted NZ “to spell out that 
motivation -- that New Zealand is acting out of its interests rather than out of ideology”.126 Thus, 
aside from ‘interests’, in general these identifications are not appealing, with ‘multilateral’ and 
‘sovereign/independent’ the most problematic. While they may not appeal to the US, the 
‘sovereign/independent’ identification has a certain utility for the justness of the US response as 
having a supposedly ‘independent’ state support their cause delivers greater credibility. However, 
in general these identifications would not have any positive impact on the alliance, as from the 
above cables it seems that the US would rather have a publicly compliant partner, even as they 
shifted from their own more ‘multilateralist’ approach in the early phase of the ICAT to their 
unilateralist stance regarding Iraq.  
 
5.3.4 ACTOR CONNECTIONS  
The counterinsurgent often described its connections with the US. In some cases, this latent unit 
was as simple as stating that NZ had “close ties” or was ‘close friends’, though in other cases the 
counterinsurgent referred to having “shared values”, while other examples included descriptions 
of a “shared history”, particularly past military actions.127 This section will examine identifications 
of actor connections made that refer to ‘ties’, ‘friendship’, ‘shared history’ or ‘shared values’. As 
will be shown, they are considered literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive.  
 
5.3.4 Table 1 – Actor connections, annual totals: 
Year close ties/shared history shared values 
2001 1 - 
2002 11 4 
2003 5 3 
2004 2 1 
2005 2 2 
2006 24 20 
2007 15 2 
2008 - - 
2009 25 4 
2010 5 4 
2011 25 4 
Total  115 44 
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5.3.4 Table 1 – Actor connections, context totals: 
Context close ties/shared history shared values 
Event 3 - 
Wider 96 35 
Domestic 16 9 
 
CONTENT 
Both of these were used relatively consistently, considered in both raw and ratio. That said, the 
‘closer ties’ description did increase during National’s time in power dramatically while ‘shared 
values’ spiked in 2006. These can be explained by ideology and strategy, respectively. National 
traditionally has a focus on bilateral relationships, which is probably why the first rose over time. 
The ‘shared values’ identification spiked during the rapprochement and appears to have been 
used strategically to help develop the relationship between the two states. They did not fit the 
context hypothesis, there was a clear divide in audience, with NZ far more likely to use these 
descriptions to a wider audience than domestic, both as a raw and ratio counts. This helps 
reinforce the belief these were used to enhance relations with the US.  
 
These descriptions are credible as they are literal descriptions of certain connections between the 
two states. NZ has ‘close ties’ politically, militarily, economically and socially with the US and the 
relationships is one built on a ‘shared history’ and ‘shared values’. With regard to accuracy, they 
deliver important details about the nature of the connection between NZ and the US. Some 
identifications outline the pragmatic reasons for NZ’s ‘close ties’, such as Goff’s 2002 statement 
that the “United States, the worlds [sic] only superpower, has the economic political and military 
strength which makes it a key power in every sphere. Our views diverge in a number of areas but 
we co operate closely in most.”128 Others explain how the values relate to the relationship, like 
new Minister of Defence Wayne Mapp’s 2009 statement that “[w]e also share the same values, 
our economies are increasingly intertwined, and our view of the world is similar”.129 These 
identifications provide detailed nuance, they offer an understanding of how and why NZ and the 
US are connected. However, while they are generally felt to be constricted, the ‘shared values’ 
identifications are somewhat exaggerated as while the two states do ‘share values’ there are also 
some key differences and these identifications exaggerate the common ones at the expense of 
those that are not ‘shared’. However, this is somewhat moderated as the counterinsurgent does 
make this clear in some cases, such as Goff’s 2006 statement that NZ and the US have taken 
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“different paths to common values. Different histories, location, size and experience clearly 
produce different outlooks and create different responsibilities. But a shared western heritage, 
which has shaped common liberal and democratic values, has also produced a like-mindedness 
that draws our countries together.”130 Thus, these identifications provide important details in an 
accurate, tailored manner. 
 
AUDIENCE 
These identifications would have experiential commensurability for the insurgent support 
population due to NZ’s position as a long term ally of the US with the same colonial origins and 
military past. Speaking of ‘shared values’ could potentially anger and alienate the insurgent 
audience, as much of the reactive narrative is based on ‘values’ and even though the 
counterinsurgent does not use these terms in any of the ‘shared values’ descriptions there is still a 
danger that these connections could be made, which may provoke anger. Aside from this issue, 
the identifications have a slight positive influence on the counterinsurgent’s legitimacy, though 
this is not significant.  
 
Referring to ‘close ties’ with the US would be divisive for the domestic audience, while for some 
it would be salient, for others it would not appeal. This is something that the US recognised, a 
2007 cable stating that “polling suggests up to half of all Kiwis believe New Zealand does not 
need a closer relationship with the United States”.131 Another WikiLeaks document showed “that 
New Zealand officials doubted there was public support for the closer [security] ties and 
preferred to keep them secret.”132 That said, a report following the anti-nuclear legislation found 
that 77 % of New Zealanders still wanted a continuing alliance with the US.133 Likewise, Headley 
and Reitzig found that while 51% of NZ viewed the US positively, only 28% viewed them 
negatively.134 The counterinsurgent only refers to ‘close ties’ and not ‘closer ties’, which infers 
they are wary of the danger of the latter. Likewise, while NZ is more alike than dissimilar to the 
US, references to ‘shared values’ would possibly not hold huge appeal as NZ’s national character 
is intrinsically tied to its new found ‘independence’ following the anti-nuclear legislation; in other 
words, a fundamental aspect of NZ’s national character is tied to it differentiating itself and its 
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values from the US.135 The ‘shared history’ is not problematic and would probably appeal to 
most. Explaining that NZ has ‘close ties’ and a ‘shared history’ with the US would reduce fear by 
connecting the country with the sole superpower. Likewise, they help to explain why NZ is 
supporting the US after the attacks, because of the ‘close ties’, ‘shared history’ and ‘shared 
values’. This all makes the counterinsurgent appear capable as they are tying themselves to this 
superpower. However, these do not really direct anger, except possibly by making the victim 
state seem closer and more similar to the domestic audience, which may increase empathy. In 
general, these identifications are unlikely to mobilise support but would help with justification by 
providing an understanding of why NZ is supporting the US.  
 
These identifications would have a strong salience for the US, particularly ‘shared values’ as this 
fits Bush’s original narrative. As Ambassador Swindells noted in 2005, “we need to move away 
from the quid pro quo, issue-by-issue approach that now characterizes U.S.-New Zealand 
interactions and instead foster a wide-ranging, forward-looking relationship built on shared 
values and common interests”, going on to say that “Embassy staff have pointed out repeatedly 
to MFAT colleagues that the absence of [Government of NZ] public acknowledgment of the 
importance of United States-New Zealand ties is both noticeable and regrettable”.136 A 2007 
cable showed how much had changed, stating that Clark’s speech will “present a more positive 
focus on overall US-NZ relations”.137 Another 2007 cable, sent regarding the 20 year anniversary 
of the anti-nuclear legislation, reinforced this: “the Labour Government might have used the 
occasion of the anniversary to focus on NZ’s principled stand against the U.S. The fact that the 
Government chose to focus instead on the warming of the bilateral relationship and proliferation 
issues demonstrates how much it wants to keep relations on their improving track.”138 However, 
while in general these are appealing, it is not completely positive because the US were aware that 
NZ was more willing to speak of these ‘close ties’ to an international audience rather than a 
domestic one. As a cable from 2004 explained: “We further note that PM Clark is apparently 
much more willing to highlight her excellent relations with President Bush when speaking to an 
Australian audience than to domestic Kiwi audiences.”139 Likewise, a 2006 cable explained that 
Clark “values the intelligence relationship very highly. It has ensured that New Zealand still has 
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some access and influence in Washington while allowing Clark to maintain the Labour Party's 
public ambivalence about the U.S. at home.”140 In 2007, there were still issues regarding the way 
NZ spoke of the US, with a cable noting that a senior diplomat had told “New Zealand [it] must 
continue to find new ways to cooperate and to improve the ‘tonality’ of its public messages 
concerning the United States”.141 Thus, while the identification would appeal, and justifies the 
alliance, because it was made more often to a wider international audience, these impacts would 
have been reduced as the US were aware of how NZ targeted specific audiences.  
 
5.3.5 COLLECTIVE ACTOR  
The counterinsurgent referred to the collective actor using the manifest units ‘UN’, ‘United 
Nations and the ‘Security Council’. As will be examined below, these are literal, nuanced, 
constricted, restrained and inclusive identifications.  
 
5.3.5 Table 1 – Collective actor, annual totals: 
Year UN  UN-positive UN-negative 
2001 42 6 3 
2002 57 13 2 
2003 168 37 10 
2004 26 3 3 
2005 49 6 - 
2006 46 10 - 
2007 88 3 5 
2008 7 - - 
2009 6 - - 
2010 16 1 1 
2011 5 - 1 
Total  510 79 25 
 
5.3.5 Table 2 – Collective actor, context totals: 
Context UN  UN-positive UN-negative 
Event 76 19 9 
Wider 158 38 11 
Domestic 276 22 5 
 
CONTENT 
The ‘UN’ was referred to relatively consistently throughout, as both a raw and ratio figure, 
though it did spike in 2003 for both. The specifically positive and negative references were less 
                                                 
140 WikiLeaks, “Lange’s Last Laugh,” WikiLeaks, cable date, January 6, 2006, accessed on 12/05/15 , available from 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06WELLINGTON41_a.html 
141 WikiLeaks, “EAP DAS Davies January 16-7 Meetings with GNZ Officials”. 
242 
 
consistent and also spiked in 2003. This fits with the extensive discussion regarding Iraq in that 
year, NZ was being honest about the flaws of the UN in the face of US criticism while balancing 
this with positive descriptions. Another interesting revelation from the usage is that the National 
Party rarely ever mention the UN, with only 27 of the 510 references, which fits their ideological 
positioning as a bilaterally-oriented realist. With regard to the context hypothesis, the ‘UN’ 
references fit for both raw and ratio. The positive and negative ones were used more to a wider 
audience, in both counts, which fits with their usage in 2003 with regard to Iraq.  
 
NZ’s overarching position on the UN is considered credible. Generally speaking, Clark’s 
government refers to the UN as the most important international body that offers the best 
means of collectively maintaining international law and world security – or as Goff referred to it 
in 2002, “a model for international unity of purpose”.142 In other words, it is described in a mix 
of aspirational and descriptive language. It is also referred to in a realistic if more negative 
manner, such as when Goff explained in 2001 to the General Assembly that “[n]o one would 
claim that the United Nations has an unblemished record of success. But without it the world 
would be a much less secure place”.143 In the lead up to the Iraq Invasion, NZ’s rhetoric around 
the UN was similarly both aspirational and realistic and while it was often positive it never let 
idealism replace truth, which is why all the identifications are creditable.  
 
Even more importantly, these identifications are highly accurate. NZ counterinsurgents outlined 
the role, composition and limitations of the UN in a comprehensive manner that explained how 
and why the UN was acting in the way it was and in the lead up to the Iraq Invasion this helped 
expose American attempts to distance themselves from any blame. Just after the invasion began, 
Goff gave a powerful example of this, explaining that the “United Nations system relies on the 
collective will of all its members. It is these member states that set its priorities. The UN cannot 
act without their consent. It falls therefore upon us all to make the UN relevant in today’s 
world.” 144 He blends an explanation of how the UN functions with a criticism of the US and its 
actions in an accurate manner. In contrast, a week earlier, Bush had said, “[t]he United Nations 
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Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours”.145 Bush spoke of 
the UN and the US as completely distinct, when it is one of the most powerful and influential 
members. The NZ identifications provide a nuance that Bush’s do not, constricting their 
descriptions by balancing the positive and negative identifications in a way that ensures accuracy.  
 
AUDIENCE 
There is a vast difference in opinion of the UN across the Muslim majority states, while 61% of 
the population in Lebanon view it favourably (the only majority for Muslim countries in the 
survey), only 17% do in Turkey.146 Pew found that in Indonesia and Malaysia, major non-Middle 
Eastern Muslim states, there was strong UN support, with the former at 82% and the latter at 
60%.147 Another poll of predominantly Muslims states found widespread support for the UN 
gaining greater powers but also a strong perception that the UN is still dominated by the US.148 
The mixture between hope the UN can help them and disillusion with the US dominance 
suggests that NZ’s positive yet realistic descriptions would probably be salient for many of the 
insurgent support population, appealing to their mixed beliefs and matching their contrary 
experiences. NZ’s position on the UN mirrors the insurgent audience’s ambivalence and would 
have a restrained emotional impact on them. In turn, this would help justify NZ’s cause as they 
are realistic about the flaws and issues with the UN, but are also aspirational about what it can 
achieve, which makes it inclusive.  
 
New Zealanders have a strong affinity with the UN and are proud of the state being an 
‘international citizen’, meaning that the general and positive identifications would appeal.149 As 
noted in a 2005 WikiLeaks cable, both Permanent Representative “Banks and Mosley admitted 
that New Zealanders can be somewhat unrealistic when it comes to their confidence in the 
United Nations and the organization’s potential to bring order to the world.”150 The negative 
references would not damage this salience because they were realistic and largely in context of 
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US attacks on the UN and, overall, NZ’s descriptions of the UN would have matched New 
Zealanders experience of a largely positive but still flawed organisation. References to the UN 
would control fear as they connect with the larger international community and make it appear 
like NZ is part of a larger collective. They would also help reduce confusion because most 
foreign affairs references are contextualised by this internationalist framework. In turn, this 
makes the counterinsurgent appear competent because of this membership. However, these 
identifications would not direct anger. Thus, they do not have any short term mobilisation 
capacity but they would help with long-term justness, especially for multilateral solutions. 
 
As already referenced, the US saw NZ’s references to multilateralism as a “means to limit U.S. 
power”, wanting the state to be more overtly bilateral in its support, suggesting that the constant 
identification of the ‘UN’ would not be salient.151 This is further reinforced by the fact that NZ 
used the positive identification so often during the lead up to Iraq as a means of justifying why 
they chose to publically refuse to support the invasion. Therefore, while these identifications do 
not have a negative impact on the US cause in general, in the lead up to Iraq they were 
specifically used in this manner and overall they would not have a positive impact on the alliance.  
 
5.3.6 PERSONNEL IDENTIFICATION 
The counterinsurgent used a number of terms to identify its personnel. Specifically this manifest 
unit involved the terms ‘personnel’, ‘soldier’, ‘troop’ and ‘peacekeeper’. As will be examined, 
these are inclusive, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive, though there are some 
accuracy issues.  
 
5.3.6 Table 1 – Military actor, annual totals: 
Year personnel soldier troop peacekeeper 
2001 2 - 2 - 
2002 21 1 - 6 
2003 53 2 - - 
2004 13 - 1 - 
2005 19 2 3 2 
2006 30 4 5 - 
2007 27 8 6 1 
2008 8 2 2 1 
2009 27 4 4 - 
2010 3 9 3 - 
2011 7 28 5 - 
Total  210 60 31 10 
                                                 





5.3.6 Table 2 – Military actor, context totals: 
Context personnel soldier troop peacekeeper 
Event 3 - - - 
Wider 46 13 7 2 
Domestic 161 47 24 8 
 
CONTENT 
‘Personnel’ was used consistently over the period, particularly in ratio count. The other three 
were not. ‘Soldier’ and ‘troop’ both show a significant increase at the end of the period, 
particularly ‘soldier’. To break down uses of ‘soldier’, it should be explained that 11 of the 
references regarded alive NZDF members serving during the ICAT, 6 were for members injured 
during the ICAT, 13 were historic or generic references and 30 regarded people killed during the 
ICAT. Of the 37 uses of the term in 2010-2011, 29 referred to dead and 2 to wounded. The 
spike 2011 occurred when the NZDF lost a number of personnel and it is hard not to conclude 
that NZDF members are ‘personnel’ when they are alive and ‘soldiers’ when they die. That 29 of 
the 60 usages refer to dead ‘soldiers’ suggests that this interpretation is correct. Certainly 
‘personnel’ has broader scope and can refer to all members of the NZDF rather than just the 
army, but the numbers are still out of balance. Also, while there would be an expected increase in 
more military terminology from the National Party due to their ideological focus, the massive 
preponderance of use in reference to those who have been killed suggests that this interpretation 
is correct. Most of the pre-2010 references of ‘soldiers’ were to NZDF members serving in 
historic conflicts and it is further hypothesised that the counterinsurgent believes that while the 
domestic audience are proud of this military history, contemporary operations do not share that 
appeal, which is why the term ‘personnel’ is used so frequently. All of the identifications fit the 
hypothesis that regarding context, being given to a domestic audience more than a wider one in 
both raw and ratio counts.  
 
All the terms were used literally, so there are no credibility issues. However, as can be seen by the 
way they are used, they vary in accuracy. Semantically there is little difference between the first 
three terms, with ‘personnel’ referring to “[p]eople employed in an organization or engaged in an 
organized undertaking such as military service”, ‘soldier’ referring to “[a] person who serves in an 
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army” and ‘troops’ referring to “[s]oldiers or armed forces”.152 However, the term ‘personnel’ is 
more generic and vague with the least militaresque overtones, while ‘soldiers’ and ‘troops’ have 
unmistakably martial implications. ‘Personnel’ can be used to refer to non-military organisations 
and this broadness means that when used in military situations it is able to somewhat mask the 
military nature of the situation, meaning that it is not as accurate because it is ambiguous. From 
the consistency analysis, it can be seen that the counterinsurgent uses ‘personnel’ in an obscuring 
fashion, only using ‘soldiers’ when their forces have been killed or injured. Thus, the nuance 
available between these terms is largely lost because they are being used in an obscuring fashion 
to constrict the nature of the deployment.  
 
AUDIENCE 
There are no perceived major impacts for the insurgent audience, all of these terms would match 
their experience of Western militaries and any minimising of the military nature of the 
counterinsurgent would be unlikely to be apparent to the insurgent audience. Thus, they control 
emotion and do not exclude the insurgent support population.  
Of all the terms, ‘peacekeepers’ would probably be most salient as it fits within NZ’s already 
examined narrative as a ‘good international citizen that punches above its weight’, which is 
supported by the fact that while 85% of the country support peacekeeping operations, military 
solutions, such as the deployment of the SAS, fall below 50%.153 The possible change in salience 
mooted above fits with the powerful ‘pacifying’ impact that the 1980s anti-nuclear movement 
had on the national character.154 ‘Personnel’ would likely be second as it does not have the 
overtly militaristic tones that would might repel many New Zealanders, while ‘soldiers’ and 
‘troops’ are the least salient as they do not fit NZ’s narrative. A point of interest here is how the 
NZ Army themselves perceive this, with one illuminating remark from a soldier in Afghanistan 
asking a New Zealand Herald reporter, “[w]ill you call us peacekeepers?... It’s been a long time 
since I’ve seen the Army referred to as soldiers” with reporter then writing “there’s little peace to 
                                                 
152 ‘Personnel’: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/personnel; ‘Soldier’: 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/soldier; ‘Troop’: 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/troop 
153 M2 Presswire, “New Zealand DOD: Peacekeeping Support at Record High,” M2 Presswire, May 3, 1999, accessed 
on 13/02/15, available from Factiva; Stuff, “Public Divided over Afghanistan SAS Deployment,” stuff.co.nz, March 
11, 2009, accessed on 13/02/15, available from http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/3025129/Public-divided-
over-Afghanistan-SAS-deployment 




keep near Kabul, and the Kiwis are strictly soldiers.”155 Clearly, for this soldier at least, his 
experience is commensurate with the term ‘soldier’ and not ‘peacekeeper’. With respect to 
emotion, this section will focus on the impacts in a different way as these terms are being used as 
a means of limiting domestic fears and concerns regarding overly ‘militaristic’ actions that do not 
match how New Zealanders see their nation rather than specifically to do with the threat. This is 
inversed for the NZDF, whose members can be considered in this section as a segment of the 
NZ population. For them, or the above individual at least, it seems clear that there is a degree of 
anger regarding the terminology used to refer to them, in particular the gap between rhetoric and 
reality. They see themselves as ‘soldiers’ and ‘troops’ not ‘peacekeepers’ or ‘personnel’ because of 
the operational environment. This is something that the US Embassy notes, writing that the 
“redefinition of the military’s role as peacekeepers rather than peacemakers have made 
recruitment and retention more difficult”.156 The terms ‘personnel’ and ‘peacekeepers’ have a 
greater mobilising potential for the NZ audience because they fit the national narrative. The 
major issue here is that use of the terms in this manner could negatively impact the 
counterinsurgent’s justness and legitimacy, which occurred in the last years of the ICAT as 
‘personnel’ who were mentoring became ‘soldiers’ who were dying in combat. Ensuring that 
their words match their actions is critical and as these usages show, this gap did appear and the 
counterinsurgent had to ‘course correct’, changing how they were identifying their military force 
because reality did not match their rhetoric.  
 
The downplaying of military aspects would not be salient for the US. In a number of cables, 
Swindells made it clear that the Embassy is not impressed with NZ’s insistence on portraying 
itself as an internationalist peacekeeper to the domestic audience.157 Swindells refers to NZ’s 
foreign policy outlook as having ‘two worlds’, the realist and idealist, with this dichotomy 
generating much concern for the US.158 The persistent use of minimal military terms exacerbates 
this concern. More specifically, terms ‘soldiers’ and ‘troops’ would have the best fit for the allied 
audience as their overarching label for the ICAT was the ‘war on terror’ and it is ‘soldiers’ and 
‘troops’ who fight war not ‘personnel’ or ‘peacekeepers’. Also, as Bacevich writes, the US has an 
                                                 
155 David Fisher, “Clear and Present Danger for NZ Troops in Afghanistan,” New Zealand Herald, August 5, 2006, 
accessed on 13/09 /09, available from 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10394622 
156 WikiLeaks, “The U.S.-New Zealand Relationship: What We Could Not Say In The Mission Program Plan”. 
157 WikiLeaks, “The Two Worlds of Middle Earth: New Zealand's Strategic Policies”; WikiLeaks, “New Zealand 
Prime Minister Clark in State of the Nation: "No Worries"; Media Reaction Muted” WikiLeaks, cable date, February 
2, 2005, accessed on 13/05/15, available from https://WikiLeaks.org/plusd/cables/05WELLINGTON96_a.html 
158 WikiLeaks, “The Two Worlds of Middle Earth: New Zealand's Strategic Policies”. 
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“infatuation with military power” and an “idealized image of the American soldier.159 Military 
power is central to the US narrative and the American soldier is core to this narrative. By 
portraying their force to their own audience in this manner, NZ infers the ICAT is largely non-
military, which conflicts with the US narrative and the justness of their ‘war on terror’, which 
could negatively impact the alliance.  
 
5.3.7 PERSONNEL DESCRIPTIONS 
The counterinsurgent described their own personnel in a positive manner. This latent unit 
includes references such as the NZDF having a “reputation for excellence” or “[o]ur personnel 
have an international reputation for excellence” as well as statements that a “special feature of 
Kiwi forces has been their ability to relate to local people”.160 As will be examined below, these 
are literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive.  
 
5.3.7 Table 1 – Personnel descriptions, annual totals: 












Total  56 
 
5.3.7 Table 2 – Personnel descriptions, context totals: 
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160 Mark Burton, “NZDF Deployment to Iraq,” beehive.govt.nz, August 11, 2003, accessed on 12/03/2012, available 
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This identification was not used with great consistency, with three years where it was not used at 
all and several years – 2003/2007 in raw, 2007/2010 in ratio – where it spiked. The reason for 
these spikes appears to be the deployment of the PRT, for 2003, the rapprochement for 2007 
and National’s need to mobilise support for the continuing deployment in Afghanistan. It does 
fit the context hypothesis, with this identification given more to a domestic audience than a 
wider one in both raw and ratio counts.  
 
These are credible identifications as the NZDF has a reputation for excellence in a number of 
areas and these identifications are given in a literal manner that specifically describes the positive 
qualities.161 For example, in 2005 Goff explained that a “special feature of Kiwi forces has been 
their ability to relate to local people”.162 This is also accurate, particularly when this is further 
explained, such as Goff’s 2007 statement that “[o]ur smallness, our multicultural nature and good 
pre-deployment training predispose us towards being sensitive rather than arrogant towards local 
populations and winning their trust and support”.163 This provides detailed information on not 
only what makes NZ personnel good but why this is so. As well as being nuanced descriptions, 
they are constricted as they do not exaggerate but rather accurately convey positive attributes. 
The only time the counterinsurgent used terms like ‘heroism’ and ‘bravery’ was in 2007 when the 
SAS received medals for showing these qualities and even this is constricted, with Clark even 
saying they are “modest about their achievements”.164 These are also informative as one of the 
key operational objectives of a COIN operation is to convince the insurgent support population 
that their forces are competent, which this identification does.165 
 
AUDIENCE 
The description of positive attributes of the counterinsurgent’s force are unlikely to be salient for 
the insurgent support population as few would have any beliefs, experiences or narratives about 
the NZDF. In turn, they would have a limited emotive impact. However, they are inclusive as 
they not only refer to the personnel in a positive manner but often (8 times) do so in a way that 
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indicates they are good at ‘relating to local people’, which legitimises the counterinsurgent, 
particularly as they help to convince the audience the counterinsurgent’s forces are competent 
and, consequently, the proper force to be responding.  
 
These identifications would appeal to the domestic audience, even accounting for the pacifist 
strain of the national character, as 15 of the identifications refer to the NZDF’s ability in 
peacekeeping rather than conflict situations and 8 to their ability to get along with locals while 
the more overt military ones refer to specific situations rather than to general bellicose qualities. 
These identifications control fear as they portray the counterinsurgent as competent, though in 
so doing may not reduce the confusion as this competency suggests the counterinsurgent should 
have been able to predict and prevent any attacks. They do not direct anger. Thus, while they 
may legitimise because they show the counterinsurgent’s personnel are ‘right and proper’, and 
thus the counterinsurgent is ‘right and proper’, for the solutions proposed, they do not deliver 
any mobilisation.  
 
These identifications would be unlikely to appeal to the US as it does not match their opinion of 
the NZDF. A 2006 cable, titled ‘Thinly Stretched New Zealand Military Aims High, But Can It 
Deliver?” explained that the NZDF was “being rebuilt after decades of neglect” and that even if 
all measures were put in place it “will take time for the military to significantly improve its level 
of capability”.166 Also, the US narrative is one of a more warlike military force, and this emphasis 
on ‘soft power’ would not fit this narrative. It could therefore not provide any significant alliance 
maintenance either, though the implication that the US has competent allies could help justify 
their cause, though this is minor. 
 
5.3.7 VICTIM DESCRIPTIONS 
The counterinsurgent referred to the victims using a number of different terms, including the 
manifest units of ‘victim’, ‘civilian’, as ‘New Zealander’, as well as the latent unit of ‘expanded 
victims’. To be included an ‘expanded victim’ description needs to maximise the scope of the 
victims, either through use of numbers, such as Goff’s 2001 reference to the “more than 6000 
lives lost”, or by reference to the number of nationalities or different faiths, like his 2002 
explanation that “[t]hose who died came from 79 different countries, were of mixed age, gender, 
religion and ethnicity.” As will be examined below, these identifications are literal, nuanced, 
constricted, restrained and inclusive.  
                                                 




5.3.8 Table 1 – Victim descriptions, annual totals: 
Year victim civilian New Zealander expanded 
2001 1 1 2 4 
2002 7 4 6 9 
2003 2 1 1 4 
2004 1 1 2 3 
2005 - 2 2 2 
2006 1 1 - 1 
2007 - 1 1 1 
2008 - - - - 
2009 - - 7 - 
2010 - - 2 1 
2011 2 - 3 1 
Total  14 11 26 26 
 
5.3.8 Table 2 – Victim descriptions, context totals: 
Context victim civilian New Zealander expanded 
Event 7 4 3 10 
Wider 6 4 14 8 
Domestic 1 3 9 8 
 
CONTENT 
None of these was used with any consistency in either raw or ratio count, though the expanded 
victim came close. The most pronounced consistency issue was the dramatic increase of ‘New 
Zealander’ identifications by the National Government from 2009, despite none being killed by 
terrorism in those years. The reason for this rise is probably due a combination of reasons, firstly 
National’s focus on national rather than international security and because of the nature of a 
long campaign. The National Party is ideologically ‘Realist’ and have a greater focus on national 
security and less faith in international security arrangements, meaning that an emphasis on NZ 
victims is to be expected.167 However, while this may have played role it is also likely that issues 
of continuing to mobilise support for a long campaign may have lead to the increase in this 
framing. National came to power seven years after the 9/11 attacks, to ensure domestic support 
they need to maintain the immediacy of these attacks many years after the event and framing 
victims as New Zealanders provides this sense of immediacy. With regard to the context 
hypothesis, none of these were given more to a domestic audience than wider in either raw or 
ratio form, which is probably due to their focus on identifying victims, which means they would 
be used more after events.  
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These ‘victim’ identifications are credible. They are all self-evident descriptions that have an 
undeniable fidelity, those killed and injured were ‘victims’ as they had “been attacked, injured, 
robbed, or killed by someone else”.168 Likewise, they were ‘civilians’ as they were “not a member 
of the military”.169 The counterinsurgent was very careful not to identify ‘New Zealanders’ as 
‘victims’ unless they were sure, after 9/11 Anderton stated he was getting “the earliest possible 
definitive advice about New Zealanders who may have been caught up in this tragedy” and NZ 
was similarly cautious after every event.170 Finally, the reference to the expanded victim 
identification is also a credible description, as the counterinsurgent either gives the exact 
numbers killed and injured (15 times out of 28) and their nationalities – at least as they were 
known at the time – or used phrasing that implies a certain scope that cannot be discredited. All 
of these examples are literal descriptions of the ‘victims’, delivering an identification that has 
unimpeachable fidelity.  
 
These identifications are also particularly accurate and informative for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the term ‘civilian’ conveys a vital component of terrorist attacks: that they target non-
combatants. This is accurate and informative as it is one of the underlying mechanisms that 
empowers terrorist attacks. ‘Civilian’ also helps confer agency on the enemy as the ‘victims’ have 
been targeted for this reason – by labelling them as having this quality the counterinsurgent is 
also suggesting that the enemy chose ‘civilians’ for this reason. Also, referring to ‘victims’ as 
‘New Zealanders’ humanises the ‘victims’, ‘giving them a face’. Likewise, labelling the expanded 
description of the victims provides useful detail, specifically helping identify the number, 
nationality and faith of the ‘victims’. This, in turn, communicates the indiscriminate targeting of 
terrorist attacks, thus, that some of the victims may have been Arab or Muslim. As well as 
providing useful information, they all do so in a constricted manner, each portrays the ‘victims’ 
in a limited manner that does not amplify any quality beyond accuracy. Even the expanded 
victim constricts as it often quantifies the number killed and even when it does not it still refers 
to the scale of the victims in a manner that has fidelity.  
 
AUDIENCE 
The terms ‘victim’ and ‘civilian’ would probably have an experiential commensurability for the 
insurgent support population, their credibility and accuracy are unimpeachable. However, there 
                                                 
168 ‘Victim’: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/victim 
169 ‘Civilian’: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/civilian  
170 Anderton, “Ministerial Statement: Terrorist attacks in US.” 
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is a slight danger that the focus on domestic victims could alienate some insurgents. The issue 
here is that there is a perception that the West only cares about their own victims, that they are 
indifferent to the suffering of the Muslim and Arab populations.171 This is a perception backed 
up by coverage in many Western states; as Alberts’ writes, “most of America’s dominant media 
pay little mind to the victims of U.S. aggression.”172 This in turn reinforces the insurgent grand 
narrative that the West is self-serving and hypocritical, justifying the insurgent cause and 
excluding the support population from the counterinsurgent’s cause. This would be somewhat 
balanced out by the expanded descriptions, though only a couple specifically refer to religion. 
This is a missed opportunity by the counterinsurgent for, as McCabe writes, one of al Qaeda’s 
biggest failures was its “indifference to Muslim casualties” as “[s]uch behavior has probably been 
the predominant factor in alienating Middle East Muslims, who, while frequently having no 
particular objections to non-Muslims, especially westerners, Israelis, or Indians, being killed, 
react vehemently when they are the target. Thus, al Qaeda and the jihadis have at times alienated 
potential and actual sympathizers.”173 McCabe’s recommendation is “to emphasize the human 
cost associated with jihadi atrocities, especially as it impacts innocent Muslims. We need to 
develop an information campaign that puts a human face on the victims.”174 This is something 
that Hunt et al. and Gompert all recommend as well.175 Nevertheless, these all control emotion 
as they are restrained in their tone and scope, providing a nuanced and constricted labelling of 
the ‘victims’. Thus, they are all being inclusive, especially the expanded victim, and would help 
the counterinsurgent’s legitimacy.  
 
The term ‘victim’ would match the domestic audience’s experience, particularly immediately after 
attacks, especially the visceral images of the ‘victims’ themselves. However, ‘civilian’ probably 
would not have the same degree of fidelity as it is a more technical term. The identification of 
‘New Zealanders’ as ‘victims’ would have a powerful salience, Loewenstein and Small list 
proximity and in-group similarity/shared nationality as key factors in eliciting sympathy for 
victims, explain that proximity “tends to increase sympathy toward victims who are in other ways 
sympathy-evoking, whereas distance tends to decrease it” and that research “on intergroup 
relations and social categorization consistently finds that people care more about others in their 
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in-group than in their out-group”.176 The expanded identification would probably have less 
appeal than the identification of ‘New Zealand victims’. With respect to emotion, all could 
actually increase fear. ‘Victim’ and ‘civilian’ could increase fear as they imply a degree of 
‘innocence’ that suggests the domestic audience could themselves one day be in the same 
position. Both ‘New Zealanders as victims’ and the expanded description have the same impact, 
but in a more direct manner, with the former the more direct of the two. These terms all help to 
reduce confusion by labelling the ‘victims’ using credible and accurate terms that provide useful 
information. While this would help reduce concern regarding the counterinsurgent’s capability, 
overall, all four of these have negative impacts on the perception of the counterinsurgent’s 
capability as they imply that the counterinsurgent was unable to protect the expanded ‘victims’, 
particularly those from ‘New Zealand’. Because of the identification of non-combatant status 
and shared nationality, they would help direct anger. The most powerful mobilising identification 
is that ‘New Zealanders’ were victims as it makes the situation more immediate and personal. All, 
however, have a high mobilising capacity. Also, the terms ‘civilian’ and ‘victim’ have a justifying 
capacity as they both help delineate an ‘ideal victim’, which would help generate more 
compassion from the audience.177  
 
These terms would be salient for the allied audience. As already noted, the US Embassy had 
commented that ‘the lack of a geographic threat also enables Kiwis to view the world with a 
sense of detachment and a bit of moral superiority’ before noting an official had laughed at the 
thought of NZ ever needing US military assistance, which suggests that the reference to ‘New 
Zealanders as victims’ would appeal. Generally, the terms all fit into Bush’s original narrative, 
expanding the victim beyond the US and inferring an innocence, which means they would all 
justify the US cause. Also, because they all help mobilise support in the domestic population, 
they would be of utility for the US cause. Overall, these identifications would have a positive 
impact on the alliance  
 
5.3.9 ACTOR/VICTIM CONCLUSION 
The actor and victim identifications usage frequencies and ratio counts will now be examined, as 
well as the context usages.  
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5.3.9 Table 1 – Actor/Victim annual frequency totals and ratio counts: 
Year Actor/Victim Frequency Ratio 
2001 94 0.978 
2002 212 0.814 
2003 395 1.418 
2004 102 0780 
2005 146 1.143 
2006 243 0.843 
2007 228 0.992 
2008 28 0.886 
2009 102 0.710 
2010 58 0.980 
2011 92 0.675 
Total  1696 - 
 
It can be seen that the hypothesis that DCFs would be consistent over time was not well 
supported by the raw annual counts, which show that 2003 (402) had almost double the 
frequency of the next highest year, 2006 (245). This can be seen in the line graph below: 
 
 
However, these variations were largely evened out when the annual word counts were factored in 
for the ratio count. The line graph below shows how much closer these all were to each other 



























5.3.9 Table 2 – Actor/Victim context frequency totals and ratio counts: 
Context Frequency  Ratio  
Event 161 1.206 
Wider 631 1.018 
Domestic 904 0.881 
Total  1696 - 
 
The hypothesis that DCFs would be more commonly used to a domestic audience is supported 
by the raw frequencies for each, with the DCF actor and victim identifications accounting for 
53% of all uses and almost six times as likely to be given to a domestic audience than during an 









































Actor/Victim DCF raw count for each context 
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However, when the ratios are accounted for, these DCFs were more likely to be used during an 
event than to a domestic audience, though the difference between the three contexts is far less 






















This section will examine how DCFs were used to propose strategies and solutions. As with the 
other framing tasks, the main criteria was whether the strategy or solution was inclusive, though 
other areas were also influential. These strategy and solution DCFs cover a range of different 
aspects and while efforts to differentiate between strategies and solutions have been made, they 
lines are not always clear. In some cases, a single manifest unit can be both, such as ‘security’ or 
‘democracy’ and it can be difficult to disentangle how a term is being used. Also, strategies are 
frequently pitched as solutions; that is, the ‘way’ component of a strategy is framed as an ‘end’, 
either as a first step in achieving an objective or simply as a solution on its own.  
 
5.4.1 MILITARY SCOPE OF STRATEGY  
The counterinsurgent outlined a range of strategies with varying military scope using the 
manifest units ‘war’, ‘conflict’, ‘fight’, ‘military action’, ‘intervention’, ‘peacekeeping’ and 
‘mentoring’. While all of these terms are literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive, 
there were some issues that need to be explored.  
5.4.1 Table 1 – Military scope of strategies, annual totals: 
Year war conflict fight military action intervention peacekeeping mentoring 
2001 1 2 2 16 2 1 - 
2002 4 1 3 11 - 12 - 
2003 34 15 5 47 6 6 - 
2004 - - - 3 - - - 
2005 4 - - 1 - 5 - 
2006 - 3 1 5 - 3 - 
2007 - 4 1 2 14 5 - 
2008 - - - 2 - 2 - 
2009 1 1 1 - - 1 - 
2010  - - - - 1 - 
2011  - - 1 - - 3 
Total  44 26 13 88 22 36 3 
 
5.4.1 Table 2 – Military scope of strategies, context totals: 
Context war conflict fight military/action intervention peacekeeping mentoring 
Event 29 8 2 44 - 5 - 
Wider 10 7 5 18 9 13 - 
Domestic 5 11 6 26 13 18 3 
 
CONTENT  
Overall, none of these was used with any consistency. There was a spike in use for ‘war’, 
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‘conflict’ and ‘military/action’ in 2003, both in raw and ratio frequencies. This is explained by 
divide between terms used predominantly for Iraq and those used for the wider ICAT. 82% of 
uses of ‘war’, 69% of uses of ‘conflict’ and 53% of uses of ‘military/ action’ were for Iraq (all 6 
uses of ‘invasion’ were also all in reference to Iraq but did not meet the DCF threshold) . In 
contrast, 85% of uses of ‘intervention’, 89% of uses of ‘peacekeeping’, 100% of uses of ‘fight’ 
and 100% of uses of ‘mentoring’ were all for Afghanistan and the wider ICAT. With regard to 
contexts, ‘conflict’, ‘fight’, ‘intervention’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘mentoring’ were all given more to a 
domestic than wider audience as raw counts, which fits with their reference to Afghanistan, 
though only ‘mentoring’ fitted this hypothesis in ratio count.  
 
Technically, these strategies are all correct, they are literal descriptions of the actions the 
counterinsurgent took during the ICAT. The term ‘war’ specifically refers to regular interstate 
conflict, which in some respects both Afghanistan and Iraq were. It is also undeniable that both 
theatres involved ‘fighting’, ‘conflict’, ‘military/ action’ and ‘peacekeeping’, use of these terms for 
either is credible. Even the term ‘mentoring’ is impossible to discredit as it could apply to 
virtually any action where the counterinsurgent’s forces were training another, all the way up to 
working with them in combat, which was the case.  
 
However, as the consistency usages show, there are some major accuracy issues. While in the 
abstract these terms provide nuance, the way the counterinsurgent used them was somewhat 
obscurant. In virtually every example, the counterinsurgent used the more bellicose strategy to 
refer to Iraq and the less belligerent strategy to refer to Afghanistan and the wider ICAT despite 
only being involved in the latter in a military role and despite their involvement in the latter 
lasting far longer. This reduces the accuracy, and thus the nuance, of these strategies as rather 
than being used to help differentiate between types of operations they were being used in a 
political manner to constrict the military nature of NZ operations in Afghanistan. Thus, while 
they are not nuanced, they are constricted, which is how the counterinsurgent uses them. 
Certainly, it could be argued that the UN Mandate for Afghanistan made it a different operation 
to Iraq, but there was still ‘fighting’, ‘conflict’ and ‘military action’ in the former and the terms 
‘invasion’ and ‘intervention’ do not convey the difference of mandated and non-mandated. The 
danger for the counterinsurgent is that a say-do gap may appear, when reality no longer matches 
rhetoric. While NZ was only involved in Iraq in a non-military role, the PRTs were combined 
operations that involved aspects across the spectrum from humanitarian assistance to ‘military’ 
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operations, though many believe the ‘soft’ component was a front for the military operation.178 
For many years, there was no say-do gap, beyond the works of those highly critical of NZ’s 
actions in Afghanistan.179 However, it was the term ‘mentoring’ that exposed the lack of accuracy 
of the counterinsurgent’s terminology. This gap is clear in the differing positions of Prime 
Minister Key who “defended the use of the word ‘mentoring’ to describe the role of the New 
Zealand SAS Afghanistan alongside the Afghan Crisis Response Unit – and appeared to be at 
odds with his defence minister, Wayne Mapp, who... conceded there was a “substantial combat 
component” in the SAS role.”180 The say-do gap meant that the head of the NZDF had to admit 
that “[t]he term mentoring does need explanation”.181 The counterinsurgent used the term to try 
to control perceptions of the nature of the operation, rather than using an informative term that 
represented the situation in a manner that enabled understanding. As Trotter writes: 
“‘Mentoring’: it’s such a reassuring – and decidedly non-military – expression.”182 
 
AUDIENCE 
The more belligerent strategies would fit the more extreme supporter’s narrative of the West as 
an invader, while terms like ‘peacekeeping’ would probably not appeal as they would be 
perceived as a euphemism for occupation. That said, the less belligerent strategies may help 
control emotion better by neutralising this narrative, but as they have been used here there is 
some potential for problems. The more bellicose would help control anger as they were used to 
by NZ to oppose the Iraq Invasion. The main issues and risks lie with the perception of a say-do 
gap, particularly for those with direct experience that does not match NZ’s framing, which could 
anger the insurgent support population, delegitimising the counterinsurgent’s cause and 
legitimising the enemy’s. As has been noted, the enemy has referred to the hypocrisy of the West 
and the political use of these strategies to obscure the military aspect of operations in 
Afghanistan, of portraying the action there as an ‘intervention’ rather than an ‘invasion’ could 
provoke anger.  
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The less belligerent strategies would have a greater salience for the NZ audience, appealing to the 
core values and fitting the national narrative. A 2010 poll found that while 72% of New 
Zealanders supported the PRT, only 47% supported the upcoming deployment of the SAS.183 In 
their article on NZ foreign policy and public opinion Headley and Retizig write that both Clark 
and Key’s actions in the past decade or so have proven that both have “been favourable to the 
idea of ‘humanitarian intervention’, [and] sceptical about ‘regime change’”, which effectively 
reflects the divide examined here.184 NZ used the dislike of the more bellicose strategies to help 
them denigrate the US-led invasion in Iraq. These strategies would have certain key impacts on 
emotion. Immediately after 9/11, the more belligerent would probably have exacerbated fear as 
they imply that the threat is more serious. However, they are better at reducing confusion as they 
delineate the situation in a more clear cut and comprehensible manner. The reason for this is that 
using force to combat force is more intuitive than using a range of ‘soft’ options. This, in turn, 
means that the bellicose strategies would help reduce concern about the counterinsurgent’s 
capabilities, though this would change over time as the less bellicose strategies have a better 
congruency with the deliberative problem and blame identifications that became more common 
over the ICAT. Finally, the more bellicose strategies direct anger more as they fit with the 
reactive problem and blame identifications and the use of force implies greater guilt than less 
bellicose strategies do. With such high levels of public support for the less belligerent strategies, 
their use would help to justify the counterinsurgent’s cause, though, as noted, in the early years 
of the ICAT the more bellicose would have also probably helped with mobilisation. However, as 
occurred in 2010-2011, there is the danger that use of the less belligerent terms in an arena that 
includes a high degree of combat could result in a say-do gap, which could in turn compromise 
the justness of the counterinsurgent’s cause. As Trotter said at the time of the NZSAS deaths, it 
has become “increasingly clear that whether our SAS troopers are engaged in operations initiated 
by ISAF, or the Taliban, the role they play is very far from that of the passive advisor. On the 
contrary, all the evidence emerging from Afghanistan suggests that our SAS leads from the front, 
and that such Afghan Government support as may be found in these operations is located (how 
to say this politely?) at some distance from the action.”185 Buchanan also voiced scepticism at the 
time of the deaths, referring to the actions of one of those killed as not just as ‘combat’ but as a 
first responder and then saying that “raises the question as to why Mr. Key has from the day he 
announced the re-deployment insisted that the SAS are in a non-combat ‘mentoring’ and support 
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role.”186 He goes on to note the “lack of synchronization of the government PR spin” with 
regard to Key and Mapp’s conflicting statements.187 In her pro-Key piece, Coddington admits 
that “Stephenson possibly has a point – mentoring is a strange word, since the SAS’ work, by 
definition, is dangerous”.188 This could also damage the justness of the counterinsurgent cause, 
and the duplicity may lead some of the domestic population to question the legitimacy of the 
government as a counterinsurgent.  
 
In general, NZ’s overemphasis on less belligerent strategies would lack salience for the US, with 
a 2006 cable stating that Labour were “ideologically drawn to a peace-keeping role”, that there 
has been “a costly decision” to “reorient the NZDF from a combat into a peacekeeping force in 
line with the goals of Labour” and that the government “seems most heavily focused” on 
“multilateral peace support and humanitarian operations”.189 As has already been noted, the US 
were generally disappointed with NZ foreign policy and strategy, especially the unwillingness to 
maintain their military capability and the use of less belligerent terms exacerbates this outcome.190 
The belligerent strategies would have a greater appeal in the abstract as they fit with the ‘war on 
terror’ narrative, though NZ’s use of terms like ‘invasion’ with regard to Iraq suggests that in 
context they would not have appealed as these terms were being used to portray US actions 
negatively to the NZ public. Therefore, neither of these types of strategies helps justify the US 
cause or provides alliance maintenance.  
 
5.4.2 COLLECTIVE STRATEGIES 
The counterinsurgent referred to the need for a collective strategy. The two most common 
forms of this latent unit were either for calls for a ‘multilateral’ strategy where states ‘work 
together’, or the counterinsurgent emphasised the importance of the ‘UN’ when acting 
‘multilaterally’. The analysis here will examine any strategy that outlines the need for the allied 
actors to solve the problem in a collective manner, or, at the least, references the international 
scope, either specifically referring to the ‘UN’ or ‘multilaterally’. With regard to the ‘UN’ strategy, 
this can include references to the ‘Security Council’ as well as ‘mandates’ and ‘resolutions’. As 
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will be shown, these strategies are literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive.  
 
5.4.2 Table 1 – Collective strategies, annual totals: 
Year multilateral UN 
2001 25 11 
2002 29 21 
2003 22 51 
2004 10 5 
2005 9 9 
2006 15 8 
2007 10 6 
2008 3 2 
2009 2 - 
2010 2 2 
2011 - 1 
Total  127 116 
 
5.4.2 Table 2 – Collective strategies, context totals: 
Context multilateral UN 
Event 23 29 
Wider 46 43 
Domestic 58 44 
 
CONTENT  
Neither of these strategies was used with consistency over the period for either raw or ratio 
counts. The multilateral strategies were used predominantly in the first three years in both 
counts, while the ‘UN’-focused strategies spiked in 2003 for both counts. There was a significant 
drop in usage for both when National took power that was probably due to their ideological 
preference for ‘traditional’ security and bilateral relations. The dramatic rise of ‘UN’ strategies 
during 2003, occurred when NZ was opposing US unilateralism in Iraq and over the whole 
period, 22% of all these two strategies were used to oppose the Iraq Invasion.  
 
Collective strategies are credible, there was a huge unity of effort in the years after 9/11 and 
emphasising the need to ‘work together’, either ‘multilaterally’ or through the ‘UN’ is a literal 
description of useful strategy.191 They are also credible because NZ has a long-standing 
commitment to “conflict and dispute resolution, human rights, environmental change, limits on 
commercial whaling and a number of other important policy areas in multinational fora”; in 
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essence, they are backed up by NZ’s history of collective action.192 The specific strategies ranged 
from the colloquial ‘work together’ through to more technical strategies, such as Goff’s 2001 
statement that “[m]ultilateral action and cooperation on a wider front is also necessary if we are 
to be successful in removing the threat of terrorism”; all refer to the collective strategy in a 
manner that clearly describes the ‘multilateral’ nature of the strategy.  
 
These strategies are also accurate, as they deliver important information regarding the 
counterinsurgent’s response to the threat, either explaining that the international community 
needs to ‘work together’ or that the ‘UN’ is an important body for implementing solutions. They 
are also informative, as the need for a ‘multilateral’ response to insurgency is a central axiom of 
COIN; generally speaking the more states acting together, the more politically, militarily and 
economically effective the COIN campaign.193 Equally important, multilateralism adds 
legitimacy: a “broad multilateral COIN can impart legitimacy... to COIN, internationally, at 
home, and to some extent in the countries facing insurgency.”194 While the different strategies 
vary in specificity, even the most basic ‘work together’ (45 times) captures the essence of the 
collective strategy in a pithy phrase that provides insight. At the more technical and detailed end, 
statements like Goff’s 2004 one that “[i]nternational action, however, should take place within 
the UN Charter and multilaterally through a proper decision making process” provide even 
greater nuance, while also constricting the solution by bounding it within international law and 
governance structures that refine the counterinsurgent’s intent and channel of action. This 
statement is also one of the many that serves as a method of opposing US unilateralism in Iraq 
and shows how the counterinsurgent is able to use a strategy to indirectly oppose another 
strategy in a highly nuanced and constricted manner. In general, all of these strategies are 
informative and constricted in their scope.  
 
AUDIENCE 
These strategies would be salient for the insurgent support population. The less extreme would 
feel included by these strategies as their states are part of the UN, while for the more extreme, 
these would appeal to their belief the West always ‘works together’. From the lead up to Iraq on, 
NZ’s references to the ‘UN’-oriented strategies would have a strong appeal as they would have 
fitted most of the audience’s narrative of the situation. Surveys of Muslim majority states in 2002 
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and 2003 found widespread anger regarding US unilateralism.195 Thus, both sets of strategies 
control emotion in the insurgent support population because they describe the response in a 
restrained manner that involved the support population and, because of this, they have a positive 
impact on the justness of NZ’s cause. In particular, its ongoing use of this solution as a means to 
oppose US unilateralism delivers the biggest justification, and consequently, legitimisation 
benefits with this audience.  
 
These strategies are highly salient for the domestic audience as the NZ narrative is one of a 
country that works collectively.196 By describing the collective nature of the response the 
counterinsurgent is ensuring it will fit with this deeply held narrative. As Headley and Reitzig 
write, “[a]pproval of New Zealand contributing towards UN peacekeeping has been high for 
some time—for example, in 1994, there was 88 percent support [and that a] number of 
individual polls have also shown that New Zealanders are favourable towards the concept of 
‘humanitarian intervention’”.197 However, while they would appeal in general, as a WikiLeaks 
cable noted, Clark was “willing to address [intelligence] targets of marginal benefit to New 
Zealand that could do her political harm if made public”, suggesting there are limits to this 
appeal as Clark hid ‘working together’ when it tied NZ too closely to the US agenda.198 These 
strategies reduce fear as they connect with the collective actor and give the appearance that the 
counterinsurgent is acting with the majority to implement solutions. This may not address 
confusion as it makes the imbalance of power between the allied actor and the enemy so big that 
it suggests the attacks should have been predicted and prevented. Likewise, while acting in 
concert does confer a degree of capacity, this same capacity does suggest that the 
counterinsurgent is not as competent as they are portraying. These strategies do not direct anger 
either. Overall, these have a low mobilisation potential as they make the threat seem small in 
comparison to the response, though they do justify the response as they fit within NZ’s national 
narrative.  
 
These strategies would be theoretically salient for the US as they fit their general narrative, and 
after 9/11 they probably were. As Goff noted after his visit to Washington on the 27th of 
September, 2001, NZ’s offer to ‘work together’ was “hugely appreciated” by the administration, 
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most probably, it is contended, because having as many allies as possible would reinforce the 
legitimacy of their cause in NZ and beyond.199 While the US referred to NZ support, they did 
not actually need it in Afghanistan early on, as Hager noted senior military personnel had to 
lobby the US to be included and when the SAS arrived there was little for them to do.200 As a US 
reporter noted, the SAS “seemed to exist as much for public relations... as it did for any military 
necessity.”201 However, they are also considered highly problematic for NZ-US relations. As 
already noted, the US believed that “the current government’s view of multilateralism [was] a 
means to limit U.S. power”.202 Another cable from 2005 explained, in reference to Afghanistan, 
that NZ “officials have clearly defined these efforts to the New Zealand public as multilateral 
initiatives, with only the most tentative of nods our way. We’d like that to change.”203 As these 
were expressed after Iraq, they are a clear statement that the US was not only aware of NZ’s use 
of these strategies as a means of opposing them, but found them troubling. Therefore, while they 
would have helped justify the US cause early on, by late 2002 these would not justify the US 
cause to the NZ audience and would not have aided the alliance.  
 
5.4.3 POLITICAL STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS 
The counterinsurgent referred to ‘democracy’ and ‘good governance’ as strategies and solutions. 
This section will examine all references to these political strategies and solutions. Any usage of 
these terms to refer to states other than Afghanistan or Iraq was discounted, as were references 
to ‘poor governance’ or a ‘lack of democracy’ as a problem, though general references to 
“promoting a stable, secure and prosperous world” through “good governance [and] 
democracy”, such as Goff did in 2002, were counted as one for each term.204 As will be 
examined, these solutions are literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive, though as will 
be shown there is an element of reactive.  
 
5.4.3 Table 1 – Political strategies and solutions, annual totals: 
Year democracy governance 
2001 1 - 
2002 4 2 
2003 6 4 
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2004 4 2 
2005 4 1 
2006 15 12 
2007 6 5 
2008 - - 
2009 1 4 
2010 - - 
2011 1 3 
Total  42 33 
 
5.4.3 Table 2 – Political strategies and solutions, context totals: 
Context democracy governance 
Event - - 
Wider 22 12 




Neither was used consistently for either raw or ratio. Rather, the usage for both spiked in 2006, 
one of the key years of rapprochement, which suggests NZ saw these political elements as 
strategically important for its relationship with the US. One interesting aspect of consistency is 
that the National Government used the term ‘governance’ far more than ‘democracy’, it is 
speculated that this is because they are more interested in the technical component of the 
solution than the idealistic. Labour, on the other hand, account for almost all the uses of 
‘democracy’ as a solution, which fits with their more idealistic and internationalist ideology. 
While ‘democracy’ was not used more in a domestic context for either count, ‘governance’ fitted 
the hypothesis in both raw and ratio. This may be explained by the former’s more idealistic tone 
and its possible appeal to the US.  
 
These are credible when given as strategies, as the counterinsurgent did actually apply 
‘democratising’ and ‘governance’ strategies. As solutions, they are questionable in their validity as 
it is debateable whether either Afghanistan or Iraq could be considered viable ‘democracies’ after 
the years of intensive efforts, with the 2012 Democracy Index ranking them at 152 and 113 
respectively, out of 167 states.205 Despite all the effort and resources, both countries are in the 
bottom third of ranked states, which suggests that over the period, this solution was not 
completely creditable.  
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The accuracy of these strategies and solutions depends on the degree to which the 
counterinsurgent outlines what is involved. The issue is that most did not go beyond use of the 
terms ‘democracy’ or ‘governance’ and when they did expand, it was often to state that NZ 
“supported democratic elections”.206 There were only a few instances where the counterinsurgent 
goes into any depth, such as Goff’s 2006 statement that “interventions while achieving stability 
do not by themselves establish political cultures which accept the rule of law, and respect 
authority deriving from democratic process. Establishing that culture, developing leadership 
capacity and putting in place sustainable economic and social development are longer term 
processes.”207 These types of descriptions deliver greater nuance.  
  
AUDIENCE 
These strategies and solutions have some saliency issues for the insurgent support population. It 
has been suggested that Islam and ‘democracy’ are a poor match.208 Countering that, a Pew 
Research survey found that “[s]olid majorities in Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan”, 
with numbers ranging from 61 % to 84%, want democracy.209 However, this does not account 
for the context. While Muslims may want democracy, they would rather it was ‘home grown’ 
instead of externally imposed. ‘Democracy’ has a pejorative aspect in some Muslim societies as it 
is associated with the imposition of Western liberal values and a resultant secularism and moral 
corruption.210 This impression is only enhanced when the ‘democracy’ is being forced on a state 
following an invasion. Thus, while ‘democracy’ may be salient in the abstract, as an enforced 
solution it is unlikely to appeal to their belief of how it should be achieved. It could even 
generate anger, as it not only has a hegemonic aspect that connects back to the Cold War, but 
there is an internal contradiction involved in forcing people to become democratic.211 This is 
backed up by a 2007 Pew survey, which found that the dominant opinion in Muslim majority 
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states was that the US “promotes democracy mostly where it serves its self-interest”.212 
Interestingly, this is a view shared by 63% of Americans.213 As the Revolutionary Association of 
the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) explains, “US governments have never brought “peace” 
and “democracy” in any country... [the] US and allies invaded our country under fine slogans of 
“democracy”... but today they are supporting and helping the dirtiest enemies of such values in 
Afghanistan.”214 Another possible cause of anger is that the term ‘democracy’ was a key 
component of Bush’s problem definition, such as his statement on September 12, 2001, that 
“[f]reedom and democracy are under attack”.215 This all suggests that the ‘democracy’ strategy 
and solution would not help justify the counterinsurgent’s cause and its inclusiveness is 
dependent on how independent NZ is perceived to be and how much impact of the idea of 
enforced ‘democracy’ has on the audience.  
 
These strategies and solutions would have limited appeal for the domestic audience, even though 
‘democracy’ is a key part of the NZ national identity, this is tempered by Headley and Reitzig’s 
findings that of nine foreign policy goals, ‘promoting democracy in other countries’ ranked 
lowest for New Zealanders.216 While New Zealanders are proud of their own democratic nature, 
it is not as popular as a strategy or solution. As Headley and Reitzig write, “the majority opposed 
the use of force to restore or establish democracy in undemocratic countries, suggesting 
scepticism about ‘regime change’.”217 This is something that the Deputy Prime Minister Cullen 
expressed at a meeting with the US in 2008, explaining that it is “difficult to establish a 
democracy in a country with such strong tribal traditions.”218 While these may help to control 
fear, they do little for confusion and the most important emotion they could generate is concern 
regarding the counterinsurgent’s competency as the domestic audience are not confident in 
imposing democracy. Overall, the political strategies and solutions would not direct anger. Thus, 
they are of little mobilisational use. The negative domestic perception of ‘democractising’ also 
means it would not positively impact the justness of the counterinsurgent cause.  
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The political strategies and solutions would be salient for the allied actor as this term is an 
important part of Bush’s original narrative, featuring as both a blame attribution and solution. 
During a 2006 meeting on Afghanistan, Rice stated that the US goal was “the ongoing 
transformation of Afghanistan from tyranny to democracy” and that their aim was “to empower 
the Afghan people to guarantee democracy’s enduring success – not just as a form of 
governance, but as a way of life.”219 NZ even made 3 references to “Bush's freedom and 
democracy agenda”, all in 2006.220 This would likely also aid in alliance maintenance as it justifies 
the US cause.  
 
5.4.4 HARD STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS  
The counterinsurgent referred to a group of similarly themed hard strategies and solutions, using 
the manifest units ‘secure/security’, ‘stable/stability’ and ‘peace’. This section will examine any 
references to these as solutions, either ways or ends, but will ignore when their absence or lack is 
used as problem identification, such as statements regarding “security issues” or a “lack of 
security”. As will be analysed, these strategies and solutions are literal, nuanced, constricted, 
restrained and inclusive, though ‘peace’ is borderline reactive.  
 
5.4.4 Table 1 – Hard strategies and solutions, annual totals: 
Year secure/security stable/stability peace 
2001 4 1 3 
2002 13 19 11 
2003 21 13 3 
2004 17 10 3 
2005 44 9 4 
2006 71 26 11 
2007 63 22 5 
2008 6 4 1 
2009 21 13 1 
2010 8 5 1 
2011 8 4 - 
Total  276 126 43 
 
5.4.4 Table 2 – Hard strategies and solutions, context totals: 
Context secure/security stable/stability peace 
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Event 3 6 3 
Wider 86 35 15 




‘Security’ and ‘stability’ were used relatively consistently, in both raw and ratio counts, though 
both were rarely used in 2001 and peaked during the years of rapprochement. This peak fits with 
the general understanding of the rapprochement and NZ’s desire to portray itself as a facilitator 
of ‘security’ and ‘stability’ at that time. ‘Peace’ showed a greater decline from an early peak, which 
fits with its borderline reactive nature. All three were used more to a domestic audience than a 
wider, in both ratio and raw form.  
 
These strategies and solutions are considered credible as the counterinsurgent did implement 
‘security’, ‘stability’ and ‘peace’ focused strategies and solutions during the ICAT. They are all 
literal descriptions of the strategies and solutions that the counterinsurgent was enacting, though 
‘peace’ was sometimes used in a manner close to figurative. The terms ‘security’ and ‘stability’ are 
accurate, as can be seen in Goff’s 2007 statement that NZ was working on “how best to achieve 
and sustain security and stability”.221 Goff connected the terms together and described them in a 
way that infers they not only need to be created but maintained, providing important details 
about both the counterinsurgent’s strategy and solution. The use of ‘peace’ was more 
problematic. At the more reactive end is Goff’s 2002 statement that “[w]e pray that out of the 
ashes of the World Trade Centre may arise... enduring peace.” This is mitigated by the way it is 
used the majority of the time, such as in statements like Goff’s in 2007 that NZ “had come to 
help them achieve peace and stability.”222 The 2002 example was given in New York during the 
first anniversary of 9/11, explaining why it has a more binary and exaggerated nature, but even 
this most reactive usage fits within the overall deliberative schema.  
 
AUDIENCE 
These strategies and solutions would probably appeal to the insurgent support population in the 
abstract, though they may be pessimistic about them in context of the ICAT. As RAWA write, 
the US “have never brought ‘peace’... in any country. It has only forced war on countless 
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countries, causing destruction, killing and disasters.”223 A 2013 survey of 65 countries found that 
the US was ranked as the ‘biggest threat to world peace’ amongst Muslim-majority states.224 
Thus, they are likely to have a mixed appeal when given by NZ as this perception could anger 
the insurgent support population, suggesting that in practice these strategies and solutions are 
not that restrained. That said, as will be discussed later, they are not just restrained and inclusive 
in abstract but can be used in a manner that specifically emphasises inclusiveness, such as Goff’s 
2007 example above, where NZ wants to “help them achieve peace”.  
 
These strategies and solutions have a natural appeal to New Zealanders, not just because of the 
innate self-desire for ‘peace’ but also because promotion of these strategies and solutions has 
long been a part of the national narrative and they fit within the various ‘very important’ and 
‘quite important’ foreign policy goals Headley and Reitzig identified amongst the NZ 
population.225 They are strategies and solutions that reduce potential for fear as they offer 
relatively glib but positive sounding ‘ways’ and ‘ends’. However, they do not seem to address 
confusion in any decisive manner. Nor do they have any major positive outcome for the 
counterinsurgent’s apparent capacity or for directing anger at the counterinsurgent. Thus, these 
do not deliver a high degree of mobilisation but they would confer long term justification and 
legitimacy as they fit into New Zealanders’ expected view of how their country should act as a 
counterinsurgent.  
 
While ‘peace’ fits Bush’s original narrative, the other two do not. However, they would probably 
still appeal because, as discussed, the US believed NZ was not focused enough on ‘security’ and 
these ‘hard’ solutions would help ameliorate US concerns. That said, they do not help mobilise 
the NZ audience and they do not justify the US cause to the same degree as the reactive 
narrative, so they would have a limited utility for the US and would have a relatively neutral 
impact on the alliance.  
 
5.4.5 SOFT STRATGIES AND SOLUTIONS 
The counterinsurgent also used soft strategies and solutions; specifically the manifest units: 
‘reconstruction’, ‘development’, ‘humanitarian’ assistance and ‘human rights’. This section will 
consider all uses of these terms as strategies and solutions, though it will not include references 
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that identify the lack of these as problems, such as references to a ‘lack of development’ or 
‘human rights issues’. As will be examined, these are literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and 
inclusive, though there are some issues. 
 
5.4.5 Table 1 – Soft strategies and solutions, annual totals: 
Year reconstruction development humanitarian human rights 
2001 - - 5 2 
2002 5 15 13 5 
2003 43 3 33 4 
2004 7 6 5 9 
2005 8 22 2 - 
2006 6 26 2 13 
2007 3 25 1 6 
2008 1 1 4 1 
2009 8 8 - 1 
2010 1 2 - 1 
2011 - - - - 
Total  82 108 65 42 
 
5.4.5 Table 2 – Soft strategies and solutions, context totals: 
Context reconstruction development humanitarian human rights 
Event 5 3 11 - 
Wider 20 24 16 9 
Domestic 57 81 38 33 
 
CONTENT 
None of these were used with consistency, all spiking in different years. For ‘reconstruction’ and 
‘humanitarian’ the spike was 2003, in both raw and ratio count. This was due to their use for 
Iraq, with 30 of the 43 uses of the former and 32 of the 33 of the latter in 2003 given with 
respect to Iraq. NZ appeared to be using these terms to differentiate from the ‘hard’ US 
solutions. The other two peaked during the years of rapprochement, in both raw and ratio 
counts, suggesting they were used strategically as a means of positioning NZ as a serious alliance 
partner. All four fitted the hypothesis regarding the context, being given to a domestic audience 
more than a wider one, both in raw and ratio counts. 
 
These identification are considered credible; ‘reconstruction’ and ‘development’ can encompass a 
huge range of strategies and solutions elements, from economic to social to political, from 
infrastructure to schools to legal systems, all of which NZ were involved with to some degree in 
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Afghanistan, and, to a lesser extent, Iraq.226 Likewise, ‘humanitarian’ assistance and ‘human 
rights’ have a broad scope of reference, covering the promotion of human welfare and social 
reforms, which NZ did during the ICAT, and the solution of a state that respects ‘human 
rights’.227  
 
These strategies and solutions are all relatively accurate. They all provide nuance, offering a range 
of specific actions and objectives that encompass ‘nation building’ and ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ operations – these are terms that are a part of the internationalist lexicon and their 
use during the counterinsurgency provides details about what the counterinsurgent is doing as a 
component of their overarching solution that fits into these common state intervention activities. 
This is furthered enhanced when the counterinsurgent explains what they are doing, such as 
Goff’s 2006 statement that “[r]ecent reconstruction work includes rehabilitation and provision of 
roads and bridges, and construction of district police stations and provision of police 
vehicles.”228 The nuance is also enhanced when the counterinsurgent uses modifiers to specify 
what the ‘reconstruction’ and ‘development’ are focused on. For example, the term 
‘reconstruction’ becomes more constricted if it is referred to as ‘civil reconstruction’, which 
occurred 7 times, as does ‘development’ when it is referred to as ‘economic development’, which 
occurred 15 times. Finally, nuance is also provided when the counterinsurgent explains that there 
are issues with these solutions, such as Clark’s 2007 statement that “post-conflict stabilisation 
and reconstruction will rarely follow a positive linear trend.”229 That said, when these terms are 
used without any extra description or specific modifiers they can be somewhat vague and thus 
are not as constricted. However, they are considered relatively informative and even without the 
modifiers or descriptions of specific activities these strategies and solutions label the 
counterinsurgent’s actions in a nuanced and, if not constricted then, unexaggerated manner. 
Even when the counterinsurgent does not specify the scope of the strategy or solution, it has an 
inherently limited nature for one particular reason: the name of the deployment in Afghanistan is 
the ‘Provincial Reconstruction Team’ and though these references are not counted here they 
help to provide context for the scope of the ‘reconstruction’ and ‘development’, i.e. it is at the 
provincial level. These strategies and solutions are also informative, as they are central COIN 
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principles – Tujan et al. explain that ‘reconstruction’ and ‘development’ are crucial to the success 
of a COIN campaign.230 Similarly, Mansoor emphasises that while security is key to achieving 
aims, ‘humanitarian assistance’ is critical for winning ‘hearts and minds’.231 
 
AUDIENCE 
While these strategies and solutions would be salient in the abstract, as they all components the 
insurgent support population would believe in, there are some potential negative implications in 
application. In particular, the term ‘development’ is a western concept that is a priori good.232 
Thus, it would not necessarily appeal to the insurgent audience, not because they are ‘anti-
development’ in the purely semantic sense but that the externally imposed and controlled 
Western ‘development’ would not appeal. Also important, as already noted many of the 
insurgent support population blame the West, and the US in particular, for the lack of economic 
development experienced in many Muslim countries means these terms may not match. 
Likewise, the term ‘reconstruction’ carries with it an implied destruction, which in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq was at least partly caused by the counterinsurgents. Thus, when specifically 
given by a Western state towards a predominantly Muslim state, the sense of anger many 
Muslims feel would mean that they may not appeal. They would not associate Western states 
with progressive ‘development’ or ‘human rights’ but rather with the retardation of 
‘development’ and suppression of ‘human rights’. This all depends on how closely the various 
aspects of the audience associate NZ with the US and how clearly delineated NZ is as a 
‘sovereign actor with an independent view’, but as above it is contended that for many the 
counterinsurgent is too closely allied with the US for ‘development’ to have a positive impact. 
Another issue is that for those actually in Afghanistan the emergence of a say-do gap would have 
been nearly instant as NZ counterinsurgents began referring to ‘development assistance’ and 
‘humanitarian aid’ before any of these solutions had occurred.233 This would have got worse over 
time, as evident in RAWA’s 2009 report: “There is no sight of reconstruction despite the jaw-
dropping 32 billion dollars of aid.”234 In reference to the ‘humanitarian’ aspect of the solution, 
the same report explains that while “Western media created a lot of hype about the so-called 
“liberation of Afghan women”... in fact, shamefully, the situation of women has got worse in the 
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past eight years.”235 However, while these have the capacity to evoke negative emotions they are 
not inherently exclusive and, as with ‘security’, ‘stability’ and ‘peace’, can be used in an explicitly 
inclusive manner, such as Goff’s 2004 statement that “NZ will continue to work with Iraq on 
reconstruction and humanitarian needs.”236 Overall, they help justify the counterinsurgent cause 
as they are relatively inclusive and have positive connotations.  
 
These strategies and solutions would be salient for the majority of the domestic audience as they 
fit the country’s internationalist national narrative and appeal to core beliefs.237 Headley and 
Reitzig’s study of NZ opinions found that ‘promoting human rights abroad’ was the second 
most important foreign policy goal behind ‘strengthening the New Zealand economy’, while 
‘improving standards of living in poor countries’ was fifth, confirming the belief that these would 
appeal to most New Zealanders.238 As they conclude, a “number of individual polls have also 
shown that New Zealanders are favourable towards the concept of ‘humanitarian 
intervention’”.239 They are key goals of the UN, as evidenced by the 2000 Millennium 
Declaration and consequent five year progress report, ‘In Larger Freedom: Toward Security, 
Development and Human Rights for All’.240 These strategies and solutions, then, help limit fear 
as they describe positive outcomes that encompass a wide range of actions. They also help 
reduce confusion as they suggest a lack of these qualities are to blame for the situation, which 
connects with deliberative blame attributions. They would probably have a mixed impact on 
competency as while they are credible, fit with the NZ national narrative and attributions, these 
were existing issues which suggests the counterinsurgent should have been able to predict and 
prevent attacks. They do not direct anger at the enemy but rather deflecting it by connecting with 
these easily parsed grievances. In general, they do not provide powerful mobilisation but would 
help justify the counterinsurgent’s cause, not just because it is a part of the national narrative, but 
because it is a key goal of the UN. One issue is that there is a possibility for a say-do gap, though 
admittedly with strategies and solutions as vague as these it is less likely than in other solutions. 
As Hager outlines, the ‘development assistance’ that was being conducted at the time of Goff’s 
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speech was, at best, limited and incompetent and, at worst, deceptive, as some of the work was 
focused on ‘quick fix’ jobs to assist military operations rather than long term projects to aid 
Afghanis.241  
 
In general, these terms fit the US narrative as they cast the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq 
in a positive manner. They also fit with the US narrative of their unique record of post-conflict 
‘reconstruction’, from Germany and Japan after World War Two through to Korea.242 However, 
there are two issues; first, NZ used ‘reconstruction’ and ‘humanitarian’ assistance frequently to 
outline their opposition to the Iraq Invasion. Second, any salience would be tempered by 
ongoing US irritation at NZ’s desire to emphasise its ‘humanitarian’ action over military 
solutions.243 Thus, while ostensibly these would have a positive impact on the justness of the US 
cause, in fact, they may not have a positive impact on the alliance.  
 
5.4.6 DIALOGUE STRATEGIES 
The counterinsurgent also used a number of dialogue-focused strategies using the manifest units 
of ‘diplomacy’ ‘dialogue’, ‘discuss’, ‘discussion’ or ‘tolerance’. The solution of ‘tolerance’ is 
included here as it was often listed as resulting from the ‘dialogue’ strategy, such as Goff’s 2004 
statement that an interfaith “meeting will encourage leaders to come together to discuss how 
they, and we, can promote tolerance, mutual respect and harmony between people of difference 
religion, cultures and ethnic origins”.244 These are literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and 
inclusive, as will be shown.  
 
5.4.6 Table 1 – Dialogue strategies, annual totals: 
Year dialogue diplomacy tolerance 
2001 - 5 - 
2002 - 3 1 
2003 - 10 2 
2004 8 - 2 
2005 2 5 1 
2006 5 11 - 
2007 8 4 2 
2008 - - - 
2009 - 2 - 
2010 - - - 
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2011 2 - - 
Total  25 40 8 
 
5.4.6 Table 2 – Dialogue strategies, context totals: 
Context dialogue diplomacy tolerance 
Event - 13 2 
Wider 8 12 2 
Domestic 17 15 4 
 
CONTENT 
None of these was used with any real consistency in either raw or ratio count, and all essentially 
disappeared by 2008, which fits with National’s focus on traditional security. Both ‘dialogue’ and 
‘diplomacy’ spiked during the years of rapprochement, suggesting NZ believed they gave them 
credibility as an alliance partner. With regard to the context hypothesis, only ‘dialogue’ was used 
more to a domestic than wider audience in both raw and ratio counts, while the other two only 
matched as a raw count.  
 
These are credible as all literal references to a specific set of strategies that encompass ‘dialogue’ 
actions, NZ was engaged in ‘dialogue’ strategies during the ICAT, from UN-based approaches to 
specific interfaith conferences to bilateral negotiations. The ‘dialogue’ and ‘tolerance’ references 
are accurate, particularly as they are almost all descriptive, referring to specific forums and 
connecting ‘dialogue’ to outcomes such as ‘tolerance’; as well as the above example, this can be 
seen in Clark’s 2007 statement about “a range of regional and global processes have been put in 
place to build greater tolerance and understanding. In our region, there is the Asia Pacific 
Regional Interfaith Dialogue.”245 These strategies provide detail not just on what the 
counterinsurgent is doing but how it can impact the problem, delivering nuance. They are also 
constricted as they are presented in a manner that never oversells the outcome or exaggerates the 
importance. While the counterinsurgent rarely explained what the ‘diplomatic’ actions were, 
these are still accurate as ‘diplomacy’ is a self-evident term that is able to convey the types of 
strategies being implemented. Contained within the term is a set of implied details, including 
diplomats, embassies, meetings, negotiations, compromises and agreements, that are all implicit. 
Thus, when the term is used by the counterinsurgent it outlines a specific set of actors and 
processes that provide nuance. This is particularly potent when NZ used this term as a means of 
opposing the Iraq Invasion, such as Clark’s 2003 statement that “[w]e have a strong preference 
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for a diplomatic solution to the crisis.”246 There is more layered information contained within the 
term ‘diplomatic’ compared to the military strategies. The ‘diplomatic’ strategy is also constricted 
as it is never given in a manner that implies any scale or scope, but rather is usually given as a 
component of a wider strategy, such as Peters’ 2006 statement that “New Zealand’s response to 
these challenges of state failure, in our neighbourhood and beyond, must encompass the full 
range of diplomatic, military and development tools.”247 They are also informative as the various 
‘dialogue’ approaches are a key principle of a successful COIN campaign, with COIN 




The ‘dialogue’ strategies would be salient for the insurgent support population, as they infer 
negotiation and compromise. However, while ‘dialogue’ and ‘tolerance’ are relatively generic, 
‘diplomacy’ may encounter some issues as there is a widely held belief amongst Muslims that 
bodies like the UN are vehicles for US foreign policy, and the ongoing issues with the Oslo 
Peace Accords mean that in practice ‘diplomacy’ may not have hold much appeal for the 
insurgent audience.249 That said, the use of this strategy to oppose the Iraq Invasion would match 
their experience and appeal to beliefs. While some in the audience may react negatively to 
‘diplomacy’ because of the historical precedent, overall, the ‘diplomatic’ strategy would have a 
restrained emotive impact as it outlines a process that involves compromise and agreements. 
This suggests that the counterinsurgent will deal with the enemy in a humanised manner that 
values their rationality. Furthermore, the use to oppose the Iraq Invasion would help negate any 
negative emotional outcome as it reinforces the NZ independence of action. The use of 
‘dialogue’ and ‘tolerance’ are restrained because they, like ‘diplomacy’ suggest that there will be 
discussion and compromise on both sides, with an aim of meeting in the middle. Thus, these 
solutions are highly inclusive and would have a positive impact on the justness of the 
counterinsurgent cause, particularly once NZ started using ‘diplomacy’ as a means of opposing 
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the Iraq Invasion.  
 
These would be salient for New Zealanders as they fit the internationalist aspect of the national 
narrative. There is one aspect that means it may not be totally central: the oft-stated position that 
a state should ‘never negotiate with terrorists’.250 As noted, NZ used a form of this when it said 
they would show ‘no tolerance’. The ‘dialogue’ strategies clash with this reactive framing task. 
However, overall they would probably appeal because they are explicitly connected with the UN, 
such as Clark’s 2003 reference to the “diplomatic process being conducted in the Security 
Council”, and because they were used as a means of contrasting NZ’s position with the 
unpopular Iraq Invasion.251 The ‘dialogue’ strategies help control fear as they portray the enemy 
as human and rational, able to be negotiated with. In turn, however, this does not help address 
the confusion regarding the reasons for the attacks. Nor does it reinforce the counterinsurgent’s 
capability as using a rational ‘dialogue’ strategy portrays the enemy as rational, which infers the 
attacks were rational and leads to questions of why they were not able to be predicted or 
prevented. This reasoning also means that these strategies do not direct anger as they suggest 
that the enemy acted in a rational manner and had a reasonable motivation. Thus, while this 
strategy would help justify the counterinsurgent cause by connecting with NZ’s internationalist 
narrative, it does not aid mobilisation.  
 
The ‘dialogue’ strategies are unlikely to be salient for the US as they do not fit into Bush’s 
original ‘war on terror’ narrative, but rather directly clash with its militaristic overtones. As they 
not only humanise and rationalise the enemy but also suggest there are issues the allies need to 
compromise on, they also imply that there were legitimate grievances behind the attacks, 
meaning they do not help justify the US cause. Furthermore, they do not help mobilise NZ for 
the US as they imply that the enemy does not need to be fought but rather can be negotiated 
with. Thus, they would not have a positive impact on the alliance.  
 
5.4.7 SCOPE, FOCUS AND LENGTH 
The counterinsurgent described the scope, focus and length of their strategies and solution. For 
scope, this latent unit was referred to in ‘expanded mandate’ terms, either using an overarching 
phrase, such as ‘multifaceted’ or explicitly listing both hard and soft strategies and solutions, 
often explaining the connections between them. With regard to focus, the counterinsurgent 
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referred to the targeting ‘root causes’. This involved the manifest units ‘causes’ or ‘conditions’ in 
reference to terrorism. While the counterinsurgent sometimes listed the ‘root causes’ (17 out of 
22), this was not necessary for inclusion. The counterinsurgent also referred to the solution being 
‘long-term’, this latent unit includes any references to the strategies or solutions requiring a long 
term effort. As will be shown, these are literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive.  
 
5.4.7 Table 1 – Solution scope and length, annual totals: 
Year multifaceted root causes long time 
2001 6 3 5 
2002 6 9 3 
2003 13 1 - 
2004 4 2 5 
2005 11 3 5 
2006 18 1 4 
2007 18 2 - 
2008 2 - - 
2009 2 - - 
2010 2 1 - 
2011 2 - - 
Total  84 22 22 
 
5.4.7 Table 2 – Solution scope and length, context totals: 
Context multifaceted root causes long time 
Event 4 2 5 
Wider 20 7 7 
Domestic 60 13 10 
 
CONTENT 
The ‘multifaceted’ strategies and solutions were used consistently in both raw and ratio form 
until 2008, then their use dropped. This fits with the National’s more traditional security focus. 
Likewise, the high usage from 2005-2007 during the years of rapprochement fits with Labour’s 
internationalist outlook and with their attempts to convince the US that they are a reliable 
coalition partner. Connecting the hard and soft aspects also peaked in those years, which also fits 
with the government’s efforts, and National’s limited use of this fits their traditional security 
focus. The ‘root causes’ strategy was not used consistently in either measure, with a spike in 2002 
for both raw and ratio frequencies. The ‘long time’ solution description was not used 
consistently over the period in either raw or ratio counts. However, its drop off in 2007 was 
probably because by this point that the campaign would last a ‘long time’ was self-evident as it 
had. With regard to context, the ‘multifaceted’ and ‘root causes’ strategies and solutions matched 
the hypothesis in both raw and ratio counts, while the ‘long time’ only matched for raw, which 
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was probably connected to its early use as a means of reassuring the US it would ‘stay the 
course’.  
 
These are all credible. With respect to the ‘multifaceted’ strategies and solutions, the use of hard 
and soft approaches is an accurate summation of the broad strategies and solutions that the 
counterinsurgent implemented in Afghanistan, and to a lesser degree Iraq, as part of the ICAT.252 
The ‘root causes’ strategy matched the actual actions the counterinsurgent pursued during the 
ICAT, though for those that did not list any actual ‘conditions’ this credibility came from 
vagueness. Likewise, the ‘long term’ solution description is credible as NZ was involved for over 
a decade. These strategies and solutions are all literal, they outline either the scope of the 
solution, often listing the various components that the counterinsurgent is utilising and even 
explaining how they all work together, or they explain that the solution will be ‘long term’. In all 
cases, the terms used are exact representations of the scope or length of the solution.  
 
They are considered accurate. The ‘multifaceted’ strategies and solutions help inform the 
audience that the counterinsurgent’s response encompasses a number of different actions and 
outcomes, and listing these actions and outcomes delivers even greater distinction regarding the 
nature of their response. While all the ‘multifaceted’ references provides useful information in a 
nuanced manner, it is the connections between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ solutions that provide the most 
detailed outline of how the solutions function together (77 of the 84 uses). For example, Goff’s 
2005 explanation that “[o]ne of the key impediments to reconstruction work and development is 
the security situation. Without security, development is impossible, and without development 
security by itself cannot achieve economic and social progress.”253 This provides a description 
that not just outlines the solutions but also helps to offers an understanding as to why they are 
needed and how they function together. In turn, these ‘multifaceted’ strategies and solutions 
constrict as they show that the problem can only be solved by a number of different actions 
working in a complementary fashion, which portrays the complexity and difficulty in a realistic 
manner. The ‘root causes’ solutions were accurate, with those that provided a list the most 
nuanced. This can be seen Goff’s statement in 2002 that NZ need to implement “measures to 
tackle the causes of terrorism. Injustice, lack of opportunity, hopelessness, desperation and the 
failure of legitimate channels to redress grievances, all give rise to resort to terrorist actions. The 
failure to resolve differences between Israeli and Palestinian people in the Middle East continues 
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to be a catalyst for recruitment into terrorism.”254 Here he connects the ‘root causes’ strategy 
with the blame attribution. Likewise, the ‘long term’ solution descriptions are accurate as they 
provide an important aspect of the solution length, but also indicate that the counterinsurgent 
has the commitment to see the solution through, as is evident in Clark’s 2002 statement that “it 
will require a long-term commitment from all members of the international community”.255 As 
well as delivering nuance, these statements are constricted as they also portray the solution in a 
realistic manner that delivers accurate details about the difficulty of achieving success.  
 
The ‘multifaceted’, hard and soft strategies and solutions are also informative as expanded 
mandate responses are a central COIN principle, with the literature recommending the use of 
the full resource of the state including political, military, economic and social levers to effect 
change by fusing a political strategy with an integrated civil-military effort.256 Cohen emphasises 
“the critical importance of a secure and stable environment for achieving economic and political 
development”, which is precisely what the counterinsurgent is describing when they explain why 
the solutions must be connected.257 The ‘root causes’ strategy is a key COIN principle, with 
Countering Insurgency explaining that counterinsurgency “is defined as ‘Those military, law 
enforcement, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency, 
while addressing the root causes’. Successful counterinsurgency requires a multifaceted approach 
that addresses the political, economic, social, cultural and security dimensions of the unrest.”258 
Thus, not only is ‘root causes’ a central principle but it connects with the ‘multifaceted’ strategies 
and solutions. Also, time is a key component in COIN and these solution identifications inform 




These would be salient for the insurgent support population. For ‘multifaceted’ this is largely for 
the same reasons as the hard and soft strategies and solutions as examined. The ‘root causes’ 
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strategies would have a particular salience, they would match the audience’s experiences and 
would appeal as they seek to address the underlying grievances. The ‘long term’ descriptions 
would appeal as they infers that the counterinsurgent is committed to ensuring they obtain their 
stated outcomes. Because the military solutions are contextualised through connection with the 
‘soft’ solutions, they do not have the same potentially repelling outcome as strictly military 
actions may. In turn, these are then all have a restrained emotive outcome as they are grounded 
in an understanding of the genuine grievances that motivate the insurgents and the requirements 
of a COIN and they are inclusive, particularly the ‘multifaceted’, as they approach the enemy as a 
rational human with legitimate grievances and security and development needs. 
 
These have a mixed salience for the domestic audience, largely because of the various reasons 
discussed in both the hard and soft strategy and solution sections. The soft approaches would 
have a greater appeal than the hard ones as the NZ population has shown many times that they 
have a preference for these types of operations.260 The ‘root causes’ strategies may not appeal as 
they imply difficult to fulfil measures. This can be seen in Goff’s 2002 statement that the 
“conditions that give rise to terrorism are complex and need addressing on a number of fronts 
he most obvious current cause which gives rise to sympathy for terrorism is the ongoing failure 
to resolve the conflict in the Middle East.”261 Here he refers to these ‘root causes’ as ‘complex’ 
and references the long-running and difficult to resolve issues of the Middle East, including the 
Israel-Palestine conflict, which are unlikely to appeal because of the low chance of success. The 
‘long term’ identification has little appeal as, in general, democratic publics do not like protracted 
conflicts and this position would probably be as true for NZ.262 While the ‘multifaceted’ 
solutions control fear, as they delineate a comprehensive solution and, in some cases, explain 
how these will work together, the ‘root causes’ and ‘long term’ strategies and solutions have a 
negative impact on fear as they state that the campaign will take a long time and needs to address 
some of the most intractable issues in international relations. None of these reduce confusion as 
both infer that the problem is extensive and complex, requiring a ‘long term’ ‘multifaceted’ 
solution. However, while the ‘multifaceted’ solution does confer a degree of capacity on the 
counterinsurgent as it shows them acting in a wide ranging manner to solve the problem, the 
‘root causes’ and ‘long term’ strategies and are more problematic. While they do show 
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commitment, the complexity of the required solution and the amount of time required to solve it 
does suggest the counterinsurgent is not that capable, particularly with regard to the deliberative 
problem identifications. None of these identifications direct anger at the enemy either, though 
the ‘long term’ identification may increase anger at the counterinsurgent because they are 
involving the state in such a lengthy campaign. As such, these identifications do not aid in 
mobilisation though they do aid in justifying the campaign, especially as time goes on the reality 
of the ‘long time’ becomes more apparent. 
 
The ‘multifaceted’ and ‘root causes’ strategies and solutions would probably lack salience for the 
US because they do not fit Bush’s original ‘war on terror’ narrative’s militarism, straying into the 
‘humanitarianism’ that angers the US when NZ emphasises it. The ‘long term’ solution fits their 
own narrative, on September 12, 2001, Bush was already stating “This battle will take time and 
resolve”.263 It is also of utility for their cause, as well as needing initial support for their cause, the 
US also required other actors to stay committed, as evidenced by the continuing ‘requests’ for 
NZ to contribute to the ICAT despite the NZ’s military’s tiny size in comparison to the US.264 
As Wikileaks has revealed, a US general even came to NZ in 2006 and “gave the CENTCOM 
“Long War” presentation to several hundred NZDF personnel”.265 Thus, while the ‘multifaceted’ 
and ‘root causes’ strategies and solutions do not help justify the US ‘war on terror’, the ‘long 
term’ solutions reinforce the US cause, justifying their actions and delivering alliance 
maintenance.  
 
5.4.8 EXPLICITLY INCLUSIVE STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS 
This section will examine the latent unit of explicitly inclusive strategies and solutions. To be 
seen as explicitly inclusive, the strategy or solution must either refer to working with the local 
population, such as Goff’s 2001 statement about “working with as broad a coalition of Afghan 
groups as is possible to create a viable political, economic and social infrastructure”, or outline a 
solution with specific reference to positive outcomes for the local population, like Goff’s 2008 
statement that “New Zealand shares the international community’s interest in a stable 
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Afghanistan in which Afghans can enjoy increasing standards of living.”266 Implicitly inclusive 
strategies and solutions are those that that outline positives without connecting them specifically 
to the insurgent support population or appear to have outcomes that are not targeted for the 
insurgent support population – they are here referred to as implicit to contrast with the explicitly 
inclusive ones and will only be examined in comparison to the explicit ones. An example of an 
implicit solution can be seen in Mapp’s 2009 statement that “members of NATO and ISAF 
intend that current operations, including New Zealand’s contribution through the PRT, will 
produce security and stability in Afghanistan.”267 For positive but implicit strategies and 
solutions, such as democracy, governance, development, reconstruction, stability, security, peace, 
rebuilding, war, conflict, fighting, military action, intervention and invasion m solutions could be 
said to be positive for the local population, but unless given with specific reference to local 
wellbeing they serve mainly international interests. As will be shown, the implicit strategies and 
solutions are all literal, nuanced, constricted and restrained.  
 
5.4.8 Table 1 – Explicitly and implicitly inclusive solutions, annual totals: 
Year explicit implicit 
2001 6 31 
2002 7 96 
2003 15 201 
2004 8 46 
2005 9 93 
2006 12 173 
2007 13 156 
2008 2 16 
2009 4 56 
2010 2 19 
2011 10 12 
Total  88 899 
 
5.4.8 Table 2 – Explicitly and implicitly inclusive solutions, context totals: 
Context explicit implicit 
Event 1 90 
Wider 21 270 
Domestic 66 539 
 
CONTENT 
It should be noted that while the inclusive frequencies are comprehensive, the exclusive numbers 
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are a guide compiled from strategies and solutions considered implicit rather than explicit – the 
already examined strategies and solutions of democracy, governance, development, 
reconstruction, stability, security, peace, rebuilding, war, conflict, fighting, military action, 
intervention and invasion – with any inclusive strategies and solutions that used these terms 
subtracted from the above figures. The explicitly inclusive strategies and solutions were used 
consistently, both in raw and ratio counts. There were slight dips in 2002, 2008-2010 but 
compared to many other deliberative framing tasks, these were minor. The explicitly inclusive 
strategies and solutions also fitted the context hypothesis, being used more to a domestic 
audience than wider one in both raw and ratio figures.  
 
The explicit strategies and solutions are credible as NZ has a long history of working closely with 
local populations and the NZDF has a reputation for their ability to undertake this work.268 This 
inclusive nature continued in Afghanistan, with Hoadley noting that “NZ PRT commanders 
from the start gave high priority to engagement with the host authorities and community.”269 
Inclusivity is more than lofty rhetoric, on the ground it is a key focus. In a thesis based on 
interviews with former frontline NZ peacekeepers, one of the recurring themes Furnari found 
was they “thought it crucial to support local people in their work, decision making processes, 
implementation of new programs etc., rather than doing things for them” and that “good 
relationships are central to effective peacekeeping” with the understanding that growing good 
relationships is “the vehicle through which peacekeeping most effectively operates.”270 The 
inclusive strategy or solution is one that goes from governmental levels to the frontline 
peacekeeping personnel.  
 
The explicit strategies and solutions were accurate as they specifically included insurgent 
audience and, in general, the formulations provided a nuanced delineation of how the strategy or 
solution would function. Some are considered more accurate than others. In 2007, Goff 
provided a technical and informative version at a military seminar: “The relationship between the 
intervening partners and the host needs to be a partnership in pursuit of shared goals. Being 
invited by the host government and maintaining a consent environment are important elements 
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in the success of a mission.”271 He also offered a more informal version in 2001, “[i]t is 
important, however, that it is the Afghans themselves who do this.”272 Key offered a less 
detailed, borderline exclusive, example in 2011, explaining that NZ was there “to help the 
Afghan people”.273 The point being that the explicit strategies and solutions offered an insight 
into how the counterinsurgent could actually succeed, while the implicit ones referred to 
outcomes like “ensuring peace and stability”, such as Goff did in 2002, or listed hard and soft 
aspects, while the explicit ones got to the very heart of what a counterinsurgent must do and 
how they could actually win by referencing the support population, and this was far more 
nuanced. They were also more constricted as rather than referring to an exaggerated “global 
peace”, like Goff did in 2002, they targeted the specific population.  
 
The explicit solutions were also informative as inclusiveness is a core component of COIN 
doctrine, with the need to adopt inclusive strategies and solutions from the strategic to the 
tactical level widely acknowledged as one of, if not the, fundamental means of justifying and 
legitimising the COIN operation, with the US FM 3-24 explaining that the “local population and 
local government officials should view any project as their own and not one that has been 
imposed on them by outside agencies”.274 
 
AUDIENCE 
The explicit strategies and solutions would have probably been salient as they would match the 
insurgent support’s own experiences of disempowerment and would have appealed to their 
belief that they are important actors who need to be involved in the process.275 At best they 
referred to them as if they not only have agency but that they are also equal partners, Goff’s 
above references to ‘shared goals’ and ‘partnership’ helped to create this agency and equivalency. 
Any strategy and solution that referred to the insurgent audience and stated that they have a role 
to play in the outcome would have had a far greater salience than those that simply stated they 
want to ‘stabilise Afghanistan’ as the former implied the counterinsurgent had the wellbeing and 
interests of the local population in mind, appealing to their own beliefs. The explicit strategies 
and solutions also would have helped to control the audience emotion, generating a sense that 
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they would be ones that they help to shape and implement, rather than being externally imposed. 
The implicit strategies and solutions were more likely to anger the insurgent support population, 
as noted above in the democracy analysis, a majority see the US as using democracy as a tool for 
self-aggrandisement. As noted in the blame section, many in the Muslim world also blame the 
US for lack of development and other grievances, which would only reinforce the alienation of 
implicit strategies and solutions. It should be noted that the explicit strategy and solution must 
be credible for it to control emotion, as if the rhetoric and reality do not match they could 
potentially increase anger as they are hypocritical, something that would be particularly important 
for audiences in occupied states. Hager recounts a raid led by the NZ SAS in 2002 which was 
based on faulty intelligence and resulted in a high number of arrests, the illegal handling of 
prisoners by US forces and the abandonment of the village with many joining the Taleban – an 
inclusive strategy or solution would not control the anger for these Afghanis as it would not 
match reality.276 This also highlights issues relating to counterinsurgent in an alliance, where one 
actor’s actions can discredit the other’s communications. The explicit strategies and solutions 
would help to justify the counterinsurgent’s cause as they involve them, making them feel that 
they are a part of the process and that they have a stake in the outcome. They show that the 
counterinsurgent is flexible and understands the need for the involving the insurgent audience, 
that their cause is not just their own security but the wellbeing of the insurgent audience. The 
implicit strategies and solutions would only limit the justness of the cause as the tie into the 
preconceived notions that the US and west are acting for selfish reasons.  
The explicit solutions would have limited salience for the domestic audience compared to the 
implicit ones. That is because they match their experience as they outlines strategies and 
solutions that are in the NZ interest, they are focused on solutions that will reduce the threat to 
NZ and international security, which would appeal to the domestic audience beliefs of self-
preservation. They have a focus on national security, which have an innate appeal to any 
citizenry. The implicit strategies and solutions would help limit fear more effectively as well as 
they are directed at national security outcomes, while the explicit strategies and solutions may 
appear to be too limited and not punitive enough. Also, the implicit strategies and solutions 
reduce confusion in a way that the explicit ones cannot, because the latter are more complex and 
target a specific grouping. Likewise, the implicit strategies and solutions would address concerns 
about the competency of the counterinsurgent as they are focused on national security, while the 
explicit ones may appear to be pandering to the enemy. Finally, neither directs anger in any 
major way, though the implicit ones would to some degree as they imply there is a threat to 
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national security and to ‘global peace’ that needs addressing. Therefore, the implicit solutions 
deliver greater mobilisation and justification than the inclusive ones.  
  
The implicit strategies and solutions would have greater salience for the US, especially those that 
focus on aspects such as ‘global security’ and other areas where the US desired NZ place more 
emphasis on to their own population. The explicit strategies and solutions do not fit the Bush’s 
original narrative. Because the implicit strategies and solutions help to mobilise the domestic 
population they may have a positive impact on the alliance, while the explicit ones would not as 
they fail to reinforce the US narrative or justify their actions and do not help mobilise any 
support for their cause.  
5.4.9 STRATEGY/SOLUTION CONCLUSION 
The solution identifications usage frequencies and ratio counts will now be examined, as well as 
the context usages, though it should be noted these excluded the implicit solutions considered 
above as these counts were made from the other solutions.  
 
5.4.9 Table 1 – Solution annual frequency totals and ratio counts: 
Year Actor/Victim Frequency Ratio 
2001 101 0.999 
2002 197 0.722 
2003 357 1.278 
2004 110 0.848 
2005 158 1.256 
2006 268 0.934 
2007 225 0.975 
2008 31 0.980 
2009 71 0.494 
2010 28 0.456 
2011 35 0.257 
Total  1581 - 
 
It can be seen that the hypothesis that DCFs would be consistent over the course of the period 
is not well supported by the raw annual counts, as can be seen in the line graph below. There 





This does even out more when they are considered in ratio form, and while there is a general 
decline from 2008 onward though compared to other framing tasks already considered, the 
solution framing task does appear to be relatively consistently used across the period. This can 
be seen in the line graph below, which shows that there is little variation across the ten years.  
 
 
5.4.9 Table 2 – Solution context frequency totals and ratio counts: 
Context Frequency  Ratio 
Event 198 1.482 
Wider 467 0.753 
Domestic 916 0.893 
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The hypothesis that DCFs would be used more to a domestic audience than during events or to 
a wider audience appears to be supported by the raw data. The domestic uses account for 58% 
of all uses. This can be seen in the following bar graph. 
 
However, this hypothesis is not as well supported by the ratio frequencies, where the event 
usages score higher than the other two contexts and is almost equal to both other two contexts, 
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5.5 DELIBERATIVE FRAMING CONCLUSION 
This section will seek to assess the relevant deliberative counterinsurgent frame (DCF) 
hypotheses before the final, concluding chapter, where all the hypotheses that compare the 
reactive and deliberative narratives will be examined. As outlined in Chapter Two, these are: 
 
• The deliberative narrative will be used with a consistent frequency over the period 
• The deliberative narrative will be used more frequently when there is a domestic audience 
rather than wider audience.  
• The deliberative narrative will predominantly focus on actor and solution framing tasks. 
• The deliberative narrative will be of utility for the insurgent support audience, mixed utility 
for the domestic audience and of limited utility for the wider international audience. 
 
First, the hypothesis that DCFs would be used consistently over the period is not well supported 
by the raw frequencies but is better supported by the ratio frequencies.  
  
5.5 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies, word count and ratio frequencies of DCFs: 
Year Total Word Count Ratio 
2001 447 9,612 4.650 
2002 745 26,036 2.861 
2003 858 27,854 3.080 
2004 317 13,082 2.423 
2005 403 12,419 3.245 
2006 659 28,813 2.287 
2007 621 22,981 2.702 
2008 87 3,162 2.751 
2009 233 14,371 1.621 
2010 96 5,921 1.621 
2011 185 13,639 1.356 
Total 4651 - - 
 
As can be seen in the table above, there was quite a large variation in frequencies over the 
period, with the highest year (2003) having almost ten times as many DCFs as the lowest (2008). 
This is obvious in the line graph below, which shows several spikes, which occurred in 2002-






The consistency of the DCFs is more apparent when the ratio frequency is examined. As the 
below line graph shows, much of the variation is removed when the differing annual word 
counts are taken into account. That said, there is still a general decline in frequency over the 
period, but the DCFs are still seen as being used consistently when considered in ratio frequency. 
However, in both raw and ratio frequencies, the drop in usage is most noticeable from the 
beginning of the National Party’s term, which may help explain it as the deliberative narrative has 
less congruency with their more traditional/realist security focus. Also, this period followed the 
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contexts than wider international ones.  
 
5.5 Table 2 – Total RCF frequencies for the different contexts, their word counts and each ratio: 
Context Frequency Word Count Ratio 
Event  559 13,354 4.186 
Wider 1480 61,980 2.388 
Domestic 2612 102,556 2.547 
 
This hypothesis is well supported by the raw frequencies, where domestic uses were almost twice 




Even when the context word counts are taken into account, the domestic uses were more 
common, though the margin is far smaller and does not deliver the same support for this 
hypothesis as the raw figures. It was expected that even in ratio form these figures would favour 
the domestic audience in a more pronounced manner. One reason for the greater than expected 
usage to the wider audience could be that a part of this wider audience is the domestic audience. 
In other words, these are not necessarily mutually exclusive audiences and this makes distinctions 

























The next hypothesis, that DCFs will focus more on actor and solution framing tasks, is well 
supported.  
 
5.5 Table 3 – Total frequencies of DCFs for each framing task: 





Total  4651 
 
As can be seen from the above figures, the actor/victim and strategy/solution framing tasks 
were the first and second highest, respectively, in frequency and together they comprise 70% of 
the total number of DCFs used over the period. That said, the problem/enemy framing task was 
also used fairly frequently, comprising 25% of total uses; however, the strategy/solution framing 
task made up 34% of total uses and the actor/victim 36%. Nevertheless, these two framing tasks 






















The final hypothesis that needs to be examined is that the deliberative narrative will be of utility 
for the insurgent support audience, mixed utility for the domestic audience and of limited utility 
for the wider international audience. As with the similar hypothesis in the reactive conclusion, 
this section rests on utility and again, the utility for each audience varies: for the insurgent 
support audience, it is about the relative justness and legitimacy of the two combatants’ causes; 
for the domestic support population, it is a combination of mobilisation, justification and 
legitimacy; while for the allied actor is involves the mobilisation of the domestic support 
population and the justification of their own cause.  
 
First, it was hypothesised that the deliberative narrative would be of utility for the insurgent 
audience; that is, it would justify the counterinsurgent’s cause, legitimise them as an actor and 
compromised the justness of the insurgent’s cause and delegitimise them as an actor. The first 
two aspects were influenced by the inclusiveness of the framing tasks and was generally 
supported in the analysis. Overall, the deliberative narrative framed the ICAT in a manner that 
included the insurgent support population, justifying the counterinsurgent cause and legitimising 
them as an actor. This inclusiveness was largely embodied by the solutions, where the 
counterinsurgent often explicitly referred to the insurgent support population as either an active 
part in or direct beneficiary of the solution. However, the deliberative narrative did not have to 
be explicitly inclusive to help justify and legitimise. As many of the actor identifications were 
focused on NZ, they were not inclusive but because of their credibility, accuracy and, 
consequent candour, delivered legitimacy as they would help the insurgent audience to 
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independent principled and pragmatic multilateral actor helped contextualise the rest of NZ’s 
counterinsurgent communication. Thus, one conclusion regarding the deliberative is that while 
many actor identifications cannot be inclusive, they act as a conceptual foundation for the rest of 
the framing tasks and are able to make those more inclusive as they are made more credible 
through this conceptual foundation. For example, the explicitly inclusive strategies and solutions 
were given greater integrity because NZ explained it was acting out of both self-interest and 
morality. This finding comes with the warning that the actor identification must match reality 
and while it was unlikely that many in the insurgent support audience perceived NZ’s position as 
an independent principled and pragmatic multilateral actor changing significantly over the 
period, the general trend means this identification was likely to lose salience as NZ’s bilateral 
connection with the US strengthened.  
 
However, there were elements of the deliberative narrative that were not as inclusive and not of 
utility, particularly problem/enemy framing tasks. Interestingly, these framing tasks were the only 
areas where the deliberative narrative overlapped with the insurgent’s own narrative, specifically 
‘terrorism/terrorist’, with bin Laden relishing the opprobrium those terms carry. Thus, while the 
‘terrorism/terrorist’ problem diagnosis and enemy identification has an audience-independent 
salience, they may not have the most utility for the insurgent support population. The diagnosis 
of ‘murder’ and enemy identification of ‘perpetrators’ delivers opprobrium without excluding the 
insurgent support population or reinforcing the insurgent cause. However, the counterinsurgent 
walks a fine line as the terms ‘terrorism/terrorist’ are the most credible and salient terms that can 
be used for these situations, functioning as a short-hand means of diagnosing the problem and 
identifying the enemy that all audiences can parse.  
 
The deliberative narrative also compromised the justness of the insurgent’s cause and 
delegitimised them as an actor, largely via the problem/enemy framing tasks, where the literal, 
nuanced and constricted diagnoses and identifications served to reduce the apparent capacity of 
the insurgent in a credible, accurate and informative manner. The most powerful of these 
involved the counterinsurgent communicating one of the defining characteristics of a terrorist 
insurgency: the tangible weakness of the enemy. This was done by referring to their small size 
and the limited threat they posed. A way the narrative could compromise the justness of the 
insurgent’s cause was by identifying Muslims as victims of attacks, which was only done twice in 
an indirect manner by referring to victims being of many religions. These methods of 
compromising the justness of the insurgent’s cause were not used often by NZ during the ICAT 
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and stand as a missed opportunity. There were also other areas that the deliberative narrative did 
not cover which would have further compromised the justness the insurgent’s cause, including 
the enemy’s connections with the global drug trade and the use of Muslim authorities to discredit 
al Qaeda, including their interpretations and bin Laden’s lack of religious qualifications. 
Conversely, however, some absences from the deliberative narrative helped compromise the 
justness of the insurgent narrative. For example, NZ barely engaged with the insurgent narrative 
over the entire period, did not refer to any of the many justifications made by al Qaeda or even 
use the terms ‘jihad’, ‘jihadi’ and ‘caliphate’ once over the ten years.  
 
It was also hypothesised that the deliberative narrative would be of mixed utility for the domestic 
audience. This was supported by the analysis, for while the deliberative generally functioned well 
as a means of justifying the counterinsurgent’s cause and legitimising them as an actor, it was 
often of limited mobilisational utility. The two main reasons that it functioned well as a means of 
justifying and legitimising was because it was internally consistent and consistent with NZ’s 
response. While the actor identifications provided the conceptual foundation for the insurgent, 
for the domestic audience these foundations were provided by both the actor identifications and 
the blame attributions. The solutions had to be consistent with the actor identifications and the 
blame attributions for the counterinsurgent to convince the domestic audience that their cause 
was right and proper. The actor identifications essentially worked in the same way as they did for 
the insurgent audience, explaining why NZ would act and how it would act; that is, on principle 
and pragmatic grounds and independently but also multilaterally. Furthermore, the blame 
attributions, particularly grievances, gave the rest of the deliberative narrative integrity by not just 
explaining why the insurgents were acting but, in so doing, outlining how the right and proper 
solutions the counterinsurgent can use solve the problem. Certainly not every aspect of this 
conceptual foundation was consistent but overall the deliberative strategies and solutions, such 
as democracy, governance, security, stability, peace, reconstruction, development, humanitarian 
assistance, human rights, dialogue and diplomacy, as outlined and conducted by the 
counterinsurgent, were consistent with the grievance blame attributions of poverty, governance, 
ethnic tension, inequality, corruption, repression and injustice. One conclusion, then, is that for 
the domestic audience, the actor identifications and blame attributions provide the conceptual 
foundation and that the rest of the counterinsurgent’s framing needs to be consistent with these 
framing tasks to help justify their cause and legitimise them as the right actor.  
 
Generally, the deliberative narrative was also consistent with NZ’s response, which helped 
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reinforce the rightness and properness of their cause as it delivered a fidelity between rhetoric 
and reality. In particular, the deliberative blame attributions, actor identifications, strategies and 
solutions matched the ways NZ responded. The Iraq Invasion helped to reinforce this 
consistency; NZ had stated from the outset of the ICAT that it would only act multilaterally 
under a UN mandate and refused to take part in or support the invasion because there was no 
mandate. The use of certain actor identifications as well as strategies and solutions during their 
opposition to the conflict would have reinforced their legitimacy as a counterinsurgent, which 
would have had reflected well on the justness of their ICAT actions as well. However, the Iraq 
Invasion also marked the point where an inconsistency between rhetoric and reality became 
apparent for the deliberative narrative. The divergence appeared in how the counterinsurgent 
framed actions in the two separate theatres, one NZ supported and one it did not. NZ used 
more bellicose terminology to refer to Iraq strategies than Afghanistan strategies. Afghanistan 
was a peacekeeping intervention that involved fighting while Iraq was a war that involved 
military action. While the potential for this to compromise the counterinsurgent cause’s justness 
for the domestic audience was limited as the opinions regarding these two operations matched 
the rhetoric, this became more problematic in 2011 when the say-do gap between the term 
‘mentoring’ and the combat situations the NZSAS faced in Afghanistan was exposed by two 
deaths. This situation uncovered inconsistencies between the deliberative narrative and NZ’s 
actual actions. These deaths also revealed another inconsistency between NZ rhetoric and reality, 
the use of the term ‘soldier’. As the analysis found, this term was far more likely to be used after 
a death. Together, these deliberative actor and solution identifications threatened to compromise 
the justness of the counterinsurgent’s cause because they were exposed as inconsistent with 
reality – specifically, that personnel were actually soldiers and that the mentoring involved 
combat. This could, in turn, create issues for their legitimacy.  
 
While the deliberative narrative had a generally positive impact on the counterinsurgent’s 
justness and legitimacy, its mobilisational utility was more limited. This was largely due to the 
problem diagnoses, enemy identifications and blame attributions, which controlled the fear of 
the threat in the domestic audience by portraying it in a literal, nuanced and constricted manner. 
These framing tasks helped reduce the scope of the threat and of the enemy, they contextualised 
it as one of many problems in a complex wider security environment, they helped humanise the 
enemy by explaining their grievances. One solution task particularly troubling for domestic 
mobilisation was that the ICAT would take a long time, as protracted conflicts do not generally 
appeal to democratic publics. There were, however, a number of connected aspects of the 
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deliberative narrative that had a perceived positive impact on mobilising support, which were the 
multilateral and collective action actor identifications and solutions. Taken together, these 
framing tasks outlined the case for NZ actively participating in the ICAT because of its 
principled and pragmatic support of collective security and the multilateral system rather than 
because of any direct threat. Thus, these did, in turn, help to rationalise the problem/enemy 
framing tasks that did not specifically mobilise support by explaining why action was needed 
despite the lack of threat. Nevertheless, in comparison to the mobilising capacity of the reactive 
narrative, the deliberative was far more limited in its ability to inspire support amongst the 
domestic population. The deliberative mobilisation relies on the domestic audience making 
connections between a number of complex political concepts, while the reactive mobilisation 
works on the emphasising the threat to the domestic audience.  
 
It was also hypothesised that the deliberative narrative would be of limited utility for the allied 
audience and, consequently, had a limited positive impact on the alliance. This was supported by 
the analysis, as the deliberative had a limited mobilisational outcome on the domestic audience 
and it compromised the justness of the US cause as laid out in Bush’s original narrative. The 
former has already been dealt with, though one interesting point to make is that the components 
of the deliberative that best mobilised support amongst the domestic audience – multilateralism 
and collective security – were some of the least salient for the US once it began to shift its 
attention towards Iraq. While these actor descriptions would have resonated with the US in the 
first year or so of the ICAT, from Bush’s State of the Union speech in early 2003, NZ’s 
consistent multilateral focus would have had decreasing salience with the US. As was shown in 
the cables, the US decried NZ’s references to these values and policies. Thus, the components of 
the deliberative that had the greatest mobilisational utility for the domestic audience were some 
of the most repellent to the US and would have had a negative impact on the alliance despite 
their mobilisational utility. 
 
The deliberative also contradicted the US narrative in a number of ways, which helped 
compromised the justness of the US cause. Many aspects of the deliberative narrative 
contradicted Bush’s original narrative, particularly the diagnoses that NZ faced no increased 
threat from this narrow, non-state group of insurgents who were motivated by a number of 
grievances but were willing to enter into dialogue and deploy for multifaceted but largely non-
military solutions with the aim of helping the insurgent support population to create a peaceful 
democracy. These components contradict the portrayal of the enemy as irrational, motivated by 
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hatred of American freedoms, the threat as existential and the requirement of a war between 
good and evil. Certainly, these components were present in other US security narratives, but they 
are incompatible with Bush’s original defining narrative and, therefore, would not help make the 
US cause appear right and proper. The WikiLeaks cables revealed just how much certain NZ 
positions and pronouncements irritated the US, including the no increased threat diagnosis, the 
emphasis on non-military solutions and, particularly, NZ’s opposition to the Iraq Invasion. That 
said, much of the US irritation was focused on NZ’s principled and multilateral foreign policy 
and its reticence to emphasise its close ties with the US to the NZ population. It is suggested that 
the US were less irritated by how NZ chose to frame the conflict specifically than on how they 
chose not to portray themselves as junior partner in a bilateral relationship with the US. There 
were also aspects of the deliberative that helped justify the US cause, particularly the less 
nuanced and less constricted problem diagnoses, the safe haven blame attribution, the expanded 
collective actor and close ties actor identifications, the long time and hard strategy and solution 
delineations. Also, it should be noted that the utility of the deliberative narrative would have 
changed significantly over the course of the ten year period. In the first year of the ICAT the US 
used a multilateral framing – particular for actor and solution framing tasks – meaning NZ’s 
deliberative framing would have been of utility at this point. However, the US narrative became 
increasingly unilateralist as the tide of support following 9/11 turned to widespread disagreement 
over Iraq. Then, by around 2006-2007 when the failings of the Iraq Invasion were clear to 
virtually every major actor in the US, NZ’s use of the deliberative would have increased in utility 
as it was beginning to realign with the US narrative. Thus, the multilateral actor identifications 
would have had an early resonance that quickly changed, as evidenced by the way the US 
understood how NZ used the term ‘multilateral’ after Iraq, before becoming more resonant as 
the failures of Iraq became apparent. That said, generally speaking the deliberative narrative did 
not reinforce the rightness or properness of Bush’s original narrative or the US cause and overall 
it did not aid the alliance because of this lack of reinforcement, though this did vary during the 
period.   
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CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter summarises the findings on this study of the two narratives used by NZ during the 
international campaign against terrorism (ICAT). In the process, it will assess the remaining 
hypothesis, examining how these two narratives functioned together, seeking to understand how 
they interacted and interfered with one another. Then it will undertake a broader examination of 
the project as a whole, including the research’s ramifications for the relevant literature, the 
limitations of the research, further research potential as well as final thoughts on the inherent 
problems democracies face countering insurgencies. First, however, it will provide a summary of 
the hypotheses that have already been examined in the previous two chapters, to give some 
context for the following discussion.  
 
6.1 FINDINGS OF CHAPTER FOUR 
Chapter Four examined the reactive narrative, which is the political response to terrorist attacks. 
The narrative’s primary focus was the domestic and allied audiences and its five key qualities are 
that it was figurative, absolute, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusive. This chapter examined the 
following hypotheses:  
• The frequency of the reactive narrative will be higher during events. 
• The reactive narrative will be used more frequently when there is a wider international 
audience than a domestic audience. 
• The frequency of the reactive narrative will be higher for more deadly and shocking attacks. 
• The frequency of the reactive narrative will be higher for attacks on NZ’s allies. 
• Over the entire course of the period the reactive frequency will drop from 2001.  
• The reactive narrative will predominantly focus on problem diagnoses and enemy 
identifications. 
• The reactive narrative will be of limited utility for the insurgent audience, mixed utility for 
the domestic audience and utility for the allied audience 
 
The first hypothesis regarding reactive narratives being used more during events comes from 
their perceived nature as ‘reactions’ to terrorist attacks. As was shown, reactive counterinsurgent 
frames (RCFs) were more frequently used during events than in any other context, both in raw 
frequency and once the differing word counts had been taken into account. While only 
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marginally more prevalent as a raw figure, the ratio count showed them to be used five times 
more often during events than to a wider audience and almost eight times more often than to a 
domestic audience. The data supports the belief that the reactive narrative is predominantly one 
of response to the emotive shockwave of a terrorist attack. 
The second hypothesis, that they would be used more when communicating with a wider 
audience than a domestic one was also borne out by the data, though only when word count was 
taken into account. While slightly lower in raw frequency, as a ratio count they were one and a 
half times more likely to be given to a wider audience than a domestic one. Also, when event 
press releases were added to wider audience, they were almost twice as frequent as domestic as a 
raw count and two and a half times as frequent as a ratio count. This hypothesis is based on the 
belief that the reactive narrative has a greater utility for the victim state because it helps reduce 
confusion, address concerns and direct anger at a time when the victim state needs this extreme 
emotive shock quelled and channelled. Again, the data supports the understanding of the 
reactive narrative as a means for the counterinsurgent to reinforce their strategic political 
alliances in the wake of an attack. 
The hypothesis that the frequency of RCFs would be higher when an attack is shocking and/or 
targets one of NZ’s closer allies was largely derived from the above insights. The hypothesis that 
reactive narrative is largely a ‘response’ to terrorist attacks infers that a more shocking attack 
would provoke a larger response. The hypothesis that it has a greater perceived utility for the 
victim state infers it would be used more for close allies. While the reactive was used more for 
shocking attacks and close allies when measured by raw frequencies, the ratio figures gave a 
more mixed outcome as the highest ratio count for an event was Istanbul in 2003. However, the 
next four events were 9/11, the Afghan Invasion and the two Bali attacks, which targeted NZ’s 
two main allies, the US and Australia, and, for 9/11 and Bali 2002, were two of the more 
shocking attacks.  
The hypothesis that the reactive frequency would drop from 2001 over the period was largely 
borne out by the data. Overall, the trend for decline was pronounced and the exceptions – that 
2002 was higher than 2001 as a raw figure – can be explained by the fact that 2001 was not a 
complete year. This hypothesis came from the belief that this particular reactive narrative was 
not part of NZ’s traditional security narrative, but rather was used because of scale and impact of 
9/11 and the data suggests this understanding is generally accurate.  
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Finally, the hypothesis that the reactive narrative would predominantly focus on problem 
diagnoses and enemy identifications was also supported by the data, accounting for almost 60% 
of the total uses as a raw count. This hypothesis came from the nature of the reactive narrative as 
a response to an attack, which suggests that it would be more likely to focus on diagnosing the 
problem and identifying the enemy than on the other framing tasks because this was the best 
means of reducing confusion, addressing concerns and directing anger; that is, of dealing with 
the emotive consequences of an attack.  
The final reactive hypothesis was that it would be of limited utility for the insurgent audience, 
mixed utility for the domestic audience and utility for the allied audience. This was a qualitative 
assessment based on the analysis of the different framing tasks. Generally speaking, this 
hypothesis was well supported by the analysis, though the utility with regard to the domestic and 
allied audience was found to have changed over the period. For the domestic audience, this was 
largely due to the declining salience of the threat from terrorist attacks, while for the allied 
audience it was largely due to NZ’s use of the reactive during their opposition to the Iraq 
Invasion. Nevertheless, the overall gradation of utility between audiences matched the 
hypothesis well.  
 
6.2 FINDINGS OF CHAPTER FIVE 
Chapter Five was focused on examining the deliberative narrative. It did not follow the same 
event structure because the deliberative narrative was understood as NZ’s traditional security 
narrative and as such would be used consistently no matter what events were occurring. The 
narrative’s five main qualities, those that contrast with the five of the reactive, were that it was 
literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive. As well as seeking to examine each framing 
task, this chapter also assessed the following hypotheses: 
• The deliberative narrative will be used with a consistent frequency over the period 
• The deliberative narrative will be used more frequently when there is a domestic audience 
rather than wider audience.  
• The deliberative narrative will predominantly focus on actor and solution framing tasks. 
• The deliberative narrative will be of utility for the insurgent support audience, mixed utility 




The hypothesis that the deliberative narrative would be used with a consistent frequency over the 
period was not well supported by the data. Of all the hypotheses examined in the preceding two 
chapters, this was the least conclusive. While the deliberative counterinsurgent frames (DCFs) 
appeared to be more consistent when word count was taken into account, there was still an 
apparent and unexpected decline over the period. This hypothesis was derived from the belief 
that the deliberative narrative was NZ’s traditional security narrative and would be used in a 
consistent manner. The reason for this decline was probably due to the fading salience of the 
ICAT over the period and the National Party’s lower affinity with the deliberative narrative.  
The second hypothesis, that DCFs would be used more frequently when there is a domestic 
audience rather than wider audience, was also not conclusively supported by the data. While it 
was more predominantly used in a domestic context, in both raw and ratio counts, the ratio 
count was closer than expected. As noted, this could be due to the fact a part of the wider 
audience is the domestic audience, but nevertheless, the findings were still surprising. This 
hypothesis was based on the understanding that the reactive was of greater utility to the allied 
victim state and the belief that the deliberative was of greater long term utility for the domestic 
audience than the allied audience because of its links to NZ’s traditional security narrative.  
The hypothesis that the deliberative narrative would predominantly focus on actor/victim and 
solution framing tasks was largely backed by the findings, together comprising 66% of all DCFs. 
While the problem/enemy frequency was relatively high as well, the actor/victim and solution 
framing tasks were still highest and second highest, respectively. The thought behind this 
hypothesis was that as the deliberative narrative is understood to be the product of the 
counterinsurgent experts within and beyond a government, it was more likely to focus on 
identifications of the counterinsurgent, their allies and the solutions proposed, something backed 
up by the data.  
The final hypothesis for the deliberative was that it would be of utility for the insurgent support 
audience, mixed utility for the domestic audience and of limited utility for the allied audience. 
This was a qualitative assessment made using the various analyses of the various DCF framing 
tasks and was reasonably well supported in general, though there were greater problems for 
utility with regard to the insurgent support audience than hypothesised, particularly from 
solutions. This was not just limited to the military strategies but also democracy and 
development as they were imposed externally by force. Also, in some cases, the deliberative was 
of some utility for the allied audience, particularly actor and solution framing tasks that 
reinforced the large size and comprehensive scope of the allies’ coalition and response, 
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respectively. Compared to the matching hypothesis for the reactive narrative, the outcome for 
the deliberative narrative was not as clean cut. Generally speaking, it depended on the specific 
framing task, as some had a greater than expected utility for the allied audience and a lesser than 
expected utility for the insurgent support audience. This suggests that the deliberative narrative is 
able to be shaped to suit specific purposes. The mixed utility for the domestic audience was 
better supported, with the deliberative narrative providing little mobilisation while delivering 
greater justification and reinforcing the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent.  
 
6.3 FINAL HYPOTHESIS 
To this point, the reactive and deliberative have been examined separately as this was the best 
way of gaining an understanding of the two. However, they are not used independently, but 
rather are generally used at the same time. That means that they interact and, potentially 
interfere, with each other. They cannot only be considered in isolation, as this would miss a key 
dynamic, and the analysis will now turn to the unexamined hypothesis given in Chapter Two: 
• The counterinsurgent’s communication will be a mixture of deliberative and reactive 
narratives and these will compromise the justness of their cause and, consequently, their 
legitimacy as a counterinsurgent. 
 
The first part of this hypothesis is easily answered. The use of two narratives was apparent from 
Anderton’s initial response to 9/11, where he said “there is no evidence of any threat to New 
Zealand” before stating that “[w]e must see this attack not only as an attack on the United States, 
but as an attack on all civilised nations.”1 That said, while every press release contained at least 
one DCF, not every press release contained components of the reactive narrative. The analysis in 
Chapter Four supports the belief that this was because this narrative is ‘reactive’, that it was used 
most in response to events and to wider audiences and so was more likely to appear in these 
contexts than a domestic one.  
The second part of the hypothesis, that the reactive and deliberative will compromise the 
justness of the counterinsurgent’s cause and, consequently, their legitimacy as a counterinsurgent, 
is central to the thesis, for it is focused on how these two narratives interact and interfere with 
each other. Managing this dynamic lies at the heart of communication for the counterinsurgent 
as they need their cause to be seen as justified and for them to appear as legitimate amongst the 
                                                 
1 Anderton, “New Zealand Response to US Attacks.” 
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key audiences. The qualitative assessment of this hypothesis will bring together the analysis of 
the various RCFs and DCFs completed in Chapters Four and Five, using these various threads 
to gain an overarching understanding of how the use of two distinct narratives impacted the 
overall justness of the cause. In practice, then, much of this analysis will focus on how one 
narrative impacts the perception of the rightness and properness of the other narrative, and on 
how this impacted the justness of their cause and their legitimacy as a counterinsurgent.  
  
The reactive and deliberative narratives were often contradictory. Each compromised the 
rightness and properness of the other to such a degree that they could not both be perceived as 
right and proper simultaneously without, at the most, cognitive dissonance or, at the least, 
inattention. Used together, as NZ did during the ICAT, they could have created problems for 
the overall justness of the cause and NZ’s legitimacy. This does not mean that the 
incompatibility would have been obvious to every person in every audience, but rather the 
constituent qualities of these the framing tasks of these two narratives make them 
counterproductive when used together. The reactive delineated an irrational enemy who was 
motivated by hate, posed an existential threat, could not be tolerated and required a military 
solution, while the deliberative portrayed a rational enemy who was motivated by an array of 
grievances, posed a serious but manageable threat and should be dealt with using a range of 
largely non-military solutions. They were fundamentally incompatible in almost every respect 
such that if one was to be perceived as right and proper then the other could not be.  
As well as Anderton’s initial catalyst, there were a number of other powerful examples of just 
how incompatible these narratives were. The contradiction was apparent in the two narratives’ 
threat diagnoses, even within a single press release. Take Goff’s speech in Washington on 
September 26, 2001. First, he said “[i]t is important that the whole world sees the target of the 
campaign as the narrow group of fanatical extremists who commit indiscriminate and appalling 
acts of terror, and not a particular country or religion”.2 Then only a few sentences later he 
referred to “the next wave of terrorist attacks” and stated that the “attacks represent a new 
generation of security threat to civilised people everywhere”.3 These diagnoses are not 
commensurate, the first constricted the scope of the threat to a narrow group while the latter 
two portray it as a new era of civilisational conflict akin to the Cold War. Considering the timing 
and his audience, it is unsurprising he used the reactive narrative to help justify the impending 
US invasion of Afghanistan. However, the deliberative diagnoses compromised the justness of 
                                                 




this by explaining that the enemy was not a ‘particular country’, just as a ‘particular country’ was 
about to be invaded.  
Another example of the incompatibility can be seen in the contrast between deliberative threat 
diagnoses like Goff’s in 2005 that “we do not have a direct sense of threat [from terrorism] here 
in New Zealand” with Clark’s 2002 threat diagnosis that “[t]errorism knows no global 
boundaries and distance is no guarantee of protection”.4 These diagnoses explicitly contradict 
one another, in the deliberative the threat was portrayed as limited, NZ had no ‘direct sense of 
threat’, while the reactive narrative delineates a threat that knew no global boundaries and 
distance (often promoted as NZ’s strategic strength) was no guarantee of protection. What 
makes this interesting is that the reactive actually became more credible over the period, as the 
attacks spread, while the deliberative became less accurate, as NZ’s action as a counterinsurgent 
increased its risk of being targeted. However, these types of reactive diagnoses declined over 
time, while this type of deliberative diagnosis peaked in 2007. It is also pertinent that Goff’s 
statement came from a foreign policy speech given to the United Nations Association of New 
Zealand and the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, while Clark’s came from her 
speech on the first anniversary of 9/11 at the US Embassy. Context mattered, it influenced the 
counterinsurgent to use different, conflicting narratives.  
One incompatibility that stood out, and encompassed many of the reactive problem diagnoses 
and enemy identifications, was blaming the enemy as irrational. This involved diagnosis of 
terrorism as an irrational, pointless scourge that could strike anyone, anywhere at any time and 
the identification of terrorists as cold-blooded, evil people with an agenda of hatred, with no 
bottom line and an unjustifiable cause. If this blame attribution was credible and accurate, then it 
placed the rightness and properness of virtually every deliberative component into jeopardy, and 
vice versa. Even more troubling, it cast the main function of the counterinsurgent deliberative 
narrative as illogical, for if the enemy was irrational then trying to include them in the solution 
was itself an illogical, possibly even irrational, objective. This can be seen in a speech given by 
Clark in the US in 2002. First she stated that “terrorism is a common enemy. It is faceless, 
ideological and seemingly irrational”, then she explained that to ‘combat terrorism’, NZ had 
“provided humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan” and “increased our contributions to UN and 
other international efforts to assist the Afghan people in rebuilding their nation”.5 To brand 
                                                 
4 Goff, “Multilateralism in NZ Foreign Policy.”; Clark, “11 September 2002 Memorial Service at United States 
Embassy.” 
5 Helen Clark, “The United States and NZ: Co-operating for Prosperity,” beehive.govt.nz, December 12, 2002, 




terrorism as irrational and then refer to assisting Afghans rebuild their nation is illogical, if the 
enemy really was irrational then the right response would not rely on the enemy making rational 
cost-benefit analyses regarding the material improvement of their state.  
Clark again referred to terrorism as ‘irrational’ in a speech to APEC in 2004, but also said it was a 
“threat by the small and often faceless against the strong; it is usually not state sponsored or 
managed”.6 She provided a credible, accurate and informative summary of the underlying 
dynamics that drive terrorism yet still referred to it as irrational. There is a disconnect; she 
explained why it is a rational choice of the small and faceless against the strong but still referred 
to terrorism, and by default its practitioners, as irrational. The context may help to explain this; 
Clark faced a diverse international audience that included the US President, so while she would 
want to appear considered and deliberative in her threat diagnosis she would also want to ensure 
that she directed blame toward the enemy. While most wider context speeches were either given 
to an exclusively US or Australian audience, this audience was much more diverse and, arguably, 
had even higher stakes because it included numerous different heads of state rather than just 
representatives of one state.  
Branding terrorism and terrorists as irrational is also incompatible with many deliberative 
solutions. In particular, the strategy of targeting root causes. Take Goff’s 2005 statement that 
“actions to suppress terrorism must be accompanied by measures to tackle the root causes of 
terrorism. Injustice, lack of opportunity, hopelessness, desperation and the failure of legitimate 
channels to redress grievances all give rise to terrorist actions.”7 This solution only makes sense if 
the enemy was rational. Underlying this incompatibility is the conflict between blaming an 
irrational enemy and blaming rational grievances, as these two different attributions cannot both 
be right and proper.  
Generally speaking, deliberative grievance attributions and root causes solutions were 
incompatible with reactive solutions like the need to ‘eradicate terrorism’; unless, of course, the 
counterinsurgent was proposing to completely eradicate the many root causes and grievances 
they listed, including poverty, governance, ethnic tension, inequality, corruption, repression, 
injustice and the Israel-Palestine conflict.8 Here the solutions of the two narratives were widely at 
odds, the reactive solution was incredibly brief, absolute and, consequently, appeared relatively 
easy to achieve; the deliberative solution was longer, nuanced, far more complex and appeared 
                                                 
6 Clark, “Address to the NZ Apec Business Coalition.” 
7 Goff, “Address to No 43 Staff Course on Foreign Affairs and Trade.” 
8 Clark, “NZ Shares US Determination to Root Out Terrorism.” 
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difficult if not impossible to achieve. This difference helps explain why reactive solutions were 
used after attacks and why deliberative solutions, and supporting blame attributions, were less 
likely to be given in that state of emotional flux. The ‘eradicate terrorism’ phrase was first used 
on the eve of the Afghan Invasion, when issues regarding the root causes of terrorism would not 
have helped justify the invasion. However, over the coming months and years, when the 
possibility of eradicating terrorism would have lost salience, the counterinsurgent needed to 
outline more pragmatic and hopeful solutions like addressing root causes.  
There were two interconnected forces at work that made the use of these two narratives more 
problematic for the counterinsurgent. The first was globalisation and the second was the 
changing nature of insurgency. Globalisation, in all its forms, from culture to communication to 
trade to travel, has meant that it is virtually impossible for a counterinsurgent to isolate a specific 
audience they want to communicate with, both because of the spread of the information, 
communication and media spheres and because of the growing connections between states. 
Globalisation has also helped catalyse change in insurgency, from what were largely intra-state to 
what are now more often international and even global conflicts. These dynamics have not only 
meant that there are more actors and key audiences than ever before but they also mean that 
there are a number of actors that have a wider variation of direct and indirect stakes in the 
outcome (that is either the direct threat from the insurgency or any other more circuitous 
ramifications of the conflict) who need legitimisation, justification and mobilisation from various 
audiences. To be clear, when insurgencies are restricted to a single state, this not only means that 
there is a very simple divide in audience between those who see the state as more legitimate and 
those who see the insurgents as more legitimate, but that the direct stakes are relatively high for 
all involved. In the globalised contemporary environment, this is no longer true. The ICAT 
served as the perfect example, not only were the actors and audiences numerous and diverse, but 
the stakes were a lot more varied as well. NZ had a number of key audiences that it had to 
communicate with, each with differing requirements and while its direct stakes in the ICAT were 
comparatively low, its indirect stakes with regard to the US were relatively high. Thus, it was left 
in a situation where to satisfy these varying factors, one of the best options was to utilise two 
differing narratives. However, these narratives were inherently contradictory and while they were 
able to meet the differing requirements of each audience individually, their use together in the 
contemporary globalised environment meant that they compromised the rightness and 
properness of each other. It also frequently angered the US and had the potential to provoke the 
insurgent enemy.  
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NZ had relatively low direct stakes in the conflict as it was not attacked. The risk for a minor ally 
such as NZ in a conflict against a global insurgent network was that use of the reactive narrative 
could make the state a more apparent and attractive target than it was otherwise. As explained, a 
large part of the motivation behind attacks against Australia (Bali 2002 and 2005; Jakarta 204), 
Spain (Madrid 2004) and the UK (Istanbul, 2003; London 2005) was their participation in the 
ICAT and their connection with the US. While it would be inaccurate to directly connect these 
attacks with use of a reactive narrative, the inverse is true, the reactive did not help defuse the 
situation or help differentiate between the different allied states. Of particular danger to NZ were 
'homegrown' terrorists, who may become alienated by their own state's use of the reactive 
narrative and decided to conduct 'lone wolf' operations.  
The same was true for the use of the deliberative narrative and the higher, if indirect, stakes with 
regard to the US. NZ's use of the deliberative endangered its improving relationship with the US 
as it contradicted the American delineation of the situation, particularly in the early years. This 
risk was more real and could have cost NZ more in the long term than the use of reactive did 
with regard to the insurgent support populace. As shown by the Wikileaks cables, NZ's use of 
the deliberative narrative to argue against the Iraq Invasion did set the relationship between NZ 
and the US back for a period.  
The fact that NZ was not the direct victim of any terrorist attacks nor was it the senior 
counterinsurgent reduced their direct stakes whilst increasing their indirect stakes. Consequently, 
this increased the complexity of their communication as NZ had to communicate in a way that 
was of utility for the insurgent audience, their senior ally and their own support audience. The 
major issue that arose from not being directly attacked was that mobilising support from their 
domestic audience was not as easy for NZ and this lack of direct threat meant the reactive 
narrative was the most effective way of mobilising the domestic populace. Early on, mobilising 
support would have been easy because of the shock of 9/11 but even within a few months 
certain sectors of the NZ public's solidarity was fading, making the counterinsurgent's task of 
maintaining support progressively difficult. In other words, the reactive was used most often 
when it was least useful with regards to mobilisation, suggesting it is its other functions – 
specifically managing the negative domestic emotions and alliance maintenance – that drive its 
use. Ultimately, it was the deliberative narrative that delivered this outcome, as rather than 
relying on the sense of direct threat and the fear that generated to mobilise support, it sought to 
justify the continuing deployment through an emphasis on a pragmatic and principled foreign 
policy premised on collective security. 
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The main issue NZ faced as a junior counterinsurgent was balancing the needs of three, rather 
than two, key audiences. NZ was placed in a tenuous position, needing to ensure their 
communication did not raise the stakes outlined above with the allied and insurgent audiences 
whilst still appealing to their own support audience. This was heightened for NZ because the US 
chose to frame the situation as a binary 'us against them' and because of its problematic history 
with the US and the resultant mixed opinion of the US amongst the domestic audience. Taken 
together, this meant that the normally thin line a junior counterinsurgent must walk was even 
thinner for NZ. The cables released by WikiLeaks revealed the pressure the NZ Government 
was under to communicate its unwavering support for the US. This political support was, 
arguably, NZ's most important contribution to the US cause and the pressure to provide it in an 
uncritical and constant manner was real and ongoing, particularly after 2003 and up until 2007, 
when the mistakes of Iraq had become apparent in the US and their own narrative had become 
more deliberative.  
The interaction between the two narratives and their potential impacts on NZ’s justness and 
legitimacy were apparent with regard to the insurgent and allied audiences. The deliberative was 
well suited to the insurgent audience while the reactive fitted with the allied actor’s own 
narrative. The problem was that NZ was unable to target their communication to the respective 
audiences. Even if they had, the use of two contrasting narratives was most problematic for the 
domestic audience. The counterinsurgent needed to mobilise support, justify their cause and be 
seen as a legitimate counterinsurgent with regard to the domestic support audience. No other 
audience required all three and while each narrative was able to deliver positive results for some 
of these, used together these narratives were unable to ensure that all three conditions were met 
in an ongoing way. On one hand, the reactive helped mobilise support for action and justified 
the more belligerent responses but was not well suited for justifying expanded mandate 
responses or inclusive solutions. On the other hand, the deliberative helped justify long-term, 
expanded mandate responses and legitimised the counterinsurgent as a pragmatic but principled 
collective actor, but was not as powerful a means of mobilising support as the reactive. The area 
where these two narratives interacted and interfered with each other for the domestic audience 
was at the interface between justification and legitimacy. Generally speaking, NZ was a legitimate 
counterinsurgent for the domestic audience by default, but in a small way their general legitimacy 
as a political actor depended on the ongoing apparent justness of their cause. While this was 
unlikely, there is some historical precedent to this, with Vietnam and Afghanistan standing as 
two counterinsurgencies that had serious political consequences for the US and USSR 
respectively. Even in contemporary insurgencies, where the insurgents are not citizens of all the 
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counterinsurgent actors, with the modern media even a small tactical mistake can have strategic 
and political consequences to such a degree that the general legitimacy of a counterinsurgent is 
on the line.9 With regard to the interaction between these two narratives, the issue that could 
have damaged the government’s legitimacy was the contrast between reactive problem/enemy 
framing and deliberative solutions. By diagnosing the problem and identifying the enemy in such 
a frightening manner and then responding in such a limited and inclusive way, the 
counterinsurgent risked compromising their political legitimacy, though only in a limited manner. 
This would have been much more serious if NZ had been attacked. In other words, the domestic 
stakes were actually very much entangled with the stakes for the other two audiences, if NZ had 
been attacked then the political legitimacy of the government could have suffered. Also, if the 
US backlash to NZ’s intransigence had been more extreme, then NZ’s political legitimacy could 
have been impacted. This again shows how interconnected the three audiences were for NZ and 
the complexity of communicating in a globalised environment.  
 
6.4 THEORY AND PRACTICE 
This section will compare the theoretical literature examined in Chapters Two and Three with 
the findings of the research to ascertain how they fared in application, seeking to use the 
practical application to refine aspects of the literature as well as the general understanding of 
counterinsurgency as a phenomenon. It will also examine the use of NZ as a case study.  
The first issue that must be dealt with is the ongoing suitability of the population-centric model, 
as this was a major theoretical component in the thesis. There are two key components of the 
population-centric that need to be reassessed; firstly, its insurgent population-centric nature and, 
secondly, its emphasis on legitimacy as the key metric. With regard to the first, the population-
centric approach believes that the insurgent support audience are the key to victory. This was 
emphasised by the UK’s Countering Insurgency Field Manual, which emphasise that the insurgent 
“population is central to the outcome of the campaign” under the heading ‘The Enduring 
Characteristics of Counterinsurgency’.10 Ngal, Caldwell and Gompert all make similar points in 
their work.11 Furthermore, the population-centric approach believes to achieve victory the 
counterinsurgent must isolate the insurgent from their support populace. FM 3-24 explains that 
in COIN the “decisive effort is to isolate the insurgents by denying the local population as a base 
                                                 
9 Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal.” 
10 Countering Insurgency, 1-8. 




of support”.12 Likewise, Cohen et al. state that “[i]solating insurgents from their cause and 
support” is a critical component of population-centric COIN.13 The insurgent populace remains 
the central fulcrum of success for population-centric approach.  
However, while the insurgent populace remains important in COIN, it is no longer the single 
most important audience for all involved counterinsurgents. Contemporary insurgencies are not 
neat conflicts between a state and a segment of their populace, but rather increasingly involve 
strategic, and often hierarchical, groupings on both sides. As Kilcullen notes, the neo-classical 
model “still fundamentally views the conflict as a binary struggle” between a single insurgent and 
a single counterinsurgent; there are few distinctions made between domestic and international 
populaces in population-centric COIN, something this thesis has sought to address.14 There are 
two aspects to this, the first is that inherent in the population-centric’s focus is an assumption 
that the insurgent support audience is a cohesive single group that can actually be targeted. The 
reality in the contemporary era is that the support audience are far more diffuse and diverse. 
They can be spread around the globe, connected through shared ideas and communication 
channels, that they are can be interspersed in many of the counterinsurgent’s domestic populaces 
and that this support group will change over time, often in response to the actions of the 
counterinsurgents. The insurgent support populace is now partly derived from globally dispersed 
communities who are connected as never before by improved information and transportation 
technologies.15 The population-centric model remains fixated on a population, when in actuality 
it is more accurate to speak of insurgent support populaces. While much of the debate in COIN 
has been on whether the focus should be population-centric or enemy-centric, this analysis 
suggests that the real focus should be on populations, plural, which in turn suggests that it 
should also be on enemies, plural. Furthermore, the fluidity and diversity of the insurgent 
populace also suggests that distinctions between ‘enemy’ and ‘supporter’ may not be as clear cut 
as these debates assume. As a conflict goes on, those who may have originally been supporters, 
or neutral, may become the enemy as events may radicalise them. The length and intensity of the 
ICAT was such that over the decade there was much room for changing allegiances within the 
insurgent audience, with the Iraq Invasion marking a point where many went from ‘supporter’ to 
‘enemy’.   
                                                 
12 FM 3-24, 7-2. 
13 Cohen et al., “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” 50. 
14 Kilcullen, “The State of a Controversial Art,” 144. 
15 Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Insurgency?” 
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A related component is that ‘isolating’ the insurgent support populace is increasingly difficult in 
this dispersed yet connected era. In the classical model, isolation referred to a largely physical 
process, but in the neo-classical it has taken on a greater ideological and psychological 
component. In the contemporary era, however, achieving either type of isolation is problematic. 
Physical isolation for the entire support populace is virtually impossible to achieve, as they are 
dispersed around the globe, with many living in various allied counterinsurgents’ territories. 
Likewise, ideological and psychological isolation is unlikely because the internet has allowed the 
massive expansion of available information which has got increasingly difficult to ‘gatekeep’. In 
the modern age, trying to ‘isolate’ the insurgent support populace has become a somewhat 
archaic objective, though the neo-classical model still promotes this as a key COIN objective. It 
was for this reason, amongst others, that the thesis considered the three main audiences 
throughout the period, ‘isolating’ any audience was impossible.  
Second, the counterinsurgent is more likely to not be the insurgent’s own government, meaning 
the relative importance of the domestic support audience has grown. During the ICAT, a diverse 
coalition was pitched against an amalgam of groups, including al Qaeda and the Taleban, whose 
members were generally not citizens of the coalition states. As Dixon explains, “Global 
Insurgency means that the war must be fought at home as well as abroad; domestic public 
opinion could influence and even determine the campaign.”16 In the contemporary era, for many 
counterinsurgents, mobilising support and justifying their actions is critical. Thus, in some cases 
the domestic support audience are equally if not more important, particularly for democratic 
counterinsurgents whose support bases are notoriously fickle when it comes to 
counterinsurgencies.17 Depending on the counterinsurgent, the international audience may also 
be important. Thus, there are, at a minimum, three key audiences for any counterinsurgent: the 
insurgent support, domestic support, international support. The population-centric model 
overemphasises the importance of the insurgent populace at the expense of other key audiences, 
failing to provide a nuanced understanding of the relative importance of different audiences to 
the different types of counterinsurgent. The point is not that the population-centric school has 
not acknowledged the expanded actors in contemporary COIN but rather that it continues to 
portray the insurgent support populace as the most important. This obscures the potential 
diversity of allied counterinsurgents, whose own populaces are likely to be the most important 
audience. To remain relevant the population-centric model needs to emphasise the variety of 
actors and how this impacts the importance of the insurgent support populace, mapping the 
                                                 
16 Dixon, “The Future of Counterinsurgency?” 427.  
17 Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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potential positions of the network of coalition actors to provide an insight into the different 
requirements and balances each actor has with regard to key audiences. The insurgent support 
populace remains important but this is not an absolute or singular position, it must be moderated 
by the context of the counterinsurgent actor who in many cases is more worried about winning 
other prizes, like a free trade deal with the US. The COIN literature has largely approached the 
nature of the counterinsurgent in a singular manner, overlooking the different types of 
counterinsurgent and their different stakes.  
The above indicates there is another related issue, that of stakes. The population-centric model 
portrays legitimacy as the key stake for the counterinsurgent. Specifically, the relative legitimacy 
between the insurgent and counterinsurgent is seen as the defining metric for victory. Thus, loss 
of relative legitimacy can be seen as the main stake for the counterinsurgent. FM 3-24 is typical 
of the literature, explaining that legitimacy is the ‘central issue’ in COIN.18 In the population-
centric model, relative legitimacy is still portrayed as the main stake for the counterinsurgent. 
However, in the ICAT, many of the counterinsurgent actors took part as much because of their 
connections with the US as due to any direct stakes. Yet the population-centric approach 
remains intent on these direct stakes and while relative legitimacy between insurgent and 
counterinsurgent remains important, it only provides a part of the bigger picture. Legitimacy is 
no longer the single stake in a counterinsurgency as the conflicts are no longer between two 
actors fighting over the becoming or remaining the legitimate authority in a single state. Kilcullen 
believes it “may be appropriate to move beyond the population-centric conception of COIN as a 
competition for legitimate government... [legitimacy] may be a secondary factor”.19 As political 
actors with pre-existing domestic and international interests and obligations, a counterinsurgent 
has much more at stake than simply being seen as legitimate by the insurgent support audience. 
In many cases they would be equally if not more concerned with how their own support 
audience perceive the conflict. At stake is their wider political legitimacy as the government of 
their state, a legitimacy that supersedes this insurgency-specific legitimacy. Also of importance is 
the international context in which they operate. In a large counterinsurgency coalition there is a 
huge set of indirect stakes that connects all the various member states, from the tangible interests 
and obligations, such as free trade agreements, to less tangible interests and obligations, such as 
enhanced political capital. In the modern era, the counterinsurgent must consider their support 
population, their allies, the host country, the wider global audience as well as the insurgent 
support audience. These indirect stakes provide an insight into the motivations and drivers that 
                                                 
18 FM 3-24, 1-8. 
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lead counterinsurgents to participate in a coalition and help explain their actions.20 In particular, 
these indirect stakes help explain why a counterinsurgent may communicate in a manner that 
appears to go against the population-centric approach, placing their motivations in context, 
revealing the complex network of interests and obligations that shape their motivations and 
actions. For NZ, as well as the US, there are a number of other key states that have an influence 
on communication, including Australia, the UK, and the Pacific Island states, as well as 
international organisations like the UN. The direct and indirect stakes can be measured by, 
amongst other indicators, the metrics of mobilisation, justification and legitimisation. To remain 
relevant, the population-centric approach needs to develop a better understanding of the stakes, 
both direct and indirect, for the counterinsurgent as this provides a more comprehensive 
understanding of why and how they respond to an insurgency. Put simply, these stakes shape 
counterinsurgent communication and action and need to be understood better.  
The population-centric COIN focus has largely been on the insurgent and their support 
populace, and not the counterinsurgents and their support. A major reason for this is probably 
due to the remaining influence of the classical model that was focused on an internal struggle 
between a state and an insurgent component of its own populace. This helps explain why 
legitimacy remains the ‘key’ stake. The analysis here suggests that there needs to be a greater 
focus on the counterinsurgent and their support populace, an updated understanding of modern 
insurgencies and a, resulting, shift away from a singular focus on legitimacy as the main stake. 
This insight is best contextualised with the above understanding of the multiple key audiences, as 
examining the mobilisation, justification and legitimisation with regard to the many important 
audiences provides a far more nuanced understanding of the counterinsurgent’s communication. 
Insurgencies are inherently political and so too are their responses and this insight would help 
population-centric theory develop a better understanding of the different stakes for differing 
counterinsurgents.  
Another one of the theoretical insights developed in Chapter Two was the belief that fear was 
not the only or even most important emotion generated by a terrorist attack despite fear 
frequently being listed in the literature as the most important emotional outcome. As noted, the 
DoD believes the aim of terrorism is to ‘inculcate fear’ while Hoffman defines terrorism as the 
“deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence” as a 
                                                 
20 See the chapters in Coalition Challenges in Afghanistan: The Politics of Alliance, ed. Gale A. Mattox and Stephen M. 
Grenier (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2015) for discussion of the different motivations of various 
participants in Afghanistan.  
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means of intimidating a wider target audience.21 Likewise, Crenshaw explains that terrorism aims 
to create “fear and hostility in an audience identified as the ‘enemy’.”22 Conversely, many 
scholars explained that counterinsurgents used fear for their own purposes. Nacos et al. 
explanation is typical of this view: that “hyping threat and fear is central to terrorist and 
counterterrorist rhetoric”.23 Fear, according to the literature, serves the purposes of both the 
insurgent and the counterinsurgent.  
The analysis reinforced the latter interpretation, that fear is used by the counterinsurgent. When 
Anderton and Clark both framed 9/11 as an ‘attack on all civilised nations’ and described the 
enemy as ‘evil’ in the immediate aftermath, they were not trying to ameliorate the fear. This 
means that the former position is somewhat problematic, particularly the belief that fear is the 
fulcrum through which terrorists achieve their goals. This is not a fringe understanding, 
Crenshaw, Hoffman, Kydd and Walter are highly respected and influential terrorism theorists. In 
their highly cited article, Kydd and Walter state that “[e]ffective counterstrategies cannot be 
designed without first understanding the strategic logic that drives terrorist violence” before 
referring to fear as the key emotive mechanism, yet the literature and this study suggest that their 
understanding of the strategic logic of terrorism is, at best, incomplete.24 Naturally, terrorists may 
still believe that fear is the most important emotion for them to elicit, but the analysis here 
suggests that a more complete understanding of the emotions and the roles they play is required.  
It was proposed that the most important emotions for a counterinsurgent to try to address after 
an attack are confusion, concern and anger, which is why the reactive narrative is used in 
response to an attack, as it is the best way of addressing these emotions. This was based on a 
number of sources. For example, confusion was apparent in Holland’s work.25 Likewise, Jackson 
referred to the confusion created by 9/11.26 Concern was also noted as a key emotion by 
Ackerman.27 Anger, too, was expressed as an important emotion in Ross and Pemberton stated  
works.28 Needing to address these emotions helps explain the statements made by NZ 
counterinsurgents after attacks. Take the term ‘cowardly’, used to react to eight terrorist events. 
                                                 
21 For DoD and Hoffman quotes see Inside Terrorism, 31,40. 
22 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, No. 4. (1981): 386. 
23 Nacos et al., Selling Fear: Counterterrorism, the Media, and Public Opinion, 35 
24 Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 50. 
25 Holland, Selling the War on Terror, 1. 
26 Jackson, Writing the War on Terror, 29. 
27 Bruce A. Ackerman, Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006), 44-45 – emphasis in original.  
28 Andrew A. G. Ross, Mixed Emotions: Beyond Fear and Hatred in International Conflict (Chicago ; London : The 
University of Chicago Press, 2014), 85; Antony Pemberton “Needs of Victims of Terrorism,” in Assisting Victims of 
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This one word helps address all three, it reduces confusion by explaining why the enemy chose 
to use terrorism rather than fighting a ‘fair’ fight; in turn, this helps to reduce concern as it makes 
the enemy seem weak and it directs anger at them because of their lack of moral and physical 
courage. The thesis reinforced the importance of these emotions in shaping the 
counterinsurgent’s response to a terrorist attack. While terrorists’ main focus may be in inducing 
fear, this fear is not the counterinsurgent’s primary concern and they appear to use it to quell the 
other more concerning emotions. The reactive narrative seems ideally suited to amplifying the 
potential fear of the victim audience as a means of addressing these three emotions. The findings 
of this thesis suggest fear should not be considered as the sole emotion generated by terrorism or 
as the main mechanism by which the insurgent achieves their goals as it does not provide the 
insurgent with any direct benefits and actually helps their enemy to mobilise forces against them.  
This understanding of the emotive shockwave and the counterinsurgent response is seen as one 
of the most significant contributions of this thesis to the literature, demonstrating that rather 
than being the most effective emotion terrorists harness to achieve their objectives, fear is largely 
counterproductive as counterinsurgents are able to harness it for their own purposes. Fear does 
not threaten the counterinsurgent’s own political legitimacy and can actually be used to 
manipulate the domestic populace. Confusion, concern and anger are more important emotions 
that a counterinsurgent needs to deal with after an attack to ensure their ongoing political 
control. This is a major failing in the literature, particularly as the judo-like use of fear by the 
victim state is a well-known phenomenon and yet this erroneous understanding of terrorism’s 
strategic logic is still being widely perpetuated. This failure is particularly problematic considering 
the considerable academic, political and military resources that have been focussed on terrorism 
since 9/11. There have been some insightful studies into the full array of emotive impacts of 
terrorism, including those referenced in Chapter Two such as Alexander and Klein’s three phase 
model for how a community reacts to terrorism and the examination into how emotion affects 
citizens’ responses to risk by Lerner et al.29 It seems that most of these studies, however, are 
done by psychologists and their insights do not appear to have been absorbed by the terrorism 
experts. Fear as the key emotive means by which terrorists achieve their goals still remains 
dominant in the terrorism literature, despite evidence to the contrary. If the post-9/11 era is to 
have an intellectual legacy, one component needs to be a better understanding of the underlying 
strategic logic of terrorism as a method of political violence.  
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The decision to use framing theory as the key means of structuring and guiding the analysis 
provided a useful set of tools and processes for examining the narratives. Generally, framing’s 
flexibility and ability to be adapted to suit the topic were very useful. However, there was one 
area, however, where the theory was lacking: emotion. This lacuna was particularly problematic 
considering the above discussion on the importance of emotion in studying terrorism and 
insurgency. Benford, amongst others, has highlighted that framing has “neglected a vital social 
movement resource—emotions [and consequently] ignored the possibility of examining the ways 
in which movement actors produce, orchestrate, and strategically deploy emotions in pursuit of 
their collective goals.”30 Because of the importance of emotion as a key part of terrorism’s 
underlying strategic logic and as a critical component in mobilising support, this addition was 
necessary. In practice, this addition was achieved by simply considering the emotional impact of 
each framing task on the different key audiences as delineated by the understanding of the 
emotive shockwave created by a terrorist attack, for the domestic audience, and using a 
religious/cultural understanding of the insurgent audience. The main utility of including emotion 
was gaining an insight into why a counterinsurgent chose to use a particular narrative in a 
particular context, particularly the reactive in the wake of terrorist events. It also provided an 
insight into how a counterinsurgent can best communicate to an insurgent audience in a manner 
that includes them. The study of counterinsurgent communication would be incomplete without 
reference to emotion, it is the what empowers terrorism and it is also a powerful means of 
mobilisation for the counterinsurgent. That it works in both directions means that framing not 
only needs to place more emphasis on emotion but also needs to develop a more nuanced 
understanding of where it fits in the framing process and how it works. Framing theory needs to 
develop an understanding of how “movement actors produce, orchestrate, and strategically 
deploy emotions in pursuit of their collective goals”, this insight is essential in the realm of 
counterinsurgent communication and for all political communication.31 It also means that the 
models of people as rational actors used by framing theorists, amongst others, need to be 
moderated with an understanding that audiences are as emotional as they are rational.32  
The decision to use NZ as a case study was also revealing for a number of reasons; in particular, 
that it was not a direct victim and that it was a junior partner in the coalition with a problematic 
history with the senior partner. This meant that while NZ had low direct stakes, they had high 
indirect stakes and, consequently, the complexity of their communication was increased, as NZ 
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31 Ibd., 419-420. 
32 Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta, “Emotional Dimensions of Social Movements,” 413. 
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had to balance their approach so that it was not only of utility for the insurgent audience but was 
also of utility for their senior ally and their own support audience. Because NZ was not targeted 
directly, mobilising support and justifying their response to their domestic audience was not as 
easy as if the state had been attacked. This lack of direct threat meant the reactive narrative was 
the most effective way of mobilising the domestic populace – though it was probably used as 
much as a means of emphasising solidarity with the US as immediately after 9/11 mobilising 
support would have been relatively easy because of the shock of the attack. However, even 
within a few months this solidarity was fading, making the counterinsurgent’s task of ensuring 
their populace supported their response over the long term progressively difficult.33 To ensure 
the domestic audience remained mobilised, the counterinsurgent used the reactive narrative. 
There is a limit to its salience, however, as the memory of the attacks recede, it would not have 
the same experiential commensurability with an audience that was not attacked. This was where 
the deliberative narrative became useful. Rather than amplifying the threat and directing anger to 
mobilise, it justified the continuing deployment through an emphasis on a pragmatic and 
principled foreign policy premised on collective security. Thus, examining a state that was not a 
direct victim allowed a greater examination of the interplay between the deliberative and reactive, 
as the counterinsurgent was unable to use the residual emotional shock generated by an attack. 
This provided insights that may not have been as visible if a direct victim had been studied 
instead as the counterinsurgent had to use the two different narratives to achieve their desired 
outcomes.  
That NZ was a junior coalition member and had a problematic history with the US was also 
effective for a case study. If the US had been selected, the audience dynamics would have been 
very different. NZ as junior counterinsurgent was placed in a tenuous position where they 
needed to ensure their communication pleased, or rather did not displease, the two very different 
insurgent and allied audiences. This was heightened for NZ both because the US chose to frame 
the situation as a binary ‘us against them’ and because of its chequered relationship with the US. 
Taken together, these two factors meant that the normally thin line a junior counterinsurgent 
would have to walk was even thinner for NZ during the ICAT. The cables released by WikiLeaks 
revealed the political pressure the NZ Government was under to communicate its unwavering 
support for the US and its ‘war on terror’. This political support was, arguably, NZ’s most 
important contribution to the US cause and the pressure to provide it in an uncritical and 
                                                 
33 For examples and statements of fading support, see Stuart McMillan, “US Can't Know When the 'Eternal War' 
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constant manner was real and ongoing. Adding to the complexity of the situation was the mixed 
opinion of the US within the domestic audience. Not only would any junior counterinsurgent 
face issues communicating to three distinct audiences, but in this case NZ was even more 
restricted. NZ had to try not to anger the US whilst ensuring that its communication did not 
overplay the relationship between the two to such a degree that it was not salient for the 
unsupportive members of the NZ populace. The multiple audiences made maintaining 
consistency in communication more difficult for the counterinsurgent as they were unable to 
specifically target any one audience. This did not stop them trying, as was revealed by the 
Wikileaks cables, NZ’s attempts to use the more resonant US narrative when speaking to a wider 
audience than to a specifically domestic one. However, they were caught trying to target their 
message, though as the thesis revealed they did continue to choose a narrative depending on the 
context. NZ’s position as the junior counterinsurgent helped to highlight the issues of 
consistency in the modern era where no communication can be targeted. The decision to focus 
on NZ’s counterinsurgent communication made the analysis more complex than if the senior 
allied actor had been studied, but it also provided a greater insight into the dynamics underlying 
counterinsurgent communication, particularly the limitations created by the counterinsurgent’s 
existing political obligations and relational history as well as the problems of targeting brought 
about by the modern globalised media and communications network. 
 
6.5 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
As with any project, there were a number of limitations, both methodological and case based. 
The first limitation was that the division of press releases by context did not create mutually 
exclusive categories, specifically, the division between wider and domestic audiences. This 
division was done consistently by categorising wider audience press releases as those delivered 
outside NZ or given in NZ to a visiting audience of representatives of either the US or Australia 
while domestic press releases were given in NZ to a domestic audience. The problem, however, 
is that in the modern era all communication has a wider audience and it is probable that the 
counterinsurgent communicators have an understanding of this reality. Therefore, examining the 
differing frequencies of the reactive and deliberative narrative for these two different contexts is 
not as revealing regarding the counterinsurgent’s decision to use the reactive as a means of 
alliance maintenance as expected because the counterinsurgent would be aware that everything 
they were saying was, at the least, being followed by allied state representatives in NZ. However, 
as noted, the US Embassy believed NZ politicians were less likely to talk positively about their 
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relationship with the US depending on whether the audience was domestic or not. While this is 
not empirical proof, it does help reinforce the division of the press releases into context because 
the allied actor believed NZ communicated differently depending on context. Overcoming this 
limitation would be extremely difficult because of the diffuse nature of modern communications, 
but while the findings that compare narrative usages between wider and domestic contexts are 
not as robust as between event and non-event contexts, the US Embassy’s perception of 
context-different framing suggest there is some efficacy to this division.   
 
Another limitation was that the use of both latent and manifest units reduced the fidelity of the 
findings. The inclusion of latent units meant that the findings are more subjective than if the 
research had focused on manifest units only. The nature of latent units as semantically similar 
framing tasks that do not use the same terms means that that often a decision to include or 
exclude must be made and there will always be a degree of interpretation. That said, the use of 
the inter-coder reliability tests to ensure that the operationalisation of the reactive and 
deliberative framing tasks was objective and replicable ensured that this interpretation was very 
limited and that, generally speaking, even the latent units were well delineated. Latent units were 
vital for the project as many of the most important framing tasks, particularly the reactive, were 
latent. Without examining both types of units, the analysis would have missed some of the most 
important framing tasks and, therefore, would not have been able to develop the same 
comprehensive understanding of NZ’s counterinsurgent communication.  
 
Another methodological limitation was that tracing the reactive’s origins was difficult. As part of 
NZ’s national security narrative, the origin and history of the deliberative is relatively clear and 
can be traced back through NZ’s key security policies and documents. However, the same 
cannot be said for the reactive narrative. While in some cases reference to President Bush’s use 
of the same term or phrase just before a NZ use suggested it was an example of mimicking, in 
other cases the origins were not so clear. Anderton’s use of reactive framing tasks in response to 
9/11, for example, did not involve direct reference to US statements and the timing was such 
that their use was more likely due to a shared vocabulary rather than any direct repetition of 
allied partners. As the examination in the introduction showed, before 9/11, the reactive was 
extremely rare in NZ’s security narrative and general domestic political discourse; yet, as the 
reactive was not always used as an obvious case of mimicking, it is not alien to the wider NZ 
narrative. Many of its key tropes have a long lineage in Western history, but it appears NZ had 
largely moved on from using these until 9/11. It was, however, beyond the scope of this project 
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to attempt to determine the exact reasons the reactive narrative was used as this task is a thesis 
on its own. While determining the reasons for the reactive narrative’s use would have helped the 
project, inferences can be made through the obvious cases of mimicking as well as the overall 
patterns of use mapped out in this thesis.  
 
The final methodological limitation was that in some cases it was what the counterinsurgent did 
not say that was of utility. One of the more prominent examples of this was that NZ did not 
refer to al Qaeda’s narrative during the period or use key terms such as ‘jihad’, ‘jihadi’ and 
‘caliphate’. The methodology used for the thesis focused on extant framing tasks and examining 
the utility of non-existent framing tasks was beyond the parameters of the project, despite the 
fact that these are also powerful means of shaping the perceptions of a conflict. Examining the 
non-use of framing tasks would have required a completely different approach that compared 
and contrasted NZ and al Qaeda’s narratives to understand the gaps between the two. This 
limitation might better be considered as a direction for future, related research, as the project 
only focused on existing framing tasks. It does not detract from the main focus as this was on 
comparing the use of the reactive and deliberative narrative as they were used in a certain period. 
 
The case-based limitation was that the focus was on a junior ally who was not directly attacked. 
This decision meant that, in some respects, NZ’s response mimicked the US and the study did 
not provide any tangible data on how a direct victim state would respond to a terrorist attack, 
nor did it provide any information about the way in which a senior counterinsurgent would 
communicate during a counterinsurgency. Consequently, many of the findings would not be 
applicable to a state that was the direct victim or was the senior counterinsurgent and the 
hypotheses regarding the wider context would not be as relevant for a victim state. Ultimately, 
this project was much more focused on the allied actors than a project that examined a senior 
counterinsurgent’s communication. While these limitations mean that the findings are not as 
easily generalised to direct victim states or senior counterinsurgents, the focus on a junior ally 
who was not directly attacked meant that the dynamics of the reactive narrative, in particular, 
were able to be better examined as its utility in the wake of an attack and as a way of reinforcing 
connections with friendly victim states was more obvious in NZ’s cause than it would have been 
in a study of the US response. The reactive’s ability to help ease the emotional stress of the 
domestic support, mobilise their support and reinforce the parameters of the allied ingroup in 
the wake of an attack were made apparent in this case study. This usage was made more 
interesting by the scarcity of this narrative in pre-9/11 political and military discourse, NZ’s 
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generally limited use of this narrative meant that its deployment was more obvious after 9/11.  
 
6.6 FUTURE STUDY 
There are a number of avenues for future study, including several suggested by the above 
limitations. As noted in the limitations, this project was focused on a junior ally that was not 
directly attacked. While this enabled an understanding of the way the reactive was used as both a 
means of mollifying the domestic populace and reinforcing relationships with friendly victim 
states, a comparative study that looked at a range of different actors communicating during the 
same period would provide an increased understanding of the dynamics of both narratives. This 
type of study would focus on a senior counterinsurgent that was a direct victim, a senior 
counterinsurgent that was not a direct victim, a junior counterinsurgent that was a direct victim 
and a junior counterinsurgent that was not a direct victim, and could also add middle-sized 
counterinsurgents as well to add even greater nuance. Clearly, the more states compared would 
enhance the understanding of how these two narratives function and why they are used, with the 
ultimate project comparing the tens of states. By comparing the way the narratives were used by 
the different types of counterinsurgents, a far greater understanding of these two narratives 
could be gained, particularly the nature of mimicking, the influence of pre-existing political 
relationships and public opinion, as well as the role of the traditional security narrative.. This type 
of study could also add insights from substantive news framing, such as Entman’s understanding 
of cascading activation, to provide a tool for understanding mimicking, in particular.34  
 
Another potential future study would involve tracing the use of the reactive and deliberative 
narratives in NZ political communication as this would provide both an insight into the reasons 
for the narratives use as well as an understanding of how they change over time, particularly as 
influenced by changing threat levels and technology. This would help to assess the validity of the 
hypothesis that the reactive narrative is most likely used in response to shocking attacks on close 
allies and, in turn, whether it is largely the result of mimicking or shared vocabulary, as well as 
helping confirm whether its key function is to mobilise support for political and military action. 
In turn, this would further help the understanding of fear’s importance in the domestic audience, 
particularly as the historical terrorist events could be assessed for their potential to generate fear 
in the NZ audience, specifically comparing the earlier years of aircraft hijacking by nationalist 
insurgents to the revolutionary insurgent attacks conducted from 9/11 onward. It would also 
                                                 




help provide an understanding of the development of the deliberative narrative, in particular 
assessing the interplay between NZ’s growing independent foreign policy over the second half of 
the twentieth century and the influence of the two main political parties. The Labour Party has a 
greater ideological congruence with the deliberative narrative and the public support this 
narrative gained during the 1970s and 1980s meant that the National Party had to adopt this 
narrative despite some ideological incompatibility. Examining the development of NZ’s largely 
deliberative security narrative would outline which party favoured which framing tasks and how 
these various components were built into the overarching frame by the two parties. This type of 
project would not only help map out the dynamics of this historical process, shedding light on 
how each party adopted, adapted or converted the various framing aspects, but could also 
provide insight into the potential reverse transition if the reactive narrative ever becomes more 
dominant in everyday NZ security rhetoric.  
 
Another useful study that would help bolster the understanding of reactive and deliberative 
narratives would directly measure their impact on an audience. The aim would be to gather hard 
data on the salience, emotive impacts and mobilising, justifying and legitimising outcomes these 
narratives have on audience, focusing on both ingroups and outgroups. This would provide an 
excellent way of gauging the actual utility of the deliberative and reactive, particularly assessing 
whether the deliberative’s ‘population-centric ’ focus was still relevant in contemporary situations 
as well as examining how the reactive actually dealt with the various emotions generated by an 
attack. In turn, this would help assess the validity of the belief that fear is not as important as has 
been stated in the literature. It would also help examine how these two narratives interact and 
interfere with each other, providing an insight into whether any or many in an audience are able 
to see both as just and legitimate or not. Of particular interest would be a study of this sort that 
monitored an audience over a significant period of time as this would help chart the possible 
change in salience of the reactive as well as the potential for the deliberative to build legitimacy 
over long periods. This would not only provide academics with a useful set of information that 
could be used to further refine the understanding of both these narratives but would also enable 
counterinsurgents to refine their narratives to achieve the optimal mobilising, justifying and 
legitimising outcomes with regard to key audiences. It could also help to refine the use of 
framing for counterinsurgencies by examining which aspects of resonance are the most 
important. Through analysis of different audience types as well, it could provide an 
understanding of if and how resonance varies across types of groups, particularly different 
cultures, something important in modern counterinsurgencies. This type of project could help to 
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turn resonance from a tautological concept into a more rigorous and unidirectional 
understanding. Another useful insight from a study of this nature would be understanding if and 
how people register the contradictions between the reactive and deliberative when used together, 
helping to explain if they are aware of them at all, whether people are selectively biased towards 
one or the other and only that narrative registers, whether they have a more fluid and flexible 
way of registering the contradictions or whether something else is going on.  
 
Another useful future study would expand the scope of these narratives to examine their use 
beyond counterinsurgency into other areas of political communication as they have the potential 
to be utilised in a range of different political contexts. There are a number of important 
dynamics that this type of study could help examine, including the general applicability of these 
two narratives beyond counterinsurgency, their relative use by leftwing and rightwing 
governments, any influence the use of these narratives in one political context may have on other 
contexts and how their use in different contexts impacts their mobilising and legitimising 
capacity. One particular area of interest would be to track any potential influence these narratives 
had after 9/11 on other areas of political communication, examining whether the rise in use of 
the reactive narrative had an impact on a state’s general political communication. This type of 
study could build directly onto the results of this thesis, comparing NZ’s political 
communication in a range of other areas from 9/11 onward to see if there were any 
corresponding impacts.  
 
Finally, a useful study would examine the communication of the ICAT in historical and current 
context, seeking to understand whether it was an aberration or was a consistent step in an 
ongoing transition. This project would need to examine the numerous previous counterinsurgent 
campaigns to assess whether there are any aspects of continuity or whether the consequences of 
9/11 are best treated as an outlier. This would help determine whether the findings in this study, 
and the many on US communications during the period, are able to be applied to other 
situations or whether they are best restricted to understanding the ‘war on terror’. If it is found 
to be more of an aberration than a continuation, this creates a number of related questions. In 
particular, whether it was the scale and novelty of the attacks themselves or the particular 
response as directed by Bush that led to this aberrance.  
 
6.7 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
The aim of this thesis was to examine the reactive and deliberative narratives as strategic tools in 
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countering an insurgency with regard to the three key audiences: the insurgent, domestic and 
allied. It was a complex undertaking, to examine the communicative output of the NZ 
Government over a ten year period using a demanding analytical framework. Overall, the 
findings reinforced the original impressions of these two narratives: one was a reaction to an 
extreme situation, the other was the result of deliberation. The exploration of the use of these 
two narratives between 2001 and 2011 revealed that the shock of 9/11 caused NZ to 
communicate in a reactive manner, that this reactive communication declined over the period as 
the shock faded and that the reactive was used more during events and to a wider audience. It 
also showed that the deliberative was used more often to a domestic audience and that it was by 
far the more common narrative in general. The key issue, however, was the incompatibility of 
these two narratives. The reactive’s utility comes from its ability to create a powerful ingroup by 
excluding the outgroup, while the deliberative’s utility comes from its capacity to bring the 
outgroup into the ingroup. They work in conflicting and contradictory ways meaning that when 
they are being given to a mixed audience, as all communications are in the contemporary 
environment, meaning that they impact the utility of one another. The counterinsurgent uses 
these two narratives in a conflict at their peril as they not only impact the utility of each other but 
could erode their legitimacy, both domestically and to a wider audience. Consistency is key to 
communicating well during a counterinsurgency, assuming, of course, that audiences not only 
pay attention but actively connect the various pieces. Even if they do not, if the media are 
fulfilling their role as the fourth estate, the more egregious inconsistencies should be picked up.  
 
This brings up one issue that needs to be specifically addressed, the deliberative’s connection 
with NZ’s traditional security narrative and its entwined resonance with the domestic audience. 
The history of usage was probably a part of the reason that the counterinsurgent continued to 
use deliberative framing tasks that were discreditable, aside from the political benefits accrued. 
That is to say that in some respects, the counterinsurgent was increasingly trapped by their 
previous communications. They had spent so long framing the Afghan deployment in a certain 
way that they could not change narratives to fit changing circumstances without repercussions, 
yet events eventually ended up exposing this divergence in a more problematic manner than if 
they had been more credible and accurate in their communication earlier on. The point being 
that a counterinsurgent is, to a degree, limited in what they can reasonably say about a situation 
by their previous communications and this consistency is a key component in determining both 
the content and reception of counterinsurgent communication. That means that no matter what 
narrative is used, its past use will limit the potential resonance and utility of future 
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communications. These internal and external drivers for consistency mean that a 
counterinsurgent should choose their narrative wisely, as they may well be forced to use it for the 
duration no matter how much circumstances change.  
 
This has particular ramifications for NZ, as not only has the bilateral relationship between NZ 
and the US improved dramatically but also the National Party, who are less inclined towards the 
deliberative narrative, has been in power for almost three terms. These two factors threaten what 
has been a bipartisan approach to foreign policy and defence, and communication regarding 
these areas. If the two main parties of NZ were to adopt different security narratives and 
different counterinsurgent narratives, the consistency of NZ’s approach could be severely 
compromised over the long terms required to conduct a counterinsurgency. While the use of 
both narratives was problematic during the ICAT, at least they were used in a consistent manner 
by both parties, deployed in response to attacks and when talking to wider audiences. If the two 
parties adopted contrasting narratives as their standard response, NZ’s ability as a 
counterinsurgent, and more generally in international relations, would be compromised. Even 
more complex is that NZ’s mixed-member proportional representation system and history of 
mixed-party cabinets means that there is the potential for key roles to be held by MPs using 
different narratives to respond to the same situation. Fortunately for NZ, the New Zealand First 
MP Winston Peters’ communications in the Labour-led Government were relatively consistent, 
but there is potential for future problems with diverse cabinets and differing narratives. For NZ 
to remain as effective internationally, it needs to ensure that it uses a consistent narrative that has 
enough flexibility within it to suit changing circumstances.  
 
A consistent narrative across communicators and even parties could be achieved through the use 
of a set of core values to guide and ground counterinsurgent communication. These values 
would need to be discerned and delineated by the government in collaboration with the relevant 
ministries and would need to have a both general resonance with the wider NZ public as well as 
a specific utility with respect to counterinsurgency – though not all values would need to fulfil 
both simultaneously. This has a clear congruity with the constructivist school of international 
relations, which sees foreign policy and national security as historically and socially constructed, 
based on the understanding “that the structures of human association are determined primarily 
by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive 
actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.”35 Katzenstein, one of 
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the leading constructivist theorists, has expressed the importance of avoiding the “sterility of 
realism and the naïveté of liberalism” by understanding the importance of culture, norms and 
identity when it comes to foreign policy and national security.36 Thus, it is recommended that 
NZ foreign policy and national security communications in general could be improved by 
viewing NZ decision-making through a constructivist lens. By reflecting on its culture, norms 
and identity and how they shape its foreign policy and national security, NZ could delineate a set 
of values that would help anchor all its communications. Understanding the wider socio-cultural 
context that underlies its decision-making would allow NZ to communicate in a clear and 
consistent manner that was of utility both domestically and internationally. In turn, some of the 
general values could be selected for specific counterinsurgency communication, those with a 
particular congruence to the insurgent-counterinsurgent dynamic and a resonance with the 
various key audiences highlighted and emphasised as the foundational aspects of all 
communication output during operations.  
 
Several of the values used during the ICAT and referenced in the thesis provide an example of 
how this could ground communication. Take ‘tolerance’, which NZ used a number of times, this 
reflects on both NZ as a ‘multicultural’ society that believes in ‘fairness’ and also fits with the 
population-centric COIN approach. Likewise, the ‘multilateral’ values NZ referenced during the 
ICAT are popular amongst New Zealanders. Emphasis of ‘multilateral values’ would help justify 
NZ contributions to counterinsurgent operations that it has low direct stakes in to the domestic 
populace whilst also helping communicate that the NZ operation was inclusive to the insurgent 
populace. Properly devised, these values would provide the ideal means to orient the 
government’s communications. In fact, used in the right way they could even enable elements of 
the reactive and deliberative narratives to be used together with a degree of consistency in certain 
areas. For example, while NZ emphasised its values, which it shares with other states that it has 
formed an alliance with, it did not explicitly connect these deliberative actor and solution frames 
with the reactive narrative. It could have constructed a narrative that made these connections, 
explaining that it was joining with those states that it shared these values with to protect the 
values from those who seek their overthrow. Rather than refer to 9/11 as an ‘attack on 
civilisation’ they could have framed it as an ‘attack on our shared values’. This has the same 
mobilising capacity without the same alienating outcome and it helps connect the more reactive 
and more deliberative strands of NZ’s communication. While not providing enough elasticity to 
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bridge the most extreme reactive aspects with the most moderate deliberative components, it 
does offer the potential for a some aspects of each narrative to be used in a consistent manner. 
For example, ‘tolerance’ has a congruence with the reactive value of ‘freedom’ and the 
deliberative need for inclusiveness, thus providing a means for NZ counterinsurgent 
communication to have both reactive and deliberative facets.  The use of a set of values as the 
basic guide for shaping all counterinsurgent communications would help ensure that there was a 
higher degree of consistency within the politician’s and government’s own communications and 
across party lines.  
 
This does suggest that NZ needs to review its counterinsurgent communication processes and 
protocols with the aim of ensuring consistency through the use of a values-framework. 
Considering the findings of the thesis, NZ needs to greater preparation and coordination of all 
its important communication. It would appear that much of NZ’s communications are 
conducted in a relatively ad hoc manner, particularly those immediately after an attack, and this is 
no longer acceptable in the contemporary context. While sending off a hastily prepared press 
release with no broader governmental coordination or scrutiny may not have been an issue when 
its potential audience was largely restricted to NZ, in the globalised world it is highly 
problematic. As the terrorist incidents and social unrest caused by the Danish and French comics 
show, it does not take much to bring unwanted negative attention. While they cannot specifically 
prepare for future terrorist attacks the NZ government should also have a set of guidelines in 
place that ensure they always communicating in a way that is both cross-culturally acceptable and 
is consistent with NZ’s core values. While a set of processes and protocols would help ensure 
that all the communications are subjected to the necessary scrutiny the development of a set of 
guidelines would provide a benchmark that would help politicians to quickly write a press 
release.   
 
The need for a review suggests that there should be a greater interaction between politicians and 
academia. Not only can academics bring their specialised knowledge to the problem but it also 
means that a government that is struggling to do more with less is able to effectively outsource 
some of the work. One of the probable reasons that much of NZ’s current counterinsurgent 
communication occurs with no broader governmental coordination or scrutiny is lack of 
resources. For a small state, the new pressures regarding this area place increasing strain on 
already struggling ministries. The trend in NZ has been for the government to limit academic 
access to certain information but this reticence only ends up limiting the pool of analysis they 
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can call on. The NZ government needs to be more willing to engage with external experts and 
while operational secrecy should always be maintained, an increased flow of information and 
consultation would encourage a synergistic relationship that benefits both parties. 
 
It is also suggested here that NZ should aim for greater transparency in its counterinsurgent 
communication. Both Clark and Key have been criticised for obscuring what they believe are 
unpopular military deployments or operations by refusing to talk about them, by using the ‘I will 
not comment on operational matters’ line or by using misleading terminology, like ‘mentoring’, 
to describe them. While these tactics may have worked in the past, in the globalised world they 
are just as likely to backfire as they are no longer able to control this information to the same 
degree. While it is not suggested that they reveal information that could endanger personnel or 
compromise operations, their ongoing attempts to managed public perception of military 
deployments is problematic, for them politically, for the NZ public and for the morale of the 
NZDF. The findings of this research suggest it would be better for the NZ government to be 
more transparent as not only would it ensure that their communications are consistent with their 
actions but also that in many cases the domestic audience support the overarching justifications 
given for their actions, even if they do not always support the specific actions themselves, 
because they are congruent with their core values. In fact, having widely agreed values in place 
would make transparency easier as they provide an overarching means of justifying less popular 
actions.  
 
Another one of the major insights this thesis provided is the incompatibility between a 
democratically-elected government and the exigencies of a counterinsurgent as a communicator. 
While democracy’s general issues regarding counterinsurgency have been noted, the issues 
surrounding communication have not.37 One of the main reasons for this incompatibility is that a 
democracy must not only consider the impacts of their communication on the insurgent support 
audience but also must mobilise and justify the deployment to their own support audience. As 
has been shown, often the best means of mobilising support amongst the domestic audience for 
a low-stake cause have counterproductive impacts on the insurgent support audience and the 
best ways of justifying a cause and legitimising an actor as a counterinsurgent with respect to the 
insurgent audience have little mobilisational capacity with regard to the domestic audience. This 
is a problem inherent to democracy, where the government must constantly ensure they have the 
support of their constituency and their cause is perceived as legitimate, a problem other regime 
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types do not necessarily have to manage. Another key reason this issue is magnified for 
counterinsurgencies is the lengthy campaigns required for most COIN operations. Not only do 
democratic governments need to maintain this difficult balance between the two key support 
populaces but they must also do so over a prolonged period. Also, counterinsurgencies rarely 
pose the same threat to a state as regular interstate war, meaning that the democratic 
counterinsurgent must mobilise support and justify a cause that does not have the same direct 
threat to their own support populace as a war.  
 
These pressures all mean that there is a danger that democracy is undermined during a 
counterinsurgency campaign through loss of transparency, actions outside the rule of law and 
control of the media, particularly if the indirect stakes are high enough. During the ICAT, NZ 
was guilty of compromising transparency – particularly the insistence on referring to the SAS 
role as ‘mentoring’ when they were in combat situations – and while it may not have damaged 
NZ democracy, these infringements are subtly corrosive and the potential for damage exists, 
even if it is limited. The same issue also comes from the other direction: the contemporary 
counterinsurgent often seeks to impose democracy in the host nation, a contradictory position of 
seeking to force a people to adopt a system of choice, and this hypocrisy can also erode the 
apparent legitimacy of democracy as a system of government both domestically and in general. 
Forcing another state to become a democracy is unlikely to promote democratic governance 
within that state.38 
 
A nested issue is that alongside the general degradation of democracy that comes with imposing 
a democratic regime, the democratic counterinsurgent also aims to set up a fellow 
counterinsurgent with the very same flaws that limit their ability to effectively conduct a 
counterinsurgent communication campaign. The democratisation solution may help the 
counterinsurgent justify their cause with their own support populace, but it replicates the 
problems they themselves experience in mobilising support and justifying their cause to different 
audiences in the newly democratised allied counterinsurgent state. The newly democratic 
counterinsurgent must ensure that they are able to mobilise support within their own populace 
while justifying action. While the stakes would admittedly be far higher for these states (such as 
Afghanistan and Iraq in the ICAT), their legitimacy would be far lower because the democratic 
government had been externally imposed, meaning that they would already be at a disadvantage. 
Thus, they would face even greater mobilisation, justification and legitimacy pressures which 
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may, in turn, lead to democracy being compromised as the newly democratic government 
communicates in undemocratic ways to secure victory in the counterinsurgency.  
 
These issues pose future problems as the democratic states move further towards a world of 
decreasing interstate regular conflict and rising insurgencies, all conducted on an increasingly 
globalised stage where there are multiple audiences with varying requirements.39 For the 
contemporary counterinsurgent, an understanding of the dynamics of both the reactive and 
deliberative narratives, both separately and in conjunction, will be crucial, as this provide the 
modern counterinsurgent with the tools to achieve various aims amongst differing audience 
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APPENDIX ONE  
PRESS RELEASES 
In this appendix, the press releases that made up the data set will be provided. Specifically, the 
date, the issuer, the title and the context will be given for each. These press releases were all 
sourced from www.beehive.govt.nz using the key words ‘terrorism’, ‘terrorist,’, ‘Afghanistan’, 
and ‘Iraq’, then selected using specific criteria before being categorised by context, as outlined in 
Chapter 2.  
 
2001 – total number of press releases: 15. 
12 September. Jim Anderton, “New Zealand Response to US Attacks.” (Event). 
12 September. Helen Clark, “PM Condemns Terrorist Attacks in United States.” (Event). 
14 September. Jim Anderton, “Ministerial Statement: Terrorist attacks in US.” (Event). 
14 September. Helen Clark, “NZ Pledges Support to United States.” (Event).  
21 September. Helen Clark, “NZ Shares US Determination to Root Out Terrorism.” (Event). 
26 September. Phil Goff, “Goff Meets Armitage in Washington.” (Event). 
3 October. Phil Goff, “Government Briefed by United States on Bin Laden Connection.” 
(Event). 
8 October. Helen Clark, “PM Says Today’s Military Action Inevitable.” (Event). 
9 October. Helen Clark, “PM Receives Briefing From President Bush.” (Event). 
15 October. Helen Clark, “Response to Terrorism High on APEC Leaders' Agenda.” (Wider). 
19 October. Helen Clark, “New Century, New Economy: PM's speech to APEC CEOs in 
Shanghai.” (Wider). 
27 October. Phil Goff, “New Zealand and Humanity After the World Trade Centre Suicide 
Bombings.” (Domestic). 
13 November. Phil Goff, “Goff Statement to UN General Assembly.” (Wider). 
14 November. Phil Goff, “Goff Statement to UN Security Council on Afghanistan.” (Wider). 
12 December. Phil Goff, “Goff Deplores Attack on India's Parliament.” (Event). 
 
2002 – total number of press releases: 22 
29 January. Helen Clark, “Extra Funding for Counter Terrorism Efforts.” (Domestic). 
28 March. Helen Clark, “US Chamber of Commerce Lunch - Washington DC.” (Wider). 
12 May. Helen Clark, “PM to Open Symposium on Terrorism.” (Domestic). 
13 May. Helen Clark, “Address to Symposium on World Terrorism.” (Domestic). 
14 May. Mark Burton, “Opening Address at NZDF Symposium, Trentham.” (Domestic). 
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23 May. Mark Burton, “NZ Extends Peacekeeping Commitment in Afghanistan.” (Domestic). 
28 June. Phil Goff, “Asia Pacific Security Challenges.” (Domestic). 
2 July. Phil Goff, “Goff Criticises Green Stance on Terrorism.” (Domestic). 
6 August. Phil Goff. “Address to the Australian Defence College - Centre of Defence and 
Strategic Studies.” (Wider). 
11 September. Helen Clark, “11 September 2002 Memorial Service at United States Embassy.” 
(Wider). 
12 September. Phil Goff, “Goff speech to 9/11 ANZAC Service in New York.” (Wider). 
15 September. Phil Goff, “Goff Statement to UN General Assembly.” (Wider). 
27 September. Phil Goff, “Address to No 43 Staff Course on Foreign Affairs and Trade.” 
(Domestic). 
9 October. Phil Goff, “Goff Second Reading Speech of the Terrorism (Bombings and 
Financing) Bill.” (Domestic).  
14 October. Helen Clark, “NZ Appalled by Bali Bombing.” (Event). 
15 October. Helen Clark, “Ministerial Statement on Bali Bombing.” (Event). 
23 October. Mark Burton, “Mark Burton--Mine Injures NZ Soldiers in Afghanistan.” 
(Domestic). 
11 November. Helen Clark, “NZ Navy and Air Force to Join International Campaign Against 
Terrorism.” (Domestic). 
22 November. Phil Goff, “NZ - US discussions on Iraq.” (Wider). 
27 November. Helen Clark, “Address to the NZ Apec Business Coalition.” (Wider). 
3 December. Phil Goff, “Goff to Afghanistan to Iran.” (Domestic). 
13 December. Helen Clark, “The United States and NZ: Co-operating for Prosperity.” (Wider). 
 
2003 – total number of press releases: 25. 
28 January. Mark Burton, “Minister Farewells Te Mana Crew.” (Domestic). 
29 January. Helen Clark, “President Bush's State of the Union Address.” (Wider). 
11 February. Helen Clark. “Prime Minister's Statement to Parliament.” (Wider). 
6 March. Mark Burton, “NZDF Involvement in Operation Enduring Freedom—An Update.” 
(Domestic). 
12 March. Phil Goff, ““NZ Statement on Iraq to UN Security Council.” (Event). 
13 March. Phil Goff, “Iraq Crisis: NZ's Position.” (Event). 
18 March. Helen Clark. “Statement to Parliament on the Iraq crisis.” (Event). 
20 March. Helen Clark. “Statement to the House on Military Action in Iraq.” (Event). 
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26 March. Phil Goff. “The United Nations: Our Hope for the Future.” (Wider). 
27 March. Phil Goff, “NZ Statement on Iraq to UN Security Council.” (Wider). 
5 May. Mark Burton, “P3 Orion deploys to the Gulf of Oman.” (Domestic). 
12 May. Phil Goff, “New Zealand's Role in the Rebuilding of Iraq.” (Domestic). 
9 June. Helen Clark, “Government Assistance to Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraq.” 
(Domestic). 
27 June. Phil Goff, “The Ethics of Foreign Policy.” (Domestic). 
7 July. Mark Burton, “New Zealand to Lead Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan.” 
(Domestic). 
4 August. Mark Burton, “Minister Welcomes Home Crew of Te Mana.” (Domestic). 
7 August. Phil Goff, “Goff Welcomes Bali Bombing Verdict.” (Domestic). 
11 August. Mark Burton, “NZDF Deployment to Iraq.” (Domestic). 
20 August. Phil Goff, “Goff Condemns Attack on UN in Iraq.” (Event). 
23 August. Phil Goff, “Goff Offers Sympathy to India Bomb Blast Victims.” (Event). 
25 August. Helen Clark, “Prime Minister Farewells Afghanistan Deployment.” (Domestic). 
22 September. Helen Clark, “NZDF to lead Afghan Provincial Reconstruction Team” 
(Domestic).  
27 September. Phil Goff, “NZ Statement to the UN General Debate.” (Event). 
12 October. Phil Goff, “Goff Speech to Bali Bombing Commemoration.” (Domestic). 
21 November. Helen Clark, “PM Condemns Istanbul Bombings.” (Event). 
 
2004 – total number of press releases: 13. 
8 March. Helen Clark, “Further NZ Contribution to Afghanistan, International Campaign 
Against Terrorism.” (Domestic). 
12 March. Phil Goff. “NZ Expresses Sympathy for Madrid Bombing Victims.” (Event). 
9 June. Phil Goff, “NZ Welcomes Security Council Resolution on Iraq.” (Domestic). 
23 June. Helen Clark, “Address to the NZ Institute of International Affairs.” (Domestic). 
5 August. Phil Goff, “NZ Condemns Terrorism, Hostage Taking in Iraq.” (Wider). 
17 August. Phil Goff, “Goff Meets Leaders, NZ Troops, in Afghanistan.” (Domestic). 
9 September. Helen Clark, “Helen Clark Responds to Jakarta Bomb Blast.” (Event). 
11 October. Phil Goff, “NZ to Mark Second Anniversary of Bali Bombing.” (Domestic). 
12 November. Mark Burton, “New Zealand Defence: Playing Our Part as a Responsible World 
Citizen.” (Domestic). 
20 November. Helen Clark, “Address at CEO APEC Summit.” (Wider). 
391 
 
3 December. Phil Goff, “Goff welcomes report on UN reform.” (Domestic). 
3 December. Phil Goff, “Eminent New Zealanders to Attend Inter-Faith Meeting.” (Domestic). 
8 December. Phil Goff, “Regional security threats post 9/11.” (Domestic). 
 
2005 – total number of press releases: 12. 
25 January. Helen Clark, “New Zealand Extends Commitment in Afghanistan.” (Domestic). 
19 April. Phil Goff, “Multilateralism in NZ Foreign Policy.” (Domestic). 
27 May. Phil Goff, “Three Day Visit by Goff to Washington.” (Wider). 
2 June. Mark Burton. “Further New Zealand Contributions to Afghanistan and the International 
Campaign Against Terrorism.” (Domestic). 
27 June. Phil Goff, “Meeting the Challenges of Security and Development.” (Domestic). 
7 July. Helen Clark, “PM Responds to London Blasts.” (Event). 
8 July. Helen Clark, “PM Condemns Attacks on Mosques.” (Event). 
1 August. Phil Goff, “Defence and NZ foreign policy.” (Wider). 
16 September. Phil Goff, “NZ Signs Treaty Against Nuclear Terrorism.” (Domestic). 
2 October. Helen Clark, “PM Condemns Bombings in Bali.” (Event). 
10 November. Phil Goff. “NZ's Role in Peacekeeping and in Afghanistan.” (Domestic). 
22 November. Phil Goff, “SAS Troops Return from Afghanistan.” (Domestic). 
 
2006 – total number of press releases: 14. 
24 January. Winston Peters, “New Zealand and the Asia-Pacific Region: Building Prosperity 
Together.” (Wider). 
1 February. Phil Goff, “Goff Positive about Afghanistan Contribution.” (Wider). 
21 February. Winston Peters, “Foreign Policy: The Next Five Years.” (Domestic). 
22 February. Phil Goff, “Trade, Defence and Disarmament Policy Over the Next Five Years.” 
(Domestic). 
6 March. Phil Goff, “NZ Defence Policy and the Factors That Shape It.” (Wider). 
10 April. Phil Goff, “Military Presense (sic) in Afghanistan Important, says Goff.” (Domestic). 
24 April. Phil Goff, “Different Paths to Common Values.” (Wider). 
24 April. Phil Goff, “Transformation of the New Zealand Defence Forces.” (Wider). 
12 July. Winston Peters, “Peters Condemns Mumbai Bombings.” (Event). 
4 October. Phil Goff, “New Zealand – Our Place in the World and Our Defence Policy.” 
(Domestic). 
17 October. Phil Goff, “Defence Priorities 2007.” (Domestic). 
392 
 
20 November. Winston Peters, “Foreign Policy in a Defence Context.” (Domestic). 
7 December. Phil Goff, “The Nature And Use Of New Zealand Military Force In The Modern 
World.” (Domestic). 
13 December. Winston Peters, “Security Policy Responses to a Challenging World.” (Domestic). 
 
2007 – total number of press releases: 17. 
11 January. Helen Clark, “Situation in Iraq.” (Wider). 
26 February. Winston Peters, “Joint Press Conference with Alexander Downer and Winston 
Peters, New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs – Wellington, New Zealand.” (Wider). 
21 March. Helen Clark, “President Bush Welcomes Prime Minister Clark of New Zealand to the 
White House.” (Wider). 
21 March. Helen Clark, “Old Friends, New Challenges: New Zealand and the United States in 
the Asia-Pacific Century.” (Wider). 
25 April. Phil Goff, “New Zealand Presence Welcomed in Bamyan.” (Domestic). 
12 May. Phil Goff, “Constructive Discussions at Pentagon and National Security Council.” 
(Wider). 
23 May. Phil Goff, “Presentation of the US Presidential Unit Citation.” (Domestic). 
24 May. Helen Clark, “Alliance Of Civilisations symposium – Opening.” (Domestic). 
3 June. Phil Goff, “Security Cooperation in Asia: Managing Alliances and Partnerships.” (Wider). 
2 July. Phil Goff, “NZSAS Gallantry In Afghanistan Recognised.” (Domestic). 
3 July. Phil Goff, “The Role of Defence Forces in Development.” (Domestic). 
4 July. Winston Peters, “NZ Assists Rural Afghanistan.” (Domestic). 
5 July. Winston Peters, “Security Through Development.” (Domestic). 
12 July. Phil Goff, “Meeting Contemporary Security Challenges.” (Domestic). 
30 August. Phil Goff, “Protecting New Zealand’s Borders – the Government’s Approach.” 
(Domestic). 
3 September. Phil Goff, “New Zealand’s Defence Policy.” (Wider). 
11 December. Helen Clark, “NZDF Command No 48 Staff Course.” (Domestic). 
 
2008 – total number of press releases: 8. 
2 April. Phil Goff, “Navy Frigate to Deploy to Persian Gulf.” (Domestic). 
4 April. Phil Goff, “NZ Strengthens Deployment in Afghanistan.” (Domestic). 




9 July. Phil Goff, “Death of New Zealand-Born Soldier.” (Domestic). 
22 August. Phil Goff, “New Zealand and Australian Defence Ministers meet in Wellington.” 
(Wider). 
14 September. Helen Clark, Helen Clark, “PM Condemns Terrorist Bombings in India,” (Event). 
21 September. Helen Clark, “PM Condemns Terrorist Bombing in Pakistan.” (Event). 
30 September. Phil Goff, “NZ Extends Role in UN Peacekeeping Mission in Iraq.” (Domestic). 
 
2009 – total number of press releases: 13. 
24 February. John Key, “Afghanistan PRT Commitment Rolled Over for a Year.” (Domestic). 
25 March. Murray McCully, “McCully to Meet US Secretary of State in Washington.” (Wider). 
25 March. Murray McCully, “Old Friends, New Opportunities.” (Wider). 
1 April. Murray McCully, “New Zealand Statement on Afghanistan.” (Wider). 
25 April. Murray McCully, “McCully Marks Anzac Day in Afghanistan.” (Domestic). 
20 May. Wayne Mapp, “Major Policy Speech: Why a Defence Review?” (Domestic). 
10 June. Wayne Mapp, “Defence Minister Attending ISAF Meeting in Brussels.” (Wider). 
10 August. John Key, “Afghanistan Review Decisions Announced.” (Domestic). 
18 August. Wayne Mapp, “Snap Debate on Afghanistan.” (Domestic). 
2 September. Wayne Mapp, “Speech to the Chief of Army's Conference: ‘Enduring Conflict: 
Challenges and Responses’.” (Domestic). 
4 October. Murray McCully, “Ministers Attend US-NZ Partnership Forum in Washington.’ 
(Wider). 
8 October. Murray McCully, “Remarks With New Zealand Foreign Minister Murray McCully 
After Their Meeting.” (Wider). 
13 October. Wayne Mapp, “Major Policy Speech: Speech to the RNZRSA National Council 
93rd AGM: ‘New Zealand’s Strategic Context and the Defence Review’”. (Domestic). 
 
2010 – total number of press releases: 6. 
2 February. Wayne Mapp, “Defence Minister Attends Istanbul ISAF Meeting.” (Wider). 
14 April. John Key, “Speech Notes to US/NZ Council.” (Wider). 
4 May. John Key, “PM Concludes Visit to Afghanistan.” (Domestic). 
4 August. John Key, “New Zealand Soldier Dies in Afghanistan.” (Domestic). 




24 September. Murray McCully, “NZ Statement to the United Nations General Assembly.” 
(Wider). 
 
2011 – total number of press releases: 17.  
1 February. John Key, “SAS Deployment to be Extended by 12 Months.” (Domestic). 
16 February. John Key, “Reply to Prime Minister Gillard’s address to the House.” (Wider). 
16 February. John Key, “PM Saddened at Afghanistan Death.” (Domestic). 
16 February. Wayne Mapp, “Tragic Death of Soldier in Bamyan Road Accident.” (Domestic). 
21 February. John Key, “NZ US Partnership Forum.” (Wider). 
21 February. Murray McCully, “US-NZ 2011 Partnership Forum.” (Wider). 
12 April. Murray McCully, “McCully to Attend International Talks on Afghanistan and Attend 
ANZAC service in Gallipoli..” (Domestic). 
25 April. Murray McCully, “At the New Zealand Memorial Service, Chunuk Bair Memorial, 
Gallipoli.” (Domestic). 
18 May. Murray McCully, “US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton And New Zealand 
Foreign Minister Murray Stuart McCully.” (Wider). 
14 July. John Key, “PM Condemns Mumbai Bombings.” (Event).  
20 June. John Key, “Address to Australian Parliament.” (Wider). 
22 July. John Key, “Speech to United States Chamber of Commerce in Washington DC.” 
(Wider). 
20 August. John Key, “Government Saddened by SAS Soldier’s Death.” (Domestic). 
22 August. Wayne Mapp, “Condolences to Family of Corporal Doug Grant.” (Domestic). 
11 September. John Key, “PM Marks 10th Anniversary of Terrorist Attacks.” (Wider). 
28 September. John Key, “PM Expresses Condolences After Loss of SAS soldier.” (Domestic). 





APPENDIX TWO  
In this appendix the coding manuals for the deliberative and reactive narratives can be found. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Framing tasks: The discourse is divided up into five ‘framing tasks’. These are different 
functional components of rhetoric that seek to outline problems, identify actors, attribute blame, 
propose solutions and justify these solutions. Each will be explained individually below, but first 
it needs to be made clear that these are not always mutually exclusive; in some cases, a single 
word or phrase can have two or more functions in discourse. This will be made clear in the 
coding form below.  
  
To be considered as ‘present’ a framing task needs to only be used a single time in a press 
release. Any term or list of terms that are marked as ‘manifest’ means that these exact term or 
phrase must be used, though to be clear this includes all possible plurals, spellings and lexemes 
of that term. For example, the term ‘civilisation’ can be represented as ‘civilisations’, 
‘civilization’ and ‘civilised’. The term ‘latent’ refers to identifications that are not exact terms 
or phrases, but rather have the same or similar subject matter expressed using different terms 
and phrases. These latent units will be explained and two examples provided to offer the 
parameters of these units.  
 
DELIBERATIVE CODING MANUAL 
 
Five qualities of the Deliberative Narrative: 
Literal: The deliberative uses literal language, such as ‘terrorism is a strategy generally used by 
weak actors’. 
Nuanced: The deliberative uses nuanced language, such as ‘while New Zealand faces no direct 
threat, our globalised world means that New Zealanders are threatened directly and indirectly’. 
Constricted: The deliberative constricts the situation, providing a measured outline, such as ‘the 
threat posed by a narrow group of extremists’.  
Restrained: The deliberative is restrained and does not evoke strong emotions, such as “the 
root causes of terrorism are injustice, inequality and ethnic tension’. 
Inclusive: The deliberative will include the insurgent support population, either implicitly (by 
not specifically excluding them) or explicitly. Implicitly inclusive can be references to a 
“humanitarian” solution, while inclusive is exemplified by statements like “we must work with 
Afghanis to create a stable country for them’. 
 
 
Problem/Enemy – This section is focused on both the counterinsurgent’s diagnoses of the threat and 
descriptions of the enemy. Threat diagnoses do not need to refer specifically to ‘terrorism’ but can 
must connect to the 9/11 and/or post 9/11 world. Enemy identifications do not have to refer to 
‘terrorists’ specifically but can include characteristics ascribed to ‘terrorism’ that are human qualities.  
 Referred to the problem using the manifest terms ‘terrorism’, ‘insurgency’, ‘terrorist attack/s’, ‘act of 
terrorism’, ‘act/s’ and ‘event/s’. 
 Identified the enemy using the manifest terms ‘terrorist/s’, ‘insurgent/s’, ‘perpetrator/s’, ‘al Qaeda’, 
‘bin Laden’ and ‘Taleban’. 
 Described the scope of the threat either using manifest the terms ‘asymmetric’ or ‘non-state’. 
 Stated there is ‘no increased threat’ to New Zealand after 9/11 (latent). Examples: ‘there is no 
evidence of any threat to New Zealand’; ‘Our strength is in one sense our geographic location; we 
have no direct threat to our sovereignty or conflicts with our neighbours.’  
 Described the scope of the threat using the manifest terms ‘international terrorism’/global 
terrorism’/trans-national terrorism’.  
 Described the scope of the threat as ‘globalised’ (latent). Terrorism described as having global impacts 
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or effecting global security but does not state that terrorism is a threat to the whole world/globe. 
Examples, ‘Terrorism poses a threat not only to the security of nation states, but also has serious 
ramifications for global security and economic stability’; ‘launching attacks on innocent civilian 
populations around the world’. 
 Referred to the scope of the enemy using manifest terms ‘group’, ‘organisation’ or ‘network’, can 
include the manifest terms ‘terrorist’ as well as manifest size referents ‘narrow, ‘small’, ‘international’, 
‘global’ or ‘trans-national’. 
 Used the manifest terms ‘violence’ or ‘murder’ to refer to terrorist attacks or terrorism in general. 
 Connected ‘terrorism/terrorists’ with other issues (latent). Only needs to mention one other issue and 
does not have to specifically state they are connected but just list them together. Examples of issues 
are: crime, global warming, infectious diseases, drug trafficking, refugees, environmental degradation, 
and humanitarian disasters and WMDs. 
 Referred to the security environment either manifest term ‘complex’ or latent unit of ‘changed’. 
‘Changed’ refers to changing period of international relations, using phrases like ‘post-Cold War’ or 
‘post 11 September’ or reference to ‘new security challenges’ 
 
 
Blame/Ideology – This section looks at both the blame attributions the counterinsurgent gives for 
‘terrorism’ as well as any references to the ‘terrorist’s’ ideology. Often the blame/ideology components 
are also problem diagnoses and enemy identifications.  
 Referred to any grievances that motivate terrorists using the manifest terms: ‘poverty’, ‘lack of/poor 
governance’, ‘ethnic’, ‘inequality’, ‘corruption’, ‘repression’ and ‘injustice’.  
 Referred to ‘rational’ negative emotions using manifest terms ‘hopelessness’, ‘exclusion’, ‘bitterness’, 
‘alienation’, ‘alienated’. 
 Used any of the manifest terms: ‘extremist/s’, ‘extremism’, ‘fanatical’, ‘fanaticism’, ‘radical/s’, ‘zealot/s’ 
and ‘Islamic fundamentalist/s’. 
 Connected terrorism with manifest terms ‘failed’, ‘failure’, ‘weak’, ‘fragile’ states, any negative issues of 
‘governance’. And/or refers to ‘failed states’ as a ‘haven’ for terrorism. 
 Blamed terrorism on ‘Israel-Palestine’ conflict (latent), this must refer to both actors, their conflict and 
its influence on terrorism or international security in general. Example: ‘failure to resolve differences 
between Israeli and Palestinian people in the Middle East continues to be a catalyst for recruitment 
into terrorism’’. 
 
Actor/Victim – This section examines how the counterinsurgent describes themselves, their allies and 
the victims of terrorism. 
 Used the manifest terms ‘international community’, ‘coalition’, ‘broad/est coaltion’, ‘unified coalition’, 
‘global coalition’, ‘international force/s’ or ‘multinational force/s’ to refer to New Zealand or allies. 
 Referred to New Zealand’s ‘values’ or ‘interests’ using those manifest terms.  
 Said New Zealand was either ‘sovereign’ or ‘independent’ using those manifest terms.  
 Referred to New Zealand being a ‘multilateralist’ or ‘internationalist’ (latent) that prefers to work 
collectively/multilaterally and has respect for ‘international law’. Examples: ‘New Zealand has 
consistently been internationalist in its outlook and ready to contribute to international security’; ‘We 
place emphasis on multilateral institutions’. 
 Referred to New Zealand as a ‘good international citizen’ or a ‘principled actor’ (latent). Examples: 
‘We aim in practical ways to advance human rights, good governance, democracy and the rule of law’; 
‘ours is a principled position’. 
  Explained how its ‘size dictates foreign policy’ by referring to New Zealand’s size or remoteness and 
making a connection with foreign policy. Example: ‘New Zealanders appreciate that as a small nation 
we have a strong vested interest in the international rule of law’; ‘Despite our isolation geographically, 
we have never been isolationist in our foreign and defence policies’. 
 Refers to US and/or Australia using terms ‘close ties’, ‘friends’, ‘friendship’, ‘relationship’, 
‘cooperation’, ‘bilateral’, ‘shared values’, while other examples included descriptions of a ‘shared 
history’, particularly past military actions. Example: ‘The United States... Our views diverge in a 
number of areas but we co operate closely in most’; ‘Relations with the US are important. Our links 
are broad-ranging’. 
 Referred to the ‘UN’ as an actor, using manifest units: ‘UN’, ‘United Nations’, or ‘Security Council’. 
 Made either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ statements about UN (latent). Examples: ‘It is the United Nations 
acting collectively which will win the wars against terrorism ‘; ‘The UN has of course failed on many 
occasions to resolve issues’. 
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 Referred to its own forces using manifest terms ‘personnel’, ‘soldier/s’, ‘troop/s’ or ‘peacekeeper/s’ 
 Made ‘positive statements’ about own personnel (latent). Examples; ‘reputation for excellence’ or 
‘world-class personnel’.  
 Referred to people killed or injured by terrorism using manifest terms ‘victim/s’, ‘civilian/s’, as ‘New 
Zealander/s’ 
 Referred to ‘expanded victims’ (latent) by either referring to the ‘nationalities’ or the ‘number’ of the 
victims. Examples: ‘Those who died came from 79 different countries, were of mixed age, gender, 
religion and ethnicity’; ‘The more than 6000 lives lost’.  
 
Strategy/Solution – This section is interested in both the strategies the counterinsurgent proposes to 
solve the problem and the outcomes and objectives they aim to achieve.  
 Referred to ‘collective’ or ‘multilateral’ solutions (latent). Can be either under UN aegis or just 
collective of states, includes using phrases like ‘work together’ or referring to ‘mandate/s’ or 
‘resolution/s’. 
 Referred to solutions using manifest units ‘democracy’ or ‘governance’.  
 Referred to solutions using manifest units ‘secure/security’, ‘stable/stability’ or ‘peace’. 
 Referred to solutions using manifest units ‘reconstruction’, ‘development’, ‘humanitarian’ assistance or 
‘human rights’. 
 Referred to solutions using manifest unit ‘diplomacy’, ‘dialogue’ ‘discuss’, ‘discussion’ or ‘tolerance’. 
 Referred to solutions using manifest unit ‘multifaceted’. 
 Referred to solutions using mixture of at least one from each category of manifest units 
‘secure/security’, ‘stable/stability’ or ‘peace’ AND ‘reconstruction’, ‘development’, ‘humanitarian’ 
assistance or ‘human rights’. 
 Referred to solutions using manifest units ‘war’, ‘conflict’, ‘fight’, ‘military/ action’, ‘intervention’, 
‘peacekeeping’ or ‘mentoring’. 
 Referred to a solution that explicitly ‘includes’ the insurgent population (latent). This can include any 
references to specific nationalities, such as ‘Afghanis’ or even just state they are ‘working for’ a 
population. Examples: ‘work with the Afghan people to create an effective and democratic form of 




REACTIVE CODING MANUAL 
 
Five qualities of the Reactive Narrative: 
Figurative: The reactive uses figurative/metaphoric language, such as ‘plague of terrorism’. 
Absolute/Binary: The reactive uses absolute and binary language, such as ‘all of civilisation’ or 
‘good vs. evil’. 
Hyperbolic: The reactive exaggerates or understates the situation, usually exaggerating the 
threat and understating complexity of solution, such as ‘terrorism is the greatest threat to the 
world’, or ‘hunt down the enemy’.  
Emotive: The reactive will use emotive language that has the potential to anger the insurgent 
support audience, such as ‘evil people’, ‘agendas of hatred’.  
Exclusive: The reactive will not include the insurgent support population but rather will alienate 
them. Exclusivity is generally the result of the other four qualities – ‘good vs. evil’, ‘agendas of 




Problem/Enemy – This section is focused on both the counterinsurgent’s diagnoses of the threat and 
descriptions of the enemy. Threat diagnoses do not need to refer specifically to ‘terrorism’ but must 
connect to 9/11 and/or post 9/11 world. Enemy identifications do not have to refer to ‘terrorists’ 
specifically but can include characteristics ascribed to ‘terrorism’ that are human qualities.  
 Identified the attacks/threat from terrorism using manifest terms ‘‘humanity’, ‘civilisation’, ‘civilised 
nations’, ‘civilised societies’ and ‘civilised people’.  
 Terrorism described as an irrational tactic or strategy using manifest terms ‘incomprehensible’, 
‘irrational’, ‘indiscriminate’, ‘pointless’, ‘senseless’, that it ‘can strike any place at any time’, that ‘‘distance 
is no guarantee of protection’ and that ‘no one is immune from the threat’; ‘Terrorism knows no global 
boundaries’ and ‘distance is no guarantee of protection’. 
 Uses the term ‘terrorism’ when an enemy referent should be used (latent). Ascribes qualities that would 
be more accurately applied to a human enemy rather than a tactic. Examples: ‘terrorism is a common 
enemy’; ‘terrorism is still a very real threat’; ‘scourge of terrorism’; ‘combat terrorism’.  
 Terrorism described as the most serious threat using manifest terms ‘primary’, ‘principal’, ‘the most 
serious’, ‘the greatest’ threat.  
 Referred to terrorism as a ‘global threat’ (latent). Must state terrorism threatens world/globe or that 
terrorism is global. Examples: ‘the threat that terrorism poses to ourselves and to the world’; ‘global 
terrorism’. 
 Described either terrorism or terrorists using the manifest terms ‘evil/s’, ‘barbaric’, ‘brutal/ity’, ‘cold 
blood/ed’, ‘scourge’, ‘plague/d’, ‘symptom’, ‘cowardly’ and ‘cowardice’. 
 Used the manifest term ‘terror’ instead of terrorism, including in formulations like ‘act of terror’ or ‘war 
on terror’.  
 Used the manifest terms ‘new era’, ‘new generation’, ‘next wave’ or that ‘the world changed on 
September 11, 2001’ to refer to terrorism.  
 Refers to the enemy in a binary/absolute manner. Most extreme version uses the ‘share their fate’ 
statement (latent), less extreme refers to ‘al Qaeda and Taleban’ without distinction. Examples: ‘Violence 
from Taleban and al Qaeda insurgents’; ‘Al Qaeda and Taliban forces’. 
 
Blame/Ideology – This section looks at both the blame attributions the counterinsurgent gives for 
‘terrorism’ as well as any references to the ‘terrorist’s’ ideology. Often the blame/ideology components 
are also problem diagnoses and enemy identifications.  
 Describes terrorists as irrational. Includes any reference to terrorism as an irrational tactic/strategy – 
that is manifest terms ‘incomprehensible’, ‘irrational’, ‘indiscriminate’, ‘pointless’, ‘senseless’, that it ‘can 
strike any place at any time’, that ‘‘distance is no guarantee of protection’ and that ‘no one is immune 
from the threat’; ‘Terrorism knows no global boundaries and distance is no guarantee of protection’ OR 
any use of alienating problem/enemy manifest terms ‘evil/s’, ‘barbaric’, ‘brutal/ity’, ‘cold blood/ed’, 
‘scourge’, ‘plague/d’, ‘symptom’, OR manifest terms ‘agendas of hate’, or terrorists ‘no bottom line’. 
 Statements that terrorists are ‘not Muslims’ or that they have ‘blasphemed their faith’ (latent). Examples:’ 
terrorists have ‘hijacked their faith’, ‘they discredit the cause they claim to represent’. 
 
Actor/Victim – This section examines how the counterinsurgent describes themselves, their allies and 
the victims of terrorism. 
 Used the manifest terms ‘civilised’, ‘humanity’, ‘democratic’, ‘peaceful’ or ‘decent’. With regard to 
‘democratic’, the identification must specify that’ all the allied actors are democratic’. Examples: 
“working with other countries who like us value freedom and democracy”. 
 Uses alienating terms to refer to victims of terrorism using manifest terms ‘innocent’ or ‘good’. 
 
Strategy/Solution – This section is interested in both the strategies the counterinsurgent proposes to 
solve the problem and the outcomes and objectives they aim to achieve.  
 Solutions that use the ‘terrorism as enemy stand-in formulation’ and propose to use military means 
against the abstract noun, specifically manifest terms: ‘war against terrorism’, ‘campaign against 
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terrorism’, ‘fight against terrorism’, ‘fight/ing terrorism,’ ‘defeat/ing terrorism’, ‘eradicate terrorism’, 
‘combat/ing terrorism’ and ‘fight the scourge of terrorism’. 
 Solutions that use the manifest term ‘justice’ and either refer to the need to ‘bring’ the enemy to ‘justice’ 
or for the enemy to be ‘brought to justice’. 
 Manifest solutions that state that there must be ‘no tolerance’ of terrorism or terrorists. 
 Solutions that use alienating phrases, specifically manifest terms ‘root out’ and ‘hunted down’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
